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

YUGOSLAVIA

TITO & AFTER

Milovan Djilas
Desimir Tochitch
Nora Beloff
Stevan K. Pavlowitch
Aleksa Djilas
Elez Biberaj
Oskar Gruenwald
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Titoism Without Tito

Desimir Tochitch

THE last four decades of Yugoslav development do not bear out the well-known aphorism: " The past may constantly change but the future is quite certain." The Yugoslav past, particularly the war period which involved the Partisans, is continually revised both in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. At the same time the future of the Yugoslav union remains quite uncertain. By this I do not mean, as do many zealous Western journalists and researchers sympathetic to the present regime, that Yugoslavia will disintegrate as a result of mounting and diverse internal problems. I believe that since the death of Josip Broz Tito in the spring of 1980, there has been no arbiter able to impose a solution to the country's problems.

The first shock to the Yugoslav regime, and to public opinion both inside and outside Yugoslavia, came approximately a year after Tito's death. The parroted claim that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had finally resolved the national question has once again shown itself to be no more than an empty slogan. For the first time in its history, on 17 April 1981 the Yugoslav regime had to admit that the conflict in the Kosovo region between Albanian demonstrators and the forces of public order had resulted in deaths on both sides. The conflict between the local authorities, all Albanians and members of the League of Communists, and the movement in support of the Kosovo region becoming a fully-fledged republic inside Yugoslavia and then later, or even simultaneously, being annexed to Albania, has gone on for the past three years and will not cease. The conflict is both complex and protracted. During the Partisan war, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia proclaimed that the region of Kosovo would join Albania. Over the five centuries of Turkish rule, the Serbs had been pressured to move out of the area (which is historically Serbian) both by the Ottoman occupiers and by the Albanians.

What adds interest here is the political phenomenon—that the present Albanian irredentist movement goes under the banner and programme of Marxism–Leninism, and is led by the young, all of whom were educated under the Yugoslav system.[1] The Yugoslav regime, which itself functions according to the principles of Marxism–Leninism, is forced to persecute many illegal Marxist–Leninist organizations, branding them as

[1] According to the latest statistical data Kosovo has 1,584,441 inhabitants of which Albanians make up 1,226,736. In the social sector (nationalized) only 182,703 persons were employed, the number of unemployed was 71,571, in agricultural work 640,629 were employed, but at the same time Kosovo had 84,091 pupils in secondary schools in 1980/81 and 40,371 students in establishments of higher education (*Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1982*, pp. 437, 438, 445, 450 and 578). The *Financial Times* of 21 May 1981 points out that 52 per cent of the Albanian population in Kosovo consists of young people. *Borba* (Belgrade) of 5 July 1981 reports that in all Yugoslavia there is 1 university student for 12·2 employed, but in Kosovo this ratio is 2·7:1.

" counter-revolutionary."[2] Trials are held in secret and the number of (mainly young) persons sentenced is higher than at any time since socialist Yugoslavia was set up in 1945–46. So secret are the trials that almost no information about them has been revealed in the government press, contrary to the practice concerning political trials of the past four decades.[3]

Hardly had public opinion inside and outside Yugoslavia become inured to news of these protracted conflicts when a second shock came last summer (1983). This was an economic and financial problem of a magnitude not experienced in Yugoslavia since 1948, the time of the break with Moscow, when East European countries cancelled numerous agreements with Yugoslavia and the USSR withdrew its credit commitments. The present acute crisis brought the Yugoslav parliament into a secret session lasting two days and two nights (2 and 3 July 1983). To avoid imminent bankruptcy, the Yugoslav government had to swallow for the first time in its history terms from its Western creditors that were barely acceptable and that were very severe. Though, perhaps, not so severe for relations between creditors and the most indebted country in Europe, the terms nonetheless damaged the Yugoslav system and its self-confidence.

Yugoslavia is, however, burdened by mounting difficulties in other spheres. Criticisms and demands for change are voiced more stridently inside the ruling Party. These is also the small but increasingly vocal democratic opposition, mainly among Serbs and Croats, arising chiefly from former Party members and Marxist intellectuals. Many initiatives for changing the constitution, the criminal code and criminal procedure, have reached the public ear.[4] Not only the older generation, but the present generation of the regime's historians has, with increasing courage since Tito's death, begun to revise its investigations and conclusions concerning the past, before and after 1941–45, a subject that was hitherto treated strictly in accordance with Marxist–Leninist theory. The Partisan past has begun to be demystified and demythologized.

The time has come for probing questions to be asked and for Yugoslavia's past and present to be evaluated seriously, more fundamentally and impartially than has hitherto been done by researchers committed to the regime and by easily impressionable Western journal-

[2] It is interesting to note the names of the illegal Albanian groups uncovered by the Yugoslav authorities: Marxist–Leninist Party, Communist Organization for Unification of Albanian Territories, People's Liberation Movement of Kosovo, the Movement of National Liberation of Kosovo, Marxist–Leninists of Kosovo, Communist Party of Marxist–Leninist Albanians in Yugoslavia. *The Institute for the Study of Conflict*, No. 137/138, in 1982 published " The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views " by Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, with an Introduction by Professor Hugh Seton-Watson.

[3] *Amnesty International Report 1983*, London, states that in 1981 of 594 accused in Yugoslavia for " political crimes " 386 were Albanians, and during the first half of 1982 of 268 accused, 150 were Albanians, representing an increase of 84 per cent compared with the first half of 1981.

[4] *Review*, published by The Study Centre for Jugoslav Affairs, No. 5, Volume II, 1983, made public 14 such political initiatives which were not printed anywhere in Yugoslavia. It is useful to consult the article by Aleksa Djilas, " Dissent and Human Rights in Post-Tito Jugoslavia " (*Review* No. 5, Volume II, 1983.)

ists. Is Yugoslavia an artificial creation? Will it disintegrate? How can the Yugoslav regime acquire a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and of observers abroad in the light of documents that have already been made public? Why has the Yugoslav system, in spite of its new-fangled decentralization and liberalization, remained petrified in a one-party dictatorship? If the country reached its present state already in the summer of 1983, whatever happened to the enormous military and financial aid from the West? What is Titoism, and does it (or did it ever) exist? If it did, how can it survive without Tito? Is there any justification for (or likelihood of) the perpetration of the policy according to which, from 1943 to the present day, the Western powers, and in particular the United Kingdom, assisted Yugoslavia both as a union of several nations and as a state based on Marxist–Leninist principles, such aid being not only " unconditional " but upheld by extraordinary moral and political support?

THE Yugoslav regime, founded in March 1945 (its members in fact drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), has not until now had any difficulties with regard to the legitimacy of its revolution and its rule. No other communist party, either in Western or Eastern Europe, formed its own army during the war and occupation and from the outset embarked on its revolution and civil war against all indigenous forces that were not pro-German.[5]

During Tito's life the Yugoslav regime did not have to face the problem of its legitimacy. Towards the end of the Second World War it was supported by the Allied coalition. After its conflict with Moscow it was supported by the entire West. It was even tolerated by the USSR after Tito's first meetings with Khrushchev in 1955. Finally, it placed itself in the vanguard of the non-aligned movement from the beginning.

But after Tito's death the problem of legitimacy did arise; the question was opened up by Yugoslav historians and sociologists. Naturally, it caused a violent reaction on the part of the Party and state apparatus.

The personal role of Tito has not yet been questioned by these experts. The question of how Tito came to occupy the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1937, the very year when the entire leadership of the Yugoslav Party perished in Stalin's purges, has not yet been publicly posed. But, even now, it is being revealed that the Yugoslav Communist Party went into battle against the occupier only on the urging of the Comintern, i.e. upon Stalin's request for action against the Nazis when Russia was invaded at the end of June 1941.

Two other important matters, suppressed for decades not only by the Yugoslav regime but also by Western historiographers, have finally come

[5] Although it may appear cynical, it could be said that social revolution in Yugoslavia was started by Adolf Hitler, who occupied Yugoslavia in April 1941 and then divided it into nine occupational zones. This process broke up the whole administrative apparatus, provoking conflicts among many ethnic groups. The Serbs and Slovenes were placed under special occupational regimes.

to light in Yugoslavia. First, Tito admitted in public a few years ago that the Partisan fight under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had in fact been a civil war against the resistance movement led by Draza Mihailovic. This admission produced scarcely any reaction abroad, but it was greeted by many former Partisans with cynical satisfaction. " We knew all the time that our war had been not only a war of liberation, and that in the first place it was a fight against Mihailovic, but we managed to conceal this from the West."[6] Of course, the Western Allies, both at government level and in the military services, had people who were very well aware of this but the matter was kept from the public presumably for special foreign policy reasons. The second revelation, that there had been negotiations between representatives of the Partisan movement and the Germans in the spring of 1943,[7] wounded the veterans of Tito's Partisan movement deeply and astonished the new generation.

Professor Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's personal biographer, though an admirer of his to this day, nevertheless criticized Tito in his book *Further Contributions Towards a Biography of Josip Broz Tito*. Dedijer considers that Tito committed three great errors during the war: 1) founding in 1941, in Uzice, on territory liberated from the Axis, the so-called Uzice Republic, which was meant to be a real Bolshevik enterprise, ruthlessly carrying out the " liquidation of people's enemies "; 2) holding talks with the Germans during the war, and not merely with local military representatives but with the highest-ranking officials of the German Reich; 3) the mass liquidation not only of opponents of the Partisan movement, but also of its own members.

Dedijer's criticism, reported by *The Economist* (London),[8] clearly opens the question of the legitimacy of the Partisan movement based on its fraudulent claim to have been an overall movement of the people for the purpose of liberation from the Axis, and indicates clearly its cynical communist party character.

While the crucial role of the Soviet army (a) during the liberation of Yugoslavia at the end of 1944; and (b) when the new Partisan government was being installed under the complete domination of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, goes on being ignored not only by official circles in Yugoslavia but also by Western historians, there has never been any public mention in the Soviet Union of the extremely delicate matter of relations between these two communist parties.

NEW revelations about unanswerable questions of the regime's legitimacy came from an unanticipated source. Two young socio-

[6] The statement in the Belgrade *Borba* on 24 May 1972: " This was therefore a civil war. But we did not want to speak about it during the war, because it was of no use to us. Even Stalin suspected whether we actually wanted to make an agreement [with the Chetniks—*DT*] or not, that is to say whether we were manoeuvring. At that time Stalin wanted us to make an agreement with the Chetniks . . ."

[7] On the subject of the negotiations between the Germans and Tito's Partisans the following books have been published: Walter Hagen, *Die Geheime Front* (Linz und Wien, 1950): Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies 1941–1945* (New Brunswick, 1973): and Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (London, 1977).

[8] *The Economist*, 13–19 February 1982.

logists asked how, contrary to the promises not to introduce a one-party system and communism, made publicly at home and abroad, the Communist Party managed to achieve both.[9] The questions that Dr Cavoski and Dr Kostunica raised in their book, which was banned soon after publication, went to the heart of the matter. Of course, beyond legitimacy as a matter of law there lies the issue of *political* legitimacy, which is the result of the interplay of many and diverse forces that exert their effect on any given society at any given time. In the case of Yugoslavia after the expulsion of her Communist Party from the Cominform and the Yugoslav defiance of Stalin, the regime nonetheless received *political* approbation from even the Soviet Union, following Khrushchev's withdrawal of the Soviet anathema and the harsh words that had been hurled at the Yugoslav leadership in 1948–55. Tito himself also achieved a sort of recognition. The various, to a greater or lesser degree intimate, personal contacts made in the glare of publicity with the Shah of Iran, with Haile Selassie, with the Soviet leadership, with Nehru, President Nixon and the Queen of England, helped to bestow on Tito a form of personal and internationally accepted legitimacy.[10]

What gave support to the Yugoslav regime's claim to some authority was that, setting aside the ample assistance that it received from the West and East in order to get itself established, from the first it was and remains to this day unique in Eastern Europe. It does not owe its existence solely to the Soviet army.

In time the problem of the regime's legitimacy after Tito's death is bound to become a political problem for the Yugoslav people. Recently, the best known opposition Marxist, Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, said: "Since they secretly admit that their rule is usurpatory rather than legitimate, today's power wielders feel insecure and are often moved to sound alarm bells warning against real and imaginary enemies."[11]

ALTHOUGH in terms of legitimacy the present regime in Yugoslavia may enjoy an advantage over other East European regimes, the issue of the establishment and survival of the Yugoslav union as such has now been exposed to public scrutiny. In spite of the propaganda which has prevailed over the past 40 years—that by means of his post-war revolution Tito solved the national question and created an ideal union of many peoples and several "religions"—the same experts and journalists who accepted this propaganda have now begun to doubt that the Yugoslav

[9] Vojislav Kostunica and Kosta Cavoski, "Stranacki pluralizam ili monizam" (Party pluralism or monism), Belgrade, 1983.

[10] After the visit of Princess Margaret to Yugoslavia in June 1970 and her unorthodox comment, for a member of the British Royal family, praising Yugoslav socialism (*The Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1970), the leader of the opposition of that time, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, declared that the Yugoslav experiment "was a great deal better than anything she had seen in five communist countries and the idea that enterprises must compete was in her opinion better than nationalization and state ownership which created monopolies like those in Great Britain" (*The Times*, 7 December 1977). On the same date, *The Guardian* quotes Mrs Thatcher as saying: "As I told Yugoslav leaders, there is more nationalization in Britain than there is here . . ."

[11] *Theoria*, journal of the Philosophical Society of Serbia, No. 3/4, Belgrade, 1982.

union can survive. They are even asking whether it should ever have come into existence. Was it not just an artificial creation of the Western powers after the First World War?

The nations of Yugoslavia are young in terms of having a full national consciousness and their numbers are small. Apart from the Serbs and Croats, who can boast a long and sustained history, the other component nations are only now creating their separate identities although they have had their indigenous cultures for some time. The Serbs, together with the Montenegrins, hardly amount to 9 million; there are 4·5 million Croats, 2 million Bosnian Moslems, less than 2 million Slovenes and less than 1·5 million Macedonians. The non-Yugoslav national minorities worth mentioning consist of 1,738,878 Albanians and 426,867 Hungarians. But, at the 1981 census, only 5·4 per cent of the population declared themselves to be " Yugoslav," i.e. 1,219,024 out of 22·5 million,[12] and this is the greatest number of " Yugoslavs " so far recorded.

The apparent multi-nationality of the Yugoslav union should not confound anyone. Seventy-three per cent of the population use the Serbo-Croat language. The two other languages, Macedonian and Slovene, are of course also South Slav languages closely related to Serbo-Croat, and are spoken by 13 per cent of the population. A vast majority (86 per cent) of the Yugoslav population is therefore unquestionably South Slav.

Admittedly these nations, whether " historically " recognized or still in the process of crystallization, did develop separately and sometimes in friction. But neither in the Middle Ages nor in modern times have there ever been nation-against-nation conflicts, a myth popular among more superficial Western journalists. Strife did occur, and for the first time during the Second World War, but even then the nations as an entity were not involved. The conflicts took place under Axis occupation in the territory of the so-called Independent State of Croatia established by the Germans and Italians. To a shallow observer it might have seemed that the warfare of the Chetniks and Partisans against forces of the Axis-created Croatian puppet-state were in reality conflicts between Serbs and Croats. Two facts contradict this simplistic analysis. The majority of the Serbian population simply did not live in this puppet-state but in Serbia itself. The puppet Croatian state had to do battle not only with the predominantly Serbian Chetniks and Partisans, but with Croatian communists and liberals, and also to a great degree with all Croats from Dalmatia.

To return to the historical dimension of the Yugoslav peoples: only two nations, the Serbs and the Croats, can lay claim to one. The Croats lost their early but independently established state in the twelfth century and were doomed to live first together with the Hungarian crown and then, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, under the rule of the Habsburgs. But the Croats, more intensely than any other Yugoslav

[12] *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1982* (Belgrade), p. 437.

nation, preserved their tradition of established statehood without a break. The Serbs lost their mediaeval independent state at the end of the fourteenth century, but by the end of the eighteenth century they had begun to organize an independent state in Montenegro. In 1804, by way of a peasant insurrection against the Turkish empire, the Serbs in Serbia formed the first Balkan state. These two Serbian states continued to exist until 1918, when the Yugoslav union came into being. The Yugoslav union was not just " created " at Versailles in 1919 as some ill-informed Western pundits believe, but in December 1918, as a consequence of a number of factors present: the victorious Serbian army, the Allied Entente, the simultaneous and forceful Yugoslav revolutionary movement among the Croatian intelligentsia, and a similar movement among the Serbs living under the Austro-Hungarian empire. Together they formed a movement for South Slav unity that had been born early in the nineteenth century.

Problems arose immediately after the creation of the union of the South Slavs in December 1918, and they have survived in varying guises to this day, 66 years on. They are in fact problems of internal arrangements and do not call into question the existence of the union itself. The strong mass movement between the two world wars, led by the Croatian Peasant Party of the brothers Ante Radic (1868–1919) and Stjepan Radic (1871–1921) and of Vladko Macek (1879–1964), and which probably comprised 90 per cent of the Croatian nation, never declared itself against the Yugoslav union. The same attitude was also manifested in the powerful mass movement of Croats under the present communist regime, known as the " Croatian Spring " of 1966–1971, under Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic Kucar.

Whatever claims to a form of autonomous statehood may now be aired by the other peoples of Yugoslavia, they were either artificially created after the Second World War (the Macedonians) or were sponsored by the communist regime itself (the Slovenes and Bosnian Moslems) to balance the impact of " the greater nations "—the Serbs and Croats. Even so, there are no claims by the Slovenes, Bosnian Moslems or Macedonians for secession from, or in favour of a break up of, the union of South Slavs.

THE history of the Yugoslav communist regime must be divided into several phases. The first covers the years from 1945 to 1948, when, in their ideological dogmatism, Yugoslav communists believed that they were not only building socialism in Yugoslavia but that they were also carrying the flag of socialism not only to Eastern, but also to Western Europe. At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in 1947, Yugoslav communists, presumptuous as they were, reproached the French communists for not having dealt with de Gaulle as they had with Mihailovic and his movement.[13] As principal Soviet canvassers at the time, Yugoslav representatives circulated in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

[13] " Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939–1973," ed. by Stephen Clissold, (London, 1975), p. 49.

A new phase began in June 1948 when the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform. Blunders and miscalculations abounded; the most important had been committed previously by Tito himself. In order to show the Soviets the orthodoxy and " true faith " of the Yugoslav communists, the Yugoslav leadership inaugurated the collectivization of land in 1949—that is only after their expulsion from the Cominform.[14] During these years non-communist elements though small in number and utterly servile, were purged from the higher echelons of the state apparatus.[15] The urban economy was nationalized.[16]

In foreign affairs Yugoslavia embarked, in February 1953, on a Balkan pact with Greece and Turkey, though this proved to be short-lived. Yugoslavia began to receive economic and military aid from the West. American aid amounted to more than the total aid which the South American dictatorships were receiving from the USA.[17] At home the Yugoslav regime instituted internal changes that were at first only indications of what was later established in practice. The Sixth Communist Congress in 1952 was marked by Milovan Djilas invoking Leninism against Stalin. In the same year the Writers' Congress in Ljubljana declared an end to " Socialist Realism " which had in fact been a glorification and idealization of Stalin and his ways. The new path was followed towards the end of 1953 by Djilas, who published his views on the need to change the Party structure. He began questioning Marxism itself and even hinted at the " withering away " of the Party. Djilas had become convinced that socialism had finally won in Yugoslavia. It was time, he thought, for the final act of democratization of the country through the leadership of the Communist Party and, of course, at the same time of democratization of the Party.[18]

These of Djilas' visions were not shared by Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. They obviously did not believe that socialism had yet been so successful that it could afford democracy in the Party, let alone in the country as a whole.[19] Moreover, they hoped to renew negotiations with the Soviets (this was in fact soon to happen). Djilas was therefore expelled from the Party leadership and divested of all his state functions. The only man who had entered into the spirit of genuine evolution after 1948 had to be

[14] Fundamental Law on Cooperatives, 1949, on the formation of " peasant work co-operatives " (Yugoslav model of kolkhozes), published in *Sluzbene novine*, 9 June 1949.

[15] Cf. "Basis of Tito's Regime" (Dr V. Stoyanovitch) in *Yugoslav Bulletin*, May–June 1952 (Paris), Volume I, No. 1.

[16] The first law on nationalization was published in 1946 and then supplemented in 1948, by which the complete nationalization of non-rural economy was achieved.

[17] *Time*, 29 March 1963, published the data of the total economic and military aid to European states from 1945 to 1962. Yugoslavia received for that period 2,396·9 million dollars from the USA while Great Britain received 8,713·2, and France 9,438·0 million dollars. The American magazine *US News & World Report* (as quoted by *Voice of Canadian Serbs* of 21 November 1961) published a list of non-aligned nations which received aid from the United States: from a total sum of 6,051 million dollars, Yugoslavia came top of the list with 2,081 million for the period 1945–60. After Yugoslavia came India with 1,906, Indonesia with 479 million dollars. The total military aid for the non-aligned nations was 913 million dollars of which Yugoslavia received 719 million, i.e. three times more than all other non-aligned countries.

[18] Milovan Djilas in *Borba* from 11 October to 29 December 1953.

[19] Milovan Djilas, *Vlast*, London, 1983.

removed. Until Tito's death both the system and the Party itself remained frozen as they had been before 1948.

The one-party system was ameliorated to the extent that the League of Communists (the new name for the Party) was henceforth to " lead " and not to govern. Djilas himself was to evolve on his own. In due course he abjured Leninism and abandoned Marxist thinking. For this brave personal evolution he paid the penalty of nine years in prison.

After Stalin's death Yugoslav relations with Khrushchev were in a state of constant oscillation. Tito proposed a new relationship among socialist states—a form of socialist pluralism. In exchange he offered to work among the non-aligned countries in advocating Marxist–Leninist socialism, which he did from 1955 onwards. The Soviets were not satisfied. They would not accept association with other socialist states, only subordination. Tito had in the meantime become sufficiently independent-minded. The West had been aiding him unconditionally since 1943 (except for the years 1945–48). He would never bow to the Soviets. With the passage of time the non-aligned bloc lost its initial cohesion. Even before Tito's death pro-Soviet tendencies, represented by Fidel Castro, were strengthened. There is little left today of Tito's influence among the non-aligned. He had great expectations of gains from trade with the non-aligned world; however there has been a constant decline here and one can hardly expect things in this area to improve.

The only development of any significance was that until 1983 commerce between Yugoslavia and the USSR actually did expand. But the economic crisis of 1983 and Yugoslavia's renewed appeal to the West has reduced the value of trading with the USSR.[20] This might only help the evolution of Yugoslavia towards eventual internal reforms, both economic and political.

IF this third phase of the Yugoslav regime can be characterized as the time of anxieties and experiments, the next phase might be described as a quest for new ways. One must be careful not to be led astray by propaganda. At no time since Tito's much heralded reforms began with the new constitution of 1963, and yet another one of 1974, did the Yugoslav leadership of Tito and Kardelj have any intention of genuinely democratizing either the country or their own Party. These leaders kept faith with Marxism–Leninism, but endeavoured to find new forms and institutions to make plausible to their own people, and to the world at large, their claim to a really new socialism, to which they attributed the most noble aims, and to which they expected to recruit new and

[20] Yugoslav trade (export/import) with Asian countries and the USSR was growing between 1971 and 1981: with Asian countries from 26·134 in 1971 to 32·444 million dollars in 1981, and with the USSR from 35·518 to 80·975 million dollars. However, on the eve of the economic crisis of 1983 the situation began to change. Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council (government) Zvone Dragan declared that exports to countries with convertible currencies increased by 14 per cent, and to the highly developed countries by 27 per cent. " With the rest of the countries trade is decreasing " (*Borba*, 7 November 1983).

progressive forces both at home and among the non-aligned. It is evident that these innovations have actually contributed to the present constitutional, economic and moral crisis of Yugoslavia.

The constitution of 1963 did not retain the principles of the Constitutional Law of 1953, which was unquestionably the most original achievement of Yugoslav communists because it drew the Yugoslav federation away—believing that they had solved the national question—from classic forms of federalism, be they Western or Soviet. Instead of the two-house system of parliament—one representing the citizenry as a whole and the other representing the constituent nations or republics—the Constitutional Law of 1953 provided for two houses, one representing the whole citizenry, while the other was the Council of Producers, representing main branches of the economy in proportion to " their contribution to the national product." Thus, those who were to be representatives of the working class were seen to make up more than two-thirds of the members of the 1983 Council of Producers.[21]

But the 1963 constitution reverted to classic federalism and in its wake came the " new economic policy " of 1965. The economy was decentralized. A free market for nationalized sector enterprises was introduced, free not only at home but also guaranteeing the right to free international trade. The novelty of workers' self-management, in theory introduced as long ago as 1950, was now extended to all social organizations, not only factories but also schools, hospitals and all other urban institutions; the principle of profitability was introduced in all industrial enterprises. As a result of these measures the free exodus of a large part of the working population to Western Europe became unavoidable. This drain of the workforce proved to be advantageous in several ways. It enabled enterprises to rationalize their operations by decreasing the workforce and increasing productivity. The influx of foreign exchange from workers abroad to their families in Yugoslavia obviously also benefited the state's balance-sheet. And, finally, this policy proved to be popular not only inside Yugoslavia, but also with the Western media who took it for a true liberalization of the regime.

Aleksandar Rankovic, one of the most prominent leaders of the Party and the state, chief of the regular and of the secret police, resisted all these novelties and was particularly opposed to greater powers for the constituent republics at the expense of the central government.[22] The 1966 public disgrace of Rankovic, who could never do anything except with Tito's agreement, became necessary for Tito in order to provide evidence

[21] The Constitutional Law of 1953 was discussed in a book by Professor Jovan Djordjevic, *Ustavno i politicki sistem Jugoslavije* (The Constitutional Legal and Political System), (Belgrade, 1961), pp. 129–31.

[22] " At the plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY (July 1966), his activity [Rankovic's—*DT*] after the 8th congress of the LCY (December 1964) was judged and condemned as a conception contrary to the building of a self-governing society and direct socialist democracy, and he was, as one of the principal representatives of the statist-bureaucratic elements in the Party and state apparatus, eliminated from all political and state functions and sent into retirement." (Jugoslovenski savremenici," *Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji* (Who's Who in Yugoslavia)), Belgrade, 1970, pp. 885–86.

of the sacrifice of a reactionary scapegoat in the cause of the reforms, and to appease local Party leaders.[23]

The resultant relaxation brought some relief and many, especially those abroad, believed that " once more " the Yugoslav system was tending towards genuine liberalization.[24] It apparently did not occur to anyone that the Yugoslav secret police would continue to function perfectly well without Rankovic. The persecutions during the " Croatian Spring " of 1971 and the purges of the so-called liberals in the Party and republic apparatus in Serbia in 1972 speak for themselves. The regime to this day has remained a one-party system retaining full police control over all its citizens. The police is still largely centralized, the armed forces are completely so. But the considerable decimation of the central government's effective power as a result of the new constitutional changes in 1974 has survived. Consequently, the fractionalization of the economic system was inevitable. The serious crisis of minds in Yugoslavia lay smouldering during Tito's lifetime, but is now visible to all since his death. Tito managed to conceal the true state of affairs in Yugoslavia from his own people, and even more successfully from the public abroad.

THERE have been two constitutional crises in Yugoslavia since 1974. The 1974 constitution stems from the Utopian conception of resolving the conflict between nations and classes by finding " the Marxist solution to the class-national relationship." It triumphantly proclaimed a constitutional order " without any precedent in the history of federal structures." But, owing to the Party's own conception, the 1974 constitution could not achieve its stated goal of " independent national life " for the federal republics and at the same time maintain in Yugoslavia " free mutual self-management association within the framework of our multi-national community."[25] In theory, the Yugoslav leadership attempted to resolve the class-national relationship on Marxist premises; in practice, the constitution turned out to favour not the nations as such but the apparatus of the constituent republics so that " self-management association " remained nothing but a hope. The chief proponent of these innovations and experiments in the Yugoslav system was Edvard Kardelj (1910–79). Already in 1971 he had announced: " I believe that if the perogatives of the Federation were contracted, a way would be opened for the free association of the nations in order to *integrate* the free and self-managing working people . . ."[26]

The root causes of the constitutional crisis lie not just in the technical failure of the structure, but in the fact that it was not effective in resolving

[23] *Borba*, from 8 to 14 December 1964.

[24] E. Crankshaw and L. Lederer wrote, in *The Observer*, 10 July 1966: " Freedom of expression [in Yugoslavia—*DT*] is not only permitted but actually is institutionalised."

[25] The Report of the Chairman of the Federal Parliament and Chairman of the Commission for Constitutional Problems, Mijalko Todorovic, as an introduction to " The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Belgrade 1974 edition of " Savremena administracija," pp. 5 and 33.

[26] Edvard Kardelj, " The present problems of our political system," in *Borba reflektor*, 1 October 1970, p. 16.

intra-national problems, because it failed to appreciate the problems of the interplay of the national aspirations of Yugoslav nations.

The actual text of the 1974 constitution is in itself a monstrosity, quite truly " without precedent in the history of federal structures." It contains 406 clauses. The introduction alone spreads over 29 pages. Clauses 10 to 243 define " the social order." Only 83 paragraphs are devoted to the " liberties, rights and duties of citizens," to " constitutionality and legality," to " courts and the office of Public Prosecutor " and to " relations in the Federation and the rights and duties of the Federation." Only 38 clauses deal with the matter bearing on our discussion: " relations in the Federation and the rights and duties of the Federation." The technical quality of this Yugoslav constitution may be gathered from the fact that one sole clause (281) is devoted to the federal authority. This solitary provision is laid down over less than 246 lines . . .

Although the constituion speaks only of federation, the entire construction resembles a confederate establishment. However, as is well known, no confederate arrangements have survived anywhere in the world. Nineteenth-century experiences in Europe and America have shown that confederacy as a system was not viable.

The confederal emphasis in the 1974 constitution is evident in the very first clause. It states clearly that Yugoslavia is a " state community of voluntarily *united* nations and their Socialist *Republics*." These republics simply did not exist when post-war Yugoslavia was set up. They were not there to constitute anything. In the arbitrary interchange of the notions of " nation " and " republic " lies the source of utter constitutional confusion.

Subsequent clauses give an even clearer indication of the confederate character of the 1974 constitution: " Socialist Republics [of which there are six—*DT*] are *states* based on sovereignty of the people and the power of and self-management by the working class and all working people " (clause 3).[27] But the powers of the federation itself can only be operated " through federal agencies *with the participation on terms of equality and responsibility* of the *Republics* and the autonomous *Provinces* " and only " on the basis of decisions of or agreement by the *Republics* and Autonomous *Provinces* " (clause 244). It is immediately obvious that the provinces, elsewhere described as two autonomous provinces inside the Republic of Serbia, have suddenly become constituent elements, in their own right, of the federation. This in effect means that the federation is made not of six but of eight actual states, two of which bear the nominal title of " autonomous provinces."

Clause 257 of the constitution provides that the " social plan of Yugoslavia shall be based on compacts concluded by working people, organizations of associated labour, self-management communities of interest and other self-management organizations and communities, and *on agreement* reached among the Republics and Autonomous Provinces

[27] Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1974 (The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, edition of " Savremena administracija," pp. 5 and 33.

on economic policy of common concern." From this it follows that in this constitution, though it claims to be socialist in its nature and purpose, there is no provision according to which the working class and "all working people" are to be the sole decisive factor. The workers as such must conform with the decisions of the bureaucracies of the republics and autonomous provinces, just as elsewhere in the constitution these bureaucracies of the republics and autonomous provinces act as sovereign powers under the purely nominal aegis of the federation.

The confederate character of the Yugoslav union is further made manifest in the passages concerning foreign affairs. Clause 271 provides that the republics and autonomous provinces "are *cooperating* with agencies and organizations *of other states* and international agencies." Though this clause also says that such acts must be "within the established foreign policy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international treaties," its spirit has been defied by the Autonomous Province of Kosovo; it was suddenly discovered only after the Kosovo rebellion of 1981 that a great number of teachers and professors from the neighbouring country of Albania had been invited to lecture by Kosovo Province authorities, and also that pupils in secondary schools and in the university were using textbooks in the Albanian language published across the border and then imported.

The federal budget cannot be prepared by the federal government alone; nor even by decisions of the federal parliament as a sovereign body, though one of the two houses of parliament consists of *delegates* from the republics and autonomous provinces. The budget, that is to say "the total volume of expenditures in the Federal Budget, shall be fixed *in agreement* with the Assemblies of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces" (clause 279). Moreover, one of the houses of parliament, the Chamber of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces, composed though it may be of delegates from republics and autonomous provinces (clause 295), cannot decide anything on its own (clause 286), but only with the "agreement of the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces." From the legal point of view, these clauses demonstrate the impotence of the federal parliament: when the agreement of all the Assemblies of the Republics and Provinces is given, it is returned to the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the federal parliament, where voting "shall be decided by individual delegations" from the Republics and Provinces (clause 295).

LEAVING aside the Utopian delusions that are at the bottom of a number of quasi-Marxist postures, it is obvious that the national question remains unresolved. On the basis of the historical claims to statehood by the Serbian and Croatian nations, a structure has been created in which all ethnic groups were given statehood although they were not and are not able to exercise their statehood. By institutionalizing this structure, the Yugoslav regime had two aims: it can, for instance, manoeuvre the small and economically non-viable Republic of Mon-

tenegro, with its population of 584,000, to put pressure on, say, Croatia and Slovenia. It can also exercise pressure on Serbia through its Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Inside the Republic of Serbia, a national minority, the Albanians, has in effect become the ruling nation in Kosovo.[28] The political intention of this unique constitutional structure is to raise the status of the " feudal lords " in each republic and province and thereby assure their allegiance to the union of Yugoslavia. Not a very successful ploy as it turned out. In the economic sphere all this juggling, resulting in rights acquired by the leadership of the constituent republics and provinces, has only contributed to the calamities that have been plaguing Yugoslavia since the summer of 1983.

Behind the absurdities of the Yugoslav constitutional structure—legal concepts that defy definition, procedures that cannot be put into practice—there is the political purpose of the Party leadership. Its essence is to subdue the national aspirations of the two large communities—the Serbs and the Croats. While the Serbs are pressured and manipulated by way of the Albanians in Kosovo, the Croats are disciplined in their own republic. Croatia was proclaimed to be a " Republic of both the Croatian and Serbian nations," even though Croatia contains only 531,000 Serbs out of a total population of 4,601,000. The present President of Croatia, Milutin Baltic, is a Serb. The transparent aim of the regime in defining the Serbs as " co-creator " of the Croatian Republic is not some notion of " equality " between the Serbs and Croats but to favour those small in number at the expense of the considerable majority of Croats in their own republic. But at the same time, to show favour to the Macedonians, who are small in number and not likely to be as recalcitrant as the Croats, the regime did not follow this precedent by proclaiming Macedonia to be a " Republic of Macedonians *and* Albanians," even though there is a greater percentage of Albanians in Macedonia than there is of Serbs in Croatia.

There is another element at the root of this constitutional confusion. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself inherited the curse of the problem of nationalities as soon as it was formed. From the outset the Party was divided into two groups. The nature of the rift did not concern the interests of workers, so neither side could claim the allegiance of the working class as such. Communists from Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina appeared to be " Bolsheviks," bent on imitating Lenin and his 1917 revolution. Croatian and Macedonian communists saw in Lenin's October revolution a way of affirming their own national identity and, in the case of the Croatian communists, a way of reviving their long-lost internationally recognized statehood. This division on national lines within the Yugoslav Party, was little concerned with Marxism, but it received the blessing of the Comintern. Tito united

[28] Milovan Djilas in *Le Monde*, Paris, 30 December 1971, said that the Serbian nation was administratively divided after 1945 into many republics " in order to keep in check . . . the centralism and hegemonism of Serbian nationalism," the most dangerous opponent of the new communist order in Yugoslavia.

two " parties " during the Second World War by imposing the imperative of unity of interests in the Partisan war. The war over, the old problems re-emerged without the help of the Comintern, which was formally dissolved in 1943.

The way in which the ruling Party manipulated the Albanians in Kosovo is a case in point demonstrating the cynicism with which other national problems were treated with an eye to temporary advantage. Tito in 1943 publicly promised to cede the province of Kosovo to Albania.[29] Much has been made of this wartime promise; Albanians regard it as justification for their ultimate secession claim, and Tito's critics as an unauthorized act by the budding statesman. But it turns out now[30] that Tito's promise was given in rather peculiar circumstances. At the clandestine wartime meeting of the Communist Party in Kosovo, with only seven Serbs and Montenegrins present—the rest were Albanians of whom a quarter were from Albania itself and were not Albanians from Kosovo—Tito's men felt free to disregard Serbian national views. This promise to cede Kosovo to Albania was but a ruse to get the Albanians to join the Yugoslav Partisan army.

The words of Professor Ljubomir Tadic, the well-known Marxist, are an apt comment on the constitutional crisis:

> The long campaign against " unitarism " and " centralism " [by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—*DT*] was inspired not so much by a desire for the principles of genuine democratization of the social and political system as I believe it was by a wave of anti-democratic decentralization and the consequent revival of some sort of feudal fiefs in Yugoslav society.[31]

WHEN compared with other backward countries, whatever their political system, the Yugoslav economy has indeed made good progress since the Second World War. Why, then, did Yugoslavia sink into the grave crisis of the summer of 1983 and why was it forced to accept high interest charges on new loans and severe restrictions on borrowing abroad?[32]

Let us compare some figures for two European countries whose circumstances before the Second World War were not unlike those of Yugoslavia. The Council of Europe, document 4384, calculated Spain's growth in national per capita income from 1950 to 1975 at 12 per cent

[29] Paul Lendvai in the *Financial Times*, 13 May 1981.

[30] The declaration of Pavle Jovicevic, secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Kosovo during the Second World War, published in *Nin*, 18 December 1983. The popular Serbian writer, Dobrica Cosic, a commissar of a Partisan unit in Serbia during the war, opposed the Party policy in Kosovo during the plenum session of the Central Committee of Serbia 29/30 May 1968, in declaring that in Kosovo only one of the two statehoods could exist, Yugoslav or Albanian, not both at the same time.

[31] *Theoria*, Journal of the Philosophical Society of Serbia, No. 3–4, 1982.

[32] After a public statement on the 20 billion dollar debt, the Yugoslav government received credit of 4·5 billion dollars in order to pay debts and interest, and partially to help the country's economy in crisis. Foreign creditors asked and have got the guarantee from the National Bank of Yugoslavia for every credit given to Yugoslav enterprises and banks, and if the Yugoslav government does not fulfil its obligations, foreign creditors have the right to confiscate Yugoslav property abroad such as ships, aeroplanes and similar property.

(10th in the world order), Greece's at 8·7 per cent (49th) and Yugoslavia's at 4·4 per cent (138th). But according to the coefficient of foreign aid received from OECD countries only, Yugoslavia led with +5·8, followed by Spain with +4·9 and Greece with +4·8.[33] The coefficients relate to 1970–76 on variables in the per capita GNP.[34] Even compared with development in East European countries, in the past few years Yugoslavia has made relatively little progress.[35]

One might well wonder why, then, a much higher standard of living in Yugoslavia is so evident in comparison with other East European countries. The answer is that the Yugoslav government engineered a false prosperity relying on unreturned foreign loans and outright gifts and not at all on the country's own productivity. The regime's spokesmen now freely admit this:

> The present hardships are in great measure due to rising domestic consumption being fostered on the basis of foreign loans.[36]

This is, of course, not the sole cause of present Yugoslav over-indebtedness. The same source reveals two further reasons: (1) " The Yugoslav economy, in terms of domestic exchange of goods and services, outstripped the rate of development of the country's resources "; and (2) " A good proportion of foreign loans was wasted on useless and wrong-headed investments." Here is an illustration and comment from Yugoslavia itself: a Yugoslav film won a prize in Cracow; it is the story of the building of a complete hydroelectric power station, turbines and all. The film ends by showing that the builders discovered on completion of the project that there was no water anywhere in the vicinity . . .[37]

The 1984 Yugoslav budget provision for national defence is 62·2 per cent of the total; 15·4 per cent is allotted to Partisan and other war pensioners and invalids.[38] A leading article in the Party daily, *Borba*, says:

> There are not a few enterprises in the country where out of five people employed three produce and two are clerks, accountants or supervisors. In some cases this ratio is two to one and there are even cases where the proportion is one to one.[39]

Party spokesmen have disclosed that borough councils and other local authorities employ 256,000 administrative staff. Add to this number the staff at federal, republic and provincial level and it becomes probable that the total administrative staff by 1981 amounted to a proportion of 50 per cent of all white- and blue-collar workers (5,846,000) in government service. This was publicly admitted:

[33] OECD, Report on Yugoslavia, June 1979.

[34] *Atlaseco 79*, September 1979.

[35] The article of Svetozar Bizic " Jugoslovenska privreda gledana iz, istocnog pravca " (The Yugoslav economy seen from the East), *Nasa rec* (Our Word) April 1980, London.

[36] Editorial in *Borba*, 13 February 1983. According to the former President of the Presidium of the SFRJ, Mika Spiljak, of every 130 dinars spent by each Yugoslav citizen, 30 dinars (about 23 per cent) came from foreign loans. (*Nin*, 24 July 1983.)

[37] *Duga*, 4 July 1981, Belgrade.

[38] *Nin*, 25 December 1983.

[39] Slobodan Vujica in *Borba*, 25 March 1981.

> Of all countries with a market economy we are probably the leaders in the number of civil servants in office work. Official statistics confirm this figure. For every 100 persons employed in government and associated social services in the field we have 103 persons employed as office staff. In the industrial sector the situation is no better. Even in the most up-to-date self-management enterprises, such as in the car industry, more than 45 per cent sit in offices.[40]

In a society that functions on such a high proportion of white-collar workers, with an enormous and corrupting number of officials engaged only in propaganda, with an exceptional number of university graduates, there can be no surprise that the Yugoslav regime's concern for the working class has turned out to be its lowest priority. Vladimir Bakaric (1912–83), the Croatian communist leader, saw this clearly enough:

> My salary before the war as an articled clerk to a solicitor was very small compared to the average wage of a skilled manual worker in those days of undeveloped semi-capitalist Yugoslavia. Today the opposite is true. Office staff at all levels in Yugoslavia are far better paid than manual workers.[41]

Manual workers in Yugoslavia today, writes Nora Beloff, are " among the lowest paid in Europe."[42] This average workers' wage, according to figures published at the end of 1983, was £78 per month.[43] The officially admitted unemployment figure for 1982 was 13·8 per cent of the available workforce. If we take into account the large number of Yugoslav workers now employed abroad, the true unemployment figure for Yugoslavia is close to 30 per cent. The well-known Yugoslav economist, Professor Branko Horvat, warned already in mid-1981: " Yugoslavia holds the European record for unemployment."[44]

The free market as such in Yugoslavia, coupled with the self-managing enterprises competing with one another, cannot be judged a failure. Neither the free market nor the self-managing enterprises have at any time been free from state interference. This criticism is also voiced by left-wing Yugoslav Marxists and by those Yugoslav economic specialists who are supporters of the regime. But none has the power to change the system. Professor Neca Jovanov, a home-grown critic, said:

> Decentralization has failed to bring about the desired democratization of society. Instead, self-management of workers' enterprises has brought about disintegration. A large number of heterogeneous organizations have now turned into a myriad of closed circles.[45]

Professor Horvat adds: " The Yugoslav system is self-managing in form, but in its essence it is simply interventionist."[46] Aleksa Djilas observes

[40] Dusan Ristic in *Borba*, 1 October 1983.
[41] Vladimir Bakaric (1912–83), leader of the Croatian Communists in Zagreb in *Vjesnik*, 19 July 1981.
[42] Nora Beloff in *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 October 1983.
[43] *Borba*, 6 December 1983.
[44] *Gledista*, July/August 1981, No. 7/8, Belgrade.
[45] Journal, *Socijalizam*, No. 7/8, 1980.
[46] *Duga*, 13 September 1980.

that " by way of self-management the state has in fact gained in strength and firmness."[47]

The Yugoslav economy has for decades[48] been pampered by credits from Western states, and Yugoslav economic experts and political leaders have been misguided and self-deceived. In addition to over-ambitious planning—the Yugoslav communists' original aberration—an atmosphere was created, and generally accepted, in which all common sense and appreciation of economic laws simply disappeared, a situation, let it be added, that is typical of all socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Dennison I. Russinow, generally sympathetic to the present Yugoslav system, admitted that

> A third of enterprises . . . would be bankrupt if the rules of the market economy were not being violated to keep them going.[49]

The recent re-scheduling arranged between the Yugoslav federal government and its foreign creditors has not changed matters. In the Centre for Marxist Thought, inside the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in Belgrade, economic experts concluded that the annual inflation rate in 1983 had reached 58·4 per cent and was " galloping."[50]

The present Yugoslav administration, more than any of its predecessors, has made enormous efforts since the summer of 1983 to uncover new paths. However, this will be difficult to do without a radical change in the system itself. The first results of " rationalization " have not been at all encouraging. The chief economic minister and deputy premier, Zvone Dragan, announced that it was planned to reduce the deficit in the overall federal budget to an estimated 300 to 400 million US dollars in 1984.[51] *Borba* reported what had actually happened during the first period of " rationalization " early in 1983. Industrial production had increased only by 0·6 per cent as against the projected increase of 2 per cent. Employment had risen by 2·2 per cent which means that overall productivity had fallen by 1·5 per cent. While exports to developed countries rose as much as 27 per cent, the overall export figure moved up by only 1 per cent as against a projected 9 per cent.[52]

No wonder that even the regime's economists seem to agree with the diagnosis of Professor Zoran Pjanic given at the same meeting of the Serbian Centre for Marxist Thought in Belgrade:

> The majority of economists consider that the existing system is the real cause of the present crisis.[53]

[47] *Nasa rec* (Our Word), November 1980, London.
[48] *Le Monde*, 16 December 1983, Paris.
[49] *UFSI Reports*, No. 39, 1982, p. 3.
[50] *Borba*, 14/15 January 1984.
[51] *Borba*, 7 November 1983.
[52] *Borba*, 15 November 1983.
[53] See footnote 50.

A COUNTRY, only semi-developed by pre-war capitalist standards and ruled at that time by an authoritarian monarch, has now become a socialist state, but is still semi-developed by present-day standards. The rapid and massive shift in the structure of the population after the war[54] was accompanied by profound political change. The first post-war generation, composed of newly landless peasants and former guerrillas, and now the second, became political tools of the post-war regime. The even tempo of bourgeois cultural and psychological development that followed the rest of Europe for 150 or more years was abruptly upset. Yugoslav lands have not found equilibrium since then. By the 1950s, the implantation of Soviet institutions and modes of life had reached a peak of frenzy. The break with Stalinism was followed by a turn towards Western Europe without, however, Yugoslavia taking up the cultural framework or way of life of Western Europe. Yugoslav society has thus come to exhibit some of the negative characteristics of both sides of the European divide.

Yugoslav troubles are less known in the West than are Polish ones because in Western eyes the present Yugoslav regime still has a special role to play in resisting Soviet designs. Observers might be surprised to learn of the great role played in Yugoslavia by uncontrolled corruption and common thieving, by the distrust, deception and trickery that have become prevalent in relations among citizens and between citizens and the government.[55] Much more is reported in Yugoslavia than in the outside world. The great publicity given inside the country to these many excesses produces an impression of considerable freedom for the media, and suggests that the country is one where socialism indeed has " a human face." In spite of the regime's fierce persecution of crime, the truth is that results are poor since the root cause of all these evils is in the system itself. The evils permeate down from the apex of the pyramid of power—the leadership of the League of Communists.

The communist boss of Bosnia, Branko Mikulic, who happens to be one of the most dogmatic and toughest of leaders, has publicly admitted that a greater number of ruling Party members has been brought before the courts as " economic criminals " than has been disciplined by the Party itself.[56] There is no institution of any kind in Yugoslavia where decision-making is not in the hands of the so-called workers' councils which are, however, almost completely dominated by Party members. These councils themselves head the list of " violators of constitutionalism," with 23,644 cases before the courts; at the lower level,

[54] The last statistical census in Yugoslavia before the Second World War, in 1931, presented the agricultural population as being 76·6 per cent, industrial and artisan workers 11 per cent, administration 3·8 per cent. (*Société des nations*, Genève, *Conférence Européene de la Vie Rurale*, Yugoslavia, 1939, p. 12.) At the recent census of 1981, the agricultural population represents only 28·8 per cent, workers in the nationalized sector more than 26 per cent, but more than 40 per cent of the present-day Yugoslav population belong to (a) " non-economic activities " groups (an enormous political apparatus); and (b) economic activities outside the economy (*Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1982*, pp. 437, 444).

[55] It is not rare news in the daily papers, as it was in *Borba* of 12 August 1981, that in some towns pensions are not paid to the pensioners because " cash boxes are empty . . ."

[56] *Politika*, 5 March 1982.

subcommittees and commissions of these councils were charged in 22,407 cases.[57]

" Economic crimes "—in plain English, theft and fraud—are not only on the increase but are now " galloping " according to the retired chief public prosecutor, Dr Vuko Goce Vucetic. He adds:

> In the past ten years, these economic crimes have risen from 14,000 (in 1970) to 41,000 cases (in 1980). Every third or fourth Yugoslav citizen between the ages of 18 and 60 has been brought before the courts and charged with one or another economic crime . . .[58]

The well-known journalist, Dragoljub Ignjatovic, has written: " Instead of encouraging work we stimulate theft."[59] Nor is the working class, to which socialism has assigned a historic role in the development of society, free from the charge of violating socialist ways and destroying socialist property:

> Public property is being stolen on a vast scale not only by those at the top but also by the workers themselves. Few are called to account.[60]

Professor Ljubomir Tadic thus concludes his sad lament:

> I continue to maintain that communist parties of the Bolshevik type, wherever they have attained power, have in fact destroyed the role of the workers' movement in modern society. This apparent paradox is the most disastrous consequence of their rule.[61]

The problem of the young is now acute. At the end of 1981 there were 833,000 registered unemployed in Yugoslavia and of these 688,000 were aged between 19 and 39.[62] As in more developed countries, unemployment in Yugoslavia has mainly affected the younger generation. The daunting figure of 13 per cent unemployment among the working population is by far the greatest problem facing the upholders of the established political creed. Yugoslav society is supposed to be socialist. It should therefore have no unemployment and no strikes. In fact, Yugoslavia tolerates both; unemployment is officially described as " persons seeking work," and strikes as " stoppages of work." Of the 833,000 unemployed only 28,000 receive the official dole. The two largest groups of the unemployed are 236,000 university graduates and others with equivalent technical qualifications, and 347,700 unskilled workers.[63]

Ideological confusion and general frustration among the young probably present a graver phenomenon in Yugoslavia than in either Western or Eastern Europe. The regime's efforts to relieve the young of their depressed condition are more or less confined to an organization called " The Union of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia." Important spokes-

[57] *Borba*, 25 February 1982.
[58] *Nin*, 23 May 1982.
[59] *Duga*, 12/27 February 1982.
[60] *Novosti*, 13 October 1982.
[61] *Theoria*, Nos. 3–4, 1982.
[62] *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije*, 1982, p. 139.
[63] Ibid. p. 40.

men of the regime have admitted in the press that this body has no visible function other than serving as an employment agency for those who are looking for jobs or accommodation through the Party machine. Dennison I. Russinow quotes a devastating comment by the Belgrade professor, Lazar Trifunovic (1929–83):

> Wherever they turn, young people see they are being tricked and deceived. From their childhood they have been instructed and "brainwashed" [to believe that] they are living in the freest, most democratic and most revolutionary system, in which all people equally have been guaranteed and have secured basic human rights. On growing up they immediately grasp that none of these rights can be realized; they move away from them and never return, disappearing in a sea of phrases, resolutions, self-management agreements, laws, regulations and instructions which are mercilessly and almost pathologically being produced by the bureaucrats in an attempt to hide the real picture about us. Having understood that the words of the resolutions have nothing in common with reality, young people cannot avoid clearly recognizing that they have been living in a society run by old people who crave power, although they suffer from sclerosis, unable to suggest anything new and creative; instead, these senile people are very radical in defending their privileges and their right to govern and manage people.[64]

The emergence of a "new sort of class consciousness," or, at the very least, of apparent new social differences among the young, coupled with the high degree of unemployment, has contributed to the spread of a distinctively melancholic mood. The principal Belgrade daily reported two characteristic comments in a youth survey:

> Among the different social groups, if I may use this expression, there is no exchange or interplay of thought or ideas, no sense of companionship. A kind of bitterness has set in. . . .

Another young person adds:

> We are weighed down by an all pervasive boredom. We go from one beer-garden to another and then, if we still have money, we suffocate in small coffee bars. Always in separate groups. . . .[65]

Of course, sociologists, psychologists and political scientists, including those in the service of the regime, are aware of this "youth problem." But only a few of the braver ones have tried to view the problem as a whole. Two fundamental attitudes have been stressed. The approval by the working class of public ownership and the hopelessness manifested by the young. One of the foremost open critics, Professor Dr Neca Jovanov, has repeated what he first said two years ago:

> Essentially, we are talking about a crisis of morals and of ideology . . . Passive resistance both by the working class and the intelligentsia has reached unforeseen proportions and has taken many forms.[66]

[64] Quoted by Russinow from the Belgrade *Student*, 23 February 1983.
[65] *Politika*, 14 August 1983.
[66] *Studentski list*, 12 March 1983.

It is by now generally known that workers have never managed to attain important positions at higher levels in the ruling Party. The proportion of ordinary workers to the whole membership of the Party has never been higher than one third. The majority of the working class remains outside the Party.[67] Ordinary workers also head the list of those expelled by the Party.[68]

TITOISM without Tito, as we call the present disposition, tries to preserve a highly personal system which perfectly suited Tito's own tastes and was built to accord with his own particular talents and skills. What has happened in the last four years, economically and in the realm of political creed, is that Titoism—an amalgam of pragmatism, personal vanity and sheer fraud, the dispersion of pre-packaged ideas and abundant promises—has been shown to be incapable of surviving Tito for any length of time. Open reactions to Titoism have begun to appear in public and from inside the system itself. It is still too early to expect tangible results. Though they may be blessed with much inherent vitality, the Yugoslav peoples are at present too exhausted from 40 years of exploitation, constant changes and futile experiments.

Yugoslavia's social structure was thoroughly broken up immediately after the last war by well-known Stalinist methods. The leadership's break with Stalin only deepened the widespread demoralization by adding its own disenchantment to the general gloom. There is now no way in which Yugoslavs could readily unite en masse, as happened with the Poles, who are a homogenous nation. In any case, the concentration of an opposition movement will be slower in a country where the only city with many more than a million inhabitants is Belgrade.

Yet the beginning of a significant resistance among intellectuals is now manifest in Serbia and Bosnia. Writers like Dobrica Cosic, Antonije Isakovic and younger ones like Momcilo Selic and Gojko Djogo have taken public issue with old and present restrictions to freedom. Croatian colleagues, Dr Franjo Tudjman and Marko Veselica, are even now paying the price of long prison sentences for their dissidence. University lecturers of the *Praxis* group, like Ljubomir Tadic and Svetozar Stojanovic, have been expelled from their posts for their remarkable exposures of what still passes for a Marxist society and a Marxist system in Yugoslavia. The doyen of Yugoslav dissidents, Milovan Djilas, can only publish abroad though he is still inside the country.

But voices are also heard from circles inside the ruling regime seeking

[67] The Yugoslav press is full of such details, as in the edition of *Borba*, 13 January 1984, in which it was stated that every second man or woman in non-economic activities (administration) is a member of the ruling League of Communists of the Republic of Serbia, that every fourth worker in industry is a member of the Party, and only every fifteenth worker in the building industry is a member of the Party. After 40 years of total monopoly of power, only 25 per cent of the industrial working class belong to the Yugoslav ruling Party. One Party leader, Momcilo Djukic in *Duga*, 28 August 1982, stated that at the last 12th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1982, among delegates of the congress only 20·1 per cent were workers, and in the Central Committee of the LCY workers represented only 8 per cent.

[68] *Nin*, 6 February 1983.

to free the system of Titoism. They are a long way from being determinant. Former Party stalwarts, some still in power, like Mijalko Todorovic, Peko Dapcevic, Dr Aleksandar Grlickov,[69] Dr Kiro Gligorov and Dr Stipe Suvar, have tried to open discussion of essential problems of the ruling creed and the etablished system. The road may still be long but the abandonment of Titoism began with his death in May 1980.

" There is a road to freedom " exclaimed the writer and scholar Mihajlo Mihajlov not long ago in America. Yugoslavia enjoys two advantages over other East European countries.[70] Yugoslavia is neither a member of the Warsaw Pact nor of Comecon. Secondly, the Yugoslav ruling Party, from its very beginnings in 1919/20, has been a political grouping never sufficiently disciplined and at no time free of sturdy anti-dogmatic elements forever asking questions and trying to adjust to perpetually changing situations.

THE report of the 1983 Congress of Yugoslav sociologists concluded: The erosion of moral standards has reached disquieting proportions.[71]

This moral erosion did not set in after the departure of Tito. " Titoism without Tito " has merely, since his death in 1980, brought the continuing erosion to light. The public in Yugoslavia has now become aware that the whole constitutional set-up, the economic troubles and the erosion of morals, are all in the largest measure the consequence of Tito's own outlook; his great talent lay in keeping their roots hidden. The downward slide had already begun in the 1950s when, under his leadership, the country freed itself from Stalin's domination but failed to find a way towards genuine liberation. " Titoism without Tito " has one positive side: the exposure of 30 years of skilled deception has begun. A number of valves have been opened in Yugoslav society.

[69] In the attempt to open a dialogue about the ideological problems of Marxism-Leninism, one personality is particularly significant: Dr Aleksandar Grlickov. He said recently " Having become an ideology, Marxism necessarily changed its original concept. Marxism as an ideology is not as much interested in advancing a picture of reality as in providing a confirmation—even apotheosis—of a reality " (*Tanjug*, 24 October 1983). In the same sense the German writer Carl Gustaf Ströhm published an article in *Die Welt* on 24 December 1983, in which he underlined the explanation given by Grlickov that " the working class, which was designed by Marx to be the precursor of socialism, does not exist today," that Marxism became a state ideology, and that Marx never talked much about the state but about the liberation of producers and the liberation of humanity.

[70] Mihajlo Mihajlov in the American magazine *Free Inquiry*, Winter 1980/81, gave concrete suggestions for the democratization of Yugoslavia, and for the transition period of this democratization, that is to say for consensus among certain elements of the ruling Party and democratic opposition in Yugoslavia.

[71] *Borba*, 4 October 1983.

Yugoslavia's Crisis of Order

Of all Yugoslavia's various crises, the economic is the one best known abroad. This is highlighted by a foreign debt of over $20 billion, 50 per cent inflation, 15 per cent unemployment and persistently low productivity—about one-fifth the figure for Western Europe.

Yet this serious economic problem is neither the sole nor decisive crisis. What is now at stake here is the Yugoslavian system itself. At bottom, this is what is popularly known as "Titoism," which it would be more correct to describe as a Yugoslavian version of Leninism, of bureaucratic socialism. One may therefore assert with some confidence that no aspect of the crisis in Yugoslavia (certainly not the economic one) could possibly be understood without taking into consideration the crisis of the whole established order—the crisis therefore of the state itself.

Titoism itself always was more of a set of pragmatic bureaucratic improvisations than a coherent idea. It is now decomposing into local bureaucratic "nationalisms" of the six constituent Yugoslavian republics. Central institutions no longer function, and the national bureaucracies are growing more inward-looking and insulated. In some of the ruling bureaucracies of the component republics (Croatia and Bosnia) neo-Stalinist totalitarianism, disguised for public consumption as "Tito's Way," is gaining strength. These tendencies also find support among some military leaders. . . . Yugoslavia's crisis has also brought forth forms of criticism predominantly democratic in character. The recent arrests of dissidents here, for instance, have provoked unexpectedly wide reaction by intellectuals. Demands for fundamental structural reforms of the system come not only from free-thinkers, but are now even voiced by some Communist Party ideologues. . . .

Up to now it could have been reasonably argued that, even acknowledging the widespread dissatisfaction, there was still no organized opposition. But even here there have been changes in the last two years. There is still no organized opposition; despite several currents of opposition that share a concern for human rights, there are no detailed programs. At the same time, however, it is obvious that the awareness of the crisis is now wide enough that it can be called general, and more and more people are consequently distancing themselves from the system.

The recent repressions in Belgrade and the systematic persecutions in Bosnia and Croatia have proved to be counterproductive. Fear no longer dominates opposition circles. The activities of individuals and groups have become more persistent and inventive. The movement for human rights in Yugoslavia has branched out. Yugoslavia is on the eve of the burgeoning of opposition movements that will vary from republic to republic. Such future movements, tolerant of each other, achieving mutual accords, are the only forces that could find a way out of the accumulated and increasingly destructive troubles that beset Yugoslavia.

The choice is getting narrower. Either Yugoslavia transforms its economy into a modern one and reforms itself into a democratic confederation, or it condemns itself to backwardness and decay, dominated by dogmas and arbitrariness and accompanied by mindless and ever more unsuccessful violence.

Milovan Djilas

The Wall Street Journal, 31 July 1984

Communists and Yugoslavia

Aleksa Djilas

THE Partisan movement, organized and led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, fought three separate wars in the course of the Second World War, which in Yugoslavia began in 1941. The first was the war against the German and Italian occupiers of Yugoslavia and against those Yugoslavs who had allied themselves with the occupiers and were collaborating with them. The second was the revolutionary war fought against all those who were resisting the communists in their aim to achieve political power and to carry out a revolutionary transformation of Yugoslav society. The third war was fought against nationalist and separatist movements. Whilst imbued with discordant ideologies and proclaiming incompatible goals, the majority of these movements, most of the time during the war, shared the wish to create separate national states and, where they were able to, they attempted the subjugation, expulsion or even killing of rival national groups, sometimes on a large scale.

The communist victory in war " No. 2," i.e. its revolutionary aspect, was in great measure due to the fact that the chief opponents of the communist revolutionary aims were collaborators of the occupying enemy powers who were at the same time nationalist extremists. This phenomenon made the Partisans appear to many Yugoslavs, and to the Allies, as a straightforward patriotic movement.

The communists were, of course, merely *one* of the contenders in the multi-faceted civil war—and revolutionary war is among other things, inevitably, also civil war.

Yet the communists' opposition to nationalist extremism turned out to be at least as important for their victory as their struggle against the occupiers of Yugoslavia.

The Partisans succeeded in being accepted as somehow superior to the other groups engaged in the civil strife, contenders who had fought one another rather than the enemy, and on nationalistic grounds. The communists were seen as trying to end the civil war. They emerged as the only supra-national Yugoslav moment.

THE nationalistic civil war claimed most victims. It was most dangerous in the regions of Bosnia, Hercegovina and Croatia, all with mixed Serbian, Croatian and South Slav Moslem populations. There, the Partisan army became for the population the only alternative to the massacres and counter-massacres committed by the Ustasha movement (Croatian fascists) and Chetniks (Serbian royalists). It was precisely in these regions that the communists won the largest following for themselves and liberated the largest territories from the occupiers.

But the communists' national policy during the war was not only

against nationalist extremism. They also promised in their propaganda to organize Yugoslavia on federal principles after the war and so to abolish the pre-war Serbian hegemony. Acknowledging the culture of non-Serbian nations, they promised them the institutional structure that these nations had previously lacked. The proposed federal structure was not meant to set up barriers and borders between the different nations of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, once oppression by one nation had been abolished and complete national equality had been established, all Yugoslav nations were to live in harmony and their indigenous cultures were to blend. The communists were thus firmly committed to Yugoslavism (" *jugoslovenstvo* "). Their wartime slogan of " Brotherhood and Unity " was not only aimed to counter fratricidal war and disunity—it also symbolized their policy of pan-Yugoslav solidarity of cooperation among the many nations of Yugoslavia of Yugoslav integration and, ultimately, of the creation of a Yugoslav national consciousness and of a Yugoslav nation.

The opportunity of creating a Yugoslav nation seemed to be reinforced by the very existence of a communist party which was Yugoslav, and by the successes of the Party in organizing and leading the Partisan army, which was also Yugoslav in spirit. If, within the Party and within the Partisan army, members of the different nations had worked and fought together in wartime, why should this not be possible in peacetime? The communists did not tire of pointing out in their propaganda that they had made decisive and irreversible progress towards the creation of a Yugoslav national consciousness and that Yugoslavism had, to a large extent, already become a reality, not merely a promise made by communist ideology for a distant future.

There was another line of reasoning which seemed to point with some assurance in the direction of Yugoslavism and a Yugoslav nation. If one believed in a future communist society, as communists and their sympathizers surely did immediately after the war, then one could not only believe that " progress " must inevitably lead towards the establishment of a classless society of freedom, equality, fraternity and abundance, but one had to believe also in the establishment of a society in which communist ideology was accepted by everyone and not just by the " avant-garde." Quite simply, everyone would be a communist. Since the Communist Party that was actually fighting was Yugoslav, and the not-too-distant communist future would encompass the whole of society, then, in that future, everyone would naturally be a Yugoslav.

The wartime and post-war Yugoslavism of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was in part also the result of the application of Marxist-Leninist internationalism to internal Yugoslav national problems. The Communist Party was opposed to " bourgeois " nationalism and believed in the creation of an international or, rather, " global " communism. " Global " seems to be a more appropriate word as the word " international " necessarily presumes the existence of a " national " consciousness. The communists, of course, believed in the complete disappearance of " national " consciousness, i.e. the end of any loyalty to a

particular nation state, or even adherence to a communist-nation concept. It followed that communists, in countries and territories where they were active, should try to prevent national conflicts, to minimize the importance of national differences and to unite the " working people " of different nations. But if they did these three things in Yugoslavia, i.e. if they fought against Serbian, Croatian, Slovene etc., nationalisms, if they made a propaganda effort to minimize the differences between the nations of Yugoslavia, and if they tried to unite all its " working people " (and that meant the majority) into one political and military movement, then they were in practice working for Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism. This is how the " internationalism " of the Yugoslav communists was transformed into Yugoslavism.

It is important to stress here that, for the Yugoslav communists, Yugoslavism meant in the first place the abandonment of political loyalties to particular nations, i.e. the disappearance of every particularistic political consciousness in Yugoslavia and their transformation into a Yugoslav national consciousness. This process would not require the disappearance of ethnic and cultural differences, nor need it bring about the abandonment of individual national languages.

To sum up, one could say that during the war and immediately after it the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had conceived its Yugoslavism in three different ways. Although these were not positively stressed in communist propaganda, they were quite distinct.

1. Yugoslavism was anti-nationalism—opposition to all the nationalisms of the nations which constitute Yugoslavia.
2. Yugoslavism was patriotism—the struggle for the liberation of Yugoslavia from " foreigners," i.e. the Germans and Italians who had occupied it.
3. Yugoslavism was internationalism—the unity of the " working people " who disregarded their nationality in the struggle for a social revolution.

THE Communist Party of Yugoslavia had not always been a supporter of the Yugoslav state. In the late 1920s and early '30s the Party believed that in order to exploit both the revolutionary potential of the unsolved national questions in Yugoslavia and the opposition of non-Serbian nations to Serbian hegemony, it should necessarily include in its programme the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Yugoslav communists had accepted this extreme position partly under the influence of the Comintern, which was nursing a special animosity towards Yugoslavia, as nothing more than an artificial creation of British and French " imperialists."

The Comintern changed its line only in reaction to the growth of fascism in Europe, and especially after Hitler's rise to power. Thereupon, Yugoslavia became a potential ally against fascism and national-socialism. It was with this policy of an alliance with all " progressive " and

" anti-fascist " forces during the period of the " Popular Front " that the Yugoslav communists acquired the reputation of a patriotic movement. To be sure, they still continued to attack Serbian hegemony, but they were also opposed to militant separatist movements and to the nationalist separatist ideologies of the other nations of Yugoslavia. The Ustasha movement, for example, a separatist Croatian movement that had allied itself with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, was thereupon considered to be an enemy as dangerous and as " reactionary " as the Royal Yugoslav police. The attitude of previous years, which had tried to make a distinction between the " reactionary " fascist character of the Ustasha leadership and the " progressive " nationalist revolutionary tendency of some of their followers, was completely abandoned.

But even at the time when they were against any Yugoslav state, the communists were none the less in certain important respects supporters of Yugoslavism. That is why the change, from radical opposition to Yugoslavia to patriotic support for its continuation and defence, did not seriously damage the Party. Nor was this reversal experienced by its members and supporters as a " betrayal " of an important original clause in the communist creed.

The Yugoslavism of this ostensibly anti-Yugoslav Communist Party, as it was in the late 1920s and early '30s, was in fact built into its very structure and organization. Members of the various nations of Yugoslavia worked in it together, often in the same Party " cells," without serious conflict. Furthermore, even during the time it supported anti-Yugoslav nationalisms and defended them as a rightful struggle for national self-determination, the Party was utterly opposed to nationalist and religious hatred, which in most cases was a substantial element in these separatist nationalisms. Finally, nationalist ideologies were always severely criticized by the communists, especially their social conservatism and traditionalism, clericalism and ultra-romantic presentation of national history. The Yugoslav " nature " of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia therefore remained unchanged from its very foundation in 1919. But the policies and tactics towards Yugoslavia as a state, and towards its ways of solving national problems in Yugoslavia, underwent radical changes.

THE conflict with the Soviet Union, which began in 1948, palpably increased Yugoslav patriotism. Stalin's imperialist attempts to control and subjugate the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and so to integrate the whole of Yugoslavia into the Soviet empire, met with bitter resistance from the Yugoslav communists, who had until then arguably been the most internationalist—i.e. the most enthusiastically pro-Soviet—communists in the world. In the course of the ensuing conflict Yugoslav communists did not eliminate internationalism from their ideology. They never defined themselves as " national communists." (This label, like the label " Titoism," was invented by Western commentators and political analysts who remain to this day the sole users of such

terms.) But no matter how passionately they claimed that it was Stalin who had betrayed Lenin's internationalism and that they had always remained faithful to it, the Yugoslav communists became completely isolated in the world communist movement. Communist parties of the world, without exception, followed Soviet instructions and the Soviet example and joined the campaign of slander and abuse directed against the Yugoslav communists. Until then envied and admired by world communists as the " purest " and most successful revolutionary movement in the world, to be compared only with Soviet communists, the communists of Yugoslavia now became " fascists " and " imperialist agents." The Yugoslavs countered with passionate attacks on Soviet imperialism. But they also began to accentuate the individuality and " originality " of the Yugoslav revolution. They stressed their independence from the Soviet example and their freedom from Soviet instructions during the Yugoslav revolution. They insisted that there had been no Soviet assistance—military or otherwise—during the crucial years of the war.

Outside pressures brought to the fore the need for ideas and policies that would promote internal unity in Yugoslavia. The Party now discovered roots of Yugoslav identity and of the Yugoslav state buried deep in history, and proceeded to affirm common Yugoslav historical traditions and cultural affinities. Historical, political and artistic figures from the nineteenth century who had propagated the Yugoslav idea were specifically praised.

Some influential Croatian and Serbian communist intellectuals even tried to promulgate a certain romantic revolutionary Yugoslavism and defined the spirit of independence and rebellion as the essential characteristic of all South Slavs. They based their theory on the shining examples of mediaeval Christian heresies that had opposed the powers and dogmas of both Rome and Constantinople, and the enormous vitality of the South Slavs during the struggles for independence from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The war of national liberation against the Germans and Italians during the Second World War, and the challenge to Stalin's hegemony over the communist world were both represented, as might be expected from these communist propagandists, as the greatest twentieth-century achievements of the Yugoslav spirit. This romantic ideology never became official Party doctrine, but it was everywhere encouraged, and particularly so in education.

During and after the conflict with the Soviet Union loyalty to Yugoslavia was firmly established as being superior to any other loyalty, i.e. to international loyalty and loyalty in favour of any one of the nations that constitute Yugoslavia. But, at the same time, such Yugoslavism was not meant to oppose, or even to contradict either internationalism or loyalty to one of the Yugoslav nations. A good communist was therefore not expected to abandon either internationalism or his nationality in order to be a good Yugoslav. On the contrary, he was supposed to remain both a good internationalist and a proud member of his nation. But

Yugoslavism was nevertheless expected to be his first loyalty in the event of conflict between Yugoslavia's independence and her interests on the one hand, and internationalism or any particular nationalism on the other. Official Yugoslav communist doctrine went on to assert that there could never be any conflict of these three loyalties, except through a deformation of one of them. If these loyalties were " healthy " and " socialist," it was somehow taken for granted that they were in some sort of pre-established harmony and that there would be no chance of conflict. Stalinism was thus to be understood as an example of a deformation of internationalism. " Bourgeois " nationalism was a deformation of loyalty and affinity to one's nation. Pre-war centralism and unitarism were seen as deformations and abuses of Yugoslavism.

SELF-MANAGEMENT appeared on the Yugoslav political scene in the 1950s and the Yugoslav Party began to develop it into the ideological foundation of its social and political order. Self-management was defined and advertised by the Party as a crucial step in the development of Yugoslav socialism. The ideologists and theoreticians of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—the Party had changed its name into " League " at its Sixth Congress in 1952, but its leaders, its critics and the people still usually call it by its old name—defined self-management as the only way of developing socialism and as something all socialist countries should adopt. Though the concept might be of universal validity, it was a specific creation of the Yugoslav revolution which was supposed to prove the superiority of the Yugoslav political system.

Through workers' control of the economy and through direct democratic control by citizens over political bodies and assemblies, self-management was meant to curb the power of the bureaucracy both in the economy and in the state apparatus. In this way it would democratize society and ultimately move it towards the withering away of the state and the establishment of a classless and stateless communist society.

Though self-management might cause the state to wither away, and therefore also Yugoslavia as a state, Yugoslavism was expected to continue to develop. Self-management would promote Yugoslavism. The direct democracy which self-management was to introduce into economic and political life would unite the nations of Yugoslavia without any coercion. The bonds between the nations of Yugoslavia, created in this way, would be deep and lasting. Ultimately, they would create one Yugoslav nation.

In the late 1960s Yugoslavia began to reform its federal structure. The communist bureaucracies of the six component Yugoslav republics—supported at the time by Tito and Kardelj, his heir apparent—were increasing the independence of their republics and of their own power by way of decentralization.

Self-management now suddenly ceased to be regarded as one of the elements in favour of the development of Yugoslavism. It began to be

interpreted in a completely different way and was now considered to be in opposition to Yugoslavism.

The concept of Yugoslavism thereupon became associated with the higher levels of bureaucratic power, which was held to be the force behind unitarism and centralism, and sometimes even with Stalinism, and the actual growth of self-management now began to be regarded as a tendency favouring the autonomy and sovereignty of the several republics as opposed to the centre. Everything that had previously been proclaimed to be in favour of the theory of self-management, as an element opposed to bureaucracy and the state apparatus in a general way, was as now being used as criticism specifically directed at the higher level of Yugoslav federal bureaucracy and the central administrative apparatus in Belgrade. Every gain in the power of political and economic bodies of the component republics as opposed to the centre was now equated with direct democracy.

Like many other central concepts in the ideology of Yugoslav communism, self-management itself could, of course, be interpreted in almost any way, if the relationships of power so allowed it. Since power in the late 1960s was being transferred into the hands of those who were favouring more independence for the constituent republics, it was then their " right " to interpret self-management in their own way. The fact that their interpretation now turned out to be directly contrary to the earlier post-war communist theory and practice about the relations between Yugoslav nations did not seem to matter in the least.

Since the early 1970s the central federal political bodies of Yugoslavia, the presidency of the state and the Party presidency, were organized as collective bodies composed of representatives from the different republics. These representatives were in fact delegates; they were either chosen by fellow bureaucrats or self-chosen; their power depended primarily on what support they had been able to gather in their republics. Tito was, of course, always powerful enough—with his personal control of the political police and the army and through his unquestioned authority as the leader of Yugoslavia—to initiate changes in the leadership of any republic or to demand that a particular republic send to either of these collective presidencies any individual he selected. He could purge, promote and appoint in complete disregard of the borders or " sovereignty " of any of the constituent republics.

After Tito's death in May 1980, no one remained with even approximately similar power. Yugoslavia moved ever more towards complete confederalism—or, to use a more descriptive term, towards " radical federalism." One might indeed have wondered whether there was only *one* Yugoslav Communist Party. Would it not be more appropriate to speak of the Communist *Parties* of Yugoslavia?

THE differences among the republics are now both conspicuous and deep. Disagreements about the policies and methods for overcoming the economic crisis, which is the worst in the entire post-war period, are

frequently discussed in the press. While disagreements on economic matters are primarily caused by the different levels of development in the various republics and the protecting of their markets against competition and cooperation by enterprises outside their borders, there are also differences and disagreements brought about by ideological clashes. Reactions to the emergence of Solidarity and the military *coup* in Poland, for example, clearly revealed that there were differences not only among individual bureaucrats, but also among the several republics and their leaderships. Differing sympathies for the participants in the Polish crisis were exposed. What some considered to be a genuine working-class movement in Poland others preferred to describe as a reactionary and anti-socialist eruption.

Fundamental ideological questions were added to the dispute. It would now be impossible to discern what the Yugoslav Party's view of itself was then, i.e. what role it should play in society and what power it should possess. There simply was not one view.

This confusion is equally true of the " Party line " towards freedom of the press and the degree of openness and criticism that should be allowed. In some republics—especially in Slovenia and in Serbia (in the latter, however, mainly in Belgrade)—the appearance of a critical press was tolerated. Dissidents and a form of democratic political opposition in Serbia have been able to have their say by way of critical open letters to Party functionaries expressing demands for political amnesty and respect for human rights. But elsewhere, for example in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the limitations on freedom are far stricter and the human rights situation is particularly bad. The difference in the treatment of the press, dissidents and critics of the regime in Belgrade and Sarajevo (the capital of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina) is almost as large as is the difference between " liberal " Hungary and " Stalinist " Romania.

Yet there remains a degree of effective fundamental accord among the bureaucrats in the different republics. They all want to preserve the system—be it in a conservative and dogmatic way or in a modified and more moderate form—and to keep the Party and themselves in power. The deepening of the present crisis must, none the less, widen the division between hard-liners and liberals in the Party, and also between the dogmatic and conservative republics and those ready to accept reforms.

IN the eyes of leading Yugoslav communists the problems of Yugoslav federalism are sometimes ascribed to insufficient or incompetent implementation of the Yugoslav constitution, of the Party programme, of the laws and Party theoretical directives. This characteristic attitude persists throughout the whole of post-war Yugoslav history. The theory and ideology are sound but the people who implement them are not doing it well.

But the theory and ideology are not sound at all. They are replete with false, ambiguous and contradictory statements.

The 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave full legal recognition to the already established independence of the six constituent republics. In 1974 they were explicity defined as sovereign political bodies. Yet Yugoslavia itself was not defined in this constitution as a confederate state. It was to be regarded as a new socialist form of multi-national state based on the principles of self-management.

The functionings of the federal state and Party bodies were settled by the constitution in a way that defies elementary logic. Majority vote among the constituent republics was explicitly abandoned as a method of reaching decisions. It was claimed by Yugoslav Party leaders involved in drafting the new constitution—in particular, by the most senior Yugoslav communist after Tito, the Slovene Edvard Kardelj and by the leading Croatian communist, Vladimir Bakaric—that if majority voting were retained the republics would not remain truly sovereign. Thus by the new provision if, for example, the representatives of *five* republics, in the state presidency or in the Party presidency, agreed on any particular policy proposal and the representatives of any *one* republic did not agree, then the representatives of this one republic would be under no obligation to accept it. The constitution was thus clearly meant to guarantee that there would be no deals at the expense of one republic in the federation.

Such a system, of course, closely resembles classical confederation. But to go so far as actually to proclaim Yugoslavia a confederate state would have seemed to many people to mark the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia into separate states. Such a step would have been opposed by many Yugoslavs both inside and outside the Party. Many people believe in the preservation of Yugoslavia since the republics do not coincide territorially with the individual nations. In several cases one nation inhabits more than one constituent republic and therefore any division of Yugoslavia into separate independent states would mean the splitting-up of her nations. In the case of some republics it was doubted that they could exist at all as independent states.

Official and authoritative interpretations of the constitution, therefore, were introduced to define the Yugoslav federal system as one in which the constituent republics did not in fact have the right of veto. This was not only meant to counter accusations that Yugoslavia was now a confederate state and on the way to early dissolution, but also to act as a kind of constitutional warning that no single republic should attempt to obstruct and paralyse the decision-making process and blackmail the other republics. This principle of " no right of veto " obviously contradicts the principle of " no majority rule."

The creators of the Yugoslav federal system were not completely unaware of this contradiction, but they hoped to avoid its implications by invoking the power of self-management. It is through this process of self-management, to be applied in all spheres of social, political and economic life, that differing and opposing interests are supposed to be regulated and conflicts avoided. Behind the pompous and often incomprehensible phrases about the self-managing Yugoslav federation, there

lies the basic belief of the creators of the Yugoslav federal system and of Tito in particular that the Party bureaucrats, while making their decisions, would be guided primarily by what the Yugoslav Party doctrine calls " class interests " (i.e. the principles on which the system itself was established) and not by sectional national interests; that their communist solidarity would prevent them from subservience to the interests of their republics.

The inadequacy of the Yugoslav federal system as it is now supposed to function is recognized and admitted even by some leading Party bureaucrats. No coherent long-term policies on how to tackle the fundamental problems of Yugoslavia, in particular on how to get the country out of the deep economic crisis, can be reached.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia does not appear to have worked out a coherent programme for the direction and methods of development of the Yugoslav federation. And as far as the " Party line " on the problem of Yugoslav identity is concerned, there simply is not one. It is, for example, quite impossible to see with any certainty what Tito himself, during the last 10 to 15 years of his rule, thought and believed relations among the Yugoslav nations should be. What is most odd, moreover, is to see even today a complete absence of any initiative or effort by the Party leaders or the Party theoreticians to contrive a more lucid programme about what is obviously one of the crucial questions for the destiny of Yugoslavia.

IT is consequently difficult to say what the Party today thinks Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism are, or ought to be. But it is possible to say what the Party is definitely opposed to.

1. The Party definitely does *not* demand from the different nations of Yugoslavia acceptance and loyalty to Yugoslavia on the basis of an ideology that would have as its essence the concept of the state. The ideology of self-management is primarily anti-étatist. The intensive participation of citizen-producers in the governing of political and economic life which Yugoslav communist theorists promise to realize through self-management, is not only, according to them, the most democratic form of organizing a socialist society but it also marks the beginning of the process of the withering away of the state. The state, therefore, is not a positive value in Yugoslav communism. Whilst in the Leninist tradition it is still claimed that the state is necessary as an instrument of class struggle immediately after revolution, it is none the less described as an obstacle to the development of socialism.

2. Yugoslavs, the Party now thinks, are *not* a nation, nor will they ever become one. Nor should it be desirable to try to achieve this. Since the late 1960s, the Yugoslav Party was absolutely firm in its insistence that the several distinct nations of Yugoslavia had already become fully formed, and that the process of nation-making had thus become both final and irreversible. This new and explicit anti-Yugoslavism was the ideological foundation and justification for the reforms of the federation

in the late 1960s and early '70s when the communist bureaucrats of several republics came to increase their independence.

3. The Party does *not* believe the central federal state and Party bodies should take any initiatives in the realm of culture, art and education, let alone attempt to create a united Yugoslav culture. All this should be primarily under the control of the republics. One of the results of this complete " de-Yugoslavization " of culture was the crisis in all projects which demanded positive cooperation among the republics. Conflict and arguments, that have been going on continuously since the early 1970s, among the editors from different republics of the *Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia*, have paralysed work on a new edition.

4. In relation to the outside world, the Party does *not* see Yugoslavia as merely an alliance of sovereign states. It is much more than that, although the Party has never bothered to define what exactly it is. When there was a threat from the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or when the Bulgarians began repeating their claims that Macedonia was ethnically and historically theirs, the Party would immediately launch an all-Yugoslav propaganda campaign. It would declare the willingness and readiness of each individual Yugoslav republic to defend the whole of Yugoslavia, as well as the willingness and readiness of the whole of Yugoslavia to fight for one of its republics. In situations like this, contrary to the practice that had been established for all other social, political and economic problems, there was no pause for discussions within the republics before decisions were made at the highest central state and Party levels. The highest central levels reacted at once without any consultation and in the name of all. This unity in matters of foreign affairs and the defence of Yugoslavia has, however, since the death of Tito become less than complete and unquestioned. After the demonstrations and riots of Albanians in 1981 in the province of Kosovo, the Socialist Republic of Serbia, of which Kosovo is a part, received very little help and few expressions of solidarity from the other republics, although it was obvious that the numerous separatist Kosovo Albanian groups were helped and supported by Albania, i.e. by a foreign country. Even so, it might still be hoped that in the face of a major threat to Yugoslavia or to one of its republics—especially in the face of the most dangerous and the most likely threat: the Soviet one—there would be an all-Yugoslav unity.

5. Yugoslavia is *not* considered by the Party to be merely a political system, although the examples which would suggest this idea seem to be more numerous than those which suggest the contrary. For example, leading Yugoslav communists repeatedly stated in the 1970s that what Yugoslavia really represented was self-management. Soldiers in the Yugoslav People's Army were taught that their primary duty was the defence of the Yugoslav system as such (the main features of which were self-management, non-alignment and national equality) from enemies both outside and inside the country. The Yugoslav Party never developed an ideology which was " national " in the sense of it being applicable only

to Yugoslavia, or of being designed primarily for Yugoslavia. The Party always insisted that its world-view was based on scientific knowledge and that it was therefore universally applicable. The theoreticians and ideologists of the Party feared that any limitations on the universal validity of its ideology, by accepting a " national " character for it, would be a serious defect. It would undermine the Party's legitimacy as the sole leader of Yugoslavia and as the initiator and organizer of the socialist transformation of all aspects of the political, social and economic life of its people. Somehow it seemed that the Party, in order to sustain its omnipotence, needed to claim to be omniscient.

But Yugoslavia is still something more than just the Yugoslav system. It is very difficult to describe this precisely, but many manifestations of an all-Yugoslav patriotism and belief in Yugoslav unity may be discerned in an indefinable and unspecified way in many aspects of the political life of the country.

6. The Party does *not* allow any advocacy of separatism. To be in favour of secession for any part of Yugoslav territory or to be in favour of the creation of any new independent state by secession from Yugoslavia is considered a crime. People found guilty of such advocacy are committed to long-term imprisonment.

7. Nationalism is also *not* permitted. Here, the situation is rather more confused.

First, it could have been argued that the Party leaderships in the republics were themselves in a certain sense nationalistic; that the entire reform of the federation and the development of Yugoslavia towards a confederate state had both actually been inspired by a form of nationalism. By the standards of the Partisan movement during the Second World War or by the Party's pronouncements in the immediate post-war period, these phenomena would have been regarded as extreme nationalism and chauvinism.

Secondly, nationalism is a rather vague concept (which separatism is not). The Party has made it even more so by varying its interpretations of an acceptable form of nationalism (which, from the point of view of the Party, would not really be nationalism) and of what it regarded as an unacceptable nationalism. The policy of the Party towards nationalism sometimes changed so radically that the criteria seemed to be lurching from one pole to the other. For example, quite moderate criticisms in 1969 and 1970 of certain extreme forms of Croatian nationalism—when this nationalism was tolerated and even encouraged by Tito—were considered to be a crime. Its critics were in danger of losing their jobs or being persecuted in other ways. They would sometimes actually be prosecuted in the courts. The official prosecutor would claim, if the accused were of Serbian nationality, that the critics were apparently themselves extreme nationalists, i.e. that their criticism of rampant Croatian nationalism was nothing but an attempt to impose a hegemony by the Serbian nation.

But when Tito purged the Croatian Party leadership in December 1971

and Party leaders from other Yugoslav republics (together with the Croatian communists who had not been accused of nationalism) declared that there had indeed been extremist and separatist tendencies in the Croatian national movement, then their declarations began to be parrotted by the rest of the Party membership. Now that Croats (moderates as well as extremists) were being sent to prison as ultra-nationalists, those who had been the first to criticize Croatian nationalism were not rehabilitated. So, what was in the first case considered by the official prosecutors to be *evidence* that a crime of Serbian nationalism had been committed was later used by the same prosecutors as *substantiation* for a charge against Croatian nationalism. The same thing happened with the criticism of Albanian nationalism before and after the riots in 1981. At the moment, the Party's policy towards nationalism—as its policy on many other issues—is rich in contradiction. The only certainties in the confused " Party line " are its opposition to separatism and extreme nationalism, i.e. a nationalism that openly professes hatred of another nation.

BUT while the Party is confused, indecisive and silent, an important new social development has taken place independently from it, and partly even against its will. This development seems to offer new hope to all those who want Yugoslavia to democratize without at the same time allowing a repetition of the nationalistic conflicts between Serbs and Croats during the Second World War.

The 1981 census showed that over 1,200,000 people had declared themselves as " Yugoslavs." This is almost four times as many as in the census of 1971. A large majority of these are of certain Serbian or Croatian origin, yet they avoid declaring themselves as such and have decided to be Yugoslavs. Almost all of these " new " Yugoslavs reside in the above-mentioned mixed regions of Bosnia, Hercegovina and Croatia.

The majority proved to be young and better-educated people—skilled workers and students—from the new towns with industrial developments and universities. It must be recalled here that a declaration of Yugoslav nationality, rather than of Serbian or Croatian, formed no part of the Party bureaucrats' political platform. There had been no government propaganda in favour of an overall Yugoslav nationality. Indeed, the Party leaderships of the constituent republics positively discouraged any expression of Yugoslavism, viewing it as a threat to their power in the separate republics over which they rule.

The people who declared themselves Yugoslavs do not appear to be centralists, nor do they assert that there should be no constituent republics in Yugoslavia. Even less do they maintain that Yugoslavia should be ruled by an all-powerful Belgrade government. They show no signs of being unitarists in the sense of believing that the overall state should actively try to suppress the cultural and national individualists of the component national entities of Yugoslavia and force them to merge into one single nation. The decision to do so of those who declared

themselves as Yugoslavs appears to be uninfluenced by any ideology, and less still by any essentially political intention or ambition.

The self-declared Yugoslavs are obviously people who deprecate and resist national tensions and confrontations in mixed regions. In their everyday lives—in their choice of friends, work, membership of clubs and other associations, as well as their " cultural consumption " (the music they listen to, the films and television programmes they watch, the books and journals they read)—they exhibit no special preference for members of their own national group.

The declaration of " Yugoslav " is primarily a vote for toleration, for continued coexistence and cooperation among the different national groups, religions, traditions and ways of life. It is a vote for pluralism.

Self-declared Yugoslavs are people who believe that Yugoslavia should continue to exist, and therefore who are particularly opposed to all extreme manifestations of Serbian or Croatian nationalism. At the same time they do not isolate themselves from those who have chosen to remain declared Serbs or Croats. They are thereby suited to act as channels of communication and cooperation between these two nations. Although at first glance their appearance in such large numbers might appear to make the situation between the nations more complicated, it in fact raises hopes for the elimination of extremist nationalist clashes and for a peaceful solution to the Serbo-Croatian national question.

The appearance on the scene of such large numbers of Yugoslavs is, in the first place, a clear defeat for extreme Serbian and Croatian nationalists—those who continue to desire some ultimate Serbian or Croatian confrontation. Opportunities have multiplied for those who wish to improve contacts and communications between Serbs and Croats. Another important thing to understand here is that this development—the significant rise in the number of declared Yugoslavs—has produced no fresh conflicts.

FOR the Yugoslav communist revolution Yugoslavism was an essential element in its aspiration to emancipate people from what were seen as the bonds of tradition, religion and nationalism. Yet this very revolution was led by a monopolistic Party with an ideology which in many of its aspects was incompatible with the freedom of the individual and therefore with human emancipation. In this context, the future of the Yugoslav idea and of Yugoslav identity seems to be in opposition to the communist bureaucracy which is both monopolistic and divisive. For Yugoslavism can only continue if it is the great, democratic, collective ambition of the Yugoslav people, in its attempt to create solidarity, openness and communication among its nations, rather than increasingly coming to resemble a mere sum of nations and republics, which are held together by the common interests of the Communist Party bureaucracy, but which are completely isolated and separate from each other. Only through democracy can Yugoslavia find a new unity for its national diversities.

The Conflict in Kosovo

Elez Biberaj

DEMANDS by ethnic Albanians for the elevation of the province of Kosovo—now an integral part of the Republic of Serbia—to a fully-fledged republic of the Yugoslav federation have been rejected by the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) as malicious and ill-intentioned. Belgrade has maintained that the federal structure established in 1945 remains valid and therefore no changes in the status quo should be contemplated. The issue of Kosovo, Yugoslav authorities have said, has long since been solved, and equality among ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups has been achieved. However, the mass articulation of ethnic Albanians' aspirations for greater political autonomy, the outbreak of widespread nationalist disturbances in Kosovo in the spring of 1981, and the continuation of nationalist manifestations, testify that the problem of Kosovo has not been solved. The challenge stemming from the ethnic Albanians, whom Belgrade has oppressed for so many years, represents one of the most serious political problems confronting post-Tito Yugoslavia.

The status and recognition accorded the Albanians, who represent a qualitatively different ethnic group from the six main South Slav ethnic groups comprising Yugoslavia, are not commensurate with their number and publicly voiced preferences. Kosovo is characterized by ever increasing manifestations of ethnic tensions, popular discontent, economic stagnation, diminishing opportunities for upward mobility, general social malaise, and deteriorating living standards. The Albanians resent Serbian domination and blame their deprivations and the lamentable state of affairs in Kosovo on the political and economic exploitation by Serbia and on the neglect by the central authorities. They have become more aware of their own national interest and are willing to challenge Belgrade for a revision of what they perceive as unjust political arrangements and for a more equitable allocation of resources. Their ethnic assertiveness is bolstered by their increasing number; the movement for the establishment of an Albanian republic within Yugoslavia represents a mass movement from below. Rejection of Albanian demands for equality with other ethnic groups has undermined ethnic Albanians' allegiance and the LCY's legitimacy in Kosovo. As a result, the regime's authority and effectiveness in the Albanian-inhabited regions have been eroded.

The Roots of the Conflict

The resurgence of nationalism and the exacerbation of ethnic antagonism in Kosovo in recent years are a direct result of the past injustices perpetuated against ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, their political and

economic exploitation, cultural oppression and discrimination, and the increasing inequalities of economic development between Albanian-inhabited territories and the rest of the country. Yugoslav policy-makers have been confronted with the dilemma of the Albanian problem ever since the annexation of Kosovo and the other predominantly Albanian-inhabited areas in 1912 and their forced incorporation into what later became Yugoslavia.

At least four different Yugoslav approaches of dealing with the problem of ethnic Albanians can be identified: 1) total de-nationalization, forced assimilation and denial of most elementary human and national rights (1918–41); 2) colonial subordination, political and social discrimination (1945–66); 3) recognition of cultural autonomy and greater policy-making rights and responsibilities (1966–81); and 4) return to a policy of harsh repression and persecution (in the aftermath of the 1981 revolt).

Ethnic Albanians, who had a distinct and well-developed national consciousness and never willingly participated in their annexation to Yugoslavia, were considered from the outset as outsiders, and great efforts were made to dismantle the fabric of their culture and society. In the process of pacifying Kosovo following its partition from Albania in 1912, the Serbian and Montenegrin armies committed large-scale atrocities against the indigenous population.[1] Even after their violent conquest, the Kosovars retained a strong sense of nationalism, and armed resistance against Serbian authorities continued until the late 1920s.[2] Belgrade followed a policy of colonialism, and ethnic Albanians were subjected to forced assimilation and de-nationalization. Kosovo and other compact Albanian-inhabited areas were divided into different administrative units. Albanians were not recognized as a distinct ethnic group and the use of the Albanian language was prohibited. The authorities used an agrarian reform as a means of transforming Kosovo into a predominantly Serbian province and forcing the Albanians to emigrate to Turkey and Albania.[3] By 1941, more than half a million Kosovars had been forced to leave their native land and some 40,000 Slav colonists had been settled in the Albanian-inhabited areas.[4]

Despite the harsh persecution and efforts forcibly to assimilate and de-nationalize the Albanians, Kosovars' ethnic consciousness and asser-

[1] Serbia's expansionist designs and the brutality of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies against ethnic Albanians were denounced by Serbian social democrats. See Dimitrije Tucoviq, *Serbia e Shqiperia*, Rilindja, Prishtina, 1975.

[2] Liman Rushiti, *Levizja kacake ne Kosove (1918–1928)*, Prishtina, 1981; and Ajet Haxhiu, *Shota dhe Azem Galica*, " 8 Nentori," Tirana, 1976.

[3] The implementation of the agrarian reform and its adverse effects on the Kosovars is well documented by the Serbian scholar Milovan Obradovic, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu (1918–1941)*, Prishtina, 1981.

[4] Hajredin Hoxha, " Politika e eliminimit te shqiptareve nga trualli i Jugosllavise se vjeter," *Perparimi* (Prishtina), No. 5, 1970, p. 432; and Hivzi Islami, " Kerkimet antropogjeografike ne Kosove," *Gjurmime Albanologjike: Seria Historike* (Prishtina), Vol. I, 1971, pp. 138–44. See also Ali Hadri, " Pozita dhe gjendja e Kosoves ne mbreterine e Jugosllavise (1918–1941)," *Gjurmime Albanologjike*, No. 2, 1968, pp. 163–91; and Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians* (Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1975), p. 138.

tiveness grew. This prompted the Yugoslav diplomat Vaso Cubrilovic to recommend a " final solution " to the Albanian problem. In a memorandum of March 1937 to the royal government, Cubrilovic argued that " the only means to cope with [the Albanians] is the brute force of an organized state." He recommended the deportation of the entire Albanian population from southern Yugoslavia to Albania and Turkey.[5] The implementation of Cubrilovic's recommendation was prevented by the outbreak of the Second World War.

In the wake of Yugoslavia's dismemberment in 1941, Kosovo was reunited with Albania. During the war, a communist-dominated Partisan movement was organized. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) pledged that at the end of the war the Kosovars would be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination. And in 1945 Tito told an Albanian delegation from Kosovo that in the new Yugoslavia the Albanians would enjoy full equality with other ethnic groups.[6]

But, as the Albanians were to discover, a great discrepancy existed between the theory and practice of the CPY's nationality policy. At the end of the war, the Albanians were recognized as a distinct ethnic group, but they were denied the right to self-determination. Neither could they express their views on the establishment of new political and territorial arrangements. In addition, the Yugoslav army launched a reign of terror against ethnic Albanians. This led to the outbreak of a general revolt. Thousands of ethnic Albanians perished during the massacres of winter 1944–45.[7]

Compact Albanian-inhabited territories were again divided among different administrative units, without regard for the wishes of the local population. Kosovo was incorporated into the Republic of Serbia and given the status of an autonomous region. South-western areas bordering on Albania were attached to Montenegro, while south-eastern areas were incorporated into Macedonia. Clearly, ethnic Albanian interests were sacrificed in order to accommodate the nationalistic aspirations of the three Slav ethnic groups and to give a territorial and demographic consistency to the republics of Montenegro and Macedonia. These new administrative district arrangements hindered the process of ethnic Albanians' integration. Albanian nationalism might have developed along different lines had the Albanians in 1945 been granted equality

[5] Vaso Cubrilovic, *The Expulsion of the Albanians*. Memorandum presented to the Yugoslav Royal Government, 7 March 1937 (n.d. or n.p.), p. 24. See also Hakif Bajrami, " Shtypja dhe rezistenca e shqiptareve ne Kosove," *Studime Historike* (Tirana), No. 2, 1981, pp. 132–34.

[6] Quoted in *Rilindja* (Prishtina), 2 April 1983, p. 11.

[7] Institut za istoriju radnickog pokreta Srbije, *Osnivacki Kongres KP Srbije (8–12 maj 1945)* (Belgrade, 1972), pp. 38–39, 72–83, and 157–58; and Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968), pp. 104–105. Albanian armed resistance against the Yugoslav communist regime continued until 1948. Yugoslav sources provide few details on the Albanian revolt. Albania's communist authorities have asserted that 36,000 Kosovars were murdered during 1945–48. *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), 9 September 1958 and 31 August 1966. Albanian *émigré* sources, on the other hand, claim that as many as 60,000 ethnic Albanians perished during those years. Abas Ermenji, *Albania* (Paris, 1968), p. 482; and Tahir Zajmi, *Lidhja e II e Prizrenit dhe lufta historike e popullit per mbrojtjen e Kosoves* (Brussels, 1964), p. 55.

with the other ethnic groups, included into one territorial unit, and had Kosovo been given the status of a constituent republic.

During 1945–48, when the Yugoslavs dominated Tirana's domestic and foreign affairs, Belgrade hoped to solve the Kosovo problem through Albania's incorporation into the Yugoslav federation. After Belgrade broke with Moscow, however, Albania aligned itself with the Soviet Union and adopted a hostile position towards Yugoslavia. This hostility lasted until the late 1960s. Post-1948 tensions between Belgrade and Tirana were usually accompanied by Yugoslav acts of repression against the Kosovars.

THE excesses of Yugoslav communist rule were most evident in the case of Kosovo, where the secret police, under the direction of Vice-President Aleksandar Rankovic (a Serb), violated the national and human rights of ethnic Albanians. Kosovo was treated as a mere Serbian colony and the Albanians were exploited politically, socially and economically. Although Albanians made up the majority of Kosovo's population, the Serbs and Montenegrins held a monopoly of skilled, administrative and professional positions, and used political means to preserve their privileged status. As a means of controlling the Kosovars, the authorities relied on some local Albanian communists, who were widely perceived in Kosovo as being more " Yugoslav " than " Albanian."

Belgrade authorities deliberately neglected Kosovo's cultural and economic development. With few exceptions, ethnic Albanians were denied positions of high responsibility. The training of Albanian experts was severely undermined. The government failed to deal effectively with Kosovo's socio-economic problems or to advance the Albanians' economic welfare. Until the 1970s, the province was discriminated against in the appropriation of federal development funds. During 1947–56, gross investments per capita in Kosovo amounted to 36 per cent of Yugoslavia's average, and during 1957–65, to 59·1 per cent.[8] Investments were almost exclusively concentrated in the extractive industry and the mineral-rich province served as a raw material supplier for the rest of the country. The teaching of Albanian cultural traditions, literature, folklore and history was severely constrained, and emphasis on the past unity of the Albanian nation was strictly prohibited.[9] Although the Kosovars continued to be linked with their brethren in Albania by family, language, cultural and sentimental ties, the Serbs strongly opposed the establishment of cultural contacts between Prishtina and Tirana in the hope that the Kosovars would eventually develop a distinct national identity.

The Albanians were subjected to government-sanctioned pressures to emigrate. During the period 1953–66 some 230,000 Kosovars emi-

[8] Ali Hadri, " Nacionalni i politicki razvoj albanaca u Jugoslaviji," in *Klasno i nacionalno u sayremenom socijalizmu* (" Nase Teme," Zagreb, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 540–41.

[9] Ibid. p. 551.

grated.[10] Albanians, especially those in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia proper, were pressured into hiding their true ethnic affiliation and were intimidated into declaring themselves " Yugoslavs," " Moslems " or " Turks." In some areas, Albanians were forced to change their names by adding Slavic suffixes to their last names, so as to appear as members of one of the Slavic nations. Those who declared themselves as non-Albanians were offered greater opportunities and a more stable future. Census statistics tended to diminish the Albanians' exact number and to emphasize the multi-national character of Kosovo and the other compact Albanian-inhabited areas.

Demands for an Albanian Republic

On the surface relations between the Albanians and the Serbs appeared to be harmonious throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s. However, latent Albanian hostility existed toward the Serbs, and there were sporadic calls for the establishment of an Albanian republic within the Yugoslav federation.[11] The government responded harshly to any sign of a resurgence of Albanian nationalism. In June 1964, the authorities uncovered an illegal organization which promoted the establishment of an Albanian republic. Its leader, Adem Demaci, a prominent Kosovar intellectual who earlier had been jailed for nationalist activity, was sentenced to 15 years. In addition, 56 members of the organization were sentenced from 3 to 15 years.[12]

In the wake of the euphoria that characterized Yugoslavia following Rankovic's dismissal in 1966, ethnic Albanians began to articulate their aspirations for cultural and political autonomy. They became increasingly aware of their subordinate position in the Yugoslav federation. Kosovo and the other Albanian-inhabited regions experienced a cultural revival, which gave the Kosovars a sense of belonging, fulfilment and national awareness. Cultural revival was expressed through the glorification of the past, the promotion of national themes and symbols, and the rejection of the Serbian interpretation of Albanian history and its verdict on Kosovar movements and national heroes who had achieved prominence in the struggle against the Serbs. Kosovar scholars, utilizing archival materials from Yugoslavia and other countries to write Kosovo's history from the Albanian point of view, emphasized the existence and past unity of the Albanian nation. At the beginning of 1968, the Kosovars adopted the standard literary language officially used in Albania, which was primarily based on the southern (Tosk) dialect and which differed from the northern (Gegh) dialect used in Kosovo. In announcing this decision, Ali Hadri, one of Kosovo's most prominent scholars, said:

[10] Islami, " Kerkimet antropogjeografike ne Kosove," loc. cit. p. 141.

[11] Asllan Fazlija, *Autonomija e Kosoves e Metohise ne Jugosllavine Socialiste* (Rilindja, Prishtina, 1966), p. 57.

[12] " Adem Demaci—simbol i rezistences shqiptare," *Zeri i Kosoves* (Organ of the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo and Other Albanian Areas in Yugoslavia), No. 3 (March 1982), pp. 18–19.

> We Albanians emphasize that we are one nation; we stress that we have a single national culture; we struggle for the affirmation of our national culture in its entirety. . . . In the democratic atmosphere of post-Brioni [post-Rankovic], we have raised our voice and have emphasized, without any reservations, the fact that there does not exist a nationality culture [for the Albanians in Yugoslavia] and a national culture [for the Albanians in Albania], as the regressive and chauvinist [Rankovic] forces wanted to impose on us, but that for every people, including the Albanian people, there exists but a single national culture . . .[13]

The Albanian cultural revival in Yugoslavia was accompanied by a resurgence of nationalism and an exacerbation of ethnic antagonism in Albanian-inhabited regions. The Kosovars demanded an improvement in their socio-political status and economic conditions, an end to the government-sanctioned policy of discrimination against them in government, education, and economic activity, proportional representation in local and federal government, and the right to dispose of their own natural resources as they saw fit. The Albanians, rejecting Serbian implications that they were not fit to run their own affairs, insisted that they could achieve full equality with other ethnic groups only if Kosovo were granted republican status.[14]

As the Albanians pushed ahead with demands for reform, the Serbs and the Montenegrins expressed deep suspicions about the effects of granting the Kosovars full equality.[15] Although the authorities publicly acknowledged the harsh repression and discrimination against the Albanians in the post-1945 era,[16] they were slow in responding to Albanian demands. In late 1968, widespread demonstrations broke out in Kosovo and western Macedonia.[17] Belgrade rejected demands for elevating Kosovo to the status of a republic, thus losing an excellent opportunity to defuse Albanian nationalism. The issue of Kosovo had not yet been politicized and apparently the Yugoslav public, in the wake of the disclosure of Rankovic's harsh repression of ethnic Albanians, was more prepared to accept the establishment of an Albanian republic than at any time before or since 1968–69. However, the Yugoslav leadership, including Tito, lacked the political will to overcome or neutralize Serbian opposition. Moreover, Kosovar leaders failed to press the issue or enlist the support of the leaderships of the other republics.

Following the demonstrations, the authorities granted the Kosovars more national rights and took measures to improve their socio-political position. The Albanians gradually came to play an increasingly greater

[13] Ali Hadri, " Nje komb, nje gjuhe letrare," *Perparimi*, Nos. 3–4, 1968, p. 323.

[14] *Politika* (Belgrade), 18 September 1968, p. 6; and *Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1830 GMT, 23 September 1968.

[15] See speeches by Joca Marjanovic and Dobrica Cosic at the 14th session of the CC of the League of Communists of Serbia, May 1968, in *Savez Komunista u borbi za nacionalnu ravnopravnost*, (" Komunist," Belgrade, 1968), pp. 89–116.

[16] See Tito's report in *IX Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade, 1969), p. 11.

[17] Peter R. Prifti, *Kosovo in Ferment*. Monograph No. C/69-15 (MIT Center for International Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

role in Kosovo's day-to-day affairs. Federal assistance to the province increased considerably. For the first time since 1945, the Albanians were allowed to display national emblems, including the Albanian flag. Cultural development of the Albanians was encouraged, the Albanian language was given equal status with Serbo-Croat, and an Albanian university was established. The improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, opened the way for the establishment of cultural contacts between Prishtina and Tirana. The Kosovars were given greater representation in local, republican, and federal government institutions, and efforts were made to narrow the extreme imbalances between Albanians and Serbs in all spheres of life. The 1969 and 1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 constitution, which recognized the autonomous provinces as constituent elements of the Yugoslav federation, granted Kosove considerable cultural and administrative autonomy. However, the political decision-making autonomy enjoyed by the republics was withheld.

Despite their considerable achievements, the Albanians continued to perceive themselves as being in a subordinate position. This perception was reinforced by the fact that the Serbian and Montenegrin minority, which in 1971 represented 20·8 per cent of Kosovo's total population, continued to be over-represented in the government, the Party and the administration; Serbs and Montenegrins enjoyed a higher standard of living than the Albanians, with 73·6 per cent of the population. This state of affairs, together with the increasing competition for scarce jobs and apartments in the ever growing urban areas, further aggravated the ethnic conflict.

THE significant economic, social and demographic changes that Kosovo underwent during the late 1960s and the early 1970s stimulated greater awareness among ethnic Albanians. The expansion of the Albanian-language mass media, which made comparisons easy between conditions in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia, underscored Albanian grievances based on perceived political, economic and cultural deprivations.

A new, self-confident, Kosovar élite gradually emerged. In June 1971, the provincial Party chief, Veli Deva, was replaced by Mahmut Bakalli, a 35-year-old former leader of the municipal committee of the League of Communists of Prishtina. Many of the older Party and government officials were sent into semi-retirement or named as provincial representatives in Belgrade. As participants in the power structure, members of the new élite aimed at maximizing Kosovo's autonomy within the existing system. Relying on the national base as a source of legitimacy, Bakalli used the ethnic issue to increase Kosovo's autonomy and employed the LCY's pronouncements on " brotherhood and equality " to advocate the full recognition of ethnic Albanians' national rights. Although the Albanians had made considerable progress in their national

self-assertion and social, economic and political development, wrote Bakalli, further efforts would have to be made to promote their " equality of rights."[18]

While pursuing a hard-line policy towards suspected " nationalists and irredentists," Bakalli used national sentiments as a bureaucratic instrument of pressure to obtain greater autonomy from Serbia. He argued that the situation in Kosovo could get out of hand and thus cause unforeseen consequences if the Albanians were not granted more autonomy.[19] He clashed with Serbia's leaders over the nature and extent of Kosovo's autonomy, and preferred to raise Kosovo's problems at the federal rather than the republican level, thus gradually loosening links with Serbia. In 1977, the leadership of both Kosovo and Vojvodina reportedly complained at a LCY meeting that the provinces did not enjoy enough autonomy.[20]

Kosovo continued to be characterized by ethnic imbalances, extreme conditions of economic underdevelopment, and an inadequate and unbalanced regional investment policy. In 1974, out of 128,000 people employed in the social sector, the Serbs and Montenegrins accounted for about 36 per cent, compared with about 58 per cent for the Albanians.[21] By the end of the decade, the share of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo's total population had fallen to about 15 per cent, while that of the Albanians had grown to 77·5 per cent. The two Slavic ethnic groups, however, continued to be over-represented, accounting in 1982 for about 30 per cent of the total number of people employed, compared with some 65 per cent for the Albanians. Of the total number of employees in " organizations of associated labour," 60·48 per cent were Albanians, and 33 per cent were Serbs and Montenegrins. The Albanians accounted for 53·5 per cent of the total number of workers with special authority and responsibilities, while the Serbs and Montenegrins accounted for 38·79 per cent. And of Kosovo's 251 presidents of administrative agencies of socio-political organizations, 54·34 per cent were Albanians, and 37·79 per cent Serbs and Montenegrins.[22]

Despite considerable federal assistance, the province not only remained Yugoslavia's least developed area, but the gap between Kosovo and other regions sharply increased. Inflation and unemployment rose dramatically and the standard of living declined significantly. By 1979, per capita annual income in Kosovo had fallen to 27·8 per cent of the Yugoslav average. Prominent Kosovars, such as sociologist Hivzi Islami, argued that the existence of such extreme social and economic in-

[18] Mahmut Bakalli, " The Self-Assertion of the Yugoslav Nationalities Under Self-Management Socialism," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade), No. 2, February 1980, p. 39.

[19] See Zivko Milic, " Dosje kontrarevolucije na Kosovu," *Danas* (Zagreb), 20 April 1982, pp. 80–84.

[20] *Tanjug in English*, 1919 GMT, 24 December 1981.

[21] *Borba*, 8 November 1977, p. 9.

[22] *Jedinstvo* (Prishtina), 22–25 October 1982, p. 7. As of 31 May 1983, the national structure of employees in Kosovo's administrative organs was as follows: Albanians 448 (61 per cent), Serbs and Montenegrins 260 (32·5 per cent), and others 52 (6·5 per cent). See *Rilindja*, 21 March 1984, p. 7.

equalities demonstrated that the problem of the Albanian nationality had not yet been solved.[23]

One of the main reasons for Kosovo's lagging behind the rest of the country was insufficient investments, as Veselin Djuranovic, former president of the Federal Executive Council and currently President of the collective presidency, acknowledged during a visit in 1979 to Prishtina.[24] In the entire post-war period, the total per capita investments amounted to only 50 per cent of the average of the country as a whole.[25] Moreover, investments were primarily concentrated in the extractive industry, while the processing industry and agriculture were neglected.

With growing energy shortages, the central authorities intensified the exploitation of Kosovo's plentiful hydroelectric power, and large deposits of lead, lignite, coal, zinc, and other mineral resources. The Kosovars resented the fact that most of the production of the primary energy and industrial resources went to support the industrial needs and meet the overall energy requirements of Serbia and the other republics. Kosovo, they charged, was being exploited. The price of electrical energy, for example, that Kosovo exported to Serbia and Macedonia—two of the republics most severely affected by the energy crisis—was two to three times below the price of the energy produced in the other republics. And some 90 per cent of the lead and zinc from the Trepca mine—exported at unusually low prices—was processed in the other republics.[26]

WITH the steady deterioration of the economy, and growing discontent and unrest among the Albanian population, Kosovo experienced the emergence of an increasingly sophisticated grass-roots movement for a separate republic encompassing all the Albanians living in Yugoslavia. The movement attracted a coalition of various people—students, academicians, journalists, workers, farmers, and even LCY members—with potential political significance.

Students and intellectuals, who were born and raised in Tito's Yugoslavia, became the staunchest proponents of an Albanian republic. Frustrated by political, economic, and ethnic discrimination, they directed their activities at breaking Serbia's clamp on Kosovo. They tried to persuade other Yugoslav ethnic groups that establishing an Albanian republic was possible and desirable. Such a step, they argued, would strengthen rather than weaken the federation. The underground press articulated the issue for Albanian political autonomy, analysed the socio-economic and political problems facing Kosovo, denounced the

[23] Hivzi Islami, " Vecorite ekonomiko-sociale te popullsise se Kosoves sipas kombesise," *Gjurmime Albanologjike: Folklor dhe Etnologji*, Vol. IX, 1979, p. 94.

[24] *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1527 GMT, 16 October 1979.

[25] *Rilindja*, 9 April 1982, p. 6.

[26] Hivzi Islami, *Popullsia e Kosoves: Studim Demografik* (Prishtina, 1981), pp. 25–26. Yugoslavia's long-term programme for energy development schedules Kosovo to be the country's greatest source of electricity. The province will have to supply to other parts of the country 47 per cent of all the energy it produces. *Prishtina Domestic Service in Albanian*, 1800 GMT, 3 December 1983.

persecution of ethnic Albanians, and suggested alternatives to the current political and territorial arrangements.[27]

The first large-scale Albanian nationalist activity, after the 1968 demonstrations, was carried out in western Macedonia and Kosovo during the period 1973–75, when a large number of Albanians received long-term prison sentences for " hostile activity." In December 1974, some 100 Albanians were arrested after students demonstrated at Prishtina University demanding that Kosovo be granted republican status.[28] A nationalist organization—the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo—was uncovered in late 1975. The organization, formed by Adem Demaci's followers, had been active during the 1968 demonstrations, but apparently most of its leaders had been arrested. It reappeared in mid-1973, under a new leadership. In June 1974, Demaci was released from prison after serving 10 years of his 15-year sentence, and reportedly assumed the leadership of the movement. Members of the organization were accused of " conspiring against the people and the state " with the aim of detaching Kosovo and the other Albanian-inhabited areas from Yugoslavia and uniting them with Albania. Demaci was again given the maximum sentence of 15 years, while 20 other members of the organization were sentenced to terms ranging from 4 to 12 years.[29]

On the occasion of the centenary of the Albanian League—the first organized Albanian national movement formed in Kosovo's Prizren in 1878—leaflets, urging that Kosovo be granted the status of a republic, were distributed throughout the province. In 1979, similar leaflets were reportedly distributed in several Kosovo towns.[30] During Tito's last visit to Kosovo, in autumn 1979, demonstrations were organized in Prishtina.[31] The authorities thwarted plans in 1980 for a widespread propaganda action scheduled for 28 November, Albania's independence day.[32]

From 1974 to 1981, the security forces identified 618 Kosovars who operated in an organized manner from " nationalist and irredentist positions." Of these, 89 were sentenced to prison from 1 to 15 years. Magistrates' courts handed down sentences against 503 Albanians. Outside Kosovo, during the same period, 39 Albanians were sentenced on criminal charges, while 76 others were punished by magistrates' courts. The security forces reportedly uncovered 13 illegal groups.[33]

During the mid- and late 1970s, according to Yugoslav officials, three main organizations, promoting the idea of establishing an Albanian republic within the Yugoslav federation, emerged. Their membership consisted predominantly of intellectuals: professors, teachers, scientific

[27] *Zeri i Kosoves*, No. 2, September 1982, p. 19.
[28] *Reuter in English*, 1624 GMT, 13 January 1975.
[29] *Borba*, 8 February 1976, p. 7; and *Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1110 GMT, 18 March 1976.
[30] See interview with Franjo Herljevic, Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs, *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1350 GMT, 12 May 1981.
[31] Boris Susa, " Showdown in the Underground," *Danas*, 15 June 1982, pp. 84–88.
[32] *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1350 GMT, 12 May 1981.
[33] *Rilindja*, 10 June 1981, pp. 6–7.

workers, doctors, economists, lawyers and journalists. Among those arrested and tried there were also many students, workers and farmers.[34]

The three organizations apparently cooperated closely, had similar programmes and tactics, and articulated well-defined objectives. In underground publications and in letters sent to the provincial leadership, they explained their objectives as " the merger of the Albanian areas in Yugoslavia into the Socialist Republic of the Albanians in Yugoslavia." Such a republic, it was argued, would be " politically, economically and territorially independent of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro," and would give ethnic Albanians equal status with other ethnic groups.[35]

In late 1980, one of the organizations sent a copy of its " programme " to the provincial leadership. Emphasizing that the Albanians in Yugoslavia live on " their territory," the organization put forth three main demands: 1) that the status of the Albanians as a " nationality " be changed and they be recognized as a " nation," with the right to self-determination; 2) that all ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia be included into one territorial unit, independent of the other republics; and 3) that the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists be given the status of the Central Committee of the " League of Communists of Albanians in Yugoslavia." These demands, it insisted, could only be met with the formation of the " Socialist Republic of Albanians in Yugoslavia."[36]

Belgrade's Response

With the rise of popular discontent and widespread underground activities in the Albanian-inhabited areas, Belgrade could not have failed to anticipate how broadly-based the support of ethnic Albanians for a republic would be. The central authorities, however, showed ineptitude and insensitivity towards Kosovar demands. They even refused to recognize publicly that a problem existed, insisting that the issue of ethnic Albanians had been solved once and for all.

The ruling LCY, which evidently enjoyed little support among the people in Kosovo, failed to take the initiative and attempt to shape and channel the direction of Albanian demands along less confrontational lines. No possibility was provided for regulating conflict through established Party and government institutions. Nor did the opportunity exist for a peaceful expression of ethnic Albanians' grievances. Officially, the ethnic conflict in Kosovo was increasingly portrayed in terms of a zero-sum game, which led to the politicization of the whole issue of the status of the Albanian nationality.

It was against the background of Belgrade's inflexibility and insensitivity that Kosovo exploded in the spring of 1981. What began as a student demonstration at Kosovo University on 11 March, by the end of the

[34] Ibid. 24 October 1982, p. 10.
[35] *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1421 GMT, 7 February 1983.
[36] Ibid.

month had developed into a full-scale popular uprising.[37] In what was apparently the most striking mass protest against Yugoslavia's communist regime since 1945, tens of thousands of Albanians took to the streets demanding republican status.

Belgrade refused to grant Kosovo republican status that had the potential of long-term stability. Instead, the uprising was crushed in a manner that disregarded any respect for the Albanians' most fundamental national and human rights. The army, police, militia and tanks were used to restore order. A curfew was imposed, public gatherings were banned, the University was shut down, and a state of emergency was proclaimed. For the first time since Rankovic's era, the Serbian militia and the federal army were given a free hand to deal with the Kosovars as they pleased. Ethnic Albanians must have wondered whether demonstrations by other ethnic groups would have been suppressed with such brutal force.

The government admitted that 9 people had been killed, and 257 injured.[38] Western news reports, however, indicated that perhaps as many as 1,000 people might have been killed.[39] Since neither domestic nor foreign reporters were allowed into Kosovo during the disturbances, it is impossible to determine accurately how many people in fact died. This writer was told by a number of Kosovars, some of whom claim to have participated in the demonstrations, that army and militia units, especially those from Serbia and Macedonia, had acted in an " extremely brutal manner," shooting at women and children, and that demonstrators in Prishtina and Podujeva were " crushed " by tanks. According to these sources, in Prishtina alone several hundred Albanians were killed and more than 1,000 wounded after the army moved in with tanks and armoured personnel carriers.[40] Armed clashes between Albanians and security forces occurred in several places.[41]

[37] The spring 1981 events have been amply reported. See Pedro Ramet, " Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 21 (Summer 1981), pp. 369–88; Patrick F. R. Artisien and R. A. Howells, " Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots," *The World Today*, Vol. 37, No. 11 (November 1981), pp. 419–27; Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, " The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views," *Conflict Studies* (London), Number 137/138 (1982); and Mark Baskin, " Crisis in Kosovo," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (March–April 1983), pp. 61–74.

[38] *Rilindja*, 25 April 1981, p. 4.

[39] *The Evening Standard* (London), 21 April 1981; and *Kurier* (Vienna), 17 April 1981, p. 5. According to US Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, 1,600 people were killed. See *Congressional Record*, Vol. 129, No. 79, p. S7816.

[40] In an interview, a member of the LCY Presidium denied reports that hundreds or thousands of Albanians had been killed, insisting that " if that had happened in a European country like Yugoslavia, it would have been impossible to hide it for long." See *Le Soir* (Brussels), 29 July 1981, p. 3.

[41] On 14 May 1981, in a village near Mitrovica, four policemen were killed and three wounded when they tried to apprehend an Albanian " fugitive," Tahir Mehaj, who apparently had refused to surrender to Serbian militia, barricading himself and his family. In a shoot-out between the Mehaj family and security forces, both Mehaj and his father were killed. *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1629 GMT, 14 May 1981. According to informed Kosovar sources, army units took part and used tanks in the assault on the house where the Mehajs had barricaded themselves. Dozens of people were allegedly killed. Five weeks after the incident, authorities disclosed that criminal charges were brought against several local Albanian police officials and villagers, who, it was said, had come to Mehaj's aid in the armed confrontation with the security forces. See *Reuter*, 12 June 1981; *UPI*, 12 June 1981; *Rilindja*, 13 June 1981, p. 4; and *Ilustrovana Politika* (Belgrade), 16 June 1981, p. 22. The Kosovars reportedly

The official reports of the Albanian uprising were characterized by fundamental distortions. The nature of Albanian demands was misrepresented. The socio-economic causes of the uprising were minimized and vaguely defined domestic and foreign " enemies " were blamed. The Albanians' subordinate position in the federation and their repression were largely ignored. Albanian nationalists were accused of attempting to create an " ethnically pure " Kosovo, which eventually would be incorporated into a " Greater Albania."

Indeed, in view of Belgrade's intransigence, some activists saw no possibility for the national assertion of ethnic Albanians in the current Yugoslav political system and voiced the maximum demand—union with their mother country Albania, despite the repressive policies of Enver Hoxha's regime. This view, however, was not shared by the majority of Albanian activists who concentrated on demanding a restructuring of the current arrangements of the Yugoslav federation.

In a news conference with foreign reporters on 6 April 1981, a senior Yugoslav official said that " a republic of Kosovo within the framework of Yugoslavia is impossible," insisting that the problem of Albanian nationality " was solved during the national liberation war."[42] A similar stand was adopted at subsequent Party and government meetings devoted to the problem of Kosovo.

THE main reason for Belgrade's intransigence was the strong opposition from the Serbs, who claim Kosovo on historical grounds. Modern Serbian and Yugoslav historiography, based on the writings of the Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic (1865–1927) and, more recently, of Atanasije Urosevic,[43] denies the autochthonous character of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, claiming that the Serbs inhabited Kosovo before the Albanians, and that the latter emigrated to Kosovo with the encouragement of Ottoman authorities after the Serbian exodus in the wake of the Austrian–Ottoman wars of 1689–90 and 1737–39. By this definition the Albanians are considered as " newcomers " to " Serbian " Kosovo.

The Albanians respond to Serbian claims by insisting that they are the direct descendents of the Illyrians, and thus have every right to be in Kosovo. On historical grounds, the Albanians could make a better case than the Serbs. While the Serbs base their arguments primarily on a legendary myth of a long bygone era, Albanians point to Kosovo's central place in their own modern history. Kosovo was the cradle of Albanian nationalism, and the Kosovars played a prominent role in the nationalist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and in the struggle which led to the proclamation of Albania's independence

regard the Mehajs as " national heroes," and the town of Mitrovica—renamed " Tito's Mitrovica " after the demonstrations—is widely referred to as " Tahir's Mitrovica " after Tahir Mehaj.

[42] See interview with Stane Dolanc, *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 7 April 1981, pp. 1, 4.

[43] Jovan Cvijic, *Osnove za geografiju i geologiju Makedonie i Stare Srbije* (Belgrade, 1919), and *Balkansko Poluostrvo i juzno-slovenske zemlje* (Belgrade, 1922); and Atanasije Urosevic, *Kosovo* (Belgrade, 1965).

in 1912. The Serbs were able to impose their control over Kosovo and annex it from Albania only through force of arms and with the sanction of the Great Powers.

Demands for the establishment of an Albanian republic within the Yugoslav federation represent a just and viable solution to the problem of Kosovo after more than 70 years of Serbian occupation, repression, domination and exploitation. The evidence indicates virtually universal support among ethnic Albanians for the elevation of Kosovo to the status of a republic. Through a variety of protest actions, the Albanians have made it clear that they consider the status quo to be totally unacceptable.

ALBANIANS display the distinctive features necessary for the establishment of a separate republic. They are distinguishable from the Slavs by language, history, culture and traditions, and inhabit compact areas not only in Kosovo, but also in Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia. The April 1981 census indicates that there are some 1,730,000 ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, of whom 1,227,424 live in Kosovo (representing 77·5 per cent of the total population), 377,000 in Macedonia, 72,432 in Serbia proper, and 37,735 in Montenegro. They outnumber the Macedonians (1,340,000) and the Montenegrins (577,298). With a birth rate of 27·4 per thousand they will probably soon outnumber also the Slovenes (1,750,000) and the Moslems (2,000,000). Proportionally, there are more Albanians in Kosovo (77·5 per cent) than Croatians (75 per cent), Macedonians (67 per cent), and Montenegrins (68·54 per cent) in their respective republics.[44] Thus, on numbers alone the Albanians qualify for a republic.

Granting Kosovo republican status would finally fulfil CPY wartime pledges that ethnic Albanians in post-war Yugoslavia would enjoy the right to self-determination as well as equality with other ethnic groups. Moreover, such a solution would confer on Kosovo the autonomous status recognized by the CPY before 1945. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1940, Tito approved a request by Kosovar communists that the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Kosovo, which had been established in July 1937, have direct links with the CPY Central Committee (CC). In a major report to the same conference, the prominent Yugoslav communist Mose Pijade spoke of the creation of a Kosovo "worker-peasants republic."[45] Throughout the war period, the Kosovo Party branch and the Partisan movement maintained direct links with the CPY CC and were not subordinated to Serbia's Party and Partisan movement. Kosovo's autonomy was recognized in Tito's communications with Kosovar communists and in many CPY statements.[46]

[44] *Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1400 GMT, 16 February 1982; *Tanjug in English*, 1900 GMT, 17 February 1982; and *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1130 GMT, 8 March 1982.

[45] Kurtesh Saliu, "Tito dhe autonomia," *Perparimi*, No. 1, 1978, p. 53.

[46] Fazlija, *Autonomija e Kosoves e Metohise ne Jugosllavine Socialiste*, pp. 38–39; and Hajredin Hoxha, "Procesi i vetevendosjes se nacionalitetit shqiptar gjate revolucionit dhe ndertimit socialist," *Kosova/Kosovo* (Prishtina), Vol. 2, 1973, pp. 68–80.

The elevation of Kosovo to the status of a republic would give the Albanians greater local decision-making autonomy, both in the economic and in the political arena, and a greater say in policy formulations at the federal level. Republican status would also give the Albanians a vested interest in the federation by ensuring a more equitable allocation of resources and political power, as well as an end to repression, discrimination and exploitation by the Serbs.

Republican proponents reject Serbian charges that their aim is the creation of an " ethnically pure " Kosovo by allegedly pressuring the Serbs and the Montenegrins to emigrate, and dismiss fears that granting Kosovo republican status would lead to its secession from Yugoslavia.[47] The Movement for the Establishment of an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia, which was formed after the merger of three underground organizations in early 1982, argued in a statement published in its organ *Zeri i Kosoves* (The Voice of Kosovo) that attempts to freeze current territorial arrangements would result in the weakening and destabilization of the federation.[48] In a subsequent statement, it argued that

> . . . the establishment of [an Albanian] republic would represent a very important factor for the stability and the strengthening of the Yugoslav federation, because no one intends to change Yugoslavia's socio-political order, let alone detach from it territories in order to hand them over to Albania. The Albanians are demanding some rights to which they are entitled but which have been denied them.
> . . .
> By granting [the Albanians] the status of a republic, neither the international borders of Yugoslavia nor the self-management socialism, which has been accepted by Yugoslav society, will be affected.[49]

IN the wake of the 1981 events, Belgrade had every reason to find a solution to the Albanian problem. But, as was the case in 1968–69, the Yugoslavs again lost an opportunity to defuse Albanian nationalism. Although mass terror no longer appeared a viable option, the authorities resorted to outright terror, intimidation, widespread arrests, show trials and massive purges, with the aim of achieving political conformity, the Kosovars' submission, and the elimination of grass-roots support for an Albanian republic.

[47] *Liria* (Organ of the Marxist-Leninist Group of Kosovo), Nos. 4–5, August 1981, pp. 5–6. In an unprecedented airing of views in support of an Albanian republic, Radio Belgrade interviewed two Albanian political convicts in January 1984. Bajrush Xhemajli, a student from Podujeva serving a 14-year prison sentence, said: " I believe that by proclaiming Kosovo a republic, our country would not lose any of its integrity, for we do not attack or wish to undermine the present system . . . We [the Albanians] do not say that this is a bad system or anything of the sort, but we do say that we want to be equal [with other ethnic groups] in Yugoslavia." The other convict, Ramadan Veliu, a former Party organization secretary, asserted that, " By the very fact that it is our striving to create a socialist republic within the SFRY, which will be led by the ideological course of the LCY, I see no tendency to endanger the political system and our territorial integrity. To give Kosovo the status of a republic, I believe, would be only a step in the direction of self-managing confirmation of society and an even deeper strengthening of the self-managing system." *Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 0900 GMT, 8 January 1984.

[48] *Zeri i Kosoves*, No. 1, June 1982, p. 2.

[49] Ibid. No. 2, September 1982, p. 19.

Control of Kosovo was intensified by means of the army, the militia and security forces. The province was put under martial law and a large number of troops from other parts of the country was stationed there. Thousands of people were arrested and a massive purge, extending to all sectors of society was initiated. The authorities claimed that between March 1981 and December 1983, 72 illegal organizations with about 1,000 members were uncovered in Kosovo. In the same period, 658 Albanians were convicted on charges of " counter-revolutionary activity " and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 1 to 15 years. In addition, several thousand people were sentenced on charges of misdemeanours.[50] By mid-1984, dozens of other Albanians had received stiff prison sentences. The majority of those sentenced were intellectuals and students, including some minors.[51] The concept of collective responsibility was vigorously applied. Families and relatives of persons engaged in " hostile " activity were penalized, boycotted, publicly condemned, and in some cases dismissed from their jobs.[52]

The provincial leadership, led by Bakalli, was replaced by members of the " old guard," such as Veli Deva, Ali Shukria, Mehmet Maliqi, Kol Shiroka and Sinan Hasani, most of whom had been compromised during the Rankovic era and obviously did not represent the wishes of the majority of the Kosovars. Officials were appointed to leading positions on the basis of loyalty to Belgrade rather than competence. By April 1983, over 1,600 people had been expelled from the LCY and an undisclosed number dismissed from their jobs.[53]

The position of ethnic Albanians rapidly deteriorated. Large segments of the population were affected—directly or indirectly—by the government's repression, which led to a further intensification of national feelings among the Kosovars. Belgrade's authority in Kosovo declined, thus undermining the Albanians' allegiance and the regime's legitimacy.

In an attempt to extinguish Albanian identity, the authorities, in the words of a senior Serbian official, declared war on the " Albanian national consciousness."[54] Such issues as education in the Albanian language, Albanian textbooks, development of cultural programmes, and the display of the Albanian flag and other ethnic symbols, became subjects of dispute.

In Macedonia and Montenegro, the authorities prohibited the display of the Albanian flag. Despite strong opposition from Kosovo's political leadership, Serbia introduced legal measures to change the Albanian flag, insisting that the Kosovars could not display the same flag as that of

[50] *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 0954 GMT, 10 March 1984. According to a Zagreb magazine, " there is almost no Albanian family that does not have someone in prison." See " U potrazi za dokazima povjerenja," *Danas*, 2 April 1984, p. 23.

[51] *Politika*, 9 March 1982, p. 8, and 16 March 1982, p. 8; and *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1402 GMT, 3 April 1982.

[52] In Mitrovica, for example, one Dr Gani Kajtazi, officially described as an " outstanding " communist activist, was expelled from the LCY because his father, from whom he was separated at the age of six, had participated in the demonstrations. See *Rilindja*, 26 July 1981.

[53] Ibid. 9 April 1983, p. 6.

[54] Ibid. 7 May 1981, pp. 1, 4,

Albania. The Albanians became increasingly distressed by the erosion of gains achieved during Bakalli's era[55] and the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the Albanian-inhabited areas.

Government repression in the field of culture, and the subordination and exclusion of the intelligentsia, led to an intellectual stagnation. Albanian intellectuals were subjected to severe criticism for nationalist "indoctrination" of the masses, particularly the youth. At Kosovo University, a widespread purge was carried out. Six professors, including Ukshin Hoti, a former senior provincial official who studied in the United States, and Muhamet Ternava, a prominent historian, were sentenced to long prison terms for having endorsed demands for a Kosovo republic and having allegedly engaged in "counter-revolutionary" activity.[56] Administrative and Party measures were taken against some 20 other university professors, including Ali Hadri, director of Kosovo's Institute of History, Rexhep Qosja, director of the Institute of Albanian Studies, and sociologist Hivzi Islami, a prolific writer on Kosovo's socio-economic problems.[57]

Official repression of the Albanian disturbances occurred at a time when the outside world was preoccupied with the labour unrest in Poland and the possibility of Soviet intervention in that country. Because of Yugoslavia's non-alignment and its strategic location, the West was reluctant to condemn the repression of ethnic Albanians.

Albania publicly criticized Yugoslavia and endorsed Kosovar demands for a republic. The Serbs, who had viewed with disapproval the development of close cultural contacts between Tirana and Prishtina, probably welcomed Tirana's attacks because it gave them an opportunity to use Hoxha's regime as a scapegoat and to shift public opinion away from the real causes of the Albanian revolt. Belgrade launched a media campaign against Hoxha's regime, accusing Tirana of having incited the Kosovars. The resumption of Tirana–Belgrade polemics caused a serious deterioration in their relations, which during the 1970s had been characterized by unprecedented economic and cultural cooperation.[58] All cultural links between Kosovo and Tirana were cut.

BELGRADE'S strategy for the conflict in Kosovo, using military repression, trials and purges of the intelligentsia, is unrealistic. In the

[55] In May 1984, an ethnic Serb, Svetislav Dolasevic, was elected president of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee, a position hereto held by ethnic Albanians. The post of the President of the Executive Council of Kosovo Assembly was also filled by an ethnic Serb—Nedjo Borkovic. *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1021 GMT, 5 May 1984, and 0918 GMT, 15 May 1984.

[56] *Rilindja*, 9 October 1982, p. 4.

[57] Azem Vllasi, president of Prishtina LC Municipal Committee, indicated in April 1984 that a new purge of intellectuals at Kosovo University was under way. He complained that a number of professors had not accepted "the essential assessments by the LCY on counter-revolutionary events, [and] have chosen to go astray, that is, to practise a kind of passive resistance to the current action of the LC." These scholars, Vllasi asserted, had refused to participate in actions designed to expose "the essence of ideological positions of the irredentist movement. . . . They do not want to make a critical reference to failures, errors, non-Marxist and uncritical tendencies in Kosovo's history. . . ."

[58] See Elez Biberaj, "Albanian–Yugoslav Relations and the Question of Kosovo," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (January 1983), pp. 485–510.

long run it can only lead to further confrontation rather than accommodation between the Albanians and the Serbs. A repressive policy is not likely to restore political and economic stability in the Albanian-inhabited areas nor is it sustainable in the long term. The present repression is fuelling the next explosion. Terror might have worked in the past, when the authorities had to deal with a parochial, underdeveloped Albanian nationality, which made very few demands on the system. Now, however, Belgrade will have to deal with a more sophisticated, better educated, and an assertive and self-conscious ethnic group, determined to see that its national rights are fully recognized.

Currently, Serbia's narrow nationalist interests have been given prominence over the interests of the federation as a whole. Yugoslav rule in Kosovo is based on fear, and popular aspirations have been suppressed by sheer force. Kosovar society has been polarized into the "collaborators," a minority of mostly old or middle-aged people who have a vested interest in the present system, and the "opponents," the majority of the population, which is disillusioned with the existing political arrangements. The cost of keeping Kosovo under Serbia's tutelage will rise and the Albanian problem is likely to become more rather than less difficult to manage. The continuation of the current policy could prove more detrimental to Yugoslavia's interests in the long run than granting the Albanians a republic.

Despite the use of force and reports of brutal tactics, the Kosovars have not been subdued. The return to a more authoritarian pattern of political rule since 1981 has not produced greater compliance nor has it elicited the initiative, creativity, and motivation that Kosovo's current problems demand. The post-Bakalli leadership, which is made up predominantly of representatives of another era, has been unable to win over any major component of society, or to convince ethnic Albanians that it is more than a surrogate for Serbian occupation.

Albanian nationalist activists carried on their activity through demonstrations, work stoppages, school boycotts, economic sabotage, writing slogans, circulating pamphlets, and various forms of passive resistance. Demonstrations occurred throughout 1981 and the spring of 1982. The second anniversary of the 11 March 1981 demonstrations was marked by disturbances in Prishtina and several other cities, albeit on a much smaller scale than those of the previous year.[59] From October 1982 to March 1984 nine bombs exploded in Prishtina.[60] The vast majority of the population is said to remain unsubdued. A Yugoslav journalist, who visited the province in October 1982, noted that the attitude and

[59] *Politika*, 5 June 1983, p. 7.

[60] Twelve members of an illegal group were arrested in March 1984 on charges of planting explosives in Prishtina. Their identities were not revealed " in the interest of the investigation." *Tanjug in English*, 1316 GMT, 28 March 1984. Earlier, the authorities announced that two members of an illegal group—Nuri Berisha, a former law student, and Rexhep Mala, a former political convict—had committed suicide in order to avoid capture by the security forces. *Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1840 GMT, 12 January 1984. *Zeri i Kosoves* (No. 1, February 1984, p. 4) charged that security forces used tear gas against Berisha and Mala, who were barricaded in a basement, and then " murdered " them.

behaviour of ethnic Albanians was characterized by " civil disobedience and sabotage, resistance against the state authorities without the use of force, and protest against the existing system."[61]

There is an urgent need for dialogue between the central authorities and ethnic Albanians and for genuine political concessions if continuation of the conflict is to be avoided. The continuation of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo is likely to lead to a radicalization of ethnic Albanians, provoke further violence, and drive a new wedge between Albania and Yugoslavia. The Kosovars have limited access to the political centre and, with no acceptable solution in sight, might feel that they need foreign support to deal with the Serbs, who have privileged access to governmental power. The conflict can also strengthen pro-Soviet forces in both Albania and Yugoslavia, which at present neither Tirana nor Belgrade wants. There is a possibility that the Soviet Union, which has never forgiven Tirana and Belgrade for their defection from Moscow's orbit, might try to exploit the Kosovo conflict, hoping to re-establish a foothold on the Adriatic.

YUGOSLAVIA'S central authorities will have to recognize that ethnic conflict in Kosovo must be regulated in a way that acknowledges the vital interests of ethnic Albanians. They must have full equality with the Serbs and other ethnic groups. The possibility of a dangerous upheaval, which is bound to arise sooner or later if the current cycle of repression continues, must be averted. Belgrade cannot regard present outdated political and territorial arrangements, which accommodate Serbian nationalistic aspirations at the expense of legitimate ethnic Albanian aspirations, as a long-term solution to the Albanian problem. The Yugoslav leadership, which evidently lacks the political will to resolve the conflict, is relying on a " muddle through " approach. But until a just solution is found to the Albanian problem, the threat of a larger ethnic confrontation, with potential international complications, will persist.

[61] Quoted in *Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croat*, 1123 GMT, 20 October 1982.

Yugoslav Literature of Disclosure

Oskar Gruenwald

FOLLOWING Tito's death on 4 May 1980, there has been a resurgence of dissent exemplified by various petitions from intellectuals concerning an amnesty for political prisoners, the deletion from the SFRY Criminal Code of the section on " hostile propaganda," nationalist/ethnic demands by Croats and the Albanian minority in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and a veritable deluge in the daily press probing Tito's unsavoury past, Stalinism in the Yugoslav League of Communists, wartime attrocities perpetrated by Tito's Partisans, the mysterious camp on Naked Island (*Goli otok*) and, in general, the extent and limits of individual freedom and human rights.

Yugoslav literature of disclosure consists of three elements: exposures of certain official myths about Tito; revelations about the notorious concentration camp on Naked Island operated for the Cominformists or " Stalinists," following Tito's break with Stalin in 1948; and the historical testimonies in the memoirs published in the West but proscribed in Yugoslavia, of former political prisoners.

The common unifying theme which underpins all three elements is the outcry against the crimes, injustices and human suffering in the face of the silence imposed from above and the gulf separating Tito's real history from the embellished slogans of the official ideology. Thus, Yugoslav literature of disclosure began to rediscover the ghost of a nation's past.

De-Titoization as Biography

Of the three elements in this literature, it is the first—represented by controversial biographies of Tito—which may have the most dramatic and far-reaching political impact in contemporary Yugoslavia.

The post-Tito " collective leadership " is particularly wary of anyone who questions the myth of Tito as an infallible leader and builder of " socialism," since his heirs cling to this myth as the source of their legitimacy. Hence, Momcilo Selic, an unemployed architect, was sentenced in 1980 to seven years' imprisonment (later reduced to three; he was released in May 1982) for a rambling six-page *samizdat* essay " Contents," distributed among his friends in Belgrade, in which he reflected on the darker side of Tito's myth and legacy. Milovan Djilas' biography of Tito (1980) was banned outright. And Gojko Djogo's book of poetry *Woollen Times* (1982) was banned and burned in public for containing questionable symbolism concerning Tito and the revolution, while the poet himself was sentenced in 1981 to two years' imprisonment (later reduced to one, due in part to vigorous protests by the Serbian Union of Writers which established a Committee for the Protection of Artistic Freedom).

In Djilas' biography, Tito is portrayed as a man of considerable organizational and leadership abilities. But Djilas' Tito is far from an infallible, fearless leader or superman. Djilas records Tito's failures as a commander: such as his indecision, lack of professional military skills, issuing of contradictory orders, and excessive concern for his own personal safety. Tito emerges very much as an ordinary human being, with his share of strengths and weaknesses, and as a military commander whose defeats in the first Partisan offensive in the autumn of 1941 reportedly led to his offer of resignation. Djilas' portrait of Tito's human and military-political foibles thus runs counter to the official version of Tito as a genius, if not a demi-god, in his role as the country's liberator and founder of the SFRY.

There are signs that the more " liberal " elements in the present collective leadership might in fact welcome a process of de-Titoization, which would free them from the dead hand of the past and help establish their own legitimacy independently of Tito. The *cause célèbre* which supports this supposition is that of Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's semi-official biographer, whose first double-volume of the *Further Contributions Towards a Biography of Josip Broz Tito* (1981) sold out instantly. Dedijer's biography was attacked by the Party hard-liners just as quickly, and the publication of subsequent volumes, scheduled for 1982, was at first stopped and then later subjected to an " on/off " policy, indicating a struggle at the top.

Dedijer's biography has opened a debate not only about Tito and Stalinism in the Party, but about the very nature of the " Yugoslav Road to Socialism." The post-Tito leadership was particularly embarrassed by commentators like Moma Kapor, excerpts from whose *Mladost* interview of 22 February 1982 were published in the Belgrade weekly *Nin* on 14 March 1982, causing quite a sensation. Kapor's remarks concerning the ruling oligarchy included a particularly pointed comment: " When they broke with Stalin, they felt as if they had spat in their own father's face, as if they had disowned him. It was some kind of feeling of guilt, or the so-called Eastern sin." Dedijer's biography reveals clearly that the " Stalinists " (i.e. Yugoslav Communist Party members who remained loyal to Stalin) and other *personae non gratae* in and out of the Party were treated to " Stalinist " methods before, during and after the Second World War: namely, intimidation, persecution, torture, exile and execution. Tito himself was prominently involved in the pre-war purges of top Yugoslav Communist Party leaders. This bitter truth was stressed in the pages of *Nin* (14 March 1982), one of the country's largest-circulation weeklies. Kapor concluded her reflections on the perpetrators of these misdeeds: " So it appears that all of us were ill-treated and manipulated, and that in reality they were frauds, liars and killers." The Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists censured the two newspapers for publishing the interview, and " public " (read: Party-orchestrated) demands for Kapor's arrest ensued.

Dedijer's biography of Tito (Vol. II, 1981) reproduces important documents, such as Tito's order of 13 May 1945 for the encirclement and

annihilation of a force of some 50,000 Ustashi and Chetniks attempting to surrender to the British via Dravograd. Such documents appear to corroborate Western, primarily *émigré*, charges concerning the massacre of an estimated 250,000 anti-communist (predominantly Croatian) military and civilians returned by the British from Austria to Tito's Partisans in May-June 1945.

Equally sensitive is the subject of Partisan accommodation with the Nazis during the Second World War, since the regime has blamed the Croatian Ustashi (of the Axis-sponsored Independent State of Croatia) as well as the Serbian Chetniks led by General Draza Mihailovic (who fought the Nazis, the Ustashi and the communists), as the arch-collaborators and traitors. In his talks with the Germans in 1943 concerning possible tactical cooperation aimed at preventing a potential landing of Anglo-American forces on the Adriatic coast, since it allegedly led to weaknesses and losses for the Partisans in battles on the Neretva river. Dedijer thus substantiates both German documents and Djilas' memoirs concerning Nazi-Partisan liaison.[1]

Exposing Naked Island

The first novel about the incarceration of the Cominformists on Naked Island was published in 1981, a further sign of the changing political and cultural climate in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Branko Hoffman's *Night Till Dawn* (1981) awaited publication for six years; it was initially rejected by all the Slovenian publishing houses, only to receive critical acclaim as *the best* Slovenian book in 1981.

A veritable " explosion of truth " began. Momcilo Petrovic, a Belgrade student and communist, directed an open letter to the Presidency of the Central Committe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Reprinted in *Student* on 16 December 1981, it demanded a full disclosure of all the facts pertaining to Naked Island and a public accounting of those responsible for the torture. *Nin* began an officially approved series on Naked Island in February 1982, which drew a spirited public response. However, the post-Tito leadership was careful in blaming the arbitrariness of nameless individual officials rather than the Party, which, of course, controlled those officials. In this, the Yugoslav communists took a leaf out of Nikita Khrushchev's book; he blamed Stalin for the " excesses " against Party members during the Great Purge and for other failings of the Soviet system. In Antonije Isakovic's novel *Flash 2*, published in 1982, a former high secret police official admitted that " We were unrelenting in our principles and in that respect were without equal in all Europe. We wanted to prove at any cost that we were building socialism just like the Russians."

Perhaps the most unusual novel about 1948 is *Heads-Tails* by Slobodan Selenic (1982). It was printed in 1972, but only released a decade later. It

[1] The German documents are quoted in Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941–45* (1973), p. 110. See also Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (1977), pp. 230–31, 242–45.

is remarkable both for its truthful representation of individual characters, Yugoslav society and life in the capital of Belgrade, and for its central message—that dogmatism, whether religious or secular, is the root cause of every Gulag, and hence that only pluralism and individual freedom can prevent them.

Central to the novels about Naked Island is the theme of Sisyphus, as the prisoners were forced to work a stone quarry with bare hands in senseless, exhausting labour. Djilas (1980) estimates that some 15,000 " Stalinist " Party members went through the brutal re-education course on the island. A repentant former member of the camp administration on Naked Island claims that the island's prisoner population remained stable at 6,000–7,000 persons, in spite of the continuous influx of new prisoners.[2] Some committed suicide, some died of exhaustion, starvation and various diseases. Others were tortured and killed by fellow inmates or the camp guards. Those who survived Hell's Island as physical or psychological cripples fell silent. Up to 1957, there were also women inmates on the island, who were taken advantage of by the guards. Political prisoners are still sent there in contemporary Yugoslavia.[3]

As for the surviving " Stalinists " from Naked Island, by 1956 most seem to have been granted an amnesty, like Vitomil Zupan, who was arrested in August 1948 and sentenced in February 1949 to 15 years of forced labour. Due to his courageous defence in court, which was deemed to be " improper conduct," his sentence was extended to 18 years. Zupan,[4] a gifted writer who won a number of decorations while fighting as a Slovenian Partisan, was found guilty of hostile propaganda, anti-state agitation, espionage, immorality, murder, attempted murder and attempted rape. No evidence was procured by the court; no witnesses admitted—a procedure that was to become standard for the new, higher socialist " class justice."

Following his release, Zupan published award-winning plays and novels. But, among other works, his 2,000-page autobiographical quartet—*Creation, Minuet for a Guitar, Levitan* and *Destruction*—remains unpublished. *Levitan*, already set up in type, was banned in 1972, but was, surprisingly, released in 1983. It became an instant literary event, winning the highest Slovenian literary distinction: the prestigious " Presern " prize.

The recent spate of novels is thus slowly lifting the veil from Naked Island, opening a new chapter in post-Tito Yugoslavia. The posing of the problem led Gojko Nikolis, a former Partisan leader, to ask the following question in *Knjizevne novine* (10 May 1982): if the socialist revolution must inevitably torture its real and imagined " enemies," then who shall follow such a revolution at home or abroad?

[2] In the *émigré* publication, *Hrvatska Revija* (1976), p. 153.
[3] Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia: Prisoners of Conscience* (London, 1982), p. 30; US Helsinki Watch Committee (1982), p. 9.
[4] See Eva Lapuh, " Chronicler of a Critical Time," in *Index on Censorship*, no. 9, 1980, pp. 42–45.

Poetry and the Gulag

The most pervasive theme of Yugoslav camp literature is the one articulated in Solzhenitsyn's works: the struggle for meaning and for touchstones of judgment in the quest for genuine liberation and inner freedom. Its other basic theme is the liberation from the split personality of *homo duplex* characterizing our era in general and socialist societies in particular, where people believe one thing, say another, and do a third. Vladislav Musa writes that he felt free for the first time in his life following his return from Austria, when he began to speak his mind.[5] It was in that moment that Musa felt he had regained his own self. An aspect of freedom incomprehensible to many in the West is Musa's contention—echoing Solzhenitsyn—that he felt freer inside than outside the prison walls. For one thing, in prison he could talk freely to fellow political prisoners, without fear of the consequences.

In a similar vein, Radoslav Kostic-Katunac asserts that genuine freedom is the freedom from fear; hence there cannot be any freedom outside prison in a socialist system. Katuna wonders whether mankind has the spiritual strength and moral courage to withstand the onslaught of totalitarian regimes with their brutalizing ideology and moral relativism. He worries about his people, whom he once knew as " raw, but proud; uneducated, yet noble; shy, but righteous," and who now appear to him as crippled beings, shackled by fear and lust for material goods, adrift without a moral or spiritual anchor.

THE challenge of Yugoslavia's epic camp literature is its attempt to come to grips with the nature of man, civilization and culture in the late twentieth century. It is remarkable in its search for the ethical imperative, a renaissance of individual and national consciousness, and a quest for spiritual fulfilment.

Camp literature forms an important part of the present ferment about Yugoslavia's Titoist past and provides a contribution to the humanistic values reflected in the current Yugoslav literature of disclosure as a whole.

[5] See Vladislav Musa, *U Titovim pandzama* (In Tito's claws) (Samizdat, Munich, 1973), p. 42. He was in prison between 1967 to 1970.

Self-Mismanagement in Yugoslavia

Nora Beloff

THE " Yugoslav expert " in the non-communist world tends to have invested considerable emotional capital, and induced others to have invested considerable real capital, in the success of the first communist country which defied the Russians. Unsurprisingly the writers of all these volumes* are disinclined to look too deeply into " the deep economic and social crisis " which, according to one of the Party leaders, Aleksandar Grlickov, now engulfs the country.

Two of the works, the OECD annual report and the Singleton/Carter analysis of the Yugoslav economy, frankly recognize serious economic symptoms: inefficiency, the misallocation of scarce resources and, above all, the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation into its eight competing parts. But neither diagnoses the complaint.

The third book, published by Macmillan, does credit neither to the writers, a Professor of Sociology at Cologne University and the Dean of the Business School at Lagos, nor indeed to its publishers. One must assume that, as it was printed in Hong Kong, it slipped through without even a cursory glance from the company's directors. These cannot of course be expected to bring special knowledge to the worldwide span of subjects covered by their profitable textbooks. But they must surely know that Yugoslavia is a one-party communist state, with a totalitarian ideology which forbids public support for Western concepts of freedom, and where people can be imprisoned for political dissent.

Yet the blurb, carrying the Macmillan imprint, states that we have before us " the study of a truly democratic system " and affirms that " all students [of the Yugoslav system] agree that it is democratic and humane." Macmillan's should be the first to know otherwise: they have themselves published a book by one of the more eminent students, Dr Ljubo Sirc, exposing the gap between the theory of self-management and the Yugoslav practice of an administered economy in which, at every level, the decisions are taken not by the workers but by the controlling political apparatus.

The volume is full of mistakes incompatible with even a minimal knowledge of history. It affirms, for example, that between 1950 and 1964 Yugoslavia received no foreign aid from any source. In fact, after the 1948 split with Moscow, the regime was rescued by massive American assistance, far greater than anything Yugoslavia could have expected from its previous patrons who, as it learned to its cost, tended to take more than they gave.

Indeed, there are senior Yugoslav economists today (unnamed for

* *Yugoslavia. OECD Economic Survey.* 1983; Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (Croom Helm, England, 1983); Hans Dieter Seibel and Ukandi G. Damachi, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World* (The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1983).

their own sake) who much regret that the US munificence to Yugoslavia, unlike the grants provided under the Marshall Plan, were unconditional. This allowed the communists to repeat in Yugoslavia the errors made everywhere else: a crash industrialization programme neglecting the producers of food and other primary commodities.

These economic distortions have prevented contemporary Yugoslavia from paying its way and the West is still having to pick up the bill, either by providing new creditors or by rolling back the old ones. Further, the failure of Yugoslav agriculture, recognized by both the OECD and the Singleton/Carter books, has produced the anomaly that a country which contains a large stretch of the Danube basin, probably the most fertile region in Europe, is a net importer of food.

The worst error in the Seibel/Damachi book (on the blurb and in the text) is the affirmation that the Yugoslav system " optimises productivity." Low productivity, as both other books make clear, has always been the system's Achilles' heel and, according to OECD figures, it has now dropped for the third year in succession, going down last year by 3 per cent, the biggest decline since records have been kept. This cannot be a weakness inherent in the Yugoslav worker who, when employed in the free-enterprise West, is considered highly productive. One reason is that he may find it impossible to keep his family unless he saves his energy for the moonlighting he has to do outside the self-management " social " sector.

If we are to believe the OECD experts, on whose judgment Western policies often rely, the principal weakness of the Yugoslav system is " an excessively high level of investment ": a weakness often denounced by Tito himself as " investomania." They fail to examine the alternative viewpoint, convincingly argued by a Professor of Economics at Belgrade, Milutin Marsecic, who is consultant to the federal government and to the Serbian Communist Party. " In the present situation," says the professor, " the problem arises not because of *excessive* but because of *wrong* investment. Regardless of whether investments represent 10 or 40 per cent of the national income, they are always too high if they are misdirected." He notes that in the past 10 years, Yugoslavia has invested two-fifths of its social product in new projects, yet " year in year out, the rate of economic growth has been declining." " Today," he protests, " we have reached an absurd situation in which a rate of investment of more than 40 per cent of social product cannot increase the rate of production by one per cent. . . ."

A kind of political innocence seems to pervade Western analysts dealing with Yugoslavia. The OECD writers, who confess they have been making the very same recommendations in each annual report for years, still " find it hard to say " why Yugoslav industrial prices cannot be held down by introducing effective internal competition. They " find it puzzling " that there is no effective incomes policy. In their limited vision, Yugoslavia is a country " where most decisions are taken by popular

consensus." In reality, decisions are based on haggling between the Party machines: popular consensus can hardly exist without political freedom for the expression of opposing views. The OECD supposes that inflation (now nearing 40 per cent) could be mastered simply " by consultation with the trade unions on the formation of monetary incomes with a downward inflationary bias." It seems that no one ever told them that, as the Polish Solidarity learned to its cost, you cannot have independent trade unions in a one-party system.

The OECD report ends by expressing the hope " that the recommendation of the Stabilization Commission will provide the basis for concrete measures to make efficient the working of the economy, on a unified and market-oriented basis." They should have consulted the man in charge of the Stabilization Commission, Sergej Krajger, who in a recent interview with the Croatian paper *Danas* explained why that was impossible: "... Every reform requires a market, but the market destroys the power of the ruling bodies. This is the reason why they are not ready to cross the Rubicon into a free market." Unlike the OECD, Krajger does not believe that the vested interests can be broken " simply by a programme of stabilization " and without effective political action.

Fred Singleton is an old faithful of the Yugoslav regime which has accorded him the highest medal ever awarded to a foreigner. It is very much to his credit that he does not hide the fact that self-management is not working. " The intricate machine is dependent on a high level of civil responsibility and an awareness by the decision-makers of the consequences to the national economy of the decisions which they take at local level." As this self-abnegation has not revealed itself in Yugoslavia (or anywhere else): " The authorities are compelled to step in with the blunt instrument of administrative orders. This they usually do too late and always with protestations that their actions are reluctant and contrary to the spirit of self-management."

Resolved nonetheless to give the book a happy ending, Singleton and Carter remind us that " the Yugoslavs in the past have shown considerable skill and ingenuity in squaring the circle." The authors have not succeeded, however, in squaring the circle of describing the Yugoslav economy as it is and making it into a success story.

The Yugoslav Oppositionists and the US State Department: An Exchange of Views

LAST summer (1983), an official of the Committee to Aid Democratic Dissidents in Yugoslavia met with a top adviser to the Secretary of State in Washington, DC. The discussion centred on United States policy towards the communist regime in Yugoslavia and the State Department's reasons as to why it is in the interest of the United States to sustain Yugoslavia's regime.*

In spite of the fact that the reasons given do not reveal anything new in the State Department's policy, which it has pursued over the past three decades, this committee felt compelled to present a rebuttal.

An unofficial transcript of State Department arguments is provided here. The Committee's answers are based on the consensus of responses received from long-time observers of Yugoslavia—those who live in the country, and those who live abroad.

State Department Arguments

★If the US were to deny credits to Yugoslavia, the economic situation would become so difficult that the regime would fall, and fratricide and civil war would ensue. Such a situation would aid the Soviet Union's attempts to take over Yugoslavia.

★History shows that any collapse of the federal authority in Yugoslavia would lead directly to civil war.

★The US cannot impose any conditions on Yugoslavia, as that would be interpreted as interference in its internal affairs.

★Yugoslavia is still incomparably more free and Western than any other communist country. In spite of constant zig-zags in internal policies, the going is slow but is certainly in the direction of an ever more liberal regime. One day it could become the Switzerland of the Balkans.

★The above is in the interest of the US, and therefore, the US will continue, in every possible way, to help maintain the status quo in Yugoslavia.

★The lack of democracy is, of course, very much regretted, but it is obvious that in such a multi-national country, there cannot be democracy of the Western type. It would result in immediate Serbo–Croatian–Albanian slaughter.

★The present regime is not ideal, but it presents the only barrier against a bloody civil war. Therefore, it deserves every support.

* A New York-based committee co-chaired by Milovan Djilas, Mihajlo Mihajlov and Dr Franjo Tudjman.

★If democratization were to come, it is clear that the Croats would vote to chop off Serbian heads.
★Therefore, democratization is not desirable and is not in the interest of the US (and the West in general), nor is it deemed desirable by those who wish that country well.

Committee Answers

The Question of History and Democracy

When, today, even the smallest entity on the globe is entitled to, and urged to develop, democratic institutions, it is not acceptable to claim that the peoples of Yugoslavia are not ready for democracy. There is nothing in history that teaches that one nation is more inclined towards democracy than another. With regard to tradition, even there one can contend that there is a greater democratic tradition among the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia than in many countries which claim a democratic label. Croats, Serbs and Slovenes who lived in Austria–Hungary until 1918, experienced a degree of parliamentary democracy in spite of the fact that an Austrian élite ruled the empire. Parliamentary democracy in Serbia proper, in the first decades of this century, was second to none in Europe.

It is true that Yugoslavia has a terrible Second World War legacy, which may eventually prove almost insurmountable, but preventing that legacy from being recognized, examined and eventually overcome, as the regime is doing, is actually doing the country a tremendous disservice. To understand the issues better, imagine being taught that the American Civil War never occurred, that there was never any slavery, or that the soldiers of the South were nothing but a group of marauding murderers, that the Confederacy was led by traitors and war criminals, that there were never any prisoner-of-war camps, that the people of the North and South loved one another, only to be thrown at one another's throats by a small group of political criminals. There is much that could be expanded in this analogy, but the contention that Yugoslavia can be kept together only by a government such as it actually has, is an indefensible assertion.

The collapse of central authority in Yugoslavia in 1941 was brought about by the Axis invasion and was not a direct result of internal strife. The crisis of 1971–72, when the purge of somewhat more popular and liberal communist leaders in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia took place, was provoked by President Tito himself. He first encouraged their policies then removed the leaders, claiming to have " saved " Yugoslavia again.

The Question of Fratricide

The possibility of a civil war in Yugoslavia is not a direct function of material prosperity, but rather of political vision and political freedom. In Yugoslavia, since political disputes are officially forbidden, they are

transposed on to cultural, economic, linguistic and even sports spheres, contaminating the intra-national scene. If political freedoms were to be allowed, the issues would be resolved where they actually occur, instead of being obscured and covered up as they have been up to the present moment.

Yugoslavia was not created in 1945, but in 1918, without any participation by the communists. It existed between the world wars in spite of the policy of the Communist International, whose agent at the time was Tito himself and which sought the partition of the country. During the same period, the Yugoslav Communist Party collaborated with every extremist group that advocated the violent break-up of the kingdom. During the struggle for power, and in its long reign since, while officially proclaiming " brotherhood and unity," the communists did everything in their power to exacerbate nationalist tensions. This policy, in addition to the old dictum: " divide and conquer," has a twofold purpose. First, it deflects the citizens' accumulated frustrations caused by a long period of one-party rule, in a direction away from the communist regime. Secondly, it presents the communist regime at home and abroad as the only entity that is capable of holding the country together.

The tragic fratricide that took place during the Second World War, which left a terrible historical legacy, was a direct result of the Axis occupation and cannot be viewed as typical of relations among Yugoslavia's peoples. They lived 13 centuries in the Balkans without the benefit of a communist dictatorship and without the fratricide which the State Department fears.

The Question of How " Free " Yugoslavia Is

This is an especially humiliating point for many Yugoslavs. To claim that Yugoslavia is substantially freer than the rest of the Eastern bloc only adds insult to the injury of suffering a repressive regime. If something is not readily apparent, as are the gallows in Teheran, for instance, it by no means follows that it does not exist. The Yugoslav regime's repression is among the most perfidious in the world, a very sophisticated (the only point of excellence in the regime) system of highly precise, individual targeting to intimidate the widest possible selection of people.

The Yugoslav regime's political terror, employed by the state through its judiciary, the police and various political bodies, is designed to make its impact with the least possible means, but for the victims of those means—and per capita, in this respect, Yugoslavia stands foremost in Europe—it is the Gulag revisited. There is no need to terrorize the entire population: the persecution of a carefully chosen 5 per cent achieves the same effect. Whatever freedoms the Yugoslavs have are all on a discretionary basis, liable to be taken away as casually as they were granted. Under the communist regime, Yugoslavia has no chance of becoming the Switzerland of the Balkans. Whatever cosmetic " progress " has been achieved so far can be wiped out overnight, in the same

way as privileges are taken away from misbehaving inmates in the regime's penitentiaries.

The degree of freedom in pre-martial law Poland, and to a certain extent in Hungary, has been greater than any experienced in Yugoslavia, except in the case of the freedom to travel. Pressured by huge unemployment in the 1960s, the regime was forced to export labour to Western Europe; therefore, it had no choice but to open its borders. This distinct difference between Yugoslavia and other East European countries is mitigated by the regime's ability to withhold a passport from anyone exhibiting a degree of dissent. Once abroad, the guest-workers are controlled by a large number of secret agents who themselves pass as guest-workers. Every Yugoslav knows that upon returning from abroad, he or she is liable for any act of spoken or demonstrated dissent. This also holds true for those who have long resided abroad and who have acquired citizenship of the country of their domicile.

The Question of US Aid

The basic aim of US policy—to preserve the status quo in Yugoslavia via financial and political aid, and to prevent Yugoslavia from slipping directly into the Soviet orbit—has at least three serious drawbacks.

First, the Yugoslav economy has been subjected for decades to socio-economic experimentation, and subordinated to political and doctrinal needs, to prove to the Soviet Union the superiority of the "Yugoslav socialist model." Financial support under such conditions results in propping up the regime without in the least helping the economy. Until recently, US credits were used with complete abandon for unproductive projects, ranging from extravagant foreign travel to providing credits to Third World nations which Yugoslavia was hoping to influence. The US was, in a very substantial way, underwriting Yugoslav foreign policy, deeply inimical to the US and to the West in general, as well as to its social, political and cultural values. Recently, commodities and raw material credits extended by the US have been used to acquire hard currency for paying off the national foreign debt, thoughtlessly incurred by a regime confident of its geostrategic position, and relying on the presumed need of all the international parties concerned to sustain it. The politically motivated experimentation and mismanagement created the economic chaos to which all of the present leaders have contributed. Leading economists in Yugoslavia have gone on record stating that short of a complete change in policy—e.g. letting market forces, rather than worn-out political objectives, dictate the economy—bankruptcy is inevitable, with or without foreign aid.

Secondly, while the present leadership does not appear inclined to seek Soviet intervention, it does rule without a popular mandate, and may be removed at any time by some faction which may seek its own salvation in a Soviet intervention. It should never be forgotten that even though excommunicated from the Cominform, Tito never allowed Yugoslavia

to break completely with the Soviet Union. It is constantly repeated by the leadership and the controlled news media that the essence of non-alignment is anti-imperialism, but not that of the Eastern variety. Therefore, the affinity of views of Yugoslav leadership with those of the Soviet Union is such that any Yugoslav communist regime that feels its power is slipping may invite in the saviours from the East. Thus US aid is only prolonging the day of reckoning, since only two solutions are possible. Either the system has to change, which the leadership is unwilling or unable to effect, or the Soviets, in spite of Western help, will be invited in to save the regime.

Thirdly, perhaps the most devastating consequence in the long run, is the effect of US support of an oppressive regime on democratic forces in Yugoslavia. The supporters of pluralist democracy are placed in the paradoxical position of being disowned by the leading democracy! These democratic forces are presently gathering momentum, as attested by many acts of defiance and by numerous petitions signed by hundreds of individuals. Regardless of whether the US aids the oppressors or not, the democratic opposition will continue to grow, and it may turn anti-American, as happened in Iran.

The Question of US Conditions

Every American knows that an application for a loan carries with it certain obligations to which the creditor is entitled. Not so for Yugoslavia. Any suggestions or advice is interpreted as interference in internal affairs. The Yugoslav regime is a signatory to all the international treaties on human rights including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Helsinki Final Act. Suggesting to the Yugoslav regime that it live up to its international obligations, as indeed the US is asking other communist and non-communist, but dictatorial regimes to do, could not be interpreted as an interference in internal affairs. The State Department, however, claims that it uses quiet diplomacy to promote human rights in Yugoslavia. To be effective, this must be a two-step approach. First, the government is discreetly warned about its repressive policies and advised to change them in order to avoid public embarrassment, which would be the second step of the process. If this public exposure does not follow, the other side quickly learns that the discreet warnings are meaningless, it disregards them and makes promises it never intends to keep. There was only one public mention of the poor human rights record of the Yugoslav regime. A mild reprimand was made by Patricia M. Derian before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Relations on 16 September 1980. This exposure provoked such an outcry in Belgrade that the US ambassador flew to Washington to intervene against this breach of quiet diplomacy. The former ambassador is presently Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Small wonder that quiet diplomacy is persistently pursued.

It is strange that US policy-makers should be so sensitive towards the Yugoslav government's feelings. Even more so in view of the fact that the

Yugoslav regime itself is one of the greatest meddlers in the affairs of other nations—as will be demonstrated later—and that the Soviets have no such restraints. As a reminder, let it suffice to say that Mihajlo Mihajlov was arrested and sentenced on the insistence of the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, while very recently, a Slovenian author was imprisoned for having written disparagingly about Brezhnev, who has been dead now for almost a year.

There is no need to demonstrate that the influence of governments on each other is a fact of life in today's world. Witness the certification on human rights conditions required by Congress for Chile, El Salvador, etc. Why not for Yugoslavia?

The Question of US Interests

Democracy, as the system most likely to assure peace in the world, is the proclaimed US objective. How do the actions of the Yugoslav regime aid in reaching this objective? The regime helped the communist faction in Greece with arms, sanctuary and materials, until Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. It sent shiploads of arms to Algerian insurgents in the early 1960s. It has continued to do likewise to the present day, lending material and moral support to every conceivable "people's liberation movement" anywhere on the globe: Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Palestine, North Vietnam, and Nicaragua today. Everywhere, the Yugoslav regime is actively pursuing its policy of world revolution, as seen through the eyes of profoundly Marxist doctrinaires. In 1956, it approved the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In 1961, it failed to condemn the Soviet Union for unilaterally resuming atomic tests after a three-year moratorium. In 1967, it broke off diplomatic ties with Israel and opened its air space, as it did in 1973, to Soviet planes ferrying supplies to Israel's enemies.

The Yugoslav regime has, through its controlled press, decried every instance of discrimination in America, keeping carefully silent on the total discrimination of people in Yugoslavia itself, solely on the basis of their political affiliations. The media in Yugoslavia still fill their pages with extremely slanted comments on events in every Western country, only to start howling with outrage when a Western independent newspaper writes a couple of lines critical of its policies. The regime has provided sanctuary to a number of international terrorist movements, not least the PLO and the German Red Army faction. At the same time, it has decried shelter given by the West to its relatively moderate political opponents.

The pivotal role of the Yugoslav regime in establishing and developing the so-called "non-aligned" bloc is well known. During its 22 years of existence, this movement has done everything in its meagre power to undermine the West and give open or tacit support to the policies of the Soviet Union.

Another objective of US policy is an independent and unified Yugoslavia. How does the Yugoslav regime aid in reaching this objective?

Formally independent, the Yugoslav regime views the world through Marxist eyes and, therefore, cannot be independent. This is amply illustrated by the preceding paragraphs.

The unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia can be assured only if the grievances of the various nationalities and religious groups can be aired in the open. Keeping a tight lid on them all, and in addition manipulating the undercurrents of discontent, as the present regime has been doing, will result in an eventual explosion. A country kept together by repression will break up all the more violently and irrevocably unless a proper set of conditions prevail.

Conclusions

There is no historical basis for claiming that a collapse of federal authority without outside interference would lead to fratricide and civil war. The fratricide which occurred during the Second World War was a direct result of Axis occupation and is not characteristic of relations among Yugoslavia's nationalities. The claim to the contrary is persistently advanced by the regime for its own self-justification.

The contention that there is more freedom in Yugoslavia than elsewhere in Eastern Europe is questionable at best. The degree of freedom in a given society is debatable, but the commitment of a government to freedom of its citizens is not. In such a comparison, there is no difference between Yugoslavia and other East European regimes.

The deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions is evident for all to see. Therefore, the aid given thus far has not bought anything but the perpetuation of a repressive regime. It also undermines the efforts of those within the Communist Party who may be inclined to press for reforms. So that when the end comes, as it did in Iran, US aid will have bought chaos and very likely an unfriendly regime.

The inability of US policy-makers to extract minimal conditions in return for extended material and moral aid must ultimately undermine US interests. Were it not so, there would be no certification requirements for other dictatorial beneficiaries.

The mere fact that an oppressive communist regime, which has done absolutely nothing to advance the cause of democracy either at home or abroad, is accorded the status of saviour of 22 million human beings, shows the contradictions of policy which undermine the very essence of American democracy.

It is this Committee's belief that the time has come to formulate US policy towards Yugoslavia in Washington, DC, and not in Belgrade. Only then will it be in the best interests of the US, and, incidentally, in the best interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia as well.

Committee to Aid Democratic Dissidents in Yugoslavia
November 1983

Tito and Stalin*

Milovan Djilas

IT was around Tito himself that the conflict with the Soviet Union crystallized from the beginning, not only because of the leading, central role which Tito played but also because of the authoritarian way in which Yugoslav communism had been led, which was identical in essense with Soviet communism.

And, although they were essentially the same, those " Yugoslav " qualities had not been taken over mechanically from " Leninism " and the Soviet Party: the Soviet experience was the most accessible and the most suitable for the intellectual formation of qualities inherent in the Yugoslav communist movement. It is inevitable that despots and oligarchies should develop out of an ideology or out of the combination of a world-view with a political movement. Even during the war the Soviets had made known privately their indignation at the glorification of Tito on the same level as Stalin. But they were caught in a trap of their own making: Tito was also a communist, and the strengthening of communist power in Yugoslavia through the glorification of Tito suited the Soviet book. Stalin was acknowledged to be the greatest man in the world and throughout history, but in Yugoslavia Tito was glorified along with him.

In the first official attack on Tito this Soviet resentment was suppressed, or we who were closest to Tito did not notice it because, although Stalin was not the only person we admired, he was not comparable – and was not compared – with anyone else but Lenin.

The reason for the attack on Tito was the speech he made in Ljubljana on 27 May 1945. Elated by the victory but cross with the Western Allies for having pushed our troops out of Trieste—an action which the Soviets condoned for their own reasons—Tito put into words what was being whispered by people at the top of the Party who were amazed at the Soviet attitude:

> It has been said that this war was a just war and we believed it to be so. But were are also looking for a just end to the war; we demand that everyone should be master in his own land; we do not want to settle other people's accounts; we do not want to be a bargaining counter for other people; and we don't want to be mixed up in any policy of spheres of influence. Why is it held against our peoples that they want to be independent in every respect; why should their independence be restricted and disputed? We don't want to be dependent on anyone, whatever has been written and said—and there is a great deal being written which is ugly, unjust, hurtful and unworthy of those who live in countries allied with us. [A reference to what was being written in the Western press—that Yugoslavia

* Extract from *Vlast* by Milovan Djilas, published in Serbo-Croat by *Nasa Rec*, London, 1983. Translation by David Floyd.

> belonged to the Soviet sphere and was a satellite of the USSR—*MD*] This Yugoslavia is not for bargaining or trading.
>
> *Borba*, 28 May 1945.

This speech of Tito's, though not this speech alone, certainly served as the reason for the Soviet government to deliver a note of protest to our government. Actually, the government was not informed about the note: it was bypassed and only a small number of members of the Central Committee was told about it. It is known that Stalin did not rush things, but neither did he delay. The note arrived at the beginning of June 1945, in the form of an official communication by the Soviet ambassador Sadchikov to Kardelj, before any rumour or idea had taken shape about Soviet intriguing with the " imperialists " at our expense or about the similarity between the Soviet Union as a great power and the " Western imperialisms." I do not know where that note is now. Tito probably kept it in his personal archive, along with other important documents. But I remember that in it the Soviet government complained at the Soviet Union being lumped together in the same basket as the Western imperialist powers. And its refusal to support Yugoslavia was defended with the nonsensical argument that after such a terrible war there was no sense in getting involved in another one over Trieste. The note included the threat of a public " disavowal ":

> Comrade Tito's speech [the note said] we regard as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union and Comrade Kardelj's explanation as unsatisfactory. That is how our readers interpret Comrade Tito's speech, and there is no other way it can be understood. Tell Comrade Tito that, if he makes one more attack like that on the Soviet Union, we shall be obliged to reply in the press and disavow him.
>
> Quoted from *Informbiro—sta je to* (The Cominform—What is it) by S. Krzavec and D. Markovic (Belgrade, 1976), p. 95.

[. . .]

THE Soviet Party was acknowledged to be the leading Party and a model for all. More than that: it was not regarded as being foreign to us. In so far as there were seen to be differences they were in the relations between our two states, but the ideologies and the ways of thinking were, if not identical, practically the same.

Nevertheless the Soviet note caused some concern among our leaders, who alone knew about it: we just could not imagine having differences of opinion with the Soviet Union, but we were not willing to abandon Tito. We were divided between the theory and reality, between the idea and our own achievements.

Although it was Kardelj's idea that we should try to influence Tito—in fact he appeared unexpectedly at the Central Committee, which he rarely visited, since the affairs of the federal government fell mainly on his shoulders—Rankovic and I were glad to see him. At that time Kardelj frequently met and consulted with Sadchikov, the Soviet ambassador.

There is not the slightest indication that his suggestion was connected with those meetings, although he was at the time also critical of Tito, whom he regarded as obstinate and lacking in breadth of vision. We met in Rankovic's office at about 10 o'clock in the morning. We agreed without much discussion to speak to Tito and tell him we thought it senseless to clash with the USSR and that he should insist on smoothing over the quarrel that had developed. We telephoned to ask for a meeting with him and were told we could see him right away. Despite his self-confident and energetic way of expressing himself, at such moments Tito was unable to suppress his uneasiness and concern. In fact, even on the way to his office, as soon as Kardelj began to talk about the Soviet note and the pointlessness of the quarrel, which might become an open quarrel with the Soviet Union, Tito cut him short and said: " Rubbish! That is not on the cards at all and cannot be! We shall come to terms with them."

We were delighted, Rankovic and I, almost like children. Tito also quickly recovered his self-confidence. We chatted about the matter a little longer and then turned to other things. We stayed with him for about an hour—Tito had some other engagements and did not keep us for lunch. On our way back in the same car Rankovic and I were full of enthusiasm, each in his own way, for Tito's courage when some problem had to be resolved, while Kardelj admired his flair. Although there were already signs that Tito was aware of the possibility of differences and contradictions in our relations with the USSR, an awareness of the inevitability of such a development had not yet taken shape in the minds of the people in his inner circle or of Tito himself.

None of us in the small group of leaders ever talked about any of this. It was as though none of it had any significance for the country or the Party. But I believe that it was this that brought about a crucial change in our inner circle: relations between Tito and the three of us became closer; the four of us now talked more freely about Soviet moves, yet none of us, not even Tito—although henceforward he became even more cautious in statements which might be misunderstood in the USSR—grasped entirely what Soviet intentions were, let alone what the nature of the Soviet system created by Stalin was.

It was not a conspiracy: we considered the way in which we used our power to be our own, Yugoslav, affair. But a critical attitude towards the USSR and with it an intellectual and emotional independence increased in extent. Social avalanches are brought about by intellectual stimuli.

While we are on the subject of Tito's Ljubljana speech there are two points which stick in my mind, although they are not directly connected with the Soviet Union. In the speech Tito dropped a remark admitting that the imprisoned counter-revolutionary groups had been killed. " The quislings "—as he put it—" have received their just deserts." Less effort was then made to conceal those executions—they were " natural " and " logical." And it was of course in this connection that Stalin praised him when he reproached the Poles: " Tito is a smart fellow! He has no

problems with enemies—he has got rid of them all." I was told this by a diplomat in the Polish delegation on the way from Bled to Ljubljana in the summer of 1946. The pride and courage which this inspired in me chased out any thoughts or worries about " unnecessary " severity and " excesses."

After making that speech on his return from Ljubljana, on 2 June in Zagreb, Tito received a delegation of Catholic priests headed by Bishop Salis Sevis. Complaining at the behaviour of " a section of the Catholic clergy " during the war, Tito, to make a stronger impression, used the words " I, as a Catholic. . . ." Zogovic and I were at the *Borba* offices when comrades from *Tanjug* drew my attention to this. I consulted Kardelj who exclaimed: " The secretary of the Party a Catholic! " We immediately plucked up courage to remove the word " Catholic " and replace it by " Croat." Later, after the conflict with the USSR had broken out in 1948, Kardelj and I reminded each other with what malicious pleasure Stalin and Molotov would have exploited that slip of Tito's and have blown it up out of all proportion in their letters and propaganda.

[. . .]

TENSION and friction in our relations with the Soviets took other, particularly economic, forms. The most acute were due to differences and disagreements over the joint Soviet-Yugoslav companies. Similar companies were set up by the Soviets throughout Eastern Europe.

Our leaders were divided in their minds about these joint companies. We realized that, by setting them up, like all victorious governments before it, the Soviet government was perpetuating its political domination as well, but we justified this on the grounds that socialism was weak and that there was a danger of a restoration of capitalism in those countries. But we did not see such weakness or danger in Yugoslavia. For this reason negotiations with Soviet representatives led at once to haggling, friction and disagreement. This in turn prompted us to think, and to compare Soviet pretensions with the way in which Western firms exploited our wealth before the war. It was equally unjust and shameless. So the weakness of socialism came to be seen as insufficient and unconvincing as an argument to justify the tributary situation of the countries of Eastern Europe, some of which were allied nations and all of which had a strong sense of identity as nation and state. When we met with representatives of those countries, and visited them, we detected among the leaders their own indignation about the joint companies, while at the same time they must have observed our independent and sometimes over-self-confident behaviour.

Although we refrained from commenting openly on the exploitation of the countries of Eastern Europe through the joint companies, we did not conceal, and we could not conceal, our own clashes with Soviet officials over the companies being set up in our country. Differences over the companies increased in importance, eventually developing into doctrinal

doubts and some doctrinal re-thinking; indoctrinated minds are creative and strong only through the defence and development of the doctrine.

It was apparent that we had not thought the question out properly and were still in two minds about it, because no one was actually against the joint companies but no one among the leaders was inclined for that reason to renounce our sovereign rights or the principle of mutual and fair benefit—no one, that is, apart from Hebrang and Zujovic, for whom sovereignty and independence in relations between socialist states were "pure bourgeois prejudices." We were encouraged in this ambivalent attitude by the defiant, boycotting and disheartening attitude of the West and especially of the United States. It is true that ideological animosity put a barrier between us and the West. But the West not only failed to open up economic relations with us, it did not even return to us the wealth which the war had dropped into its pockets. On one occasion in the course of my work I happened to be with Tito when Vladimir Velebit, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned Tito that the treaty with the Soviet Union concerning a joint company for air transport was in conflict with our sovereignty as a state because it provided for Soviet command of our airports. Tito exclaimed angrily: "That's impossible! Sovereignty must be preserved!" But even this decision remained ambiguous. It had still to be explained to the Russians! The treaty had to be accepted, but the sovereignty had to remain ours.

We were, above all, victims of our own propaganda—more so even than the Soviet officials, because we had constructed our own idyllic view of the Soviet system, of the growth and economic might of the Soviet Union. For us industrialization was not only a vital necessity and a justification for all the sacrifices and devastation, but also the necessary condition for a future classless society. For us socialism was not just a better life but also the brotherhood and unity of men and peoples.

It seemed to us the most natural and logical of things that the Soviet Union, a country sharing the same ideals, already highly industrialized, and in many ways the most industrialized state, should help us with our industrialization. It was these deceptions and self-deceptions that often gave rise to our exaggerated demands on the Soviet Union. But Soviet officials were not only unable to satisfy our unrealistic and in many respects megalomaniac "planning" demands; they did not even deliver the equipment promised for the joint companies. On one occasion in 1947, in the vestibule outside his office at the planning commission, Boris Kidric pointed to a carefully constructed model of an electric power station, a gift from a Soviet colleague, and commented with roguish cynicism: "It would be much better if he had given me a real power station." On another occasion he told me that our enterprises were behind with deliveries of goods due to be sent to the Soviet Union and to countries of Eastern Europe. But between socialist countries such things were arranged in a friendly, understanding way.

If there was in such reproaches on our part a lack of patience and realism, the Soviet attitude was simply grotesque and insulting. In

negotiations about a joint company for copper—to be more precise, about the production of copper already going on at Bor—the Soviet officials argued that the ore itself could not be regarded as having any value because according to Marx it did not acquire value until work had been put into it, since work alone could create value. The Soviet argument led to a great dispute among our leaders. Nobody could dispute what Marx had said, although it was known that the capitalists—and such was the case of Bor itself, which belonged to the French before the war—paid for the ore and the labour separately.

[. . .]

AT that time we were also buying arms from the Soviet Union. But it was only in 1948, after the conflict broke out, that it was revealed that the Soviets were selling us used and repaired weapons at their dollar value. Our commissions noticed this when they took delivery, but did not make a fuss about it. It was thought to be in order, because it was trade with the Soviets; no one was much concerned with the cost. It was much the same when we sent students to study in the USSR. They were sent off without much thought and we began to be worried only when it came to paying for them at the official and utterly unrealistic exchange rate for the ruble against the dollar.

The negotiations over the joint companies made no progress, or progressed very slightly over minor issues. But they did not come to open conflict and could not do so. The sharpening of the internal conflict with the " bourgeois " opposition and the Catholic Church and over foreign affairs with the West, especially with the United States, hindered us, while the Soviets were held back by their eagerness to stabilize the situation in Eastern Europe and by their caution in relations with the United States. Moreover, on the occasion of Kardelj's meeting with Stalin in March 1947 in connection with the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow about the Austrian treaty, Stalin adopted a " reasonable " attitude:

> How would it be if we didn't set up any joint companies at all . . .? It is obviously not a good form of cooperation to operate through joint companies with an allied and friendly country like Yugoslavia. It would always lead to disagreement and misunderstanding; the independence of the country might suffer in some way and friendly relations would be ruined. Such companies are suitable for satellite countries. . . .
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> V. Dedijer, *J. B. Tito, Prilozi za Biografiju* (Kultura, Belgrade, 1953), p. 465.

Stalin's " reasonable " way of speaking—the division of socialist countries into " satellites " and those that were independent—struck us at first as strange. Stalin had already surprised the foreign communists with his " un-idealistic," great-power, autocratic reactions and ideas. But we had reconciled ourselves to this and accepted it. It was as though it did not

apply to us. We ourselves had tasted power and had begun to think as an independent state, but we had not realized that Stalin was out to seduce us by his " reasonableness " about our behaviour or that he realized that we had already come to like the taste of power.

There were no attacks on Tito, at least not in public. The Soviet leaders, if they had taken nothing back, kept quiet, while Tito himself became reconciled with the uncertain, stubborn realities. Moreover, on the occasion of Kardelj's meeting with him, Stalin took a keen interest in Tito's health, since he had recently been operated on for a hernia. The operation had been carried out by Soviet doctors, which was further evidence that relations were still close and trusting. Tito told the story that a drunken Soviet doctor had wanted to plunge his hand into Tito's wound after it had been bandaged up. But he told it only after 1948 when all kinds of Russian misdeeds were revealed even where they did not exist and when it was not the time for them. . . .

[Djilas then discusses the conflict between Tito and Hebrang and the latter's expulsion from the leadership of the CPY. Kardelj told Molotov about this affair when they met in Paris.]

ON the same occasion Kardelj informed Molotov—probably to create the impression on him of greater trustworthiness—that Vladimir Velebit was under suspicion as an English spy. To which Molotov commented, without showing much interest: " Aha, so Velebit is an English spy." Doubts about Velebit had originated with Rankovic and his intelligence service and had been kept to a very small circle of people.

Rankovic was by nature suspicious and liked to look into people's private lives. Since he was in charge of the secret service and organizational matters in the Party these qualities were exceptional virtues in an official. At the end of the war, or just after it, some English woman had rushed to Belgrade, and the OZNA, our secret service, had photographed a letter from her to Velebit. I saw the photograph myself: there were one or two sentences in which it was possible to detect only a sentimental attachment. But that was sufficient for our secret service, over-zealous like all secret services, even if it had not had the Soviet secret service as a model.

The " Velebit affair," that is to say what Kardelj told Molotov in confidence, was later to be exploited by the Soviet leaders with great zest and at great length in their letter to the Yugoslav Central Committee of 27 March 1948, and in later propaganda. But Tito had no doubts about Velebit. What is more, in one conversation he dismissed Rankovic's charges with one word: " Rubbish! " I had no doubts about Velebit either. Indeed I always felt rather awkward about him because of my failure to react to what Kardelj had said to Molotov, or to the UDBA's [secret police] suspicions about him. This feeling prompted me, after the conflict with the USSR broke out, to tell him that it was the English girl's letter which had been the reason for the suspicion. This caused Velebit to

be depressed, but he understood the situation and the situation I had found myself in.

[. . .]

SOON after my return from Paris on 27 May 1946, Tito left for Moscow at the head of a delegation, which included practically all the leading comrades, to discuss the industrialization of Yugoslavia and its rearming with Soviet aid, no more no less.

The visit to Moscow lasted longer than was usual for a state delegation. This may have been due to the death of Kalinin which occurred at the time. . . . The Soviet leaders did not keep strictly to protocol in dealing with state delegations from the socialist countries. It would be respected when arrangements for the visit were being made, but things would be changed during the stay in Moscow to fit in with the commitments and later assessments of the Soviet leaders. At the foundation meeting of the Cominform Ana Pauker passed on something communist leaders used to say in the pre-war period: " To Moscow whenever you want; back from Moscow when they let you go." Ana Pauker repeated the saying with blissful resignation. She probably did not know that it was a saying from mediaeval times applied to present-day Moscow: " Into the city when you wish, out of it when they let you."

Much of the Kremlin's way of treating foreign communists before the war was carried over to its attitude to the rulers of communist states. The " world revolutionary centre " simply assumed the role of a ruling autocratic state, and yesterday's leaders and heroes were allotted the role of more or less obedient vassals.

[. . .]

The delegation returned delighted with the promises and elated by a relaxed evening at Stalin's house and by Stalin's wit and personality.

Stalin was very restrained on the question of joint companies. But after Tito spoke in favour of them as a means of promoting Yugoslavia's economic development, Stalin and Molotov went along with the idea on the basis of mutual benefit. In so far as agreement was reached about the companies, it did not lead to anything but quarrels and suspicion. And it was no better with other economic agreements with the Soviets, although we could hardly boast of the way we fulfilled our undertakings.

It was on this occasion that Stalin displayed a lively interest in Albania. It was apparent that he was probably better informed about it even than our leaders, although Yugoslavia and Albania are neighbours and had relations on many levels. Stalin wanted to know in detail about the personalities and tendencies in the Albanian leadership. When he talked about the Albanian leaders' desire to visit Moscow he mentioned that the Albanian Central Committee did not want to allow Enver Hoxha to come on his own but insisted that Koci Xoxe should come with him as a sort of

control. " What do you think about that? " he asked Tito. Tito replied that he did not know of any serious disagreements in the Albanian Central Committee. But Stalin repeated: " What do you think? Should we have them here in Moscow? It seems to us there is no need. Better that we should help them through Yugoslavia." Stalin did not leave it at that but went on: " Anyway, there's something wrong in the Albanian Politburo." (Rankovic intervened to say that there were no major differences in the Albanian leadership.) Tito then said: " We can solve these problems together with the Albanian comrades." Stalin simply agreed, saying " Alright."

The conversation about Albania was not unplanned, and I would say that the idea of subordinating Yugoslavia [to the Soviet Union] had already taken shape in Stalin's mind. Albania and the friction over it between Yugoslavs and Soviets would, at the beginning of 1948, serve Stalin very well as a most convenient and convincing excuse for attacking Yugoslavia. The offer of Albania to Yugoslavia was Stalin's trap, but it was one constructed out of actual attitudes and the undoubted pretensions of the Yugoslav leaders, at least of the principal members of the leadership, with regard to Albania, as well as out of our ambitions which were certainly not idealistic but inspired by a lust for power. In Stalin's—and not only in Stalin's—rise [to power] it seems to me that his exploitation of revolutionary idealism and the creation of a privileged class were decisive.

AT the time we were still in the grip of ideological dogma and revolutionary idealism, and moreover we were unrestrained in our longing for power and greatness as a state. Stalin knew this better than anyone from the course followed by the Russian revolution and his own experience. The question of Albania was only one issue, but the most sensitive in the process of imposing his authority and subjugating Yugoslavia.

In the course of the evening spent at his villa Stalin gave his opinions, mostly negative, about the leaders of the European [communist] parties: Thorez didn't know how to " bite "; La Passionaria didn't know how to keep herself under control; Togliatti was a professor who knew how to write a good theoretical article but not how to lead people towards a fixed goal; Pieck was a senile old man who knew only how to tap someone's shoulder.

On the other hand he took the opportunity of seizing Tito, lifting him up three times and declaring: " Tito must be taken care of. Because I shan't live for long and he is necessary for Europe. Yes, Tito is needed for Europe! " Neither then nor since have I been able to understand what role in Europe Stalin had in mind for Tito. I connected it, vaguely and uncertainly, with the Soviet leader's insistence that evening that Germany, the whole of Germany, " must be ours," and that in it Tito—Tito personally—had been allotted the role of Soviet or communist regent. I had never had any profound belief in a role for Yugoslavia, or for the

Yugoslav revolution beyond its Yugoslav and Balkan connection, despite our popularity in the countries of " people's democracy " which the Soviets were aware of before we began to exploit it. But the leading comrades, when they recounted the scenes at that evening with Stalin, were carried away by their own enthusiasm, an uncritical enthusiasm, with shining eyes and animated smiles. Tito himself was glowing with pride, but remained " modestly " quiet and restrained. Perhaps the enthusiasm was best illustrated by Rankovic's reply when he drank, at a challenge by Stalin, a glass of pepper vodka at a single gulp, though he didn't like strong drink: " I would drink poison if Stalin offered it."

Another evening, at which the Bulgarian leaders Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov were present, provided Stalin and his colleagues with an opportunity to reopen the wounds, still unhealed, and inflame the renewed Bulgaro-Yugoslav rivalry. He made it quite clear that he thought more of Tito than of Dimitrov; Beria commented quite audibly that Kolarov lost the ability to think 40 years ago; and when some Bulgarian wine was opened Stalin said: " This is Yugoslav wine. The Bulgars looted it during the war in Yugoslavia."

Another sign of the exceptional attention paid to the Yugoslav delegation was the fact that it stood in the guard of honour at Kalinin's lying-in-state; and especially to Tito himself, whom Stalin invited to take a place at the funeral ceremony among the members of the Soviet Politburo.

WHAT was Stalin after—why did he do these things? I do not believe there is, or can be, any one clear answer to that question. There is no doubt that he was enthusiastic about Tito and the Yugoslavs, but at the same time he was deceiving them. His mind worked in a number of directions up to the point when he decided in concrete terms which was his way, his interest and the way to increase his own power. He saw in Tito not only the leader and master of the new Yugoslavia but also an independent and gifted politician, an outstanding colleague and exceptional adversary. Maybe both at the same time, or at different times and in different forms.

Stalin's ambivalent and reserved attitude towards Tito at that time was certainly influenced by Tito's earlier career, his stay and training in the Soviet Union and his special links with the Soviet intelligence services. The extent and nature of those links were never known or made clear to the other members of the Politburo, with the possible exception of Kardelj. Perhaps the following details confirm to some extent the impression I have. Apart from the radio contact with the Comintern during the war there was another contact maintained from Zagreb with the Soviet intelligence service with Tito's cooperation. This was operated by the agent known as " Vozdukh " (" Air "), Josip Kopinic, who at the beginning of the war imposed himself on the Croatian Central Committee, since Tito had replaced the Bureau of the Croatian CC. Tito ordered Pavle Savic, the physicist who acted as staff cypher clerk during

the war, not to show dispatches from Moscow to members of the Politburo without his permission. Why? Because of his special relations with Moscow, or in order to conceal criticisms Moscow made of his work? There were such criticisms, and Tito did not conceal them from comrades in the Politburo, and I certainly did not notice that he concealed anything else, anything more important. But he did not allow dispatches to be shown to others before he had read them, just in case.

The Soviet intelligence services devoted special attention and care to Tito at the end of the war. I would point out—lest the reader should get a false impression about my intention in revealing these details—that a connection with the Soviet intelligence services was necessary for a party, especially an illegal one, for organizational reasons, and the connection which particular members of the Party had with the Soviet services was regarded as a mark of appreciation, even an honour, and greatly enhanced their prestige. Tito did not become a slave to such connections or to the honours which the Soviet leaders showered upon him, however much pleasure they gave him.

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The Moscow Years

Veljko Micunovic

A MEMBER of the illegal Yugoslav Communist Party in the 1930s, a Partisan leader in the Second World War, head of the Yugoslav counter-intelligence service after the war and later Tito's ambassador in Moscow and Washington, Veljko Micunovic was one of the ablest of the men produced by the " new Yugoslavia." In the 1970s, struck down by illness, he produced a diary of his embassy experiences in Moscow—" The Moscow Years 1956–58 " (published in 1977)—which told of his friendly relations with Khrushchev and gave a unique account of life in the Kremlin at an especially exciting period.

In 1969 Tito decided to send Micunovic again as ambassador to Moscow, where he remained until 1971. He found the situation under Brezhnev very different from what he had known under Khrushchev. He was no longer treated as " one of them." Nevertheless he did his best to maintain good relations with the Russians while defending Yugoslavia's right to an independent role in world affairs. His experiences as ambassador of a country sharing the Soviet ideology contain valuable lessons for those with less sympathy for communism who still hope to come to terms with the Kremlin.

Despite declining health and deprived of the use of one arm, Micunovic carried on with the editing of his notes and completed preparation of a second volume of his diary (which spanned the years 1919–1971) only nine days before his death in 1980. Since then the manuscript has been awaiting publication. But in the uncertainty that followed Tito's death his successors lost courage and repeatedly delayed giving permission for the second volume to appear. In 1982, however, the Belgrade weekly " Nin " published extracts from the manuscript, from which the following passages are taken.

I ASKED to make a formal call upon Kosygin [then Prime Minister of the Soviet Union] and I received an immediate and positive reply. Kosygin received me two days later in his office in the Kremlin, where the offices of the Soviet Prime Minister are situated.

As I entered the vast rectangular room I found Kosygin already waiting for me, standing at the end of a long conference table covered with a green cloth. I was very familiar with the room from earlier occasions when I had called on N. A. Bulganin [former Prime Minister] when he headed the Soviet government, and later when I had met N. S. Khrushchev, who was Prime Minister from 1958 until he was dismissed on 14 October 1964.

Sitting near the head of the table were four Soviet officials from the government and Party apparatus who had the task of recording the

conversation. In his day Khrushchev would receive me in this very same room but entirely alone without any record being taken. Perhaps my talks with him were actually recorded in those days, though I never heard anything to that effect. There were a great many of them. But now Kosygin had four people with him. Some I knew and some I didn't. I knew that three of them came from three different organizations: from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the office of the Government. I didn't know where the fourth man was from. They were all holding sharpened pencils in their hands and had blank pads of paper in front of them; and as soon as we started to speak they started to write.

I could only guess why they had now introduced this procedure. At all events they didn't want any top leader to be alone with the ambassador of Yugoslavia, as had been the practice before.

Kosygin waited for me on the spot at the table where he stood, not taking a single step towards me. Without a word he offered me his hand, and, again without a word, he pointed to the place at the table where I was to sit and then went to the other side of the table and sat down among the note-takers. Of the officials present, the one I knew best was Astavin of the foreign ministry who was head of the Yugoslav desk but had been brought in on this occasion as a note-taker. I found myself facing the five of them and it seemed to me to be an unusual set-up for such a meeting. Kosygin muttered something only half audibly, pointing at me at the same time, which I took to mean: carry on, or, I am ready to listen to you. I did not immediately start to speak or do anything to disturb the deathly silence. I wanted to let all those present realize just how strange a welcome this was for a Yugoslav ambassador. I had known Kosygin for a long time, so that such a start to an official visit was on his part all the more unusual and discourteous. I had made similar calls many times in different countries around the world and had been welcomed by all kinds of people, just as I had myself received all sorts of people making such calls. But I cannot recall a single occasion like this one with Kosygin. He did not utter a single word to convey the slightest hint of a welcome, nor make any reference to the fact that we had met previously, that I had already served in Moscow and was no stranger there. He simply remained silent and waited for me to begin; the note-takers held their pencils poised and the conversation started up with some delay.

In this awkward situation I spoke a few conventional sentences, thanking Kosygin for receiving me, and said that I looked forward to receiving help from Soviet bodies in my work and that I hoped that Yugoslav-Soviet relations would develop favourably. I said that that was the view in Belgrade and that comrade Tito and our leadership expected such a development.

Kosygin did not say that he was correcting my first remarks, but it sounded like a correction: it was not simply that good relations should develop between us, he said, but that those relations should be comradely and socialist, as were relations between the USSR and all the other

socialist countries. Kosygin went on to say that the atmosphere between our two countries had improved (he probably had in mind our public quarrel about the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia) and that favourable conditions had now been created for a further development of Yugoslav-Soviet collaboration. Kosygin was out to make it quite clear that he considered that any improvement did not depend on the USSR but only on the policy pursued by Yugoslavia. The only practical matter and sign of Soviet goodwill with regard to our future relations to which Kosygin referred was the Soviet leaders' agreement to enter into negotiations with Yugoslavia concerning economic cooperation over the next five years. He said that the USSR saw no benefit for itself in this, but that they were ready to talk to Yugoslavia (as though the mere fact that they were ready to talk to us would help us).

In view of Kosygin's statement that a further improvement in our relations now no longer depended on the USSR but exclusively on Yugoslavia, I said that both we and they desired an improvement in our relations, that it was quite clear to both sides how that could be achieved, and that it was only thanks to efforts made by both sides that we had succeeded in overcoming certain difficulties arising out of the past, and in improving our relations. That is how it had been in connection with the political conflict between us last year on account of events in Czechoslovakia. Our political contacts had suffered, but cooperation between our states had continued more or less normally in various fields. The improvement of relations between us had always depended, and still depended, on both countries, on both the Soviet Union and on Yugoslavia. I thought that it was not a question today of who was more and who less responsible for the difficulties which had arisen in our relations in the past, or of upon whom depended more and on whom less the improvement of our relations today.

Kosygin said that he too did not wish to discuss who was more or who was less responsible for our relations. He then went on to say that the press in Yugoslavia was printing unfavourable opinions about the policy of the USSR. In the Soviet Union they did not do that sort of thing and the behaviour of the Soviet leaders towards Yugoslavia was quite different—not one of them had said about Yugoslavia anything like what was being said and written in Yugoslavia about the USSR. The Soviet press and the Soviet leaders do exactly the reverse of what we in Yugoslavia do, so that it was quite clear, Kosygin said in conclusion, that the improvement in our relations depended on Yugoslavia.

I said I agreed with him that the behaviour of the press, radio, and television and other media was very important both in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia and that the media were playing an ever greater role in foreign and domestic policy. But I could not agree with his opinion of the Yugoslav press. On the contrary, our press, radio and TV were promoting the best possible development of our relations. I mentioned some of the differences in the situation of the media in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. I did not believe that relations between us depended on some

article appearing in our or their press, but that the press depended upon the direction and aims of our and their policy. When things were normal in that respect the press promoted a positive development of our relations.

AFTER saying that I had not intended to speak about this matter today, I begged him for permission, since he had raised the question, to inform him that here in Moscow had appeared a very unfavourable and insulting article against Yugoslavia and, what is more, in an official publication of the State Planning Commission, which meant in fact the Soviet government, since Gosplan was actually a branch of the government. It was an article in their periodical *Planned Economy* which set out to show that the economy and socialism in Yugoslavia were collapsing. What was particularly difficult to understand, in my opinion, was that the first half of the article went over everything that was being done in Czechoslovakia before August 1968, while the second half quoted Soviet facts and opinions about the collapse of socialism in Yugoslavia. It thus appeared that someone was describing a certain state of affairs in Czechoslovakia leading up to 1968 and saying that a similar situation had existed in Yugoslavia for 15 or 20 years. Yugoslavia was thus identified with certain political tendencies in Czechoslovakia, as though Yugoslavia could have some connections with what some people were doing in other countries. Such writing in the Soviet press had, of course, a bad effect on the development of our relations.

This was obviously very unpleasant for Kosygin, who was displeased with this turn of events, because he had reckoned that the Soviet case in this matter was a strong one and the Yugoslav case weaker. He asked Astavin and the other Soviet officials present about the article in *Planned Economy*. They did not know what to tell him, because they had not seen the latest number of the periodical. Kosygin said that he also had not read the article, but that it could be dealing only with economic matters, and that was something different from ideology and politics. He said that he could point to a huge number of articles against the USSR in the Yugoslav press, that even our [Yugoslav] leaders criticize the USSR in public and that nothing like that happens in the Soviet Union.

Kosygin said that the Soviet press criticizes various things that happen in the USSR itself in the field of economics, and that the article I referred to was of no special significance. I was unable to agree with this separation of economcs and politics. In the article they talk about the bankruptcy of socialism in Yugoslavia and not about some Yugoslav plant working badly. In this connection I referred to an official publication, a book published this year with articles about the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In that book our struggle for national liberation and our revolution is written down to the point where it is treated as a sort of incidental battle of some " national avengers."

I was not able at first to hit upon the right word in Russian and one of the note-takers, who was acquainted with the article, willingly came to my

aid and produced the necessary word. I said that we had all been participants in those events and that it was not a question of some individual avengers but of decisions by the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to organize an armed struggle in 1941, that it was a question of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia which, as nowhere else in Europe, had in the early years of the war hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and of the millions of casualties which the peoples of Yugoslavia suffered in that struggle. We carried on that struggle alone right until half way through 1943 and thus helped the USSR and our other wartime allies. To write such things [in the Soviet Union] was very displeasing to our people, and one wondered how it was possible for someone in the USSR in 1969 to write about our struggle in that way.

To all appearances Kosygin was aware of the way our wartime struggle was being presented in the Soviet press. He said that they in the Soviet Union did not wish to distort history and they had not done so in this case. He then went over to the offensive and started to criticize Yugoslavia, saying that we had written and said all sorts of things in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. To my comment that these were completely different matters, Kosygin was no longer disposed to discuss history, saying that we had both fought and that we had won the battle.

THE conversation then took a pleasanter turn, dealing with future negotiations in the economic and cultural fields.

Kosygin then moved to the question of the high cost of national defence. He said that the USSR could not economize in that field. The situation in the world remained, and would continue to be, fairly complicated and difficult. They would continue to do everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet armed forces were up to their task at every moment; they would not permit America to inflict harm on the USSR in any field. Kosygin referred to the economic burden which the USSR bore in providing aid for the Vietnamese. In the same way he referred to Cuba to which the USSR gives everything necessary for it to survive and develop. At the end of this brief account of the extent of Soviet aid to socialist countries Kosygin said that the USSR had at the same time to bring about a rise in the standard of living of its own citizens.

On Kosygin's initiative we also spoke about military cooperation between us. Reverting to the question of Czechoslovakia he mentioned ironically the way we had been afraid and had started to scream about the danger for Yugoslavia and the threats on the part of the USSR. People in the Soviet Union had been amazed at our attitude because nothing of the kind had occurred to anyone. I commented that we had long been used to living with all kinds of dangers and that we had no reason to be afraid.

The conversation lasted about an hour.

* * *

In 1971 Veljko Micunovic was elected a member of the Presidency of

Yugoslavia and had therefore to return from Moscow to Belgrade. Before he left the Soviet Union he asked for meetings with the top Soviet leaders. But only Brezhnev agreed to receive him.

THE Soviet government provided me with a ticket on a regular passenger plane from Moscow to Simferopol and a car to meet me. Brezhnev received me immediately after my arrival in Yalta. He looked fitter and more rested than on the occasion of our talk in Moscow at the beginning of February this year. But, unlike his attitude at that meeting, Brezhnev did not appear well disposed, at least not at the beginning of the meeting.

After I had thanked him for receiving me and said I knew he was doing so at the expense of his holiday, I added that I had brought him a letter from Tito which spoke, among other things, of our very positive view of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Even before I handed Tito's letter to him, Brezhnev interrupted me and asked: Who prevented us from having good and friendly relations? Why did we get conflicts between us when he [Brezhnev] had personally for 15 years, and especially for the last seven years as leader of the Soviet Communist Party (" and that must mean something ") been in favour of having very good relations with Yugoslavia?

I thought that it would be better to hand him Tito's letter than to continue my prepared statement.

Brezhnev started to read the letter, commenting in the same way: There you are: exchanging declarations about best wishes, but things don't improve; again we declare our love for each other, and yet we quarrel—who can understand that? Then he read the letter rather more calmly. Finally he thanked Tito for the letter and said that the very fact that Tito wrote to him was always treated there with the necessary attention, irrespective of what the letter was about.

Giving a sort of general description of the present state of relations between us he again said that, with the best will in the world, it was pretty difficult to understand it all and know what to say. They in the USSR were for the best relations with Yugoslavia; he personally always took that line; he could give us records of Politburo meetings to assure us of it. Brezhnev recalled conversations he had had with Tito 10 years previously and referred to the notes which he had personally written to the Politburo of the CPSU after those conversations (at the time of Khrushchev) in support of Yugoslavia (the agreement concerning deliveries of our ships to the USSR); he was doing the same now as leader of the CPSU for seven years, and yet things were not going very well. During the first part of the conversation the atmosphere was such that for me to have offered any counter-arguments would have seemed discourteous, so I refrained from replying—that our clashes and misunderstandings recently were the result mainly of our two profoundly different attitudes towards the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Concluding his reflections about our quarrels, Brezhnev pointed out

how different our two systems were. The USSR was going its way, while Yugoslavia was going its way; we cannot turn them from the path they are on (!), and they do not wish to divert us; then why should we keep on quarrelling?

Returning to Tito's letter, Brezhnev criticized our behaviour in connection with the Yugoslav *émigrés* in the Soviet Union. Why did we have to write a protest to the Soviet government? Brezhnev then asked me to explain to him what it was all about. When I told him that there were between 200 and 300 Cominformists in the USSR he dismissed the matter with a wave of the hand saying it had no significance, that they had similar individuals in the USSR who said the worst things about him, Podgorny, Kosygin and others, but it meant nothing at all.

(The Yugoslav government's official protest was the result of more intensive subversive activity on the part of Yugoslav Cominformist *émigrés* in the USSR aimed at Yugoslavia, and the appearance in the Soviet press at the same time of articles supporting the *émigrés*.)

I reminded him that, today as in 1948, these people, and especially the officers of the Yugoslav army who had fled to the USSR, remained for us deserters and traitors. I was sure the USSR would take up the same attitude if it were a question of people who had deserted from the Red Army and were now working against the USSR. That was what justified our government in protesting to the Soviet government. I pointed out that they in the USSR could very easily make it impossible for such things to happen in future. Brezhnev passed this over in silence and said nothing more against our protest, but he continued to deny that there was any political significance in these events or that the Soviet leaders were connected with them in any way.

It was clear that our conversation had not got off to a good start, because questions had immediately been raised on which we had completely different views. It was also apparent that the Soviet leaders were very cross with Yugoslavia for protesting about the Soviet support for the Cominform emigration.

I think the Russians were less upset by our view of the Cominform *émigrés* and much more by the fact that it resulted in an official protest. It was as though what was important were not the reasons why the Yugoslav protest was made but the fact that we had the effrontery to protest at all and that we were treating the USSR like any other state.

(Brezhnev went on to approve of Yugoslavia's " non-aligned " foreign policy, to criticize the Yugoslav press, and to discuss his forthcoming visit to Yugoslavia.)

AFTER talking about the visit and some other matters the atmosphere improved radically and it became possible for me to ask some questions about Soviet policy . . .

To my question about this year's harvest (since this was now the central problem of the Party and government in the USSR) Brezhnev said it was

true, unfortunately, that they would not have a good harvest this year. They expected to have 10 to 15 million tons of wheat less than last year, which was a record year. The reason: climatic conditions. Apart from that they had to ensure deliveries of grain to all their allies including Cuba with the exception sometimes of Bulgaria and Hungary. That was a loss of another 10 or 15 million tons. Brezhnev agreed that it was a commercial deal, but " what sort of trade is it when you are selling bread ". . .

In unofficial talks with Soviet leaders about the general situation in the world, China is always one of the main subjects. So it was on this occasion. Brezhnev said that all of us, being Europeans, knew very little about the Chinese. It was no good judging them by our own criteria. Nor should one let oneself be carried away by the Chinese communists because they were primarily nationalists with great-power ideas, and had been like that for more than 10 years. Scholars, sociologists, ethnographers and others who had studied China a hundred years ago had said better and truer things about China than " today's foreign ministries and governments " in many countries. Anyone who wanted to understand China and Mao Tse-tung today should read a work on China written by a Russian scholar and published at the beginning of this century.

With regard to the present relations between the USSR and China Brezhnev spread his hands and himself put a question: How do you weigh them up, what can you put your trust in when it is a question of the Chinese and what you can do about them? The Chinese say they are in favour of the normalization of state relations with us, but at the same time they threaten that they will be quarrelling with the USSR for another eight or ten thousand years! They declare officially that capitalism has been restored in the USSR and that one must expect a revolution in the near future which will overthrow the present Soviet leadership. They say they want an agreement with us about the frontier and at the same time they put forward claims to our territory. We continue to talk with them and we shall go on doing so, but two years of talks have produced no result.

In this context Brezhnev recounted ironically what Chinese propaganda says about the Soviet leaders: all of them have been liquidated; they shot him at some meeting in China; they had " hanged " Kosygin and " boiled " Mikoyan. That was how Mao Tse-tung was now training a generation of Chinese communists to regard the USSR.

During the conversation about China Brezhnev did not mention the visit to China by Tepavac [Yugoslav foreign minister] or the good state of Yugoslav-Chinese relations. The Russians sometimes avoid talking to us about questions which they find unpleasant and which can only have a bad effect on our talks as a whole. The Russians' silence about such subjects simply reveals their dissatisfaction, not their indifference, and certainly not their approval. In my opinion the Soviet leaders are not happy about the good state of relations between Yugoslavia and China. Brezhnev did not suggest this by a single word, but he spoke at great length about the extent to which relations between the USSR and China

had deteriorated and how embittered the Russians were at the Chinese. So that we should be aware of it and take it into account.

To my question about Nixon's visit to China Brezhnev laughed at the way it had been said around the world that news of a secret agreement between Peking and Washington about Nixon's visit " came as a shock in Moscow." " It was no shock for us," Brezhnev said. " We were least of all surprised. We have been following the Chinese-American talks for a long time. I was not in Moscow when it was announced, but comrades phoned me and asked me what was to be done. I said: ' nothing for the moment. Publish a short report about Nixon's visit and then we shall see.' It is now becoming even clearer that there will be no sensations and that it will take a long time to establish a new situation in relations between Peking and Washington," and he went on immediately to say that the Americans, irrespective of all Nixon's demagogy and manoeuvres, know very well that China is not and cannot be a partner of the USA in the world today. It is only the USSR that is a nuclear power. China is not, in the true sense, and it won't be for a long time to come. Economically China means nothing at all. The excitement which arose over Nixon's visit to China is already subsiding and will continue to do so.

To my remark that I had that very day read a very long article on these matters in *Pravda* signed by a Soviet professor (Arbatov), Brezhnev readily acknowledged that he had had the text of the article and that he had sent instructions to Moscow that it should be published if the Politburo had no objections.

BREZHNEV became noticeably better disposed when I asked him about the prospects for an agreement about West Berlin and the ratification of the treaty with West Germany. In his view the prospects are good: the talks are coming to an end although not everything has been cleared up yet. The main obstacles to an agreement still come from the USA. On the other hand Brezhnev spoke only favourably about Willy Brandt and his efforts to reach an agreement.

I then spoke about the efforts being made by the Soviet government for the holding of a conference on European security. Brezhnev said that, if it were not possible to solve all problems at the first conference, which was reasonable and as no one expected, we could take a first step and plan a second one. It would have not only an all-European but a worldwide significance. . . .

To my question about the state of relations between the USSR and the USA, especially since the announcement of Nixon's visit to Peking, Brezhnev said that that had not affected Soviet-American relations. The Americans knew that the USSR was the only partner for them in the world. So everything was going on normally between Moscow and Washington as before the announcement of Nixon's trip. Agreement has almost been reached for the conclusion of a treaty on obligations assumed by each country to render impossible the accidental outbreak of nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. Such a variety of atomic weapons

had been accumulated by both countries, Brezhnev said, that such a treaty was important and necessary, however modest it might appear. The atomic arsenal on both sides had become so complex today that there was a possibility of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war, and that was something the USSR and USA had to make impossible. The negotiations which were now taking place between the two countries were the first of this kind in history, since it was a case of two superpowers who knew exactly each other's situation in the field of nuclear development and all the dangers that followed from it. For that reason the negotiations were complicated and difficult. The Americans raised those questions " which pinch them," and for that reason want talks about offensive missiles of the most powerful kind. Brezhnev let it be known that here the USSR has the advantage over the USA, while the Russians are demanding the same criterion for all the USA's missile weapons outside American territory.

Brezhnev said that talks were also going on about the construction of a defensive anti-missile system, but it was interesting that neither side had mentioned missiles mounted in submarines. We have not raised this either because if it doesn't interest the USA it doesn't interest us. This may have remained outside the scope of the talks until now because science and technology are unable as yet to confirm the presence of a submarine at distances of more than 20 to 30 or, in special circumstances, 50 kilometres. Therefore it is not possible at the present time to reach agreement in this field, because in practice it means nothing.

* * *

I THINK it is not diplomatic and is discourteous on such occasions for an ambassador to raise any questions on military subjects but, without my asking, Brezhnev himself started talking about them. Ten years previously he had been responsible for carrying out certain special programmes for the Soviet army and he told me of the work he had had to put in to carry out such a colossal programme in the scientific, technological and especially financial fields. The results were known, Brezhnev said, and that was why the USA is now conducting negotiations with us. But all that cost a lot of money and effort. Always and everywhere the military demand to have ever more resources. If anybody economizes in something, it's somebody else, not the armed forces. Such a policy has to be continued in the USSR because of the circumstances. If the USSR had not been militarily strong we should not have had these 25 years of peace, Brezhnev said. The population in the USSR understands this and that is why nobody has any objection to expenditure on the army, and it is enormous.

Brezhnev spoke again about his forthcoming visit to Belgrade and mentioned some of the problems facing the Yugoslav government.

Remarking that these were all our own domestic affairs, Brezhnev, " speaking as a friend," said that they in the USSR had for a long time been much concerned by what was going on in Yugoslavia: unemploy-

ment, the departure of our own workers and specialists to the West (already half a million, or a million of our people, who knows) and, what is far more important, public clashes between our republics or peoples. Brezhnev (like Kosygin three months ago) pointed to the USSR as an example of the opposite situation and asked: What would have happened to the USSR if something similar had happened here? He reminded me of the role of the Party and the role of the state, and the necessity of having a state monopoly of foreign trade, state planning, i.e. the Soviet centralist system as a model.

At the end Brezhnev congratulated me on my election to the Presidency of Yugoslavia. He expressed regret that I was leaving the USSR, but was sure that we should soon meet again in Yugoslavia, etc. I was glad that the meeting ended in an atmosphere much better than the one in which it had begun. At times it seemed to me as if Brezhnev was trying to be more friendly, as in our meetings 15 years before, but that he was keeping the distance and self-restraint of an untouchable head of a superpower. In this fairly cordial atmosphere he accompanied me across the garden of his villa to the car. The meeting had lasted three and a half hours, which was by all standards far longer than is generally allowed by Soviet protocol. I think that this was Brezhnev's way of showing his special interest on the eve of his visit to Yugoslavia.

Dedijer as a Historian of the Yugoslav Civil War*

Stevan K. Pavlowitch

Until things have actually happened, we tend not to believe that they can happen; but those things that have happened are possible, because they would not have happened had they not been possible.[1]

Our folk poems tell of a wretched fratricidal war. Our enemies spoke our language: we needed no interpreters. Perhaps that is why we did not understand one another. We all understand only our hatred, and keep silent, so that every one of us can remain convinced that he is in the right, and stick to his own views.[2]

We fought on opposite sides . . . and were witness to merciless killings, not only in combat . . . Many more lives were lost in that internecine settlement of accounts than through crimes committed by the armies of occupation.[3]

IN November 1981 there appeared in Yugoslavia a monster of a book, huge even by that country's standards of war books, huge even by the standards of the author's previous works; and this was only the second volume of the planned four-volume work—Vladimir Dedijer's *Further Contributions Towards a Biography of Josip Broz Tito*.[4] In spite of its length (1,262 pages, with another 80 pages of illustrations), of its weight (2·1 kg) and of its price (1,400 dinars), its print-run of 70,000 copies was quickly sold out.

To a Western reader, even one familiar with such lengthy biographies as Martin Gilbert's *Churchill* or Renzo De Felice's *Mussolini*, Dedijer's venture must appear strange. The author himself has written barely over one third of it; the rest is made up of " contributions " by other people, conversations, documents and photographs. Much of it is more relevant

* This article is based on a paper originally given at the conference on History and Historians in Central and South-Eastern Europe held in honour of Professor Hugh Seton-Watson in London in 1983. It will also be published in a *Festschrift*.

[1] Quotation from Aristotle in epigaph to Mihailo Lalic's novel, *Dokle gora zazeleni* (Belgrade, 1982).

[2] From Matija Beckovic's oration at the funeral of Mesa Selimovic, (*Knjizevna rec*, Belgrade, 27 August 1982).

[3] From a letter to the London-based monthly *Nasa rec* written jointly by two former guerrilla commanders who fought with Tito's People's Liberation Army and Mihailovic's Yugoslav Home Army respectively (December 1982).

[4] *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, II (Liburnija, Rijeka). Vol. I was just the story of *Tito Speaks* (in Serbo-Croat *Prilozi za biografiju . . .*).

to the author than to his subject. As a tool, the book is of little use to historians. It has no index. It is indifferent to the spelling of foreign names,[5] and to evidence that does not favour the author's theses. Documents are quoted without proper source references. At one extreme, no source is given at all. At the other, when the author wants to show that he personally has discovered a hitherto secret and most revealing document, we get the full works right in the text, preceded by the words " I have discovered," and followed by a photo-reproduction of some Public Record Office papers, complete with the ritual caption " Not to be reproduced photographically without permission," but with no acknowledgment of copyright. Between the two extremes, there is much talk of documents from secret archives which were passed on to Dedijer (or simply shown, or reported to him) by friends, some unnamed.

Not all the " contributions " are new or relevant. Just as some eighteenth-century composers repeated the same tunes time and again in different genres, so Dedijer repeats themes that have appeared in his earlier books. For instance, the section on General Mihailovic and Cardinal Stepinac, as models of extreme Serbian and extreme Croatian nationalism respectively, is both stale and irrelevant. Mihailovic figures as a quadripartite agent (not unlike Hoxha's Shehu) and the linchpin of the author's by now well-known conspiracy theory that all the imperialist powers were against Yugoslavia's independence. Dedijer's presentation of Stepinac reflects his obsession with the Vatican, that other Great Power (with no divisions), which even he cannot make responsible for Mihailovic.

The volume bears Tito's famous perfunctory signature on its cover. It begins with a facsimile reproduction of a letter from the president's *chef de cabinet*, dated 8 May 1978: " . . . The Comrade President does not object to a third edition of *Tito Speaks*, but thinks this would be a good occasion to produce an amended edition." Six months later, the author saw Tito for the last time. The visit is described in the kind of detail that would sell it to a women's magazine—what they had for lunch; what the President told Dedijer's son; what Tito's poodle (a now aged gift from Queen Frederika) did—and it builds up, supported by photographs, to the farewell, when Tito is alleged to have said: " *Pisi, Vlado, pisi samo istinu* " (" Write, Vlado, write only the truth "). Subsequently, the President ordered that Dedijer should have access to all archives, including Tito's own, and help was forthcoming from many important personalities in the Yugoslav establishment. The author, who boasts that Tito consulted him over the writing of his memoirs, wants to show that this book, no less than the original *Tito Speaks*, was inspired, even commissioned, by its subject.

[5] This is particularly true of those held in contempt. Thus SOE stalwarts Hudson and Kemp become Huntson and Comp; Ambassador Rendel is Randall; and Chianti wine is turned into Chiasso, which will not do, even from a teetotaller.

BORN in 1914, a journalist on the staff of the independent Belgrade daily *Politika* and a communist, Dedijer, during the Second World War, became a close collaborator of the CPY's agitprop chief, Milovan Djilas, and acted as chronicler of the Partisan struggle. After the war, he became Tito's propagandist and biographer, published various books,[6] and was elected to the Central Committee in 1952. Tito's official biography—*Josip Broz Tito: prilozi za biografiju*, or, in English, *Tito Speaks*—came out in 1953. Published in Yugoslavia in Serbo-Croat (in Cyrillic, Latin and braille scripts), Slovenian and Macedonian, and abroad in Albanian, Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Czech, Danish, English, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish and Turkish, as well as in six Indian languages, not to mention Esperanto, *Tito Speaks* contributed to the worldwide popularization of the Yugoslav leader, and earned its author a chair of History at Belgrade University. His association with Djilas, however, brought about an interruption in his career. Having defended Djilas' right to free expression, if not his ideas, he was expelled from his Party positions, was forced to stop teaching, sentenced to a six-month suspended prison term, and was eventually allowed to go abroad in 1959, as Tito appears to have had a soft spot for him. Research fellowships and visiting professorships took him to universities in Scandinavia, Britain and America, where initially he lectured on Yugoslav socialism, and then spent four years investigating the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914 in Sarajevo.

Through his work on the Sarajevo murder, Dedijer was supposed to have undergone a metamorphosis. Known abroad as Tito's " voice," he was built up into a scholar of international reputation, to become some sort of authorized historiographer of twentieth-century Yugoslavia. Originally, *Sarajevo* was meant to be published in English for foreign consumption. In the summer of 1964, the manuscript was ready, and it was announced that Dedijer had been appointed to a top research post at the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade. He was rehabilitated in progressive stages, and a large-scale public relations campaign was launched, announcing the book's imminent publication in all Yugoslav languages and scripts, and in the major European languages.

Eventually an American edition, *The Road to Sarajevo*, appeared in 1966, followed by a Serbo-Croat, and, in 1967, British, French, Italian and German editions. Whereas previous approaches to the subject had been almost exclusively political and diplomatic interpretations, Dedijer put the assassination back where it had originated—among the revolutionary youth of Bosnia and Hercegovina. A great deal of research was invested in a tremendous effort to produce what must be described as an important book, even though its substance is practically swamped in a

[6] Notably his three-volume diary (*Dnevnik*, Belgrade, 1945–50, with a second, one-volume, edition and an abridged English edition, *With Tito through the War*, London, 1951—all of which " omit . . . those things for which the time of publication has not yet come ").

mass of irrelevancies, with much of the ground work and editing farmed out to unprofessional assistants.

If the foreign editions contained just three or four useless chapters, the Yugoslav edition, with more than a thousand pages, had twice that number. The " original " English text was translated back into Serbo-Croat, and everything that could be connected, however remotely, with the subject was thrown in, in a chaos of slapdash editing. Since a second edition followed in 1978, with some 300 more pages, one is almost tempted to say that the best version of it is the 15-page article, " Sarajevo Fifty Years After," in the July 1964 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (reduced as it is to essentials, this is a must for all students of the question).

Acknowledged as a historian, Dedijer was elected to the Serbian Academy. More big books followed; increasingly they looked at the Second World War and the Tito-Stalin quarrel. In 1980, a *History of Spheres of Influence and of Secret Diplomacy* and *Testimonies of the Second World War* gave vent to his theory of the " widest coalition in the Second World War, " a conspiracy among all the powers, Axis and Allied, which had tried to smother the Yugoslav revolution. After his return to Yugoslavia, Dedijer also busied himself with another role; first as a member and later as chairman of the so-called Russell Tribunal, which looked into war crimes and/or violations of human rights, in Vietnam (by the Americans), Latin America and West Germany.

VOLUME II of *Further Contributions* had been heralded with serialized extracts in the principal Belgrade and Zagreb dailies, and with interviews. The reaction was immediate. Led by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Socialist Alliance in charge of checking the output of new books on Tito (over 400 since his death to that time), a campaign against Dedijer was launched by several groups. The Partisan veterans accused him of slandering the revolution. The Defence Secretariat decided that the book should be excluded from army libraries. *Borba* organized a " round table "of conformist historians, who criticized the author harshly, but only in general terms. Important personalities blamed him for operating under false pretences. It was said that he had been given all manner of help on the understanding that he was writing a book against Djilas, that he had abused his helpers and that his book actually smacked of Djilasism.

At the time of publication Dedijer was abroad, investigating the Gulf War for the Russell Tribunal. On his return, his old paper, *Politika*, gave him the right of reply on 26 November 1981, but the campaign went on, unabated for a couple of months, then less intensively until April 1982. Dedijer lashed back by circulating two open letters, of 17 February and 5 March, protesting against the campaign of hate and intimidation directed at him, his family and his assistants, demanding the right to reply on television, and threatening to sue a number of personalities (including Bakaric, who has since died). *Politika* then gave him another chance to

express himself more formally, in a two-page interview of 13 March. In it, he admitted that the book had run out of control, growing to twice the size originally planned, and that its form was unsatisfactory, but that, as far as its substance was concerned, it contained nothing but the truth. The revolution was so great an achievement that its blemishes could be acknowledged. Anyhow, Dedijer asked, was it not " better that we should tell the truth about ourselves than leave it to our enemies to do so?" Tito was a hero, but not a god; he was a great man, with human qualities and human passions, and it was Tito himself who had entrusted him " to write the truth, and to show that Tito was not afraid of being weighed on the scales of history." By hitting at him, he added, his critics were really hitting at Tito's greatest virtues. " I am convinced that after this book of mine, after so much lightning and thunder, the history of the revolution will have to be written in a new manner."

On the same day, the press announced the publishers' decision not to proceed with the last two volumes of *Further Contributions* (in which he planned to deal with the Tito–Stalin rift and Tito's non-aligned policy). Eventually, more professional assessments began to appear.[7] After the storm had died down completely, Dedijer announced in January 1983 that he was preparing a new book on the charisma of political leaders and revolutionaries in the twentieth century, and that it would take him away on a year-long trip around the world, to obtain testimonies from statesmen on Tito's struggle for independence, and also to lecture at foreign universities on the subject of charisma, and on the " theories " and " scholarly methods " he had applied in his *Further Contributions*.[8] In November, he complained that he, his family and his research team were being persecuted, threatened and blackmailed to the point where he had had to send his wife and sons to live with friends in Italy, and that the manuscript of his third volume was being " massacred to the point where it could no longer be recognized " (L'Espresso, 20 November 1983). Eventually, in June 1984, the third volume did appear in print, though not with the original publisher Liburnija of Rijeka, but under the imprint of the Belgrade publishing enterprise Rad (only 684 pages). Although it deals with the period 1945–55, it again contains critical revelations about the conduct of the Partisan war, and harsh words about several of its leading personalities—notably Kardelj this time. It also contains the revelation that Tito's close collaborator, the Croat Ivan Stevo Krajacic (still alive), was a " Soviet spy." He was introduced to Tito in 1947 by Tito's future wife, Iovanka Budisavljevic.

The third volume of Dedijer's book has some sensational episodes, such as the failed attempt by two Soviet doctors, one of whom was Stalin's

[7] Historians working on the publication of Tito's complete works objected to the sensationalism of Dedijer's volume, and argued that the time had not yet come when all could be revealed (Tone Ferenc and Pero Damjanovic in *Politika*, 7 May 1982), but the most balanced review came from the military writer General Nikola Pejnovic who, having analysed the all-too-evident weak aspects of the book, concluded that, on the whole, it was not to be anathematized (*Vojno delo*, March–April 1982).

[8] *Politika*, 6 January 1983.

personal surgeon, to assassinate Tito. The occasion for this crime was supposed to have been the hernia operation which was performed on Tito in Brdo Castle in Slovenia in February 1947. Dedijer has collected the testimonials of the Yugoslav doctors who assisted the Russian doctors, and of the head of the Security Services, General Milan Zezelj.

The conflict between Tito and Stalin occupies a large part of the book. It describes Stalin's project to make Yugoslavia into " a province of the USSR " with the launching of three state federations in Eastern Europe: one between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; another between Hungary and Romania; and the third between Poland and Czechoslovakia. All of these were later supposed to join with the USSR.

This third volume also includes a description of the plan to attack Yugoslavia, beginning with the plot in the Yugoslav navy and partly based on the presence of Soviet battleships in the Albanian port of Durazzo, a plot masterminded by the Italian communist leader Vittorio Vidali, who was Stalin's hitman in Spain during the Civil War and the senator from Trieste in Rome after the war (he died not long ago).

Which of these revelations is true and which not, is not always easy to judge. Stalin was opposed to the Bulgarian–Yugoslav federation at the time when Dimitrov was advocating it. On the other hand, the stories about Tito's wife's involvement in court intrigues seem to have been confirmed by her disgrace prior to Tito's death.

WHY did so unwieldy a book attract not only the wrath of veteran Partisans and politicians but also the curiosity of a host of more general readers? Much of it went against the grain of official historiography. It told how the history of the war had often been doctored; how documents had been destroyed or retouched—by the secret police, by Party leaders, by Tito himself.

It contained new information on the links between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet Union during the war. While there was still a Soviet legation in German-occupied Belgrade, Tito was in personal contact with the military attaché and other Russian diplomats. Prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, two radio transmitters were set up in Zagreb for communication with Moscow, with Tito's agreement. One served as the Comintern link with eight (unnamed) European communist parties, and was operated successfully throughout the war by Josip Kopinic, who sent out more than 1,400 of Tito's messages. The other was operated as a link with Soviet military intelligence until early 1942. The Comintern had long considered Yugoslavia an artificial creation and had long wanted to break it up, so that in April 1941, when their German allies did break it up, the Soviets had no difficulty in accepting this *fait accompli*, to the extent of tolerating for a time those local tendencies that urged a break-up of the CPY. The Macedonians joined the Bulgarian Party, and the Croats were in two minds about whether to set up their own independent party or remain in the CPY, and Bakaric himself was

apparently confused. This is still a sensitive issue in Yugoslavia, and Dedijer's revelations touched on raw nerves.[9]

The book also looks at other wartime quarrels between communist leaders; at the brutality of summary executions by the Partisans, within their own ranks as well as among their enemies; at their links with Mihailovic's men, in spite of the fact that the latter were, in Tito's words, "our main opponents now and for the future"; at the communists' contacts with the Germans. In particular, Dedijer deals with the episode between the Partisan high command and the German command in Zagreb during the March 1943 talks.

These talks had first been referred to between 1949 and 1956, by Stephen Clissold, Wilhelm Hoettl (who revealed Vladimir Velebit, the then Yugoslav ambassador in London, as one of the negotiators) and Rudolf Kiszling, on the basis of their own information sources. Djilas, in 1963, had also mentioned them, saying then that the essence of the talks lay in getting the Germans to recognize the rights of Partisans as combattants. In 1965 and 1969, Ilija Jukic and Ivan Avakumovic reconstituted the talks respectively from German Foreign Ministry records and from captured German military records available in US National Archives microcopy. Avakumovic also collated these with a between-the-lines reading of published Yugoslav documents.[10] With his back against the wall, due to the increasing constraint of the Axis ring closing in on him in the spring of 1943, Tito contacted the German military authorities with the following offer: the Partisans would stop harassing the Axis forces in the "Independent State of Croatia," if they were allowed to return to their homes, or withdraw to the East in order to fight the forces of Mihailovic. Discussions were also held about the communists' attitude to an Anglo-American landing, and the possibility was envisaged of joint German-Partisan defensive action.

In the face of such evidence, Phyllis Auty still maintained in 1970 that "Tito and his chief negotiator in 1943 have denied categorically to me (interviews in 1968) in response to specific questions that these negotiations had any purpose other than a truce for exchange of prisoners. I see no reason to doubt Tito's word on this, and know of no credible evidence to refute it."[11] So in 1971 I summarized the evidence then available, and in 1973 Walter Roberts devoted a section of his book to the talks. Not only was the latter the fullest account to date, it also revealed Milovan

[9] Dedijer was the first to draw attention to the mysterious representative of the Comintern whose very existence was previously unknown to the Yugoslav public. Since then, Kopinic himself has fuelled more controversy through his own copious revelations in the authorized two-volume account by Vjenceslav Cencic, *Enigma Kopinic* (Belgrade, 1983).

[10] S. Clissold, *Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power* (London, 1949), p. 151; W. Hagen (pseudonym for Hoettl), *Die geheime Front: Organisation, Personen und Aktionen des Deutschen Geheimdienstes* (Linz-Vienna, 1950), pp. 263–66 (published in English under Hoettl's real name as *The Secret Front: The Story of the German Secret Service* (London, 1953), pp. 168–72); R. Kiszling, *Die Kroaten* (Graz-Cologne, 1956), pp. 199–200; M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London, 1963), p. 13; I. Jukic, *Pogledi na proslost, sadasnjost i buducnost hrvatskog naroda* (London, 1965), pp. 145–53; I. Avakumovic, *Mihailovic prema nemackim dokumentima* (London, 1969), pp. 112–14.

[11] Letter to *TLS*, 27 November 1970.

Djilas as Tito's chief political negotiator. Roberts' six pages made the headlines, caused a diplomatic incident, and finally seemed to convince most interested people in the West that the episode was typical of the situation which had prevailed in Yugoslavia. Djilas, who in 1971 had inquired about what was known in the West from German and other sources, decided after the fuss caused by Roberts' book to give his own interpretation in 1977. Velebit, by then in retirement, told a journalist writing a book on post-war Yugoslavia's eminent ambassadors, that he had acted " more as a technical person," adding that " there was nothing dishonourable in those talks," but he did not revert to that question at all in his recently published memoirs.[12]

Dedijer devotes a whole chapter (20 pages of his book) to the talks. He gives a full Serbo-Croat translation of the German military documents that formed the basis of Roberts' section,[13] and provides further details: 1) General Koca Popovic (the military negotiator, later chief of the General Staff and foreign minister), who provided the author with oral information and with documents from his personal files, confirms that the German documents used are all genuine; 2) General Velimir Terzic (Tito's acting chief of staff at the time) states that the initiative for the talks came from Tito himself; 3) published Yugoslav documents[14] show that Tito then gave orders to stop action against the Germans on the Belgrade–Zagreb railway line, and to concentrate all efforts on liquidating Mihailovic's units, who represented the main danger; 4) right from the beginning, there had been enemy contact for the exchange of prisoners, and to obtain food for prisoners. After September 1942, contacts with the Germans became a regular feature on all fronts[15]; 5) there were strong and pervading links with the Ustasha administration. The officer corps of its Croatian army, and also the Ustasha Militia, were effectively infiltrated so as to provide intelligence, weapons, ammunition and medical supplies. Ivan Krajacic, the main co-ordinator of this infiltration, adopted several false identities, and passed himself off as a counsellor in the Foreign Ministry, an Air Force officer and an Ustasha Militia officer. He had meetings with the commander of Pavelic's bodyguard, with the commander of the Croatian navy, and made his exit from Zagreb in August 1943 in a minister's official car.

The author never managed to talk to Tito about the German connection (the President twice postponed an arranged audience, and

[12] S. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London-New York, 1971), p. 141; W. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941–1945* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1973), pp. 106–12; M. Djilas, *Wartime* (New York-London, 1977), pp. 229–45; D. Stuparic, *Diplomati izvan protokola: ambasadori Titove Jugoslvije* (Zagreb, 1978), p. 147; V. Velebit, *Secanja* (Zagreb, 1983).

[13] Characteristically, the author describes these as his own discovery. He also reproduces some of the documents in facsimile, notably the one actually signed by the three Yugoslav plenipotentiaries that states that the People's Liberation Army Command considers the Chetniks to be the main enemy (11 March 1943), and the full powers issued to Koca Popovic (4 March).

[14] Already quoted by Avakumovic as far back as 1969 (p. 114).

[15] When Rade Koncar, a member of the Politburo, was arrested in Split by the Italians, an exchange was arranged for a captured officer who was a relative of Mussolini's, but the officer was killed when he was being taken to the place of exchange, and Koncar was consequently executed.

then fell ill and died), but he does express an opinion: it should never have gone beyond its original purpose to exchange prisoners. Italian opposition would have proved a more serious obstacle to the Germans crossing the Neretva than a truce with the Partisans. As it was, the truce lulled the Partisans into a false sense of security, enabled the Germans to prepare their offensive in full secrecy, and eventually forced the Partisans northwards through the Sutjeska valley instead of enabling them to go to Serbia.

WHAT is particularly interesting from the British point of view is the treatment of British–Yugoslav relations as seen by the one-time chronicler and propagandist of the People's Liberation Movement. For Dedijer, no sooner had the Western democracies gone to war in 1939 than they wanted to push Yugoslavia into the conflict in order to deflect Hitler's attention eastwards, a policy which Tito condemned as no less a threat to Yugoslavia's independence than the threat from the Axis powers. In 1941 the British did all they could to destroy Tito, and so prevent the resistance turning to revolution. Dedijer surmises that Hudson, SOE's first man in occupied Yugoslavia, brought Mihailovic instructions to that effect. He does not accept the " claim of some English historians who were working for Intelligence, such as W. Deakin," that no invasion of Yugoslavia was ever planned by the British. He does not follow those of his Yugoslav colleagues whom he sees as having fallen into the Deakin trap—for Sir William was merely trying to disguise the envisaged armed intervention by British imperialism against Yugoslav communism. Indeed, the author claims that in the spring of 1943 SOE was preparing for just such an event, with the help of Chetniks and occupation troops. When Deakin eventually came to Yugoslavia, he cleverly tried to play down the role of Tito and the CPY, he was two-faced and was not liked by the Partisans.[16] The very arrival of the Deakin mission is seen as the cause of six precious days lost in the Partisans' retreat, and thus a contributing factor in the subsequent disaster. There was a serious clash at the time of the Italian armistice because Tito had not been informed of it in advance, whereas the author alleges that Mihailovic had been so as to enable him to get the lion's share of Italian equipment.

All this fits in with his " widest coalition " theory. Yugoslavia was to be the first victim of the aggressive British Right. What the British failed to achieve in Yugoslavia in 1943, they carried out in Greece the following year. In so far as any evidence is produced, it seems rather fanciful,[17]

[16] This is confirmed by Gojko Nikolis, wartime head of the Partisans' medical services, in his most unmythological memoirs, when he refers to Deakin as the embodiment of Perfidious Albion (*Korijen, stablo, pavetina: memoari* (Zagreb, 1981), pp. 549–59). Dedijer's dislike of Sir William Deakin is such, however, that he accuses him, among others (ranging from the Vatican to Rankovic, through Chetnik *émigrés*, the CIA and Cyrus Sulzberger), of trying, at the time of his semi-exile, to provoke him into attacking the Yugoslav regime, so as to compromise him in Tito's eyes.

[17] The Partisans are said to have decoded secret BBC signals giving Mihailovic orders to cooperate with Axis troops against the Partisans in January 1943.

beyond the facts that: 1) the Soviets, in the summer of 1942, brought Tito's attention to the possibility of an Anglo–American " second front " in the Balkans (at a time when Moscow was desperately trying to get a second front anywhere, even in the Balkans); and 2) the Yugoslav government believed, until well into 1943, that the British would land (which the British wanted them, and others, to believe).

Dedijer's hypotheses are interesting as evidence of what was obviously more than natural diffidence towards the British as class enemies.[18] He explains that Tito saw the Chetniks as the main factor in the expected British intervention to maintain the capitalist order and the monarchy. The Chetniks were thus the main threat to what had already been achieved: they had to be destroyed before the British landed, and a British landing had to be stopped at all costs. March 1943 was the most critical month for the Yugoslav revolution. This explains the talks with the Germans; the coalition hypothesis is their justification.

THE anti-British bias also comes through in the chapter dealing with Yugoslav–Albanian relations at the end of the war. This notwithstanding, it is the only chapter that really deals with an issue which had hitherto been in almost total darkness. Tito is quoted as having once told Dedijer that Albania and Yugoslavia have at least one element in common: both waged revolutionary struggles during the war, whereas other occupied nations merely produced resistance movements. The author adds that both had to contend with British attempts to destroy their revolutions and pit one against the other.

In the first half of 1944, Tito decided to postpone any decision on the future of Kosovo. The Germans were still in Yugoslavia, an Allied landing was still feared, the Partisans still had to conquer Serbia, and without Serbia they would not have had Yugoslavia or socialism. The ultimate idea was to bring Albania into the Yugoslav federation and divide Kosovo between Albania and Serbia; but to take such a decision at that time would have weakened their hand both vis-à-vis Mihailovic and vis-à-vis the Albanian communist leadership. By the autumn, however, Kosovo had been freed from the Germans, although there still remained the Albanian counter-revolutionaries to contend with. Using the archives of the Institute of Military History in Belgrade, Dedijer went on to reconstruct the great Albanian uprising in Kosovo in the winter of 1944–45.

The Yugoslav communist authorities began to mobilize the Kosovo

[18] Documents are quoted, issuing from the Partisan leadership between April and October 1943, with increasing expressions of anti-British feelings, e.g.: " Keep the so-called [British] delegates under your control while we investigate why they have come " (to Croatian headquarters, 23 April); " The English are sending various so-called sabotage missions. We are being very cautious and keeping them under control " (to Comintern, 20 July); " They [British liaison officers] want to know too much about our intentions. We give them only such information as we think can be given, [and we] also tell them all about the Chetniks " (to Comintern, 1 September); " The English obviously intend to interfere in our internal affairs. We shall not let them " (to Croatian headquarters, 9 September); " The English are so impudent that they drop parachutists into our territory without our permission " (to Comintern, 7 October); " If someone [British] comes without advance warning, arrest him " (to Croatian headquarters, 11 October).

youth with the intention of sending conscripts to the stalemated Srem front against the Germans. This would have included the followers of the counter-revolutionary commander Saban "Poluza," who negotiated an agreement with the Yugoslav Partisans, whereby he would send 4,000 of his men to Srem, then changed his mind under popular pressure. Poluza's men put up an active resistance to the Partisans until their leader's death in late February 1945. At the same time, another Albanian counter-revolutionary, Adem Voca, who had also negotiated earlier with the Yugoslav communists, was rallying supporters in the mountains. Early in February 1945, Tito placed the whole Kosovo area under military rule. Even though the Albanian communist leadership had ordered its units in the area to side with the Yugoslav Partisans against the Albanian fascists, the Yugoslavs had to bring in troops from other parts of Yugoslavia, until a total of 40,000 men were needed to get the better of the remaining Albanian opponents. The latter numbered no more than five or six thousand, but they had links with the Chetniks and with right-wing circles in the West (as proved in Dedijer's eyes by the presence of British officers at their headquarters). At the same time there was that winter a revolt by the Albanian recruits from Kosovo in the Yugoslav Partisan army. Order was not restored in that region until March 1945.

THE usual questions, "Why?" "In whose interest?" were best put by Blagoje Neskovic, secretary of the CPY Regional Committee for Serbia in 1941, head of the government of Serbia in 1945, later member of the Politburo until he was dropped at the Sixth Congress in 1952: "To what end and for whom has Dedijer re-tailored historical facts after 40 odd years?"[19] Several answers can be suggested. One would be rather similar to that given for the famous Djilas articles published in the winter of 1953–54: the writer had close links with Tito. Another explanation would be that Dedijer had been given full backing to write what was supposed to have been a book against Djilas. This would fit in with the anti-Djilas campaign that was in full swing in the autumn of 1981, to which Dedijer was an important contributor.

The book is, indeed, full of criticism of Djilas; he becomes responsible for almost everything that went wrong in the Partisans' struggle. As the arch-Stalinist, it was he—if we are to believe Dedijer—who carried through (in Tito's absence) the directives of the Hitler–Stalin pact; who, more than anyone else, believed that the war would be over two months after the German invasion of Russia, and wanted to prepare for the assumption of power in Belgrade as soon as the Red Army arrived; who concocted propaganda lies to create an aura around Tito; who was responsible for the communist failure in Montenegro after the July 1941 rising there; who most contributed to the loss of morale in the winter and spring of 1942 as a result of his ruthlessness; who did so much both to separate Party members from ordinary patriots, and to bring about a

[19] *Politika*, 24 November 1981.

general deterioration in Partisan ethics. According to Dedijer, Djilas is vague, contradictory and not entirely honest in what he says about himself in the memoirs that were published abroad. Djilas is held responsible for subsequently doctoring the facts in Tito's authorized biography, and (together with Rankovic) for the inheritance struggle which developed around Tito.[20]

However, many other people are also at the receiving end of the author's vindictiveness. It is with relish that he exposes his comrades. Few of the old guard emerge unscathed, but that is meant to provide a stark counterpart to Tito—particularly Djilas who is all doctrine while Tito is painted as life itself, as it is lived in the reality of the Yugoslav environment, with all its rich human contrasts.

Dedijer's book is certainly not meant to be the beginning of a process of de-Titoization. Such new light as it does throw on the subject is intended to flatter. From Tito's ancestry (traced back to 1611) to his charisma, this book is conceived as a " demystifying " humanistic glorification of the great man, through the prism of revolutionary struggle by the masses. Like his view of 1914, Dedijer's 1941 is set well among the people. It is seen as a spontaneous rising in which Tito and the CPY naturally found their place, and were naturally looked up to for leadership. Dedijer is a self-professed admirer of Michelet's *histoire d'en bas*, but whereas the Frenchman had but one hero—the people—his Yugoslav counterpart has two heroes—the people and the great man—and he accepts the greatness of the Yugoslav revolution with all its warts, mistakes and horrors.[21] This was the first national rising in occupied Europe, and it ignited spontaneously. Tito understood this, in all three of its aspects—the rising of the Serbs in the " Independent State of Croatia, " the rising in German-occupied Serbia, and the rising in Italian-occupied Montenegro. Dedijer argues that all attacks against him and his book are really attacks against Tito.

This leads to a third possible explanation of why the book was allowed through. Whereas the author was anxious to save Tito from his entourage, the establishment was anxious to make Tito share the responsibility with them for what had gone wrong. If it can be shown that Tito, however great, was a people's leader who shared the people's

[20] Djilas has since answered some of these allegations in his latest volume of memoirs (*Vlast* (London, 1983), pp. 14, 237–38, 265, 292–94).

[21] He goes into the whole question of Partisan reprisals (10 traitors for every people's fighter killed, and entire villages burnt to the ground) which continued even after the end of the war (against captured or returned collaborators and counter-revolutionaries). He explains it by the communist dogma of the so-called second phase of the revolution (the liquidation of the bourgeois elements who took part in the first phase) added to the social psychology of the *milieu* (vendetta). He relates a nice story from Tito's first visit to London in 1953. During the laying of wreaths at the Cenotaph with Churchill, there was a demonstration against Tito. His personal bodyguard, a Montenegrin Partisan-hero colonel, recalled after the event that he moved closer to Churchill, as he was resolved, " if they killed our Tito, immediately to kill Churchill." He gives moving examples of the fratricidal aspect of the civil war. Of Mihailovic's three children one was with him and two were with the Partisans; Vukmanovic-Tempo's brother, a priest, was executed for having sided with the Chetniks; a Bosnian mother, whose two sons, a Chetnik and a Partisan respectively, were killed fighting one another, had them buried together under one inscription: " Killed by a brother's hand."

humanity and who made mistakes, then he has a share in the responsibility for what has gone wrong. A little gentle de-Titoization through Dedijer could help the Party, whatever Dedijer's intentions may have been. At the end of the day, whatever the weave of explanations for their mixed intentions, by revealing the quarrels between the various tendencies, the doctoring of history, the " humanity " of the Partisans, no less " human " than some of their opponents, the author showed the large cracks in the beautifully still frieze depicting the communist leadership marching united through the revolution. Willy-nilly, Dedijer's attempt to bring back Tito the man has meant a move away from Tito the statue, so that the humanization of the People's Liberation Struggle cannot but demystify the standard account of the heroic Partisan war.

DEDIJER is not alone, in so far as some of the ideas he confusedly expresses in his *Further Contributions* have been taken further still, not in historical monographs, nor even in the reflections of historians, but in controversial works of literature on civil war themes that have since been published.

Vuk Draskovic, born in 1946, works in Belgrade. His novel *Noz* (" The Knife," Belgrade, 1982) is about the war in Hercegovina. Its hero, his author's senior by four years, is a war orphan brought up as a Moslem by a family that sided with the Ustashi, and who as a student in the 1960s is troubled by the need to know his real identity. He eventually discovers that he was born into an Orthodox pro-Chetnik family massacred by the people who subsequently brought him up, and that his real family and his adoptive family are but two branches of the same family, one of which was converted to Islam under the Turks. In Draskovic's novel too, the initial rising is spontaneous and devoid of ideology. The rest, however, is little more than a bloody internecine struggle where the foreign occupying forces are never seen. There is one wise old Moslem character—nicknamed " Sikter effendi " because he rejected all sides in the civil war—who helps the young man overcome his predicament. His wisdom comes from his understanding of history, which enables him to see through the myths invented to help people survive in bad times. All knives are the same, he explains, for they were all used to cut our throats, all throats are equal, and all knives are double-edged. If at first glance the Partisans appear superior, it is because they rose above the traditional pattern of hatred, but only to introduce new hatreds with as much, if not more, fanaticism.

The message is that we have to come to terms with our past, and see ourselves as we truly are; to seek the blame in ourselves, and not in others; to try to understand what happened in our country, destroyed during the chaos of the Second World War, when it turned on itself, and further back in time. We must know, so that such things should never happen again.

Also living in Belgrade, and born in 1914, Mihailo Lalic could be father to the hero of *Noz*, but the hero of his own novel, *Dokle gora zazeleni*

(" Until the Mountain Becomes Green Again," Belgrade 1982), belongs to his own father's generation. Set in Montenegro in 1941–42, the novel takes the form of extracts from the memoirs and diaries of Pero Grujovic, the narrator. Too old to take an active part in the war, he sympathizes with the Partisans but keeps a " low profile," as he also has friends among moderates on the other sides, and sees the rights and wrongs of all. Quiet and reflective, Lalic's Grujovic is more true to life than Draskovic's Sikter. Whereas Draskovic's novel is written in an awkward colloquial style, and with that hazy, half-propagandist understanding that post-war generations seem to have of the " other sides," however impervious they are to the propaganda about the " heroes' side," Lalic's prose flows smoothly from the mind and eye of the observer, with a more traditional love of the language, and a better understanding of the mentalities of the time.

" Happy are the nations who live in the East or in the West; their conquerors come from one side only . . . Where we are, they come from both sides, and sometimes from all four sides. One attacks us and will not let us live, while the other incites us to stand up and will not let us die." This idea could sum up the novel's approach to the structure of history. Its message, usually expressed through the narrator, but also through other characters, is that we always see ourselves as better than our opponents, whom we despise. When legitimate power has dissolved, Montenegro plunges back into its history and returns to its myths. We believe we are fighting for freedom, but it is a freedom without justice (echoes of Djilas?), the freedom to enslave others. History moves slowly, and communism will change little below the surface. Whatever their undoubted merits, the Partisans have also done their share of killing. Indeed, their fanaticism leads them to kill their own people too, and their belief in sexual equality does not permit them to spare women, " contrary to the old custom, respected by Turks and Albanians, that women are never killed, even during the most serious of battles."

There is also a faint parallel between Montenegro in 1915–16 and Montenegro in 1941–42 suggested by the narrator, a disappointed idealist believer in unification who is about to become disappointed by the dawn of yet another new era. After the First World War, Montenegro's war effort was passed over in silence by the official historians in Belgrade who wanted only Serbia's glory to shine, even at the price of blackening her smaller sister's reputation. The historians of pre-war Yugoslavia were not renowned for their objectivity; historians are, anyway, always on the side of whoever is on top. The narrator, however, in what could possibly be a gibe at official interpretations of the Second World War, hopes that eventually a revisionist school will emerge and find its sources, if not in local, then in foreign archives.

In the theatre, in that same year of 1982, the play *Golubnjaca* (The Pit and the Pigeons), adapted from a short story by Jovan Radulovic, was staged. Banned at Novi Sad and taken up by Belgrade students, it is set in the poor Karstic countryside of northern Dalmatia, where the author was

born in 1951. The " pit " of the play is a deep limestone depression into which people would throw the carcasses of animals and anything they wanted to forget; it was the home of wild pigeons. During the war, Orthodox Serbs were thrown into it by fascist Ustashi, and the play is about the obsessions of the children of the 1950s who grew up around the pit, affected by official silence and private tales.

THESE are but the best-known instances of ways in which writers have begun to look at the forbidden miasma of the Second World War, through literary works, through interviews and other public asides. Yugoslavia is presently experiencing a period of general interest in the 1940s, probably because of a feeling of instability, of fear for the future, at a time when the claim that the Party is the protector of the revolution and the legatee of the Partisan struggle is fading. What had become largely an irrelevance by the time of Tito's death, has since emerged as a novel curiosity for an increasing number of Yugoslavs. They want to find out what has been kept hidden, they want to grasp the extraordinary complexity of a complex period, they want to learn about themselves. They are afraid that they might be on the threshold of a similar period, when the equilibrium could again be broken. Basically, they are looking to draw lessons for the crisis of post-Titoism, and they want to look their immediate past squarely in the face, through works that are not Manichean.

This would not be that dissimilar to the sort of reappraisals being conducted in a number of West European countries were it not for the fact that the revision of history is no mere academic exercise for Yugoslav historians. Contemporary historians in that country range from hack writers to neo-positivist scholars. At the bottom end, there are those who follow instructions imparted from the political authorities about the topics that must be written up (e.g. to react against the Bulgarian celebrations of the treaty of San Stefano, or against trans-Atlantic reappraisals of the role of Mihailovic). At the top end, there are those who take refuge behind the narrative of uncontroversial " facts," without analysing causes or consequences, who pile up details without ever going into essentials, who dare not question (or do not even consider) the legitimacy conveyed by the communist ideals of the People's Liberation Struggle. We know that in the best of scholarly environments, historians can have emotional blockages which prevent them from always seeing the complexity of the world around them.[22]

At a time when professional historians in Yugoslavia are too unscholarly, too shy or too unimaginative, to raise questions or express opinions, it is outside their ranks that writers have begun to blur the neat divide between black and white, and are looking to history as a collective

[22] See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *Paris-Montpellier, PC-PSU, 1945–1963* (Paris, 1982). Having militated in quasi-monastic isolation in the French Communist Party, this eminent scholar only gave in his Party card after the Hungarian rising, joined the PSU, and now militates in professorial irony against President Mitterrand and his Socialist Party.

psycho-analytical therapy. To accuse them of raising the ghosts of nationalism, of insulting the revolution or of denying the class character of the Partisan movement, to ask the jaded question—" Who is behind it?"—is to resort to what the French call " *la langue de bois.*" There is neither nationalism nor denial of achievements in these works, but a wish to probe further, to stop blaming proverbial bogeymen, and to " seek the blame in ourselves," to " know what really happened so that it should never happen again." To look one's own history in the face can only be salutary.

This mood has been symbolized by a noisy, emotional, maverick intellectual, a propagandist, a court historiographer and a historian of sorts who has disgorged it all in a mess of a massive book after which, as he has characteristically boasted, history will never be the same again. Dedijer and his book are typical of much of what has been happening in Yugoslavia since 1980. Will the historians—the professional ones, who hide behind power, faith, fact, myth and tradition—be shamed into taking up the challenge?

East German Intellectuals in Opposition

Roger Woods

ANYONE reading the GDR's home-grown critics must sooner or later ask what value can be attached to their insights and criticisms, and in what ways their ideas are significant. In attempting to answer these questions I shall concentrate on three particular intellectuals: Rudolf Bahro, the late Robert Havemann and Stefan Heym, partly because their views are given such prominence in the West and partly because the SED leadership clearly places them in the category of opposition.

Rudolf Bahro was a Party member and economist whose attack on the SED's brand of socialism in *Die Alternative* resulted in his arrest and imprisonment. After his release in 1979 he moved to West Germany. Robert Havemann, once a Professor of Physical Chemistry at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, was one of the SED's most tenacious critics and resisted pressure from the authorities to make him quit East Germany right up to his death in 1982. Of the three, only Stefan Heym remains in the GDR and continues to arouse controversy as an outspoken critic of the regime.

The East German View

A typical East German response to its radical critics is to dismiss them as enemies of socialism, as a " tiny group of individuals who represent nothing and nobody."[1] In May 1979, shortly after Heym's novel *Collin* and Rolf Schneider's *November* had appeared in West Germany, and Joachim Seyppel had protested against the authorities' treatment of Havemann, the writer Dieter Noll assured Erich Honecker that " a few worn out types like Heym, Seyppel or Schneider who cooperate so eagerly with the class enemy to obtain cheap recognition for themselves ... certainly do not represent the writers of our Republic. And the Party can be sure that working people throughout the country approve of the government's actions. . . ."[2]

Yet despite such denials that radical critics are in any way a representative or significant force in East German society the severity of the official reaction is a clear sign that the SED takes its critics seriously. One of the main aims of the June 1979 revision of the Penal Code was to silence East German intellectuals who had resorted to publishing their critical writings abroad. The strengthening of the cultural contingent on the Central Committee elected in 1981 also reflects a growing awareness

[1] Quoted from *Militärwesen* by Hendrik Bussiek in *Notizen aus der DDR* (Frankfurt am Main, 1979), p. 257.

[2] *Neues Deutschland*, 22 May 1979. The government actions referred to were the currency charges brought against Heym and Havemann.

of the potential for conflict in the cultural sphere,[3] as does the frequency of Honecker's personal interventions in the debates surrounding critical intellectuals. Honecker's interview with Stephan Hermlin, the person generally regarded as the instigator of the petition in support of Wolf Biermann, who was deprived of GDR citizenship in 1976, is perhaps the most dramatic proof of how seriously the Party takes unrest among intellectuals.[4]

The West German View

In the Federal Republic there is little hesitation in providing a forum for East Germany's critical intellectuals and presenting their accounts as valuable insights into what is actually going on. More importantly, their opinions about the regime are portrayed as typical of the views of the East German population as a whole. The *Spiegel* review of the film version of Heym's *Collin* was entitled " at last the truth."[5] This response is encountered not just in the West German press but also in some Western academic studies of the GDR. Havemann's brand of democratic communism is said to reflect a widespread feeling of opposition among the East German population,[6] and when *Der Spiegel* published the *Manifest der Opposition* in 1978 the debate over its authenticity on occasion gave way to the idea that, authentic or not, it could be regarded as a summary of popular feeling in the GDR.[7]

This Western assumption, that the views of highly critical intellectuals are representative, appears to be backed up by the findings of research into popular opinion in East Germany. There have been some ingenious attempts to find out just what the East German population does think of its political system: Gebhard Schweigler related findings of surveys conducted in the 1960s in which West Berliners returning from East Germany were questioned about the views of the East Germans they had spoken to.[8] Mleczkowski bases his assessment of popular opinion in East Germany on public-opinion polls undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968,[9] and the economist Hans Apel conducted his own small-scale polls in East Germany in the 1960s.[10] Ingenious though some of these surveys may be, however, they are all ultimately unsatisfactory, and the unscientific

[3] See Hartmut Zimmermann's analysis of the composition of the Central Committee in his contribution to *Policymaking in the German Democratic Republic*, Klaus van Beyme and Hartmut Zimmermann (eds.), (Aldershot, New York, 1983).

[4] See the account of this interview by Karl-Heinz Jakobs in *Der Spiegel*, no. 48, 23 November 1981, pp. 86–108.

[5] *Der Spiegel*, no. 49, 30 November 1981, p. 247.

[6] See Hermann Weber," Demokratischer Kommunismus," in *Ein Marxist in der DDR*, Hartmut Jäckel (ed.), (Munich and Zurich, 1980), p. 172.

[7] See Werner Volkmer, " East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade " in *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, R. Tökés (ed.), (London and Basingstoke, 1979), p. 137f. Similarly Ilse Spittmann, quoted by Wolfgang Mleczkowski in " Der neue Moralismus—Zur politisch-geistigen Alternative in der DDR," *Liberal*, no. 4, 1979, p. 272.

[8] *Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und der DDR*, second edition (Düsseldorf, 1974), p. 94.

[9] " Grenzprobleme regimekritischen Denkens," *Liberal*, no. 21, 1979, pp. 552–54.

[10] Apel's findings summarized in Hermann Rudolph, *Die Gesellschaft der DDR—eine deutsche Möglichkeit?* (Munich, 1972), p. 17f.

methods used are underlined by the radically different results each survey produced: estimated support for the system during the '60s ranges from 7 to 15 to over 50 per cent (Mleczkowski, Schweigler, Apel).[11]

The Intellectuals' View

The confusion is not entirely dispelled if one looks at what the critical intellectuals themselves have to say about their significance. At one point Heym can argue that writers are paid more attention in socialist society than in the West,[12] and that as far as the East German population is concerned he is the most popular East German writer of the day.[13] Yet elsewhere he expresses his fear that those who think as he does may turn against him because they do not have his freedom to travel in the West and to speak out.[14] Similarly, Havemann was at one stage not prepared to assume that most East Germans thought as he did,[15] yet at another claimed that the 200 signatories to his open letter to Brezhnev were representative of the majority of the East German population.[16] There is also an unresolved tension running through Havemann's attitude towards what he considered to be the aspirations of East Germans: on one occasion he argued that they want more freedom, not more consumer goods,[17] yet on another he described East German "*Kleinbürger und Spießer*" and their dreams of material comfort.[18] For his part, Bahro points out that demands for greater democracy such as were heard in Czechoslovakia in 1968 are superficial, limiting any reform movement to the special interests of intellectuals,[19] and he rightly adds that the Party can and does make use of popular anti-intellectualism in combatting any such demands.[20]

Apart from the self-doubts of the intellectuals themselves, there is some evidence to suggest that there may indeed be a mismatch between their political goals and the more tangible benefits sought by East Germans. Sociological studies, admittedly from the 1960s, have shown that young people are more interested in travel and music than in political and economic issues,[21] and a 1978 opinion poll, described by East German sources as representative, revealed that East Germans were particularly interested in material prosperity.[22] Recently established

[11] Peter Ludz estimates that in 1975 25 per cent of the East German population accepted the political system and 20 per cent rejected it. *Die DDR zwischen Ost und West* (Munich, 1977), p. 224. Ludz gives his source as Bonn, suggesting that surveys of the type Schweigler refers to are still being conducted on behalf of the Federal Government but that the findings are not being made generally available.

[12] Quoted by J. B. Bilke in "Menschenrechte im SED-Staat," *aus politik und zeitgeschichte*, 15 November 1980, p. 8.

[13] "Gespräch mit Stefan Heym," *GDR Monitor*, no. 8, Winter 1982/83, p. 1.

[14] *Der Spiegel*, no. 22, 31 May 1982, p. 97.

[15] *Berliner Schriften*, edited by A. Mytze (Munich, 1977), p. 22.

[16] See the interview with Havemann in W. Büscher et al, *Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978–1982* (Hattingen, 1982), p. 186.

[17] *Berliner Schriften*, p. 142.

[18] Ibid. p. 109.

[19] *Die Alternative* (Reinbek, 1980), p. 254f.

[20] Ibid. p. 271.

[21] W. Jaide, B. Hille (eds.), *Jugend im doppelten Deutschland* (Opladen, 1977), p. 240.

[22] Reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 July 1978.

unofficial ecology groups in the GDR provide gloomy confirmation of this point, arguing that the East German population takes Western levels of consumption as its goal and that it is prepared to ignore the harmful effects modern production methods are having on the environment if these methods help provide higher living standards.[23] Bahro's doctoral thesis also illustrates a slight mismatch of interests, with Bahro calling for fundamental reforms in the way work is organized, and the cadre economists he interviewed in preparing his thesis pursuing the more modest and conformist goals of greater responsibility and less bureaucracy.[24] Bahro seems aware of this mismatch of interests when he argues that the SED cultivates materialism in order to direct the population away from social reform.[25] However the divergence of interests may be explained, it qualifies the widespread assumption that intellectuals are important because they articulate the discontent of a larger sector of the population.[26]

Perhaps because there is some doubt in their own minds about their representative status, critical intellectuals can develop a fall-back position. Although their commitment to what they see as genuine socialism is obviously sincere, their insistence on applying Marxist methods in analysing East German society seems to stem in part from a need to provide their analyses with an alternative significance: what both Havemann and Bahro claimed to offer is not merely a list of reforms that East German socialism ideally needs to undergo, but an account of the forces currently at work in society which will eventually push aside the existing order and establish " genuine " socialism.[27] The message is that their criticisms of the present and projections of a future society are significant because they are based on a Marxist analysis of how society will develop. For Bahro it is the " intellectualizing " of the workforce which generates " emancipatory interests,"[28] and Western commentators such as Raymond Williams see this non-Utopianism as the most important feature of Bahro's *Alternative*.[29] For Havemann it was the tension between the " state and the masses," which will bring about what he called the second phase of the socialist revolution.[30]

Yet even within the Marxist framework, this attempt to define Bahro and Havemann's significance is fraught with difficulties. Bahro and Havemann themselves were aware of the shortcomings of their analyses: in *Die Alternative* Bahro asserted that Marx's categorical imperative that any order must be overthrown in which man is a degraded, enslaved, abandoned, humiliated being must take precedence over any scientific

[23] Wolfgang Büscher, Peter Wensierski, *Null Bock auf DDR* (Reinbek, 1984), p. 46f.
[24] *Plädoyer für schöpferische Initiative* (Cologne, 1980), p. 32n.
[25] *Die Alternative*, p. 263.
[26] See, for example, Jiří Pelikán and Manfred Wilke (eds.), *Menschenrechte: Ein Jahrbuch zu Osteuropa* (Hamburg, 1977), p. 17.
[27] *Berliner Schriften*, p. 17; *Die Alternative*, p. 206.
[28] *Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen* (Cologne, Frankfurt am Main, 1979), p. 28f.
[29] *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London, 1980), p. 261.
[30] *Berliner Schriften*, p. 17.

proof that such a revolution is possible.[31] Bahro also reflected that his strategy for a communist alternative in *Die Alternative* is the shakiest and most incomplete part of his book, and that it runs the risk of Utopianism.[32] And it is interesting to note that after the initial enthusiasm for Bahro's theories had given way to an assessment of their validity, Western observers of the GDR found it difficult to go along with his account of precisely where the pressure for political reform would come from.[33]

The term " Utopianism " in the sense of non-Marxist speculation on a better future also pervades Havemann's work, and on occasion Havemann could apply the term to his own suggested reforms for East German society.[34] He could go further still and argue that *Bahro* was indulging in idle dreams when he called for a league of communists to be established.[35] Bahro (implicitly) returned the compliment, for whereas Havemann saw the call for individual freedom growing louder as the standard of living rises,[36] Bahro looks with dismay at the " material insatiability " in East Germany which gets in the way of political progress.[37] There is then an element of morale-boosting as well as of Marxist conviction underlying Bahro's objection to what he calls defeatist social analysis,[38] and Havemann's conclusion that a Prague Spring is a historical inevitability in all socialist countries.[39] Heym sums up the situation when he writes that those who want to change things need a profound conviction that things can be changed.[40]

An Alternative Approach

Although the approaches noted so far to the question of significance are often revealing about the political systems which produce them and the motives of the individuals involved, it is clear that they all pose considerable problems. An alternative approach is to ask whether the criticisms made by Havemann, Bahro and Heym reflect major concerns and debates within the GDR. To anticipate the conclusion, it is clear that these criticisms published in the West do indeed echo internal discussions. While some of these discussions are conducted by groups far removed from the decision-making process, others are conducted within the circles responsible for formulating policy and shaping East German society. To pinpoint the various discussions is to establish the existence of a continuum, of areas of overlap between permissible debate and

[31] Ibid. p. 22.
[32] Ibid. p. 209.
[33] See, for example, the discussion of this point in *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 11 (November 1978), pp. 1160–81, particularly the contributions by D. Waterkamp and G-J. Glaeßner.
[34] *Ein deutscher Kommunist* (Reinbek, 1978), p. 102.
[35] Ibid. p. 98.
[36] *Berliner Schriften*, p. 26.
[37] *Die Alternative*, p. 335.
[38] *Die Zeit*, 16 January 1981.
[39] *Berliner Schriften*, p. 28.
[40] *Collin* (Munich, 1979), p. 228.

self-criticism on the one hand, and the radical criticisms put forward by Bahro, Havemann and Heym on the other.

The most readily accessible area in which their thoughts are echoed within official circles is the area of *Selbstkritik*, which is largely concerned with inefficiencies within the economy. Although it is generally sandwiched between thick slices of self-congratulation on the achievements of socialism, this criticism can often provide unambiguous confirmation of what, for example, Bahro has to say. Anyone familiar with Politburo reports on poor morale at work, on resources being wasted, laws being ignored and unpleasant truths being concealed,[41] will realize that the private speech by Erich Mielke which found its way into *Der Spiegel* (no 9, 26 February; and no 17, 23 April 1979) contains much less that is new (or for that matter private) than is generally supposed. The malpractices noted by the Politburo can be dwelt upon at some length in published surveys. In one such survey directors of industrial enterprises complain about the complexity of East German labour law and state that if it were necessary they would ignore legal stipulations in order to meet their targets.[42]

When Bahro describes how workers give less than their best because the pressure to perform well is not as great as in the West,[43] he is doing no more than echoing the account in the FDJ (East German youth organization) newspaper of how a visit to a Berlin building site revealed poor productivity: " We did not pick a bad day—the practice is common. Perhaps it is because of the simple socialist truth: in this country you live in the comforting knowledge that your job is safe and that society will look after you."[44] Elsewhere Honecker himself can publicly blame government ministers for failing to ensure uninterrupted supplies of electricity and fuel.[45] Bahro's point that the cadre economists he interviewed for his thesis showed signs of disappointment and discouragement because they were overqualified for the tasks they actually performed is directly confirmed for a wider section of the working population by East German research: a 1980 study by the Central Labour Research Institute reveals that almost 20 per cent of skilled workers are in jobs which do not make proper use of their training. East German sources estimate that approximately one million skilled workers do not have sufficient opportunity to utilize their training and qualifications, and conclude that this problem can result in dissatisfaction, frequent changes of job, disappointment and a resigned attitude.[46]

When Bahro questions the effectiveness of financial incentives in work and argues instead for greater responsibility to be given at the level of individual enterprises he is able to back up his case by referring to surveys

[41] See the Politburo resolution of 18 May 1977 in *Neues Deutschland*, 21/22 May 1977, p. 3f.
[42] Details in Uwe Jens-Heuer, *Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung im Sozialismus* (Berlin, 1982), p. 196f.
[43] *Die Alternative*, p. 172.
[44] *Junge Welt*, 8/9 December 1979.
[45] *Neues Deutschland*, 28/29 April 1979, p. 3.
[46] See Jan Kuhnert, " Überqualifikation oder Bildungsvorlauf?," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 5 (May 1983), pp. 497–520.

conducted not only in the Soviet Union but also in the GDR.[47] East German academic sources also echo Bahro's plea for technologists to be given more say in the overall running of enterprises, and his arguments against excessive centralization.[48] Similarly the journal *Sinn und Form* recently published an interview with the director of an agricultural collective in which he blamed the shortfalls in the food supply on central planners and their inhibiting effect on local initiatives.[49]

IN these areas then there is clearly an overlap between Bahro's pragmatic criticisms and public self-criticism within East Germany. And indeed, Bahro placed his thesis within this framework of acceptable self-criticism. Although it was ultimately rejected, the positive response which the thesis received from its first three assessors (two of whom were SED members) shows that his idea of what was acceptable was not that far off the mark.[50] Yet echoes of Bahro are to be heard not merely in this area of pragmatic criticism aimed at greater economic efficiency. Bahro himself points the way when he refers to economists and sociologists in the Soviet Union homing in on the crucial issues, and Soviet artists, social scientists and journalists dismantling the official image of their country to reveal a very different reality. There are clear signs that the same process is at work in the GDR.

In his thesis Bahro argues that the division of labour retained in East Germany is a hindrance to the development of the personality.[51] In *Die Alternative* the idea resurfaces in more aggressive form, with Bahro arguing that self-development is a worthier goal than the economic growth which the SED accords such high priority, and that material insatiability is costing East Germany its freedom to develop into a higher form.[52] That these points were also being raised within the SED close to the time when *Die Alternative* appeared is suggested by a report in which a Central Committee head of section responsible for agitation took issue with the argument that increasing material prosperity was laming the social energy and activity of East German citizens. Shortly before that, Politburo member Konrad Naumann had attacked what he called radical left-wing critics who accused the Party of pursuing its consumer policies at the expense of ideology,[53] and Honecker had reaffirmed his commitment to the linking of economic and social policy in the face of critics who were reminding him that " man cannot live by bread alone."[54]

[47] *Plädoyer*, p. 33, 82, 134.
[48] Ibid. p. 53n., 142.
[49] Gabriele Eckart, " Zwei Tonbandprotokolle aus dem ' Havelobst ' ," *Sinn und Form*, no. 2 (March/April 1984), pp. 290–313.
[50] Heym also placed his *5 Tage im Juni* in the framework of acceptable debate by prefacing it with a quotation from the Party statute on the duty to encourage criticism and self-criticism. In his statement on Poland, Heym stressed that the trade union Solidarity was a consequence of social and political defects (" *Mißstände* "), a typical SED expression used to acknowledge shortcomings. Büscher, *Friedensbewegung in der DDR*, p. 236.
[51] *Plädoyer*, p. 46.
[52] *Die Alternative*, p. 218, 335.
[53] See the report in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 November 1978.
[54] Reported in *Die Zeit*, 21 April 1978.

The debate in the late 1970s between Harry Maier, Deputy Director of the Central Institute of Economic Science, and Harry Nick, Research Director of the Academy of Social Sciences, underlines the fact that Honecker's remarks are not merely directed against his critics abroad. Maier stresses that material wealth is only the means enabling members of a society to develop all aspects of their character and that the economic goal of socialism should be to increase the amount of free time available for individual development and to pay particular attention to the quality of work. Ranged against Maier, and very much one of the majority, Nick adamantly rejects any such arguments which seem to him to call into question the goal of economic expansion.[55]

In the case of the unofficial peace movement it is clear that Havemann could and Heym can rightly claim to echo, indeed to be part of, a debate going on within the GDR, and to represent a growing body of public opinion. Havemann and Heym's provocative and challenging stance has placed them nearer many young East German peace campaigners who are growing increasingly impatient with the circumspection of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches. Although the influence of the unofficial peace movement on SED policy is minimal, the representative status of Havemann and Heym within it remains. Moreover, the praise for the movement expressed by Stephan Hermlin and Volker Braun makes it more difficult for the Party to draw its usual distinction between its radical critics, such as Havemann and Heym, and its valued but " difficult " intellectuals.[56] If Heym, the dissident, invoked the wrath of Hermann Kant, President of the East German Writers' Union, for " lumping together " the Soviet Union and the USA without making any clear moral distinction between the two nuclear powers, how much more awkward must it be for the SED to see Christa Wolf, one of the GDR's " star intellectuals," taking the same line in a recent essay. She also rejects the official East German view that " peace must be armed " and refuses to separate the peace issue from the need to criticize one's own society.[57]

Havemann's advocacy of some measure of political pluralism and his rejection of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe mean that he has much in common with the Eurocommunism of the communist parties of Spain, France and Italy. This Eurocommunism in turn has given the SED cause for concern since it appears to have raised its head within the Party itself. The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1976 and the Karl Marx Conference held last year in East Berlin must have done much

[55] The debate is summarized in *Der Bahro-Kongreß* edited by K. M. Gyöngyösi *et al.* (Berlin, 1979), pp. 233–5.

[56] See the contributions by Hermlin and Braun at the December 1981 meeting of writers and scientists from East and West in East Berlin. The proceedings of the meeting appeared in *Berliner Begegnung zur Friedensförderung* (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1982), pp. 38, 161. At the writers' meeting of April 1983 in West Berlin Hermlin again praised young East German peace campaigners whom the authorities regarded with suspicion.

[57] *Voraussetzungen einer Erzählung: Kassandra* (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1983), pp. 84, 122, 114. Although these contentious points appeared only in the West German edition of the book the Western media were quick to broadcast them so that East German readers could add them to their editions.

to stimulate the debate on Eurocommunism in the SED, for at these conferences Western European and Japanese communists made it clear that the Soviet Union was no longer to be accepted as the leader of world communism and that political and ideological pluralism were essential elements of socialism. Moreover, the proceedings of the conferences were published in *Neues Deutschland*.

In December 1979 the Central Committee passed a resolution to review the state of the Party by interviewing all of its 2,130,671 members and candidates. Whereas the previous Party review of 1970 had resulted in expulsions for simple inactivity, the 3,944 members expelled in 1980 were said to have been unwilling to observe the Party statute, and the expulsions were preceded by warnings from Erich Mückenberger, head of the Central Party Control Commission, against false and damaging ideas, hostile influences, reformism, revisionism, anti-Soviet attitudes and ideas of a third way,[58] a reference, as Timmermann points out, to the path between social democracy and Soviet communism which the communist parties of Italy and Spain were advocating.[59] At a confidential meeting of Party members in the Academy of Sciences, Professor Gerhard Ziegengeist spoke after the Biermann affair about the popularity Eurocommunism enjoyed among East German writers, and he concluded that " the Berlinguer model is getting a sympathetic hearing. Among large numbers of artists an image of socialism has become entrenched consisting of left-wing, revisionist and SPD elements."[60] Timmermann also traces Eurocommunist sympathies among the scientific and technical intelligentsia critical of what they regard as the ideological dead end of consumer communism.[61]

IT is perhaps in the area of East German literature that voices are heard which echo most clearly not only the themes but sometimes also the viewpoints of Havemann, Bahro and Heym. Thus it is not just Heym who can mock Socialist Realism in art, where, as he puts it in *Collin*, the men all have massive hands and tiny heads, and the women all look six months pregnant.[62] Jurij Brezan complains that a significant number of talented young writers not only do not take Socialist Realism as their model, they actually wish to be seen in opposition to it.[63] Similarly, Hartmut König, Secretary of the FDJ Central Council with responsibility for cultural affairs, has spoken out against young East German writers who announced in a journal for literature, aesthetics and cultural theory—the reference is to *Weimarer Beiträge*—that literature is a form of opposition

[58] See K. W. Fricke, " Die SED nach der Überprüfung," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 7 (July 1980), pp. 680–3.

[59] Heinz Timmermann, *Reformkommunisten in West und Ost: Konzeptionen, Querverbindungen und Perspektiven* (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 31, 1980), p. 25.

[60] Minutes of the meeting were published in *Die Zeit*, 20 May 1977.

[61] Op. cit. p. 24.

[62] p. 117.

[63] Quoted by Ingrid Pawlowitz, " Kein Duft von wilder Minze," *Weimarer Beiträge*, no. 9 (September 1982), p. 137.

and resistance, initially to parents and school and then later in ideology. König is obviously dismayed that not enough young writers are praising achievements such as the completion of the building programme with songs like " *In Potsdam wird gebaut* " (" They're building in Potsdam "). He objects to young East German writers suggesting that the pressures of socialism made the free development of the personality impossible and that the individual develops not through East German society but against it.[64]

The concern Bahro, Havemann and Heym show for the individual vis-à-vis the state is clearly shared by many writers whose work is published within East Germany. These writers can thus meet with terms of disapproval which are very similar to those applied to more extreme critics of East German society and to " pessimistic " Western literature. Where Reiner Kunze was condemned for adopting the standpoint of a " critical individualist " in work he published in the West, Klaus Höpcke, Deputy Minister of Cultural Affairs, has recently registered with regret the subjective views put forward by some young GDR writers,[65] and a discussion in *Weimarer Beiträge* about Doris Paschiller's *Die Würde* is typical of many reviews critical of new literary developments which have little to do with the SED's exhortations to East German writers to help " strengthen the love and loyalty of young people towards our socialist fatherland."[66] Paschiller is said not to be greatly concerned with examining the possibilities for self-fulfilment in society, and to view with scepticism the individual's chances of helping to shape society. The heroine instead seeks self-fulfilment by withdrawing from society, regarding her environment as mysterious and threatening.[67]

The recent anthology of works by GDR writers born after 1946, *Kein Duft von wilder Minze*, is criticized for its lack of appreciation of social issues, for its apparent lack of interest in the struggle between imperialism and socialism, for the excessive interest the writers show in their own individual problems and an entirely private form of self-fulfilment.[68] Other young writers are taken to task for portraying the relationship between the individual and the state as antagonistic,[69] and in the journal *Temperamente* Sylvia Kögler makes a similar attack on young authors for their individualism, their disillusionment and their lack of revolutionary commitment.[70] This tendency to withdraw from the social and political arena is in fact at odds with the highly political reaction to political problems from Bahro, Havemann and Heym, but the idea of an antagonism between the individual and the state remains a link between them and young writers publishing in the GDR.

[64] " Die Verantwortung der FDJ für Kultur und Kunst in den Kämpfen unserer Zeit," *Junge Welt*, 22 October 1982, pp. 3–10.

[65] " Phantasie für das Wirkliche," *Einheit*, no. 2 (February 1982), p. 178.

[66] Kurt Hager's speech to the FDJ's Conference on Culture, October 1982 reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 October 1982.

[67] W. Gabler, " Doris Paschiller: Die Würde," *Weimarer Beiträge*, no. 1 (January 1983), p. 16.

[68] Pawlowitz, p. 141f.

[69] König, p. 8.

[70] " Zur Diskussion junger Künstler," *Temperamente*, no. 2, 1980, pp. 140–144.

Weimarer Beiträge has recently attempted a defence of this rising tide of individualism, arguing that it is a trend one can afford since the figures portrayed by young writers are all in agreement about the basic social issues.[71] Yet this argument tends to underestimate the potential for conflict underlying what has been described as the growing understanding among East German intellectuals that only a literature which describes and intensifies social contradictions can help the GDR out of its problems.[72] This attitude can often be complemented by statements from those responsible for getting authors into print: at the October 1983 conference of the *Kulturbund*, held in Leipzig, Roland Links, the publisher and chairman of the Central Commission for Literature, announced that publishers should be issued with fewer red pencils, and he came out in favour of more self-critical literature.

This development in literature is expressly acknowledged by Uwe Jens-Heuer, (one of Ludz's " revisionists " from the 1960s). Heuer notes that the themes of personality and individuality loomed ever larger in East German literature of the '70s and provided one inspiration for discussions in legal circles. He detects a trend away from the idea that under socialism the interests of the state are identical to those of the individual and towards recognition of the fact that state and individual are separate, that even under socialism there should be " subjective rights," i.e. rights of the individual in his dealings with the state. On these issues Heuer is at odds with East German legal theorists, such as Haney, who see implicit in Heuer's view the danger of a confrontation between society and the individual and of a pluralistic fragmentation of society.[73]

IN the social sphere a lively debate is gathering pace over the issue of the emancipation of women. Although Heym and Havemann have little to say on the subject, Bahro is certainly critical of the patriarchal tradition and of the subordinate role played by women in the GDR.[74] In many ways recent developments in the internal discussion of women go beyond what Bahro has to say.

Whereas work and family tasks are traditionally regarded as complementary in East German society, with the mother deriving important stimulation for motherhood from her employment and a more mature relationship developing between mother and child,[75] the literary historian Karin Hirdina has recently taken up Brigitte Martin's simple question: " Why, despite all the equality between men and women, are there more unhappy women?," thus starting a public discussion on the issue of women in the columns of *Für Dich*, the mass circulation women's magazine. Emancipation, Hirdina concludes, seems to have become a burden, and she points to the many East German women writers

[71] R. Bernhardt, " Die Sonderlinge der Debütanten," *Weimarer Beiträge*, no. 1 (January 1983), p. 7.
[72] Alexander Stephan, " Cultural Politics in the GDR under Erich Honecker," in *The GDR under Honecker 1971–1981*, Ian Wallace (ed.), (Dundee, 1981), p. 39f.
[73] See W. Biermann, *Demokratisierung in der DDR?* (Cologne, 1978), p. 27.
[74] *Die Alternative*, pp. 367–369.
[75] H. Kuhrig, W. Speigner, *Zur gesellschaftlichen Stellung der Frau in der DDR* (Leipzig, 1978), p. 56.

portraying the demands of work as a danger to personal relationships, to the survival of the family and to the well-being of the children.[76] Similarly, Irene Dölling, a lecturer in cultural theory at Humboldt University, describes the situation of East German women with the term " double-bind," a more subtle and critical label than the usual double-burden (*Doppelbelastung*), for it means that women are not simply weighed down with responsibilities in two areas, but that they are involved in contradictory, not complementary, activities. Social norms encouraged by socialist states emphasize marriage, family and motherhood as essential to women's happiness, yet they do not draw the necessary conclusions for other female aspirations. Dölling argues that emancipation can only be a genuine liberation if women can bring their qualities and values into all spheres of productive activity and thus bring about changes in the nature and the aims of this activity. Dölling's rejection of the idea that work equals emancipation seems to be a criticism of SED policy on women which is so concerned to create the conditions for women to combine motherhood and employment.[77]

In her preface to Maxie Wander's best-selling " *Guten Morgen, du Schöne*," Christa Wolf writes that East German society gave women the opportunity of doing what men do, and that this eventually led women to ask whether this was in fact what they wanted for themselves. She argues that for the first time women are now demonstrating their " otherness," and that they may wonder why they should assume roles which have done men such harm over the centuries.[78] Just what practical effect such questions might have on public life was demonstrated recently in an open letter to Erich Honecker in which several hundred East German women objected to the March 1982 military service law which provides for female conscription if the need should arise: " we women see military service for women not as an expression of their equal rights but as something which is at odds with being a woman."[79]

Although feminism is rejected by East German critics of the current situation of women, the often heard complaints about the dominance of male standards and male institutions[80] have been interpreted in the GDR as evidence of an " anti-male attitude,"[81] and this in turn is regarded by more conformist East German sociologists as an essential element of feminism.[82] There is then a growing feeling among writers and academics that the issue of emancipation, declared by Ulbricht to have been

[76] " Worüber Frauen schreiben," *Für Dich*, no. 29, 1983, pp. 9–11.

[77] " Zur kulturtheoretischen Analyse von Geschlechterbeziehungen," *Weimarer Beiträge* no. 1 (January 1980), pp. 59–88.

[78] Maxie Wander, *' Guten Morgen, du Schöne*," 14th edition (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1983), pp. 9–19.

[79] Letter reproduced in *Der Spiegel*, no. 49, 6 December 1982, p. 117.

[80] See Hirdina's criticism of the novelist John Erpenbeck's *Der blaue Turm* and her account of female writers in the GDR seeking to mark women off from the standards of male society (loc. cit.), and Dölling, p. 72.

[81] Hirdina, p. 11.

[82] Kuhrig and Speigner, p. 14.

resolved in his own time,[83] is more complex and subtle than originally thought and that the time has come to throw it back into the melting-pot.

SUCH debates from the political, economic and social spheres suggest that it is indeed worth approaching the question of the significance of radical critics by looking for resonances of their criticisms within the GDR.[84] These resonances vary in strength, acceptability to the SED leadership and influence on SED policies, yet they do show that between SED policy and the ideas for reforms of Bahro, Havemann and Heym there are many intermediate positions within East Germany. Their existence tends to undermine the East German (and occasionally West German) view that these radical critics are irrelevant, and it also qualifies, however slightly, the argument—which Bahro himself advances in modified form—that the GDR is a monolithic society which, because it is incapable of discussion, is also incapable of change.[85]

[83] See Gisela Helwig, " Frauen in der DDR," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 7 (July 1979), pp. 754–58.
[84] Cf. Zimmermann, loc. cit.
[85] *Plädoyer*, p. 7.

The GDR and Martin Luther

Ronald D. Asmus

THE attacks which appeared in *Pravda* during July and August 1984 on Honecker's " soft " policy towards West Germany drew the attention of the world to Soviet dissatisfaction with certain aspects of East German policies. The speculations in the Western press centred upon the question of Honecker's response to the FRG's *Ostpolitik* and his alleged willingness to engage in an intra-German " romance " with Chancellor Kohl. But Soviet objections to Honecker's visit to West Germany may not be the only reason for Soviet dissatisfaction. Whatever short-term tactical disagreements between Moscow and Pankow may exist about the external policies of the GDR, Soviet leaders could not have failed to notice another aspect of the East German regime's recent evolution: its attempts to stress its historical German roots in its search for legitimacy. The connection between the two aspects of Honecker's policy may not yet be clear, but a systematic analysis of the latter phenomenon—which long antedates the current Soviet-East German tensions—may also have something to do with it.

IN 1983 the German Democratic Republic celebrated the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in grandiose fashion. After having been denounced for years as a " princes' lackey " and " betrayer of the peasants, " Luther's official image in the GDR has experienced a major face-lift with the Great Reformer suddenly elevated into the socialist pantheon as " one of the greatest sons of the German people."[1] Such words of acclaim came from no less authoritative a source than SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker and indicated the dramatic change in the official Party interpretation of Luther and his role in German history.

The significance attached to the 500th anniversary of Luther's birth in the GDR was reflected in the multitude of academic conferences, exhibitions and commemorations which took place under the sponsorship of both Church and state officials. International colloquiums on various aspects of Luther were held in several cities with the East German Evangelical Church also serving as the host for the Sixth International Congress for Luther Research. Seminars, discussion groups and colloquiums were also held by a variety of Party-led mass organizations such as URANIA or the Cultural League of the GDR. For popular consumption there was a state exhibit on Luther and the Reformation held in the Museum for German History in East Berlin, a six-part film series on

[1] See the text of the speech delivered by SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker at the founding session of the state Luther Committee published in *Neues Deutschland*, 14–15 June 1980. Honecker's speech as well as those of the other speakers at this session have been published in book form as *Martin Luther und unsere Zeit* (Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1980).

Luther's life produced by the official GDR film corporation DEFA, a set of commemorative stamps, three separate record collections featuring excerpts from biblical texts or musical compositions from the Reformation period, as well as over 100 books on various aspects of Luther displayed at the spring Leipzig Fair.[2]

Equally impressive was the vast and expensive restoration work undertaken at a number of historical sites connected with Luther's life. In Wittenberg, where Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the court church in 1517, thus launching a movement which would shatter not only the religious foundations of the Western world but with it the religious unity of the German people, the court castle and court and city churches, as well as major portions of the inner city, were painstakingly renovated at an estimated cost of 3,000,000 East German marks. In Thuringia alone, some 33 sites were restored, including the Augustinian cloister where Luther became a monk and was later ordained as a priest. Special attention was devoted to the Wartburg, where Luther, disguised as the "Junker Jörg," translated the New Testament from Hebrew and Greek into German while under the protective custody of Frederick the Wise of Saxony, thus setting the standard for the written German language. Similar efforts took place in several other cities, including Leipzig, the site of Luther's disputation with his adversary Johannes Eck, and Eisleben, where Luther's places of birth and death were restored at a cost of some 1,000,000 East German marks.

In order to take full advantage of the international echo which the quincentenary of Luther's birth found, the GDR's official travel agency began to advertise worldwide as early as 1981 to those interested in "following in the footsteps of Martin Luther," offering seven different travel programmes to Western tourists wanting to see cities that, in the words of one travel brochure, "are closely tied to the life of Martin Luther and that show in a special way his accomplishments and the lessons he taught for social progress, social justice and peace in the world."[3] Whether Luther himself would have agreed with the interpretation offered by his venerators in the SED of social progress, social justice and peace, is certainly a debatable question. In any case, large numbers of Western guests, above all from the FRG, Scandinavia and North America, did make a pilgrimage to the GDR in 1983 to catch a glimpse of the sites where Luther lived and preached. That the authorities' efforts were designed also to maximize hard currency earnings, as well as provide a glimpse of Luther's past, was evident in the fact that one-day "Luther trips" from West to East Berlin were offered for less ambitious sightseers, although Luther is not known to have spent any time there.

The highlights of the Luther Year took place in early May when the East German Evangelical Church opened its celebration with a ceremony broadcast live in both German states from the Wartburg. In the autumn a series of ecumenical meetings and celebrations in Leipzig and Eisleben

[2] *Neue Zeit*, 19 Jan. 1983.
[3] *Rheinischer Merkur*, 24 Dec. 1982.

between 10 and 13 November concluded the Church's celebrations, with the latter ceremonies attracting an impressive list of representatives from the religious world, including the Secretary-General of the World Council of Churches Phillip Potter, the Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Runcie, President of the Vatican Secretariat for Christian Unity Johannes Cardinal Willebrands, the Metropolitan Filaret of the Russian Orthodox Church, and numerous representatives from other Western Protestant Churches, including those from the USA and FRG. Although the SED had also hoped to gain a certain amount of international prestige through the Luther celebrations by means of the attendance of leading Western religious and state representatives at its official Luther commemoration held in East Berlin's State Opera House on 9 November, the authorities' hopes were only partially fulfilled. The inability to work out a compromise on questions affecting the status of East Berlin that might have enabled West German President Karl Carstens to attend both the state and Church sponsored events meant that the heads of state of other North European Protestant countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway, also boycotted the event in a show of solidarity. Nonetheless, the authorities' commemoration ceremony took place in impressive style in the attendance of prominent international religious representatives. Although the main address was not delivered by Honecker, as originally expected, but rather by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of State and head of the East German CDU, Gerald Goetting, the authorities openly glorified Luther as a great German revolutionary whose heritage has been incorporated into the current GDR, and praised cooperation between Church and state officials as exemplary and proof of the correctness of the SED's *Kirchenpolitik* of recent years. Coming shortly before the decision in the West to proceed with the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, it was perhaps only to be expected that the authorities would attempt to exploit the occasion to attack this decision; in his speech Goetting attempted to use Luther's heritage to criticize the NATO " dual track " policy and to enlist support for the " peace policy of the socialist states."[4]

HOW is one to interpret the significance of the Martin Luther Year in the GDR? The thought of the SED as the embodiment of Martin Luther's thinking is, of course, absurd; yet the spectacle of an atheist communist state honouring the religious reformer as " one of the greatest sons of the German people " and a spiritual forerunner of Karl Marx, inconceivable a decade ago, has become a reality. On one level, the reawakening of official interest in Luther is yet another example of how historical personalities in the GDR are subject to the winds of political fortune. Much more is at stake, however, than " only " the question of the proper historical interpretation of a weighty personality in German history. Rather, it is a question of the SED's attempt to appropriate

[4] See *Neues Deutschland*, 10 Nov. 1983.

German history for purposes of political legitimization and to present the GDR as the true inheritor of all positive German historical traditions. Lest anyone forget, despite some three decades of socialist transformation and a regime that repeatedly pledges its allegiance to Soviet-style "socialist internationalism," the GDR remains a very German state. Under conditions of "real socialism" questions of history are inseparably linked with politics and with what the SED refers to as the "socialist understanding of our heritage." Although some fertile minds have been tempted into conjuring up visions of a "Lutherization" of the socialist GDR into a state where all its subjects obediently follow Luther's counsel of acceptance of existing political norms as established by the secular authorities—a not unprecedented phenomenon in German history—such factors are neither the sole nor the major impetus behind the official Luther jubilees in the GDR. Instead, the Luther celebrations must be viewed in a much broader context, as part and parcel of a more sweeping process of historical revisionism, conducted under the auspices of the SED with the proclaimed goal of further solidifying the shaky foundations of the "socialist nation" in the GDR. For 1983 was not only proclaimed Martin Luther Year in the GDR but also Karl Marx Year in recognition of the 100th anniversary of Marx's death. Nor should one forget the recent festivities organized to commemorate the birth and death of Richard Wagner, the praise of August the Strong of Saxony, or the array of other historical figures now finding favour in the eyes of the SED. After years of de-emphasis, Germanness is again officially in vogue in the GDR. In 1982 it was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe who was vaulted into the socialist Valhalla; and in 1980 we witnessed the honouring of Carl von Clausewitz with the publication of his selected works and a guard of honour at his grave, as well as the sudden reappearance of Rauch's equestrian statue of Frederick the Great on Unter den Linden. Since the mid-1970s there has been one essay or book after another, revising the fate of various historical figures. The question of "who will be next?" is a tantalizing one, not only for the Western observer. As the case of Martin Luther indicates, the field appears to be increasingly wide open.

The SED and Martin Luther

The treatment of Martin Luther by the ruling SED regime in the GDR has undergone a tremendous evolution over the past three decades. In the immediate post-war period Luther was often harshly criticized as one of the historical figures at least in part to blame for the catastrophic course of German history. It was allegedly the legacy of Martin Luther and its exploitation by German leaders, through the alliance between throne and altar, that helped make Germans so subservient to the state. The sense of uniqueness and mission, which could also be found in Luther's writings, had purportedly helped mould that part of the German political character that prepared the soil in which the roots of National Socialism were later to take hold. Such sentiments were, of course, by no

means limited to East German commentators, since many historical theories, particularly in the early post-war period, viewed German history in linear terms with the Third Reich as the culmination of certain philosophical, social and political trends in German history. Whether such interpretations concretely explain historical reality remains a question for considerable debate. What is important in this context is that such opinions were also promoted in the GDR and that at earlier times East German commentators appeared to be, if anything, particularly vehement in rejecting and condemning the German past. The foundation of the GDR, the first socialist state on German soil, was to be a break with the past and an attempt to create a new Germany devoid of debilities. For example, Alexander Abusch, later East German Minister of Culture and Deputy Prime Minister, wrote in his book *Der Irrweg einer Nation* (published in 1946) that Martin Luther and the Reformation represented the " grave-diggers of German freedom " and that the defeat of the peasants in the Peasants' War was to blame for the future centuries of reaction in German history.[5] In Abusch's eyes, Luther was " the greatest spiritual figure of the German counter-revolution for centuries." Equally harsh was the condemnation of another East German historian, Wolfram von Hanstein, who, in 1947, wrote:

> Viewed in historical terms, there is a direct line of continuity from Luther to the great mediaeval princes, to Frederick II and his successors, to Bismarck and the Wilhelmian era, and, finally, to Hitler.[6]

This span of German history, according to von Hanstein, could therefore be viewed as " that epoch at whose beginning Luther preached and at whose end Hitler murdered."[7] In general, East German historians tended to characterize the Reformation as the " princes' Reformation," with its successes achieved through the betrayal of the peasants. In the hope of preserving the religious aspects of the Reformation, Luther, like other theological reformers, had allegedly allied himself with the ruling class, thus earning the disparaging label of " princes' lackey " and " betrayer of the peasants." The real, praiseworthy revolutionary hero of the time, in the eyes of the SED, was Luther's rival, Thomas Müntzer. Following Friedrich Engels' analysis, East German historians stressed the parallels between the Peasants' War of 1525 and the 1848–49 revolution, finding the primary factors for the failure of both to have been the lack of unity among the revolutionary forces and their betrayal by the German bourgeoisie.[8]

Indications of initial revisions in this almost entirely negative view of Luther began to appear as early as 1952 when a major conference on Luther was held in the Museum for German History in Berlin, an event

[5] Alexander Abusch, *Irrweg einer Nation* (Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1951), p. 20.

[6] Wolfram von Hanstein, *Von Luther bis Hitler, ein wichtiger Abriss deutscher Geschichte*, (Voco-Verlag, Berlin, 1947), p. 7.

[7] Ibid. p. 124.

[8] See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956), pp. 15–26.

that some East German historians have now rediscovered and to which they refer back in order to justify subsequent changes in the official Party line and to demonstrate " continuity."[9] The primary point of contention at the congress was the question of whether Luther should be viewed entirely in his " anti-proletarian " context or whether attention should be given to his other achievements, such as those in the cultural field or his role in initiating a German " national " consciousness. Some participants, including Jürgen Kuczynski and the current SED Politburo member responsible for culture, Kurt Hager, argued in favour of a more differentiated interpretation of Luther that, while recognizing his negative aspects, would also incorporate his contributions to the German language and his " progressive " role in initiating the formation of a German national consciousness.[10] Yet 1952 was also the year of Stalin's famous March note proposing four-power negotiations for a peace treaty with (and unification of) a neutralized Germany; and one cannot avoid the suspicion that this may have been one of the factors behind the SED's toying with "national" considerations in this area as well.

In any case, the Stalin note proved unsuccessful, going down in history as one of the most " contentious and puzzling documents in post-war Soviet foreign policy "[11] and the arguments of people like Hager and Kuczynski were to remain forgotten for a number of years. Despite periodic hints of reappraisal coming from some quarters, the overall judgment of Luther in the 1950s and 1960s remained negative.[12] In short, Luther was still censured as the " princes' lackey," the representative of the treasonous German bourgeoisie, and a figure to be placed in sharp contrast to Thomas Müntzer, who was considered the consistent defender of the interests of the German people.[13] Luther's legacy, in the words of one East German historian writing at that time, had not only " burdened Germany for centuries " but " continues to do so in today's West Germany."[14]

FOR the SED, German history was divided into two distinct and opposed lines of historical tradition. The first, the so-called tradition of revolutionary progress, was represented during the Reformation by figures such as Müntzer and had allegedly culminated in the " national " policy of the working class as carried out in the GDR. The second line of tradition included Luther and his anti-national alliance with the mediaeval

[9] See, for example, Horst Haun, " The Discussion Over the Reformation and the Peasants' Wars in the GDR Historical Sciences, 1952–1953," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, no. 1, 1982, as reprinted in *epd-Dokumentation* (Evangelischer Pressedienst, Haus der Evangelischer Publizistick, Frankfurt-am-Main), no. 40a, 6 Sept. 1982.

[10] See Wolfgang Büscher, " The Broad Outline Is Becoming Clear," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 6, 1982, pp. 9–13.

[11] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976), p. 536.

[12] See Josef Foschepoth, *Reformation und Bauernkrieg im Geschichtsbild der DDR* (Duncker and Humblot, Berlin [West], 1976), pp. 105–113.

[13] Ibid. p. 107;

[14] See Günther Fabiunke, *Martin Luther als Nationalökonom*, (Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1963), p. 54, as reported in Foschepoth, op. cit. p. 107.

princes, a tradition that the GDR at that time claimed was continued in the " anti-national " policy of the West German bourgeoisie. In their strict partition of German history into its good " progressive " and bad " reactionary " components, East German historians clearly relegated Luther to the reactionary side and therefore to West Germany.

By the late 1960s it had become apparent that this view of Luther would no longer suffice. The 450th anniversary of the Reformation in 1967 provided another opportune occasion for the SED to make certain corrections. Luther and his legacy, it was now explained, had to be viewed dialectically with the Reformation and the subsequent Peasants' War as two phases of a unitary revolutionary process.[15]

> Although Luther and Müntzer may have been bitterly opposed theologically and politically, historically they belong together. It is not merely a question of some trivial friend-foe relationship, but rather a genuine historical dialectic. Whoever praises the one does not need to damn the other.[16]

More important, it was no longer acceptable, either " scientifically or politically," to classify Luther as a " princes' lackey " or to make his legacy the monopoly of bourgeois-imperialist historians. Rather than being written about as part of the alleged disastrous historical legacy of the FRG, Martin Luther was now to be incorporated " into the good traditions " of the German people, who, in the words of the SED, " have found their true home in our republic."[17]

Although it was still Thomas Müntzer who received top honours in 1975 during the 450th anniversary of the outbreak of the Peasants' War, additional attempts to repolish the long tarnished image of Martin Luther in the GDR were also evident. It should be noted, however, that such efforts were largely confined to academic journals and an occasional history book. The gradual changes in the SED's interpretation of Luther had not yet been incorporated into school textbooks, which, for example, continued to present the old black-and-white dichotomy between Luther and Müntzer.[18] At any rate, all past efforts and publicity devoted to rehabilitating Luther pales in comparison with the major campaign launched in mid-1980 with the announcement of the formation of an official state Martin Luther Committee to oversee preparations for a series of celebrations planned for 1983 in conjunction with the 500th anniversary of Luther's birth. The state committee was composed of 100 leading political, cultural and literary figures of the East German establishment, including five SED Politburo members. The importance

[15] Foschepoth, op. cit. p. 107.

[16] See Gerhard Brendler, " The Reformation and Progress," p. 67, in Leo Stern and Max Steinmetz (eds.), *450 Jahre Reformation*, (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin [East]), pp. 58–69, as reported in Foschepoth, op. cit. pp. 109–10.

[17] Gerhard Brendler, " Early Bourgeois Revolution and Tradition," in Gerhard Brendler and Max Steinmetz (eds.), *Weltwirkung der Revolution, Internationales Symposium anlässlich der 450-Jahr Feier der Reformation in Wittenberg von 24–26 Oktober 1967, Referate und Diskussionen* (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschafter, Berlin, 1969), p. 184, as reported in Foschepoth, op. cit. p. 110.

[18] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 29 March 1980.

that the Party attached to the event was underlined by the fact that the chairman was to be no less an authoritative figure than SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker. Four senior clergymen of the East German Evangelical Church were also included as " guest advisers " to the committee's work, a distinction apparently insisted upon by the Church, in order to emphasize its independence. All four are also members of the separate Church Martin Luther Committee founded in 1978 and were to help coordinate and supervise activities by both institutions in this field.

Addressing the inaugural meeting of the state Martin Luther Committee in East Berlin in June 1980, Honecker proclaimed 1983 to be Martin Luther Year in the GDR and said that the GDR would be " honouring the historic achievements that Luther brought about for social progress and world culture by launching the Reformation, which itself represents a bourgeois revolution."[19] In reference to the participation of senior Church officials in the Luther Committee's work, the SED Party chief claimed that this reflected " the general cooperation among citizens of our country regardless of their attitudes and religion." Gone, this time apparently forever, were the mordant descriptions of Luther as the " princes' lackey " and the " betrayer of the peasants." Instead, Luther was praised as " one of the most significant humanists, whose efforts were directed towards a more just world." In reference to Luther's support of the German princes and his bitter conflict with Thomas Müntzer, Honecker simply declared that Luther was a tragic figure caught in a conflict between his role as the initiator of a great revolutionary event and his inability to comprehend the laws of social development, a fact that does not, however, diminish the value of his other achievements.

Informed sources had been aware of the most recent reassessment for some time. Negotiations had also been under way with the East German Evangelical Church to discuss possible cooperation between the two institutions for the Luther jubilee and to avoid " misunderstandings " such as those that had occurred in the past.[20] Attentive Party members could also have picked up hints of the approaching Luther renaissance in the official Party press. In late 1979, for example, *Forum*, the journal of the official East German youth organization FDJ, published an article on Luther under the title " What Does Luther Have To Do With Marx?" in which Luther was honoured not only as a German revolutionary but also as a philosophical trail-blazer for Karl Marx.[21] In the autumn of 1981 the SED firmly established its official view on Luther with the publication in its theoretical journal, *Einheit*, of 15 " Theses on Martin Luther," prepared by a group of social scientists and professors from the East German Academy of Sciences under the leadership of Dr Horst Bartel,

[19] See Honecker's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, 14–15 June 1980.

[20] In 1967 a state Luther Committee with official Church participation was formed in connection with the 450th anniversary of the outbreak of the Peasants' War; most Evangelical Church representatives withdrew from the committee, however, in protest over political differences that subsequently arose.

[21] See the article by Dr Ernst Engelberg, " What Does Luther Have To Do With Marx?" *Forum*, no. 13, 1979.

Director of the Academy's Central Institute of History.[22] In addition to documenting how far the SED's attitude towards Luther himself had evolved (he was said to be " among the great personalities of German history " and " a pioneer of the great spiritual and political conflicts with which Germany and Europe entered the era of declining feudalism, the emergence of mercantile capitalism, and the first bourgeois revolution ") the theses also documented the SED's emerging claim to German history in its entirety:

> The GDR is deeply rooted in all of German history. As the socialist German state, it is the result of centuries of struggle by all the progressive forces of the German people for social progress. Everything progressive and all who have contributed to it are indispensable parts of the traditions that shape the national identity of the GDR.

According to the theses in *Einheit*, the GDR's commitment to Luther's legacy arises not only out of Luther's importance in German and world history but also from the fact that most of the places where Luther lived and worked are located within the territory of the East German state. Although Luther is not particularly known as an economic theorist, the theses note that both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had a high opinion of Luther's " economic views " (not mentioning, however, that both Marx and Engels were extremely critical of Luther on many other points) and that Luther " is the one economic thinker of Germany who is often cited affirmatively in the works of Marx." Luther's translation of the New Testament is praised as his " greatest cultural achievement." As to why Luther's great achievements were not discovered and publicized earlier, the theses blandly mention that with the victory of the working class and its allies on German soil and the construction of socialism in the GDR " the social prerequisites have been laid for honouring Martin Luther in every way . . ." Past condemnation of Luther is silently passed over, the theses simply noting that in the 1960s " some studies " appeared in which Luther and his work were understood " in a differentiated manner." *Einheit* insists that the revolutionary German workers' movement always differentiated among Luther's historical achievements, his class-bound limitations, and the misuse of his legacy through the reactionary alliance of throne and altar. " It [the workers' movement] neither glorified nor disdained Luther, but rather paid tribute to his place within the variety of progressive and revolutionary movements in German history."

It is only now, after some three decades of rule, that the SED is self-confident enough to allow a more " differentiated " treatment of the Great Reformer. With at least a partial Church–State *rapprochement*, the figure of Martin Luther is supposed to serve not as a symbol of conflict but rather as one of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two institutions. With memories of a common German past becoming increasingly distant for large numbers of East Germans, society is deemed sufficiently " mature " for such a " differentiated " interpreta-

[22] See the " Theses on Martin Luther," *Einheit*, no. 9, 1981, pp. 890–903.

tion of Luther and German history. Luther as a historical, indeed, as a national, figure is no longer considered a threat but is rather a potential asset in further stabilizing an East German national consciousness.

That this was at least one of the underlying motives behind the SED's Luther celebrations was confirmed by Honecker himself. Speaking at the second official meeting of the state Luther Committee in October 1982, the SED Secretary-General stated:

> The diverse activities of citizens of all classes and social groups with differing philosophical and denominational convictions itself reflects a greater historical and state consciousness. It is particularly these efforts to exploit the progressive achievements of history in order to solve the tasks of today that explain the great interest in the Luther commemorations in the GDR.[23]

One might question, perhaps, whether Luther himself would have appreciated his legacy being used to accomplish some of the tasks that Honecker had in mind. The SED Party chief called, for example, for the Luther jubilee to be used to guarantee those conditions that would assure the fulfilment of planned goals for the maintenance and gradual increase in standards of living, in accordance with the 10th SED Congress. Even more critical, according to Honecker, is the task of preserving peace. As preposterous as it may appear, the Luther jubilee was too golden an opportunity for SED agitprop specialists to pass up. Not only was the Great Reformer integrated into the SED's campaign to increase labour productivity and to reduce industrial inefficiency, he was also singled out as a champion of peace and, by implication, a supporter of the Warsaw Pact " peace offensive " directed against NATO. This aspect of Luther was the subject of the following East German Radio commentary:

> On the question of peace Martin Luther always adopted a militant partisan position. Neutralism or pacifism were foreign to him. He called the danger to and the opponents of peace by name and placed them in the dock of public opinion. . . .
>
> In view of the strong threat to world peace through the expansionist military expeditions of the Ottoman Empire, Martin Luther wrote in 1529 the defiant verse: " A mighty fortress is our God." It is a spiritual call to all Christians to defend their fatherland against the enemy. For Martin Luther, a central part of a necessary and rational peace service included the right and obligation to defend peace from external threats. . . . The peace efforts of Martin Luther, however, were limited through objective circumstances, as he possessed little knowledge about the socio-economic factors threatening peace in an antagonistic class society. . . . We, however, cannot ignore the fact that we live in a world in which the socio-economic factors endangering peace have not been eliminated. The preparations for the 500th birthday of the reformer occur at a time in which all people, regardless of their philosophical views or denominations, are concen-

[23] *Neues Deutschland*, 30–31 Oct. 1982.

> trating their efforts on preventing the implementation of NATO armament plans, particularly the Brussels missile decision.[24]

Martin Luther and the East German Evangelical Church

The life and legacy of Martin Luther were commemorated in 1983 not only by state and Party officials in the GDR. Perhaps more appropriately, Luther was also honoured by his spiritual descendants in the GDR, the East German Evangelical Church.[25] In contrast to official portrayals of Luther as a great social reformer and a historic personality, indeed a revolutionary figure in German history, it was another aspect of Luther that was commemorated by the Church. In the words of Thuringian Bishop Werner Leich, chairman of the separate Church Martin Luther Committee:

> We want to honour Martin Luther not as a great person, but rather we want to bring his message of the almighty God in the form of the joyous tidings of Jesus Christ closer to the people and put it at the centre of all Church activities.[26]

Leich's statement, delivered at the founding meeting of the state Martin Luther Committee to which he is also a " guest adviser," was itself a clear attempt to demarcate the Church's celebrations from those sponsored by Party and state officials and to dispense any doubts that might have arisen about the participation of senior clergymen, albeit in their guest advisory role, in the work of the state Martin Luther Committee. Church officials, while stressing their organizational independence as well as the different thematic orientation of their celebrations, nonetheless applauded the official interest in the Luther anniversary. Bishop Leich, for example, described the participation of high-ranking Church officials in the work of the state Luther Committee as an expression of the fact " that we also view the commemoration of Martin Luther outside the Church as pertinent and we applaud it, [if it results in] the life work of Martin Luther

[24] Radio DDR I, 8 Nov. 1981, 08.20 hours.

[25] The East German Evangelical Church is not a single organization but rather a number of regional Churches organized since 1971 under an umbrella organization, the Federation of Evangelical churches in the GDR.

According to its present constitution, the federation is an association of independent territorial Churches for the purposes of practical cooperation in the interests of common witness and service. It is strongly federal in character, with decision-making powers decentralized. The eight territorial Churches consist of the five United Churches of Anhalt, Berlin-Brandenburg, Görlitz, Greifswald and the Church Province of Saxony, as well as the three Lutheran Churches of Mecklenburg, Saxony and Thuringia. The five United Churches simultaneously form the Evangelical Churches of the Union (*Evangelische Kirche der Union*—EKU) in the GDR and the three Lutheran Churches also constitute the United Evangelical Lutheran Church (*Vereinigte Evangelische Lutherische Kirchen*—VELK) in the GDR. The federation is estimated to have a total membership of some 8,000,000. In comparison, the Catholic Church in the GDR is estimated to have 1,300,000 members out of a total East German population of some 17,000,000. For further details on Church membership in the GDR, see Hans-Jürgen Röder, " Churches and Religious Groups in the GDR: An Overview in Figures," *Kirche im Sozialismus* (Berliner Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kirchliche Publizistik, West Berlin), Special English Edition, June 1979, pp. 32–38.

[26] See the speech delivered by Leich at the founding session of the state Luther Committee, the full text of which is reprinted in *Martin Luther und unsere Zeit*, pp. 21–29.

. . . [becoming] better known and appreciated within broad sectors of our society."[27]

Not only could such Church–State cooperation hardly have taken place under Honecker's predecessor Walter Ulbricht, but it would also have been unthinkable prior to the partial Church–State *rapprochement* that took place in the mid-1970s, a process symbolized by the well-publicized meeting in March 1978 between Bishop Albert Schönherr, then Chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, and SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker.[28] Even then, however, Church officials were well aware that the success or failure of this new course would depend not on the frequency of high-level contacts but rather on the experiences of local Christians and whether they really received the equal treatment not only promised by Honecker but also guaranteed in the GDR constitution.[29] The Martin Luther Jubilee in the GDR promised to be another test case of both the potential and the limits of Church–State cooperation. Bishop Leich noted the importance of the fact that both the Party and the Church were capable of not only tolerating but also respecting and accepting the views of the other side and could cooperate in preparations for the Luther anniversary. Yet in an apparent reference to the continuing difficulties, harrassment and charges of discrimination against Christians on the local level, the Thuringian Bishop also had the following to say:

> We hope that the Christians in our state will be able to experience in their everyday lives that which has been demonstrated at the administrative level of the [state] Luther Committee in the GDR. You are citizens of our state with equal rights and deserving of equal respect.[30]

As if to underline their separate concept and interpretation of Luther and his legacy as well as their institutional independence, all Church celebrations were held independently of those sponsored by the state officials, that is, there were no jointly sponsored celebrations. Nonetheless, both sides did invite the other's representatives to various ceremonies and consulted with one another on organizational issues and guest lists in order to avoid overlapping and controversy. East German Evangelical Church officials, for example, themselves invited foreign guests to Church-organized celebrations, while state officials issued

[27] Ibid.

[28] For further details on the Honecker–Schönherr meeting, its achievements as well as its implications for all involved, see Reinhard Henkys, "Church-State-Society," in Reinhard Henkys (ed.), *Die Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* (Christian Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1982), pp. 11–61. This book is perhaps the most thorough and perceptive study of the problems and prospects of the East German Evangelical Churches in the 1980s.

[29] Article 20 of the 1974 East German constitution states:

> Every citizen of the German Democratic Republic has the same rights and duties, irrespective of nationality, race, philosophy or religious confession, social origin or position. Freedom of conscience and freedom of belief are guaranteed.

See *The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic* (Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Verlag Zeit und Bild, Dresden, 1974), pp. 19–20.

[30] See Leich's speech in *Martin Luther und unsere Zeit*, pp. 27–28.

invitations to foreign dignitaries desiring to attend officially sponsored events. The informal division of labour worked out between the two institutions was demonstrated to Western reporters in mid-February at the opening to the public of the restored houses in Eisleben where Luther was born and where he died. Although local Party and state officials were in charge of the opening ceremony and the official tour of Luther's place of birth, it was a local Evangelical priest who conducted the tour of Luther's place of death.[31]

THE thematic orientation of the Church celebrations was designed, in the words of one Church official, to " allow Martin Luther himself to speak." In contrast to the Party interpretation of Luther as a historical revolutionary figure, the Church events were designed to emphasize Luther's religious and theological significance. Church officials established five guidelines for the Church events. First, Luther was to be viewed in a " Christocentric " context with the primary emphasis on Luther as an interpreter of the Bible and a teacher of the Church. Second, Church events were also designed to accentuate Luther's ecumenical significance and the common heritage of the Christian world as symbolized by the invitation of representatives from a variety of denominations to various ceremonies. Particularly noteworthy in this context is the increased cooperation and discussion between the Evangelical and Catholic Churches which the Luther anniversary has helped spur, both in the GDR and elsewhere.[32] Third, East German Church officials also emphasized the missionary significance of Luther and his importance for Churches outside Europe. Fourth, the Luther jubilee was designed to further dialogue within the GDR between Christians and non-Christians and to make people more aware of the Church's work. Fifth, Church events were designed to be " realistic " and to avoid any glorification of Luther with the more controversial aspects of Luther's legacy, such as his attitudes towards Jews, being subjects of special colloquiums. A final goal of the Church celebrations was to increase personal contacts between the Protestants in both Germanies. The Luther year ceremonies were the first occasion since the construction of the Berlin Wall when Protestants from both German states had the opportunity to get together on any significant scale.

The entire spectrum of Church celebration events was held under the theme " God, above all, to be feared, loved, and trusted," a phrase taken from Luther's catechism. Although it was the major celebrations at the Wartburg in May, and in Leipzig and Eisleben in November, that received the most publicity, the real focus of the Church's efforts was a series of seven *Kirchentage* which took place between May and September under the motto " Dare to Trust," events which attracted over

[31] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 Feb. 1983.

[32] The Luther anniversary appears to have brought about a better relationship not only between the Protestant and Catholic Churches in the GDR, but in general as symbolized by Pope John Paul II's letter on Luther and his precedent-setting participation in a Lutheran service in Rome on 11 Dec. 1983.

200,000 participants in total, with over 100,000 in attendance at the Dresden *Kirchentag* in July alone. The East German Evangelical Church's success in planning, organizing and running events on this scale clearly enabled it more firmly to establish its presence in society as an independent institution and as an autonomous social force. The fact that the discussion at these seven Church congresses was by no means limited to Luther, but instead covered an entire range of social issues—peace and disarmament, environmental problems, education, alcoholism, suicide, homosexuality and other social issues—again demonstrated that the Church is becoming increasingly involved in new areas of social responsibility. Church leaders are certainly well aware of the difficulties and dangers inherent in such a course, but they also realize that they are the only alternative to the SED and that they must take up the debate on such pressing questions which the Party so often ignores or treats in an entirely dogmatic and manipulative fashion.

The organization of so many events on such a large scale posed, not surprisingly, enormous logistical and organizational problems for Church authorities faced with limited financial and personnel resources. Work started as early as 1981 in an attempt to ensure adequate transportation, space, food, overnight facilities, paper, etc. Although otherwise quite keen on emphasizing their independence vis-à-vis state authorities, Church officials were quite open in acknowledging their appreciation for the support provided by the state. Such assistance was unprecedented in terms of scope, and indicates the priority which state officials also attached to the events. In addition to fairgrounds, conference halls and overnight facilities which were placed at the disposal of Church authorities, state officials also helped to arrange special train schedules.[33] Such cooperation is likely to strengthen the hand of those within the Church leadership who have long advocated a limited *modus vivendi* with the state based on the principle of cooperation in areas of mutual interest while retaining full institutional autonomy. Speaking in late October, the chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, Bishop Johannes Hempel, stressed the openness and fairness with which Marxists and Christians had learned to deal with each other in the course of the Luther Year and expressed his hope that this mutual respect would be carried over into the future. It is also noteworthy that Honecker, in an interview in November with the West German periodical *Lutherische Monatshefte*, also spoke in quite positive terms about the course of the Luther Year celebrations and labelled them a model for future relations between Church and state.[34] Honecker noted that the state had provided "an extraordinary amount of assistance" and claimed, quoting one of the Church's Luther Year slogans, that it—i.e. the Party—"had dared to trust." In addition to promising that the state would continue with "its understanding attitude towards the legitimate interests of the Church,"

[33] *Epd.* 11 Feb. 1983.
[34] For Honecker's interview with the *Lutherische Monatshefte* see *Neues Deutschland*, 6 Oct. 1983.

Honecker also appealed for an " open discussion, a candid settling of problems, and a willingness to take practical steps."

Only time will tell if the spirit of the Luther Year will be carried over and have a longer-term impact upon relations between the East German Evangelical Church and the state. Six years have now passed since the famous meeting between Honecker and the former Chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, Bishop Albert Schönherr, a meeting which symbolically initiated the partial *rapprochement* between the two institutions. Despite open differences and periodic conflict in a number of areas—education, military training in the school system, questions concerning peace and disarmament—the Evangelical Church hierarchy appears convinced that its policy has paid off.[35] The Luther Year celebrations have been a good example not only of the overlapping, but also of the differing interests on both sides. Whereas Church officials tend to describe their relations with the state Luther Committee as " businesslike," the SED has tended to refer to them as " trustful." The difference, although rhetorical, is hardly accidental. The Church, while aware of the benefits of cooperation with the state, is also aware of the risks, and has remained sensitive and determined to resist attempts by the SED to harness it for its own propaganda purposes. Back in 1979, State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi described the attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Church as a great historical experiment through which the state would recognize the Church as an autonomous social force while simultaneously attempting to make it feel at home and win it over for its own goals. As the Luther Year has demonstrated, it is indeed a fascinating experiment, but also one whose final results are not yet known.[36]

Reactions in the FRG—and Elsewhere

The 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth was also commemorated in the FRG. The considerable interest in Luther in the Federal Republic was reflected in the countless number of books which appeared on the market along with extensive television coverage of various events and special programmes on Luther's life and legacy. In addition, a number of prominent West German politicians used this occasion to speak out on the significance of Luther and his legacy.[37] In contrast to the GDR, however, the Luther jubilee in West Germany was primarily a Church event, a fact emphasized by the then Federal President Karl Carstens in a foreword to a recently published guide on the Luther celebrations in the GDR.

It will be largely the responsibility of the Church to commemorate the work of Martin Luther in 1983, the year of the 500th anniversary of

[35] See the balance drawn on the fifth anniversary of the Honecker–Schönherr meeting by Manfred Stolpe, Deputy Chairman of the Conference of Evangelical Church Directorates in the GDR, in his article " The Basis for Businesslike Relations," *Neue Zeit*, 5 March 1983.

[36] For the text of Gysi's speech delivered in Geneva see *Epd-Dokumentation*, no. 28, 1981.

[37] See the contributions of various leading West German political figures on the Luther anniversary in *Das Parlament*, no. 3, 22 Jan. 1983.

the reformer's birth. They will have the task of communicating the significance of Luther's life-work, which proved so laden with consequences for the history of the Church in Germany, Europe, and far beyond.[38]

Although not on the grandiose scale of the celebrations planned in the GDR, the events scheduled in the FRG were nonetheless impressive. A series of exhibitions, symposia and other public events were held, most of which took place in the four West German cities most closely connected with Luther's life—Nuremberg, Coburg, Augsburg and Worms. West German travel agencies reported a surprisingly strong interest in the Luther celebrations, with bookings for " Luther trips " far exceeding original expectations. The total number of tourists who visited the FRG for the Luther year exceeded levels in past years in connection with the Goethe jubilee and attained the number that arrived for the Prussian exhibit in 1981.[39] Luther's theological legacy and his role in the Church and society were also one of the focal points of a variety of Church events. In September, the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany (VELKD), a federation of Lutheran Churches of Bavaria, Brunswick, Hannover, North Elbe and Schaumburg-Lippe, held its 1983 General Synod in Coburg to commemorate Luther's stay in Coburg Castle in 1530, with the most important Church gathering and celebration taking place from 31 October to 4 November, when the Synod of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) met in Worms for celebrations that were also attended by representatives of the East German Evangelical Church.

THE commemoration of the Luther anniversary in both German states has inevitably spurred a discussion about competition between the two Germanies over the historical past, a controversy similar to that in 1981 when competing exhibits dealing with the legacy of Prussia were opened in East and West Berlin.[40] West German attitudes towards the Luther jubilee, as well as the Prussian renaissance, themselves reflected a deep ambivalence towards the German past. Commemoration of such historical figures, considered normal in Western countries such as France or the USA, is at times still regarded as distasteful and raises suspicions in a country where the past continues to haunt the present. For years, historical anniversaries and controversies in the FRG were relegated to academic journals and the *feuilleton* sections of newspapers. History and memories of the past were largely forgotten or suppressed in a country where the present often appeared a success to the degree in which it rejected the past or allowed it to be forgotten.

The glorification of various heroic figures has, of course, in the past had

[38] See the foreword by Karl Carstens in the pamphlet published by the Church Office of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) entitled *Exhibitions and Events in the Federal Republic of Germany in Honour of the 500th Anniversary of Martin Luther's Birth*, pp. 4–5.

[39] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 March 1983.

[40] See Peter Jochen Winters, " On the Treatment of German History: Two Exhibits, Two Concepts," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 11. 1981, pp. 1,137–1,141.

tragic consequences for Germany and for others. In the case of Martin Luther, the exploitation of his legacy to demand complete servility to secular authority in Wilhelmian times and, in a much more brutal form, under National Socialism, are memories still fresh in the minds of many. For this reason a number of West German commentators have openly warned against any exaltation of Luther and have cited the GDR as an example of the misuse of historical traditions. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for example, has voiced reservations about the intent of the official Luther celebrations in the GDR and has warned about the SED's " very subtle " attempts to use Luther to bind the concept of the nation with that of socialism " as if there were a direct line [of continuity] from Frederick the Great to Erich Honecker."[41]

A number of West German politicians, however, had expressed interest in attending some of the Church-sponsored Luther celebrations in the GDR; but West German officials made any official West German participation in the official Luther celebrations in the GDR contingent upon the overall state of bilateral relations and protocol issues that would arise during such a visit. On a number of occasions the then West German Federal President Karl Carstens, for example, expressed his desire to attend the opening celebration of the Church-sponsored Luther jubilee in the Wartburg on 4 May, and the GDR had let it be known that it would welcome West German participation in the official state Luther celebration on 9 November in East Berlin. Apart from the fact that a West German Federal President has never paid an official visit to the GDR,[42] additional problems arose from the fact that the celebration took place in East Berlin, the status of which remains, of course, a major point of contention. A number of West German commentators expressed fears that the GDR could attempt to use such an occasion to score points on questions of diplomatic protocol. Visions of West German representatives being officially received in the presence of a NVA guard of honour in East Berlin appalled West German officials familiar with Eastern bloc protocol practices and Carstens eventually turned down his invitation. It was apparently these as well as other concerns that led the West German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, in a leader entitled " The Misused Reformer," to comment:

> Evangelical Christians in the Federal Republic have a lively, almost passionate, interest in the Luther celebrations of the Evangelical Church in the GDR, particularly in taking part in them in the Luther cities of Eisleben, Wittenberg and Eisenach—precisely because of the partition of Germany. For the leadership of the GDR there are almost infinite possibilities of making such wishes contingent upon the West German Evangelical Christians' showing reverence to the atheist state before being allowed to honour Luther himself in the

[41] *Epd*, 12 Jan. 1983.

[42] West German Federal President Karl Carstens has already met unofficially with Honecker on two occasions, the first being during the funeral ceremonies of the late President Tito of Yugoslavia in May 1980 and, more recently, in December 1982 in Moscow at the time of the funeral ceremonies for the late Leonid Brezhnev.

> GDR. The old problem of the proper Protestant attitude towards authority can be exploited during the Luther Year commemorations for the stabilization of an atheist dictatorship on German soil. It will be simple enough. The regime of the GDR has, as its main goal, the elimination of the special nature of inter-German legal relations. When not only Church officials, but also those holding state office—even the highest representatives of the constitution—go to the GDR in order to demonstrate that the Reformation included all of Germany, then the schemers of the atheist state will turn this intent upside down and use the Luther Year further to destroy any German sense of community.[43]

Other West German commentators attempted to discover positive aspects in the increased attention being devoted to Luther and other historical figures in the GDR. They noted that the "differentiated "interpretations of historical figures currently being served up by the SED more closely correspond to historical reality than past polemical and one-sided interpretations. Secondly, on a more speculative note, that they might also have consequences both unanticipated and undesired by the SED. Indeed, the smooth appropriation of German history under way in the GDR might prove to be a two-edged sword. Although it is officially emphasized that the power of the working class is now so established that the Party can afford such a colourful gallery of forefathers, one can also interpret such revisions as a confession of the failure of past policies. Moreover, as one West German commentator pointed out, "For the adult East German citizen, why such grotesque over-simplifications are being corrected is not so important. The most important thing is that such new sources of information make it easier to think about the nation."[44] This view was also reflected in an editorial in the liberal West German *Süddeutsche Zeitung*:

> As the only communist state lacking a national identity, the GDR finds itself compelled to convert an understanding of tradition into a view of history which it can use to compete with the FRG for a national identity, as well as to fulfil the requirements of the "leading role of the working class." Friction is therefore unavoidable. At a time of strict delimitation and an increasing lack of ideological credibility the SED does not evade its own citizens' burning question about the sense of the German "socialist nation." For many, however, the new revived interest in traditions and history could lead to ideas of a German "special path," which in no way conforms to the SED's prescriptions, in either a positive or negative sense. They could, for example, digest the material, relics and memorials of history in the same fashion in which they have read the priceless German classics—without reading the [SED's] summaries and conclusions as ideological guides.[45]

[43] See the editorial by Ernst-Otto Maetzke entitled "The Misused Reformer" in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 Jan. 1983.
[44] Quoted in "Das Streiflicht," a daily satirical column in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24 Feb. 1983.
[45] See the editorial by Hans Schuster entitled "A Picture Gallery for the SED State" in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 Jan. 1983.

THE FRG may not be the only interested observer of historical jubilees like that of Luther being staged by the GDR. Although the reaction in other socialist bloc countries was limited and restrained, one might assume that at least some of the GDR's fraternal allies do not view such a cultivation of German historical pride in an entirely unambivalent manner. Particularly interesting are the attitudes of the Poles, a people whose own history is so intertwined with that of the Germans. What historical event, other than Prussia's role in the partitionings of Poland, has historically divided Germans and Poles more than the Reformation and its consequences for the territorial and religious boundaries in Central Europe? Thus far, the Luther jubilee has evoked but a slight echo in the official Polish press, with coverage limited largely to a factual recounting of Luther's role in the Reformation and the consequences that the Reformation had for Poland.[46] Yet the barely camouflaged hostility to the GDR's renewed interest in Prussia shows that at least some commentators are observing the SED's changing interpretation of German history with great interest.[47]

The question of the Soviet Union's attitude to this new East German historiography will of course be even more critical. The SED certainly continues to back Soviet standards of "socialist internationalism" vociferously, both in theory and in practice; and East German commentators also point out and emphasize that their framework of analysis is fully in accord with that prevalent in Soviet historiography. Yet the experience of other East European countries has demonstrated that the cultivation of historical and national traditions and loyalty to Moscow are not always compatible. Anti-Russian sentiments could easily be aroused in the GDR as in other East European countries, and Moscow is likely to insist that the GDR's historical revival does not overstep the boundaries of ideological propriety.[48] What does appear certain is that the SED has been the last of the Soviet satellites to come to the realization that Soviet-style "socialist internationalism" alone is insufficient as a basis of popular support for any regime in Eastern Europe.

"*Rehistorisierung*" in the GDR

It would be a fundamental error to view the SED's "resurrection" of Martin Luther as an isolated incident. Rather, as already emphasized, the Party's changing attitude towards Luther must be seen in a broader context, as Luther is simply the most recent in a long list of historical figures who have been reinterpreted in a much more basic reorientation of the SED's attitude towards German history and its conscious posturing with regard to the question of the German nation. In the broadest sense, the SED's attitudes towards history have been quite consistent in so far as

[46] See, for example, the article by the Polish historian Henryk Dominik entitled "The Great Reformer" in the Wroclaw party daily *Gazeta Robotnicza*, 4 Feb. 1983.

[47] See Wolf Oschlies, *Preussen, "rote Preussen," und Polen*, (Information aus der Forschung, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien), no. 9, 29 Dec. 1981.

[48] That this might be the case was indicated in an article reviewing the 1981 Prussian exhibit in West Berlin by the veteran Soviet journalist Ernst Genri in the Moscow daily *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 9 Aug. 1981.

the Party has always maintained that the GDR incorporates all the positive " good " traditions of German history, while having broken with all that is " reactionary." The variable factor, however, has been increasing elasticity in the definitions of " good " and " reactionary."

The prescriptive as opposed to the descriptive presentation of history for reasons of political expediency is, of course, by no means a new or rare phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Despite an official commitment, at least in theory, to Soviet-style " proletarian internationalism," the regimes of all the Warsaw Pact countries have at various times attempted to wrap themselves in a cloak of national goodwill and to tap patriotic sentiments in order to shore up the shaky foundations of political legitimacy. Romania's Ceaucescu has perhaps been the most blatant in remoulding the historical past to fit his own personal whims and the operational needs of the Romanian Communist Party, but similar trends are also discernible in other East European countries.[49]

In the GDR, however, the attitudes of the ruling SED élite towards the past have been dominated from the outset by two unique factors: 1) the singular and unenviable position of having to share a common history and culture with a politically more attractive and economically more potent West German neighbour, whose very existence represents a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy and stability of the East German state; and 2) the always latent and unresolved question of the German nation and its future; in other words the " German question." Moreover, for many the frequently catastrophic course of German history often seemed to demand more apology than praise and thus did not necessarily appear to be a potential asset. In the early post-war period many Germans simply wanted to forget the past. Did German history not lead to Hitler? What could be said about it except that it must not be repeated? In the GDR, the authorities themselves insisted that the very founding of the " first socialist state on German soil " was supposed to be not only a legal but also a spiritual break with the past. In those years, for large parts of the East German élite, many of whom had spent the war in exile in the Soviet Union, class loyalties may have taken precedence over national ones, with Soviet-style " proletarian internationalism " serving as a form of *Ersatz* patriotism. As one shrewd Western observer has pointed out, such a transnational outlook within the SED élite itself mirrored developments in the FRG in the early post-war years, when many West Germans also expressed strong sentiments for supranational European organizations.[50]

This is not to say, however, that early East German leaders were ambivalent about the future of the German nation. On the contrary,

[49] For the Romanian case see Vlad Georgescu, *Politica si Storie cazul Communistilor Romani 1944–1977* (Jon Dimitru Verlag, Munich, 1981); Dionisie Ghermani, *Die kommunistische Umdeutung der rumänischen Geschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Mittelalters* (Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 1967); and Michael J. Rura, *Reinterpretation of History as a Method of Furthering Communism in Romania: A Study in Comparative Historiography* (Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1961).

[50] See Melvin Croan, " East Germany: The Soviet Connection," *The Washington Papers*, no. 36, (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1976), p. 42.

pan-German proclamations and proposals hinting at or promising German reunification were part and parcel of early SED Party programmes. Indeed, the vociferousnesss with which Walter Ulbricht voiced such ambitions and at times attempted to put the blame for the partition of Germany on the FRG suggested that the GDR aspired to play the role of a socialist Piedmont and a catalyst for the reunification of Germany under socialist auspices.[51] Numerous statements from the 1950s and 1960s leave no doubt about the SED's theoretical pan-German aspirations and its claim to represent the entire German nation. Yet it must be pointed out that the SED's concept of the German nation was itself limited, namely to that of a nation that had broken with the German past, or at least most of it, and was largely based on the tradition of the German labour movement or specific " progressive " events in German history such as the 1813–15 War of Liberation and the failed revolutions of 1848–49 and 1918, the rest of German history being left to the " bourgeois-imperialist " historians of the FRG.

It soon became clear, however, that this mixture of " socialist internationalism " and the revolutionary traditions of the German labour movement presented by the Party was either being rejected outright by society or was proving too schematic and abstract. In any case, it was clearly not convincing enough to mobilize society to fulfil the SED's ambitious social and economic goals, let alone provide a basis for a new East German state consciousness. Although Ulbricht himself proclaimed in 1952 that " everyone understands the great significance that the scientific study of German history has for the struggle for the national unity of Germany and for the cultivation of all the great traditions of the German people,"[52] the fact remains that for years the study of history remained neglected in the GDR. It was not until the Seventh SED Congress in 1967 that the role of the social sciences in general, including that of historiography, was finally upgraded in conjunction with the announcement of the " developed social system of socialism, " or ESS.[53] A major component of the ESS was the new priority given to science as a " main productive force." Marxist–Leninist historiography together with the other social sciences was now expected to help meet the growing needs of a highly developed, industrialized socialist society. One such need, from the Party's view, was the development of a well-formed,

[51] Melvin Croan, " New Country, Old Nationality," *Foreign Policy*, no. 37, Winter 1979–80, p. 145. For the attitude of the SED and the Soviet Union towards the future of the German nation in the immediate post-war period see Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Von Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949*, 2nd ed. (Verlaggemeinschaft Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 217–60. For documentation of official statements by leading East German figures on the nation, see Carl Christoph Schweitzer (ed.), *Die Deutsche Nation* (Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 1979, 2nd ed.), pp. 501–612; see also Hermann Weber (ed.), *Der Deutsche Kommunismus, Dokumente* (Verlag Kiepenhauser und Witsch, Cologne, 1963), pp. 511–47.

[52] Walter Ulbricht, *Protokoll der Verhandlungen der II Parteikonferenz der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, (Deutsches Bücherverzeichnis, Berlin, 1951–55), p. 120, as quoted in Ulrich Neuhäusser-Wespy, " From Prehistoric Times to the SED," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 2, 1983, p. 145.

[53] For further details see Günther Heydemann, " The Theory Boom in the Marxist–Leninist Historical Sciences of the GDR Since 1967," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 3, 1980, p. 262.

socialist consciousness of history as the basis for a socialist national consciousness.

WITH the benefit of hindsight, however, one can say that a far more fundamental change in the SED's attitude towards the German nation and its historical past resulted from the direct ideological challenge posed by the emergence of a new West German *Ostpolitik* towards the end of the 1960s. Changes in West German foreign policy, combined with the shock of the chronically insecure SED leadership over the course of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, underlined the need for a more stable state and national consciousness as a barrier against possible ideological infection. Even more threatening was the long-range vision of the new *Ostpolitik*, introduced by the SPD–FDP coalition under Willy Brandt in 1969. Based on the hope of *Wandel durch Annäherung*, that is, change through *rapprochement*, the coalition government clearly held the long-term hope that a policy of *rapprochement* could stimulate social and political changes in East German policy that might help make the national partition of the German nation anachronistic.[54] The successful conclusion of negotiations for the Berlin, Warsaw and Moscow treaties, combined with the tremendous appeal of Brandt's policy among the East Germans themselves as demonstrated during the Brandt–Stoph meeting in Erfurt in March 1970, soon made it increasingly difficult for the SED to maintain its theoretical commitment to the existence of a single German nation.

The SED's response to the challenge posed by the *Ostpolitik* was not long in coming. On 19 January 1970 Walter Ulbricht attempted to respond to Brandt's concept of two states in one nation by saying, " This is the historical reality: the German Democratic Republic is a socialist German national state and the West German Federal Republic is a capitalist NATO state with limited national sovereignty."[55] Yet the SED continued to find itself on the defensive, and less than a year later Ulbricht went a step further in claiming that

> the GDR is the socialist German national state. *Within it, the evolution of a socialist nation is proceeding*. The FRG is an imperialist state of NATO and embodies the remnants of the old bourgeois German nation under conditions of the state monopolistic ruling system.[56] [emphasis added]

In his report to the Eighth SED Congress in May 1971 the new SED Secretary-General, Erich Honecker, again modified the Party line by

[54] The phrase *Wandel durch Annäherung* was originally coined by Egon Bahr in the early 1960s; it later came to symbolize West German hopes that a policy of *rapprochement* with the East could convince a more secure Soviet Union to relax its stranglehold on Eastern Europe while at the same time strengthening the hand of those East European communists who anyway wanted to liberalize their regimes. West German *Ostpolitik* was to play a major role in initiating a thaw in Eastern Europe, a process that—it was hoped—might eventually lead to the barbed-wire post-war divisions of Europe being replaced by normal frontiers between states.

[55] As quoted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 Apr. 1980.

[56] Ulbricht's speech, delivered on 17 Dec. 1970, was first published in *Neues Deutschland* on 14 Jan. 1971.

claiming that a new type of nation, " the socialist nation," had been created in the GDR in response to the formation of a separate West German state.[57] In attempting to refute Brandt's assertion of the continuous unity of the German nation, Honecker alleged that the contradictions between the prevailing social systems in the two German states had led to a process of " demarcation " or " delimitation " (*Abgrenzung*), a catchword that has defined the SED's *Deutschlandpolitik* ever since.

In July 1972 the SED Politburo member and Party theorist Albert Norden delivered a major speech at the Karl Marx Party College in East Berlin in which he countered Brandt by stating: " There are not two states in one nation but rather two nations in states with different social structures."[58] As the debate in the FRG prior to the ratification of the Basic Treaty reached its height in early 1973, a number of SED spokesmen claimed that the " German question " had already been solved and that a unified German nation no longer existed.[59] A brief phase followed in which the de-emphasis of the German nation also found expression in a renaming process introduced by the SED. With the exception of the title of the Party itself and a number of prominent publications, the offensive words " German " and " Germany " were eliminated from the names of a number of institutions and replaced with the abbreviation " DDR."[60] Even the GDR's national anthem fell victim to the censor's pen. While in Moscow in 1943 Johannes Becker, undoubtedly with the best of intentions, had written a text that included the passage " Arisen out of the ruins and headed for the future, let us serve Germany, our united fatherland." The last three words were clearly no longer appropriate, and East German schoolchildren were subsequently taught to hum their national anthem. As SED historian Stefan Doernberg put it, " Sentimentalizing about being German is an old trick of certain circles in the FRG for covering up imperialist class interests."[61]

[57] See Honecker's address to the Eighth SED Congress in Erich Honecker, *Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII Parteitag der socialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 15—19 Juni, 1971* (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1971). For further details see Ronald D. Asmus, " The GDR and the German Nation: sole heir or Socialist sibling?" in *International Affairs*, Summer 1984.

[58] See Norden's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, 4 July 1972.

[59] See, for example, the speech by Kurt Hager, entitled " The Manifesto of the Communist Party and the World Revolutionary Process," delivered at an international conference in East Berlin under the heading " The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the World Revolutionary Process," reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, 16 March 1973; the speech by Albert Norden, delivered on the 125th anniversary of the 1848 revolution and entitled " The Legacy of the 1848 Revolution is in Good and Secure Hands with Us," in *Neues Deutschland*, 20 March 1973; and the article by Hermann Axen, " The Strengthening of the International Position of the GDR," in the foreign affairs weekly *Horizont*, no. 12, 1973.

[60] Thus, the former German Radio was renamed the Voice of the GDR and the German Union of Journalists was renamed the Union of Journalists of the GDR. The letter " D " for " Deutsche " also disappeared from numerous abbreviations, and when the Leipzig " Hotel Deutschland " was renamed " Hotel on the Ring " a Leipzig newspaper managed to produce the following sentence: " The Hotel on the Ring will in the future be called the Hotel on the Ring " (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 1 Oct. 1979).

[61] That Dr Mittenzwei's views are not shared with the same enthusiasm by all the SED Politburo members is confirmed by a short exchange contained in Klaus Bölling's account of his stay in the GDR. Bölling, having asked SED Politburo member in charge of cultural affairs Kurt Hager what he thought of Mittenzwei's book, received the following sardonic reply: " Mrs Mittenzwei has not yet become a member of the Politburo." See Klaus Bölling, *Die Fernen Nachbarn* (Stern Verlag, Hamburg, 1983).

Despite, or precisely because of the multitude of inter-German agreements being hammered out in negotiations and the resulting influx of West German tourists, the SED agitprop apparatus energetically continued to remind Party and populace that they were East German citizens of German nationality. There were to be Germans of the FRG and Germans of the GDR, but no more Germany. The FRG was a "foreign country," Honecker stated shortly after assuming power, "and an imperialist foreign country at that."[62] At the 13th Central Committee Plenum in December 1974 Honecker coined a phrase that well described the new policy: "Citizenship—GDR, Nationality—German." This policy was also codified in the new GDR constitution of October 1974. While a preamble to the 1968 version referred to the GDR as "a socialist state of the German nation," the 1974 version adopted the wording of the Soviet constitution and in Article 1 blandly stated that the country was "a socialist state of workers and farmers." The 1968 formula, "the vital interests of the nation," was also dropped and replaced by the statement that "the people of the German Democratic Republic . . . have realized their right to socio-economic, political and national self-determination."[63]

IN attempting to justify such fine distinctions, East German historians differentiated between various socio-historical types of nations. The classifications adopted were not based on such criteria as "national will or character" but rather, first, on its level of social and economic development and the character of its national economy, as well as its political organization, and, secondly, upon characteristics such as culture, manners, customs, traditions and mentality.[64] A key distinction was made between "nationality" and the "nation," with the former being defined as "the totality of ethnic attributes, features and ties within the population and the classes, groups and individuals who are its components," and the latter as "a dialectical unit containing economic, political, social and ideological relations of a class nature."[65] Such theoretical pirouettes provided the ideological basis for the following conclusion:

> In the FRG the old capitalist nation survived. In the GDR, on the other hand, socialism produced its own form of national development adequate to its needs, the needs of the socialist German nation. It (that is, the socialist nation) differs in its economic, social, political and ideological principles, in its essential content and features, from the capitalist nation in the FRG; and [it] inevitably demarcates itself

[62] *Neues Deutschland*, 7 Jan. 1972.

[63] See *The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic*, p. 9 and the Preamble, p. 8.

[64] See Alfred Kosing, *Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1976).

[65] See Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, "Birth and Growth of the Socialist German Nation," *Einheit*, no. 9/10, 1979, pp. 1,068–1,075. The nation includes within a dialectical unit economic, political, social and ideological relations that have a class nature, as well as ethnic ties, which operate across several social configurations. Here the social class-like factors and elements determine the origin, evolution, and socio-historic type of the nation. Nationality, on the other hand, merely describes the totality of the ethnic attributes, features, and ties within the population and the classes.

> from it while at the same time further moulding its new socialist quality. In terms of its socio-historic type, the nation in the GDR is socialist and in terms of nationality German, whereas the nation in the FRG is capitalist in its socio-historic type and in its nationality also German.[66]

A nation, however, can neither be created nor dismissed by unilateral decree. Or, if one is to attempt such a manoeuvre, then one must also create a history for it. It is from this vantage point that one must scrutinize the East German historians' energetic pontifications on the so-called " national history of the GDR." Although East German officials currently trace the SED's renewed interest in German history back to the Eighth SED Congress in 1971, a careful study of Party documents reveals that it was first at the Ninth Party Congress in 1976 that a strong emphasis on the better utilization of German history for the building of a national consciousness became clearly discernible. Shortly thereafter, an article appeared in the academic journal *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, entitled " Tasks of the Historical Sciences of the GDR Since the Ninth Party Congress." Written by Central Committee member and Deputy Director of the SED's Institute for Marxism–Leninism Ernst Diehl, the article hailed the Ninth Party Congress as a " landmark " in the history of the GDR and called for a broadening of the socialist historical framework in order to meet the demands of the sharpening class struggle with bourgeois imperialist historians in the FRG.[67] After expressing his satisfaction that past neglect of history had not been corrected, Diehl went on to state that *all* periods of German history contained progressive elements, which East German historians had to illuminate further in order to establish a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the GDR's historical roots, particularly among the younger generation.

Such appeals seem to have been taken up with considerable vigour in as much as the spectrum of historical figures now claimed by the GDR as part of its heritage has been continuously broadened, the example of Luther simply being one of many. Other periods of German history, long ignored or condemned, have suddenly been placed in a more positive light, with greater emphasis being put on the achievements than on the shortcomings. One of the more astonishing periods of German history chosen for revivification has been that of the state of Prussia, large portions of which currently belong to the GDR. Although certain figures associated with Prussia had in the past been singled out for praise by the GDR, primarily " enlightened " generals such as Scharnhorst, Geisanau or Clausewitz, any clear or direct association with Prussia—" the most militaristic state in German history "—would have been inconceivable in years past. Now, East German historians plead for a more " differentiated " view of the Prussian past. A leading figure in this revision has been Dr Ingrid Mittenzwei, Head of the Department of German

[66] Ibid. pp. 1,073–1,074.

[67] See Ernst Diehl, " The Tasks of the Historical Sciences of the GDR Since the IXth Party Congress," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, no. 3, 1977.

History, 1648–1789, of the East German Academy of Sciences and the author of a recently published biography of Frederick II.[68] Mittenzwei's primary contention is that Prussia was not simply a " reactionary " state but that its ruling classes also contributed to progressive social developments. Although government policies clearly served the interests of the dominant Junker class, they also spurred industrial development and helped create the conditions for the beginning of the social and political maturation of the German working class.[69] Although underlining the point that their writings are not meant as an apology for Prussia but are rather an attempt to describe such periods of history in all their complexities, they also insist that it is absolutely necessary for the GDR to come to grips with the Prussian past, since a danger was threatening from the West, namely, the attempts of " bourgeois historians, particularly those oriented towards social and cultural history," to develop a different view of Prussia " to justify the current imperialist system of the FRG."[70] In the words of Mittenzwei:

> Our attitude towards Prussia was coloured by polemics, which were made necessary by the struggle of the revolutionary labour movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries against the reactionary Prussian spirit. The recognition of this has nothing to do with the hindsight of a new generation. The conflict with Prussia, above all with such a phenomenon as militarism of the Prussian type, was absolutely necessary following the catastrophe of the Second World War. Today, these matters can be viewed in more differentiated terms. Even more, such distinctions have proven to be particularly important at the present time.[71]

Yet it is not just a question of Frederick the Great and Prussia, nor is it Martin Luther and the Reformation or any other historical figure that has been singled out for special attention in recent years (such as Goethe or Wagner, for example). Although it is the treatment of these figures that most often attracts Western attention, the point must again be made that the SED's attitude to German history as a whole is changing. In the words of Professor Horst Bartel, Director of the Central Institute of History of the East German Academy of Sciences: " Socialism is the legitimate heir to everything revolutionary, progressive and humanistic in all of German history."[72] East German historians are quite candid about laying claim to previously untapped historical traditions. Under the rubric of developing the " national history " of the GDR, they speak of a three-dimensional expansion of the GDR's historical legacy[73]—chronological, territorial and socio-structural.

[68] See Ingrid Mittenzwei, *Friedrich II von Preussen* (Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Cologne, 1980).
[69] See also Horst Bartel and Ingrid Mittenzwei, " Prussia and German History," *Einheit*, no. 6, 1979.
[70] As quoted by the West German historian Michael Stürmer in his article " To Whom Does German History Belong?" in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 22 May 1982.
[72] See Horst Bartel, " Historical Heritage and Tradition," *Einheit*, no. 3, 1981, p. 272.
[73] See Walter Schmidt, " The Past Is Never Finished—What Must Provide the Basis for a National History of the GDR?" *Sonntag*, no. 27, 1981, p. 9; as well as the excerpts of Schmidt's speech delivered at the Seventh Historian's Congress of the GDR reprinted under the title " Socialist Nation and German History " in *Sonntag*, no. 7, 1983, p. 9.

CHRONOLOGICALLY, the national history of the GDR is not to be limited to the genesis and development of the East German state but rather is to include the entirety of German history " since the appearance of the German people as an ethnic unit." In other words, the prehistory of " the first complete break on German soil with the reactionary past," as the GDR is referred to, is to be traced back literally to prehistoric times. The genealogy of socialism on German soil is not only to include the 150-year struggle of the German working class but also the efforts and aspirations of the progressive bourgeoisie and democratic, lower-middle classes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the Reformation and the Peasants' War in the sixteenth century; and the peasant uprisings, plebeian revolts and anti-feudal heretic movements of the Middle Ages. Territorially, the GDR's claims are by no means to be limited to those parts of Germany that currently constitute the GDR. Although historical developments that occurred on these territories are to receive priority, the historical heritage of the GDR is also to include both the revolts in south-western Germany and Thuringia in 1525, the efforts of the south German Jacobins after the French revolution, and the Mainz Republic of 1793, as well as various strikes, uprisings and revolts that took place in Silesia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[74] Finally, from what East German historians refer to as the socio-structural vantage point, the GDR has also embarked upon an examination of the historic accomplishments of all classes and social strata in German history, including the " exploiting " classes, in an attempt to ferret out " progressive positive elements that must be included in our store of traditions."[75] Of interest is not only the Hohenzollern dynasty, but also various mediaeval German emperors and kings, representatives of the nineteenth-century liberal aristocracy, and even " representatives of the monopolistic bourgeoisie who were not only imperialists but also great scientists, such as Abbé Siemens."[76]

The third category is clearly the most elastic, as it opens the gates to countless new interpretations. It is in this category that SED historians include recent " differentiated " revisions of controversial figures such as Martin Luther or Frederick II. In the recent past there have even been indications that the GDR is coming to terms with that weighty historical legacy of Otto von Bismarck. Although it had been rumoured for some time that a revision of the SED's views on Bismarck might be in the offing, the first indications of a new posture towards Bismarck appeared in mid-February 1983, when the official youth newspaper *Junge Welt* published an interview about Bismarck under the title " A Statesman of High Rank."[77] Although Bismarck " certainly was not the patriotic, heroic figure and infallible master of the art of statesmanship " that he is often made out to be, he also could not be held " personally responsible "

[74] See Schmidt, " The Past is never Finished . . ."
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] See the interview with the East German historian Heinz Wolter in *Junge Welt*, 10 Feb. 1983.

for the disastrous course of Prussian–German history that followed. Moreover, " A re-encounter with Bismarck would certainly be thinkable within the context of our more differentiated understanding of our historical heritage."[78]

The SED has clearly set itself ambitious goals, indeed nothing less than the creation of an entirely new national history dating back to prehistoric times. Examples of the depth of the plunge being taken into the past include the ambitious 12-volume *German History*, the initial volumes of which are already on the market in both the GDR and the FRG.[79] Although planned goals in this field are repeatedly reported to have been fulfilled, SED historians insist that a broad spectrum of historical problems remains to be explored and that no " gaps " are to remain unfilled.[80] A central research plan for the historical sciences has been drawn up for the 1981–85 period. In addition to further studies on ancient history, the Middle Ages and the modern age up to the present, East German historians are also to focus their efforts on regional history,[81] the background to local labour movements, and the history of individual cities and even enterprises. After years of neglect, at least some efforts are under way to restore and maintain historical monuments. Commissions for the study of local history have been established at the county level, and in 1979 a Society for the History of the Homeland was established under the sponsorship of the Cultural League of the GDR. As stated in a joint declaration issued by the SED CC and the National Front on the 30th Anniversary of the GDR in October 1979, " Every city, county and community has at its disposal traditions that belong to our national identity and to the progressive and humanist history of our people."[82]

THE GDR is experiencing an officially sponsored and guided *Rehistorisierung*, with the SED rapidly moving towards a claim of sole representation or *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* for, in the words of Honecker, " all that is good in German history." The explicit purpose is to

[78] Ibid. A number of recent studies on Bismarck's foreign policy have also appeared. See, for example, Heinz Wolter, *Bismarck's Aussenpolitik 1871–1881* (Akademie Verlag, Berlin [East], 1983).

[79] The 12-volume *Deutsche Geschichte* will be published in the FRG by the Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag in Cologne. Volumes 1–3 are already available for purchase, with the remaining volumes scheduled to be on the market either in 1984 or 1985.

[80] See Ernst Diehl, " GDR Social Sciences—Accomplishments and Tasks," *Einheit*, no. 12, 1980, pp. 1,264–1,271.

[81] See Günther Heydemann, " New Social History Research in the GDR—Methods and Results," *DDR Report*, no. 7, 1982, pp. 5, 422–425. A great deal of attention has, for example, been paid to the history of Saxony. In early February a series of articles appeared on August the Strong in conjunction with the 25th anniversary of his death. See *Neue Zeit*, 7 Feb. 1983. For West German commentaries see the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 and 9 Feb. and 5 March 1983.

[82] As quoted in " GDR History Being Revised," in *Politik am Sonntag*, RIAS, 6 Feb. 1983. In this context one should also note the distinction made by East German historians between " heritage " and " tradition." Heritage refers to " all of history in all its contradictoriness " or " the totality of historically developed economic, political, ideological and cultural relations as well as the attitudes of diverse classes and social strata. . . ." Tradition, on the other hand, refers to those aspects of the overall historical heritage that the SED has selected as worthy of cultivation, i.e. " those lines of historical development upon which the GDR is based, the embodiment of which it [the GDR] is preserving and extending." See Horst Bartel, " Historical Heritage and Tradition," *Einheit*, no. 12, 1978, pp. 273–75.

present the GDR as the embodiment of all progressive German historical traditions and as the inevitable culmination and high point of the German historical process. German history is no longer to be considered the "*Irrweg einer Nation*," but rather a source of political legitimacy for the first socialist state on German soil. The goals involved are threefold. First, the creation of a set of traditions with which East German society, above all East German youth, can identify, thereby stabilizing (or creating?) a socialist national consciousness. Secondly, to supply a historical justification spanning centuries for the creation of the GDR not as a historical "accident" but rather as the result of an inevitable historical process. Delimitation in the political arena is to be complemented by demarcation in the competition over the historical past at a time of heightened ideological class struggle between socialism and capitalism. Finally, the cultivation of regional and local history is to be used to enforce the East German citizen's sense of identity with the country in which he lives in the expectation that heightened historical consciousness will increase individual initiative and social engagement. Patriotism and love of the "fatherland" are to serve as an ideological booster for the fulfilment of ambitious goals at a time of increased austerity.

The Past for the Future

In 1983 the GDR commemorated Martin Luther as a great historical personality and, in the words of SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker, a man whose "social and ethical views are a testimony to the deep roots in our national soil, which are worthy of our esteem today." It was not the first time in German history that Luther and his legacy were selected by the political authorities for exaltation. Although misleading historical analogies with the 1870s or the 1930s should be avoided, one common element does exist: in all cases Luther was to be understood as a figure of national integration and his legacy a source of political legitimacy. East German officials claim, of course, that the Luther jubilee is nothing more than the neutral treatment of a historical phenomenon and that their new view of Luther is simply a necessary corrective to previous one-sided, polemical interpretations. One might ask, however, when anybody last witnessed a "neutral" celebration in the GDR, particularly one that extended over months and honoured "one of the greatest sons of the German people."

Despite all the current attention being devoted to Luther in the GDR, a real Luther renaissance in the historical sense is not in sight; nor would it reflect the real intentions of the authorities. The issue is not only history but also something else, something current, with Luther, Goethe, Frederick II or Wagner being nothing more than symbols. The real underlying motive for such historical revisions is politics and what the SED refers to as the "socialist understanding of heritage." The official Luther jubilee is merely the most recent step in the SED's attempt to tear down the walls of a self-erected ideological cage of some 30 years' standing. The entire span of German history from its origins to the

present is being reinterpreted to create a national history that will serve to strengthen the foundations of the SED's rule. Although the GDR has long been active in trying to promote itself as the more attractive of the two German states, it now appears that a campaign is under way to convince the population that their section of the former German Reich is also more " German " than the FRG and that they are truly the spiritual heirs to the German past as opposed to a rootless West Germany whose economic success has turned it into a brash, ultra-modern, cosmopolitan state. In attempting to do so, the SED has itself laid claim to a form of *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*. Western observers will undoubtedly witness further " differentiated " surprises as East Germans continue to discover how rich the SED thinks their historical heritage is. The future course of the SED's *Geschichtspolitik* and the lengths to which East German historians may go in reinterpreting the past is, of course, difficult to predict, but one thing is clear: the official discussion in the GDR about German history is really a debate about the German nation, its past as well as its future.

The SED of course claims that there is nothing more to discuss. In the eyes of the Party, the " German question " has long been dead, solved through the creation of a separate German state and the development of a separate " socialist " German nation. West German claims of the continuing existence of a unified German nation are simply dismissed as empty rhetoric and a disguise for imperialist aims.[83] Moreover, the SED also claims that East German society is now sufficiently " ripe " or mature and that the pillars of socialist power are sufficiently secure to allow a more sophisticated and differentiated view of the past. Both claims are open to question. More to the point, however, is the question of whether such assertions reflect the SED's self-confidence and its perception of its strength, or whether they simply underline its weakness and the total bankruptcy of its previous policies. The Party's claim that it has succeeded in turning the German nation from a nation " *an sich* " into a socialist German nation " *für sich* " will undoubtedly be greeted with considerable scepticism in the West. One should also take note, however, of the advice of Brandenburg Bishop and Former Chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR Albert Schönherr who, in a speech in the West German town of Tutzing, warned against viewing the SED's new approach to German history solely in terms of propaganda or the search for figures of national identification. Instead, the Bishop emphasized what he viewed as the positive side of such historical revisions, namely, the fact that past one-sided interpretations were being revised in a critical fashion. Finally Schönherr had the following to say:

> To discuss figures such as Luther and Frederick II and to concern oneself with the historical heritage in the broadest sense does not necessarily have to be a sign of weakness or ideological helplessness. The fact that one can treat the historical heritage in a more relaxed

[83] See Hans Koch, " Legends and Realities," *Einheit*, no. 12, 1980, pp. 1,296–1,303.

and sovereign fashion might also indicate that the question of power is viewed as having been solved.[84]

The question of " power," however, has clearly been settled for some time, perhaps since as early as 1953, and at the latest since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The question of the " nation," on the other hand, has remained quite real and tangible. Indeed, the frequency with which Party theorists have modified the SED's concept of the nation over the past three decades and the urgency and shrillness with which the existence of a " socialist " German nation is now being proclaimed, are hardly a solid testimony to the SED's self-assurance in this field. The SED's policy of *Abgrenzung* vis-à-vis the FRG is itself perhaps the ultimate expression of the Party's lack of confidence in the loyalties of its own population and their commitment to their " socialist " German nation. If such a national consciousness did indeed exist, one might have expected that the authorities would have been willing to allow greater openness or tolerance than we have witnessed in the decade following the signing of the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the FRG. Instead, the actions of the authorities continue to betray a deep sense of insecurity towards the population in whose name they rule.

Has the SED really renounced Walter Ulbricht's vision of a reunified Germany under socialist auspices? The entire logic of the theory of separate " socialist " and " capitalist " nations, as well as numerous official statements on the irreparable split of the German nation, and the claim that the German question is closed, may seem to indicate this. Yet old ambitions and visions apparently die hard, as demonstrated by the remarkable statement made by SED Secretary-General Honecker in early 1981 about a possible German reunification:

> And when certain people in the West nowadays harp upon greater German dictums and act as if the reunification of both German states were closer to their hearts than their wallets, then we would like to say to them: Be careful! One day socialism will also come knocking at your door; and when that day comes, when the working class in the Federal Republic proceeds with the socialist transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany, then the question of reunification of the two German states will appear in an entirely new light. And no one should have any doubt about how we will then decide.[85]

IN conclusion, it might be appropriate to note that the future contours of SED policy towards the German past and the question of the nation will be contingent upon a number of factors, both domestic and foreign. Creative interpretation on the part of East German historians combined

[84] See Schönherr's article, " Chances and Problems of a Christian Existence in a Socialist Society," in *ept-Dokumentation*, no. 8, 1981, pp. 1–11.

[85] See Honecker's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, 16 February 1981. It is also noteworthy that in an open letter to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in early October 1983, Honecker appealed " in the name of the German people " for Kohl to reconsider his commitment to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on West German soil, a formulation which raised quite a few eyebrows in the West. For the letter see *Neues Deutschland*, 10 Oct. 1983.

with the occasional ideological pirouette required from Party ideologues will not be sufficient to create a new historical consciousness. Much more important will be the reception of such historical explications within society itself, particularly among the post-war generations who now make up some 60 per cent of the total population. The Party remains a firm believer in the power of *Erziehung*, with the prescriptive teaching of history a potentially potent tool in that all important socialization process. Yet will jubilees such as the recent one devoted to Luther really be perceived as a reflection of the rich historical traditions of the " socialist " German nation as opposed to the " dying " capitalist nation in the FRG, or will they be viewed as proof of something quite different, namely, the common historical past of all Germans? Will the East German *Bürger* come away from such events, exhibitions and jubilees, really convinced that the GDR represents the culmination of all progressive German historical traditions, as the Party hopes, or is he more likely to be reminded of the common historical bonds between Germans in East and West?

This question is as unanswerable as it is tantalizing. The sparsity of concrete, empirical information in the West precludes any definitive statements about the existence (or lack thereof) of a separate East German national consciousness.[86] In past years it has become quite common for Western journalists and academics to note that the two Germanies have drifted apart, that years of partition combined with a mixture of envy, resentment and reproach vis-à-vis the FRG have all helped mould a separate East German consciousness. East Germans, we are told, are justifiably proud of what they themselves have accomplished. Western visitors to the GDR, to their delight or dismay, discover a quiet conservatism and awareness of past German traditions in the small towns and villages that do not exist to the same extent in the FRG. All this is undoubtedly true. Yet it remains to be proven that such nuances of cultural distinctiveness and parochialism can be cultivated into something more sturdy and resembling a separate national consciousness, particularly of the type desired by the SED.

In his popular book *Preussen ohne Legende*, the West German analyst and historian Sebastian Haffner raised the provocative thesis that the Prussian renaissance in both German states represented a search for those German values that were lacking or had disappeared in the GDR and FRG respectively. In the FRG, according to Haffner, there was a longing for a sense of order and sincerity lost in the brash, fast-paced environment

[86] For perhaps the most thorough study on national consciousness in both German states see Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*, Vol. 15, Sage Library of Social Research (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills & London, 1975). As Schweigler correctly points out, however, the amount of hard data on the state of East German national consciousness is limited and any conclusions reached must remain tentative. It is also known that the SED CC conducts its own public opinion research on such questions. The fact that the results have never been published may indicate that the attitudes dominant in society do not correspond to the SED's wishes. The West German political scientist Peter Christian Lud, in his perceptive study entitled *Die DDR zwischen Ost und West: von 1961 bis 1976* (Beck, Munich, 1977), cites private sources according to which in 1975 over two-thirds of East Germans did not view the FRG as a foreign country (*Ausland*).

of a post-industrial state; in the GDR, on the other hand, there was a longing for that " dry Prussian liberalism and freedom of thought." Can or should one attempt a similar analogy in the case of Martin Luther? If so, then what is Luther's significance for the FRG and GDR today? Although the Luther celebrations in both the GDR and FRG may not as of yet have provided a clear answer to this question, they have again illustrated the different ways in which both German states are attempting to come to terms with their German past. In quite different ways, both the GDR and FRG have abandoned those interpretations of German history that were dominant in the early post-war period. Have time and post-war changes provided sufficient breathing space for a more open and perhaps more objective encounter with the heavy mantle of German history? Half a millenium after his birth, the Great Reformer again serves as a timely reminder of the unity as well as the division of the German nation.

Soviet Philosophy

Sigmund Krancberg

If man is deprived of reason, what is left for him?
—Only systems of dogma grounded in ideological myths.

MODERN schools of philosophy go about their business in an atmosphere of prudent and precise reasoning, expressed in meaningful but austere language. This current attitude is further joined by a passion for clarity and a steadfast dedication to objectivity that set the rules for the most dispassionate manner of discourse. Problems of philosophy are analysed, dissected, refined and reduced to logical constructs, and if found wanting in the light of this scrutiny, are declared intellectually worthless, and refused any recognition whatsoever.

It therefore becomes difficult to present an exposition of philosophy as it is practised in the Soviet Union, where philosophy, " a science of the general laws of being (i.e. nature and society), human thinking, and the process of knowledge,"[1] has never been fully separated from ideology. In one sense, ideology in the Soviet Union is considered as a conglomerate of false rationalizations of the bourgeois ruling classes, used for the purpose of justifying and preserving the political and economic relations of capitalist society. In another sense, the use of the term " ideology " relates to a system of views and ideas applied to the interpretation of Soviet experience and is manifested in a total commitment to the practices and institutions emanating from the Communist Party. For this reason, the problems of a plausible and clear presentation of Soviet philosophy are not so much complicated by the habitual and tedious expressions of self-righteousness, or by the expectations of the inevitable communist Utopia, as they are confused by the overall ideological tone of philosophy in the Soviet Union.

OBSERVING the currents of philosophy in the Soviet Union today, one perceives at once its dual and contradictory nature. On the one hand, philosophy in the Soviet Union is undoubtedly elevated to a stronger position than in any other country. On the other hand, the same philosophy, interchangeably labelled as dialectical materialism or Marxism-Leninism, has acquired a distinctly one-sided political and dogmatic character, not only designed to express and support the ideological aims of the Soviet Communist Party, but also to exercise a determining influence over the structure and style of philosophical endeavour in the Soviet Union.

It was Lenin who pointed out that " recent philosophy is as partisan as

[1] *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin (eds.), (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967), p. 340.

philosophy was two thousand years ago. In other words, today as in the past, the philosophers are divided into two mutually opposed camps, materialism and idealism. In the final analysis, the struggle between them is an expression of the tendencies and ideologies of opposed social groups and classes."[2] This so-called " Party principle " (" *partiynost'* ") claims that in a class society philosophy cannot be non-partisan, and that essentially it reflects in its views the ideology and the specific interests of the class it serves. Moreover, according to this cardinal principle of Soviet philosophy, opposition to Marxism-Leninism is not only a response to a deep emotional commitment to bourgeois class interests, but is also demonstrated in the reactionary nature of Western philosophy which, in its theories, downgrades or disregards the real import of social struggle. The presupposition of the social struggle rests on the assertion that capitalist society is divided and deeply troubled by the antagonistic confrontation between the oppressing and oppressed classes. The Soviet philosophers believe that the oppressed, meaning the lower working classes of capitalist society, are in turn committed to the cause of ending exploitation, struggling and striving for the ideals of socialism and communism.

After the victory of the October revolution, Soviet philosophy not only accepted without question the " Party principle," but also adapted Lenin's political and polemical style. This led to an impatience with complexity, to the insistence on bringing everything down to a single issue, to the conjuration of " objective " conditions, and to an unscrupulous readiness to distort the position of the opponent. Above all, the attempt to simplify and to reduce all philosophical controversies to the common denominator of a conflict between materialism and idealism cynically obscured, rather than clarified, issues and problems.

The establishment of the Institute of Red Professors and the Communist Academy in the early post-revolutionary period, was seen not as a comprehensive attempt to control intellectual life, but as an organized and effective means of propagating Marxism-Leninism in intellectual circles. However, in 1921, with the start of a serious campaign against religion and against " idealistic " tendencies, the majority of non-Marxist professors, including some of the more prominent academic philosophers, were removed from their teaching positions.

Still, Soviet philosophers—now Marxist-Leninists in their great majority—did not suffer from strict edicts of official dogma or from the complete authoritarian control which was to be established with the consolidation of the Stalinist regime in 1929.

It is true that communism of the early 1920s gave serious treatment to the problems of securing the ideological and material foundations of a new proletarian culture. Nevertheless, there was a great degree of freedom in the heated polemics of the day. Soviet philosophers disagreed about the status of philosophy, and initiated discussions on important aspects of the dialectic and dialectical materialism.

[2] *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1963), p. 46.

One of the most debated topics among communist writers centred on the question of the very existence of philosophy. According to Plekhanov and Lenin, philosophy was a very important branch of learning, and as such was an integral part of Marxism which derived its foundations from a creative, materialist development of the Hegelian dialectic. Another group, consisting mostly of natural scientists, insisted that Marxism, as the only true doctrine, simply eliminates traditional philosophy and heralds the advent of science. The most outspoken representative of this group, S. K. Minin, aired his anti-philosophical views in an essay "*Filosofiya za bort*" (Overboard with Philosophy). Another member of this group of "mechanists," Stepanov-Skvortsov, in one of his works stated: "The Marxist recognizes no special field of philosophical activity distinct from that of science; for the Marxist, materialist philosophy consists in the latest and most general findings of modern science."[3]

For some time, mechanist conceptions based on a simplistic scientific optimism were quite popular in Soviet intellectual circles, in the years from 1922 to 1926. However, the mechanists were strongly opposed by a number of Soviet philosophers, later known as the "Menshevizing idealists." The most prominent among them was A. M. Deborin, who developed his views in the controversy with the mechanists, and who based his arguments on the philosophical works of Plekhanov. Deborin,[4] in his struggle with the mechanists, stressed the independent status of philosophy (dialectical materialism) over and above the natural sciences: "Dialectical materialism exists as an independent discipline alongside the other positive sciences, more especially as the methodology and theory of scientific knowledge."[5]

Moreover, Deborin accused the mechanists of neglecting the unique character of the specific levels or stages in the development of matter (being–life–consciousness), and thus eliminating the basic modes of categories of being.

In the end, the views of the Deborinists prevailed. Aided by the communist ideological tradition and by a number of pronouncements of doctrinal authority from leading Bolsheviks, mechanism was declared out of step with the achievements of modern science and branded as an unwelcome digression from the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

It is noteworthy that Deborin was one of the first Soviet philosophers who strongly criticized *History and Class Consciousness*, published by Lukacs in 1923. A year later, Deborin accused Lukacs of a revisionist attempt to interpret Marx by discarding Engels. According to Deborin, the two classic authors of Marxism are inseparable, and a close reading of their works will not reveal any appreciable disagreement between them.

However, the victory of the Deborinists over the mechanists was short-lived. On 27 September 1929, Stalin, in an important speech, again

[3] Cited in Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963), p. 138—henceforth referred to as G. A. Wetter.

[4] Deborin is also known for being instrumental in publishing works of Western materialist philosophers.

[5] Cited in G. A. Wetter, op. cit. pp. 160–61.

condemned the mechanists, but at the same time attacked Soviet philosophical theoreticians in general. This speech was the beginning of an organized campaign against the relatively free style of philosophical discourse in the Soviet Union. While mechanism was said to be a right-wing deviation which readily served the interests of the *kulak* agents within the Party, Deborinism was condemned for supposedly giving support to Trotsky's " left-wing deviation," or Menshevizing idealism. Furthermore, Deborinists were accused of being overly abstract, of misunderstanding the significance of the relation between theory and practice, and of divorcing philosophy from politics. Deborin was personally taken to task for valuing Hegel too highly and for obscuring the differences between Hegel and Marx. Above all, Deborin was attacked for remaining aloof from the great tasks and challenges of socialist construction.

About two years later, the Central Committee of the Communist Party officially denounced mechanism and Deborinism, once more singling out Deborin and his comrades for dangerous distortions of Marxism-Leninism. Shortly thereafter, Deborin publicly admitted that he had fallen into the deplorable errors of Menshevizing idealism, and that his philosophy, suffering from serious neglect of the Leninist " Party principle," was divorced from concrete life. In his recantation, Deborin thanked the Central Committee and especially Comrade Stalin for correcting him and restraining him from his errant ways.[6]

This decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 25 January 1931, marks the beginning of a new era in Soviet philosophy. From this day on, every effort was directed at keeping the work of philosophy in the closest possible contact with the life and programme of the Party. In turn, this new trend virtually ensured the Communist Party of steady and unwavering philosophical support in its political struggle to impose the Stalinist " Party line." At the same time, Soviet philosophy gave prominence not only to Marx, Engels and Lenin, but also, to a great degree, to Stalin. The period of lively discussion characterizing the preceding years (1917–30) was a matter of the past. With it disappeared the last vestiges of pre-revolutionary traditions and culture, followed by a Stalinist dictatorship which demanded and enforced the complete subordination of philosophical activity to the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Philosophical knowledge and a critical approach to theoretical problems did not count any more as outstanding qualities. What mattered was the readiness to conform to the dictates of the Party. In other words, the allegiance to a doctrinaire world outlook blended with the single philosophical school of institutionalized Marxist theory, narrowed the choice of general perspectives and imposed a number of conditioning factors in strict conformity with the Party line.

This was the beginning of the long period of silence in Soviet philosophy which was only interrupted by the submissive chatter of

[6] Interestingly enough, Deborin survived the purges and remained in Moscow until his death, occasionally contributing essays on non-controversial subjects in the 1950s.

sycophants. The only controversies permitted in the philosophical realm were directed against bourgeois ideologies; any other discussions among Soviet philosophers usually touched upon internal " heresies " and ideological errors, followed by the inevitable disclaimers and humiliating recantations.

THE new course of Soviet philosophy was forcefully directed into a rigid mould of officially prescribed opinions, with Stalin elevated to the status of fountainhead of all wisdom. Philosophers, subservient in every respect to the requirements of the Party, competed among themselves in trying to give the impression that there was only one creative philosopher in the Soviet Union—Comrade Stalin. The leading official Soviet philosopher in the 1930s, M. B. Mitin—now a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Central Committee of the CPSU—wrote: " The further advancement of Marxist-Leninist theory in every department, including that of the philosophy of Marxism, is associated with the name of Comrade Stalin. In all Comrade Stalin's practical achievements, and in all his writings, there is set forth the whole experience of the worldwide struggle of the proletariat, the whole rich store-house of Marxist-Leninist theory."[7] (At present, Mitin's obsequiousness finds its outlet in the glorification of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the most " genuine source of wisdom."[8] As a matter of fact, in October 1961, the Soviet philosopher P. I. Shabalkin—who spent 20 years in prisons and camps—accused Mitin of criminal complicity in the Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Although this accusation was serious and well-documented, it was completely ignored by the Soviet authorities. Their only reaction was absolute official silence in this case.)[9]

In 1936 there was another upheaval in Soviet philosophy. The new Stalinist constitution was proclaimed as a great and historic achievement marking the end of the period of the construction of the foundations of socialism. The Soviet people were told they had successfully reached the stage of socialism, and that they were about to embark on the splendid road to communism. All this was taking place in the grim climate of mass purges with communist publications full of pious pronouncements on the significance of socialist legality and the importance of the individual in the new Soviet society.

At the same time, Soviet philosophers (including Mitin) were again taken to task for presenting to the public philosophical works full of abstract and scholastic tendencies. The Stalinists labelled many philosophers as political illiterates for merely mentioning the works of Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev, who were exposed at the famous Moscow Trials. As expected, Mitin and his colleagues publicly acknow-

[7] Cited in G. A. Wetter, op. cit. p. 177.

[8] M. B. Mitin, *Problemy sovremennoi ideologicheskoi borby* (Problems in the contemporary ideological struggle) (Moscow, 1976), p. 61. On pages 9 and 10, M. B. Mitin also presents a spirited defence of the Leninist " Party principle " in philosophy.

[9] *An End to Silence*, edited and with introductions by Stephen F. Cohen (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1982), pp. 124–32.

ledged their errors and meekly promised to follow the Party line from then on. With the Party relentlessly attacking any independent and original work, philosophical activity in the Soviet Union virtually came to a standstill. The only remaining Soviet philosophical journal, *Under the Banner of Marxism*, even ceased publication in 1944.

After the Second World War, the year 1947 marked the end of the long period of silence in Soviet philosophy. However, the trend of renewed philosophical activity was nonetheless circumscribed within the narrow channels of the Stalinist " model " of philosophical endeavour—the Party was still considered the final authority on all philosophical and scientific questions. Instead of the hoped-for relaxation of political control, there was an intensified concern with ideology and its influence in philosophy.

Still, in 1947, the journal *Voprosy filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) began publication. In the same year, it was decreed that formal logic should be taught in all higher academic institutions. (In the 1930s, formal logic was dismissed as a " metaphysical " habit of thought.) The output of philosophical works increased considerably. But the stress on the significance of the " Party principle," with its emphasis on Party fidelity, was more and more pronounced. Zhdanov, Stalin's Minister of Culture, attacked one of the leading Soviet philosophers, G. F. Aleksandrov, for bourgeois " objectivism " and abstract neutrality in his work. Ironically, before this attack, G. F. Aleksandrov was elected to the General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences in 1946, and was highly praised as a " Stalin Prize winner, Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Academy of Social Sciences . . . —a gifted exponent of Marxist-Leninist philosophy."[10]

The vagueness and triviality of the official accusations directed against Aleksandrov can only be interpreted as a new attempt by the Central Committee to launch an attack on the " philosophical front " with the purpose of setting stricter ground rules for philosophical work. The tone of the campaign underscored ideological dedication and devotion to the Party—Zhdanov singled out Aleksandrov for the non-political character of his work, for its remoteness from contemporary issues and for the lack of a militant Bolshevik Party spirit. Zhdanov went on to say that Stalin was, in general, dissatisfied with the work of Soviet philosophers, because they displayed too much timidity and abstractness.

Despite the usual wave of recantations, the new philosophical journal *Voprosy filosofii*, under the editorship of B. M. Kedrov, contained some notable essays which demonstrated a degree of originality and independence. However, in 1948, Kedrov was removed from his editorial post, and the journal published the essay " Za Bolshevistskuyu Partiynost' v Filosofii " (For a Bolshevik Partisanship in Philosophy) in which it stated that some of the articles in *Voprosy filosofii* raised " *questions which are not open to dispute* " (my emphasis) " and sought to revise the positions

[10] Cited in G. A. Wetter, op. cit. p. 183.

of Marxism-Leninism in relation to the history of Russian social thought."[11]

The campaign against ideological retardation in philosophy spread into other fields. Biologists, composers, linguists, writers, and even statisticians were sternly rebuked for the lack of ideological steadfastness and dedication manifested in the neglect of Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

Only the death of Stalin slowed down this campaign. Within a year most references to Stalin as a philosophical genius virtually disappeared. There was a growing demand for honest professional competence and integrity in philosophical work. This new trend was further helped by the 20th Party Congress, which inaugurated the campaign for liquidating the cult of personality in Soviet political and cultural life. For once, Stalin's errors were not only publicly discussed but also criticized outright, and his readiness to make dogmatic statements in fields in which he was not competent, was finally exposed. This was important progress in Soviet philosophy—still controlled by the Party, which permitted a relatively free discussion without the threat of intimidation and recantations.

Gradually, especially after the 20th Party Congress, there was a marked qualitative improvement in the style and composition of Soviet philosophy. To begin with, Einstein's theory of relativity, formerly declared unsound and inconsistent with the " objectivity of knowledge "—Soviet philosophers surmised that a bourgeois physicist like Einstein could not come up with a valid theory—was, after prolonged discussions, officially accepted as compatible with the doctrines and views of dialectical materialism. At about the same time, cybernetics, roundly condemned as a reactionary pseudo-science, was accepted as a legitimate science of computers. In the mid-1960s, the Moscow University Philosophy Faculty ordered that formal and symbolic logic be taught separately from dialectical logic.[12]

All these developments created a significant change in all areas of Soviet philosophical activity. Nevertheless, the great majority of Soviet philosophers are still concerned with problems within the ideological structure of dialectical materialism and their arguments are based on the " scientific " and " progressive " principles of Marxism-Leninism, which, over the years, acquired a canonical character.

BUT what are these essential principles of Marxism-Leninism stripped of its ideological components mixed with the artificial and, at times, clumsy transplant of Hegelian dialectics?

Soviet philosophers believe that the actual primacy of matter is the most essential feature of reality. The three dominant properties of

[11] Ibid. p. 189.

[12] " Dialectical logic is the logical teaching of dialectical materialism, science and the laws and forms of mental reflection of the development and change of the objective world, and of the laws governing the cognition of truth." *Dictionary of Philosophy*, op. cit. p. 248. This is one of many vague and obscure definitions of dialectical logic. It is really a pseudo-logic which can neither be verified nor refuted by means of the methodology of empirical sciences. See " How Enlightened is Dialectical Reason " by Ernst Topitsch, in *Encounter*, May 1982.

matter—motion, space and time—are the inseparable elements of our material world. The whole world is an unlimited assortment of matter which is apparent in a great many manifestations. The boundless varieties of matter, known in common usage as " things," while forming an integral whole, are in their infinite diversity dependent on and determined by each other. Besides the common properties and relations, things in the material world are also undergoing a continuous and unending process of change and development.

The diversity and unity of all things in the process of their existence are reflected in uniform laws, such as magnetism and gravitation, whose constancy and universality attest to the substantiality of the physical universe.

Dialectical materialism, the " scientific " philosophical world outlook and basic component of the Marxist doctrine, firmly believes in the unity of matter and consciousness. Dialectical materialism " proceeds from the fact that consciousness is a property not of any matter but of *highly organized matter.*"[13] In the long chain of evolution, the highest development of the brain originated and was achieved in man. Consciousness is the enterprise and creativity of the human brain in its coordinated connection with the nervous and sensory systems. The unity of matter and consciousness is further demonstrated in the most essential activity of the brain—in the perception of the external world. Fundamentally, perception is accomplished through a faithful reflection (the copy theory) of the outside world of matter in types of mental activity known as sensation, feeling, cognition, comprehension and thought.

It is important to note that, while Soviet philosophers believe in the unity of matter and consciousness, they are careful to stress the fact that matter and consciousness are *not* identical.

In practice, dialectical materialism is not only concerned with the study and interpretation of material phenomena; it is at the same time closely observing, analysing and providing various means to change and improve the workings of man and society. (In Soviet practice, this formula is applied with a propagandist twist: the shabby present is virtually disregarded and the future is treated as if it has already arrived.)

This sociological approach originated in the works of Marx and Engels who claimed that the structure of society and the history of humanity has its basis in economic causation. In other words, it is a given set of material conditions at a given particular time that determines the course of history. This extension of dialectical materialism to the study of society and its history is the substance of historical materialism.

Thus, the world of matter and motion undergoing the continuous process of change is subject to known general uniform laws. The process itself is of a strictly mechanical nature, since consciousness, motive and will are not participants in purely natural phenomena. History, however, is made by people who have a great variety of tasks and aims, and who

[13] *The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p. 102—henceforth referred to as *The Fundamentals*.

constantly struggle for their fulfilment. The manner in which they go about satisfying their many tasks and aims determines not only the character of society, but it also sets its historical perspective.

If there is to be social life at all, man has to procure, first of all, material resources which will satisfy his hunger, his thirst, and his need for shelter. To do this, man has to engage in labour activities that produce the necessary basic requirements and comforts of life. This steadily progressing process depends primarily on man's ability to control his physical environment, as well as on the degree of his mastery over the forces of nature. To satisfy his material needs in a more efficient manner, man invents, makes, and uses all kinds of tools, ranging from the primitive implements of the Stone Age, to the highly-sophisticated machine aggregates of our century. The means of production created by man, the tools and machines employed in this process, and above all the people involved in the process of production, form the *productive forces* of society. " While the means of labour are the *determining* element in the productive forces," Soviet philosophers emphasize that the " working people, with their knowledge and experience, are the *most important* productive forces of society."[14]

The fact that production is basic to social life is not only reflected in the interaction between man and nature, but also in the relations between people who take part in production. On the whole, these *production relations* are founded on the relationship of the people to the means of production—machines, land, raw materials, factory buildings, etc. Consequently, the character of the *production relations* " depends on how the means of production are distributed in a society or, in other words, how the problem of the *ownership of the basic means of production* has been solved in that society."[15] Viewed from the economic perspective, it is the nature of these production relations that determines the dominant or subordinate role of various social groups in a given historical period.

IN their concrete aspects, the production forces and the production relations constitute the *mode of production.* Generally speaking, the analysis of the mode of production " entails discovering what the productive forces and production relations are and how they are interconnected."[16] Historical materialism considers the productive forces and production relations as the two constantly changing elements in the mode of production. Unity and common purpose seem to be the characteristics of a given mode of production in its initial stages, but then the productive forces, meaning labour, production skills and technology, make constant progress, while the production relations remain basically unchanged within the bounds of the mode of production. The lack of mobility in the production relations and their respective retardation, bring them into an ultimate conflict with the forces of production, which is

[14] Ibid. p. 306.
[15] Ibid. p. 315.
[16] Ibid. p. 305.

sooner or later resolved in a " revolutionary destruction of the old obsolete and hidebound economic, social and political forms, which opens the road for the establishment of a new mode of production."[17] At this stage, the outdated production relations are replaced by new production relations that conform more closely to the nature of the forces of production.

The mode of production is the most essential form of development of society, and is the basic determinant of its economic structure. From the historical perspective, it is the economic structure that shapes and forms the groundwork for all other social relations in the political, cultural, legal, philosophical, moral, religious and scientific fields of human endeavour. The ideas, organizations and institutions of society, even the state itself, take their origin from this groundwork and constitute the superstructure of society. The general view of historical materialism is that this theory explains the inner workings of society as revealed in the mode of production and its connection to the socio-economic relations which in turn determine all other aspects of social life. It is the pervasive socio-economic formations which command the process of history, and it is the theory of dialectical materialism and its scientific interpretation of history that provides man with the knowledge of the general laws of development of society. In other words, Soviet philosophers believe that historical materialism, employing the dialectical method,[18] is capable of a concrete analysis of a given situation, and of a correct assessment of historical events, taking into consideration most of the essential features of social phenomena along with the conditions, as well as the circumstances, of conflict and struggle. This " correct assessment of historic events " is not a Marxist-Leninist presupposition still to be tested and verified, but a dogmatic belief open to confirmation but not to disproval. From this viewpoint, the Soviet approach to developments in Western society fails to take notice of the complexities of modern capitalism with its concentration of managerial power in corporate form, and the growing influence of the state in the economic process. Most important, it pays insufficient attention to the integration of the working class into a social system it was supposed to undermine and destroy. Still, according to Soviet philosophers, the historical process with its dialectical forcefulness demonstrates the inevitability (consistent with the conclusions of historical materialism) of the eventual replacement of the capitalist socio-economic system with a socialist, and later a communist, order. Needless to say, Soviet theoreticians further believe that the doctrines of dialectical and historical materialism represent the notion of ultimate truth in

[17] Ibid. p. 327.

[18] " The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear not to be durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing." From J. V. Stalin, " O dialekticheskom i istoricheskom materializme," in *Voprosy leninizma*, 11th edition, pp. 535–63. (On dialectical and historical materialism, in *Problems of Leninism*.)

Marxist-Leninist philosophy, even if, like all philosophy, it is also ideological.

REVOLUTION is not only an attempt to change the social and economic order—it is at the same time an important moment in history which brings forth a change in language, a new mode of thought, and a new social sense of values and ideas. Since the emergence of the Soviet state, the great majority of Soviet philosophers, following the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, aimed at a single, unified philosophy that would best express the essence and the concepts of dialectical and historical materialism. True to the famous dictum of Karl Marx, that the task of the philosopher is not only to interpret the world but also to change it, the Soviet regime resolved to employ these theories as a blueprint and a programme for converting the populace to the Soviet system, demonstrating at the same time a flexibility that could accommodate the currents of change and development. The indoctrination of Marxism-Leninism, with its expedient and at times brutal application of power aimed at socially and politically desired ends, exerted an equally enormous influence in conditioning and shaping Soviet thought. The success of the October revolution, the sudden change from a revolutionary social movement into a state power structure dedicated to the construction of a " socialist order," served in itself as proof of the correctness of the philosophy of Marxism.

Hence, Marxism-Leninism acquired a prominence which made it the only accepted school of thought, and Marx, Engels and Lenin became the undisputed " classics " of this school. Thus Marxism-Leninism, also known in Soviet philosophy as dialectical and historical materialism, not only set the traditional and ideological formulae for an all-encompassing world-view, but its central ideas became the foundation for all learning, research, cultural, social and political activity. At the same time, the Soviet regime attempted to turn this philosophy into a mass ideology. Soviet textbooks on dialectical and historical materialism were published in hundreds of thousands of copies,[19] in editions reprinted every few years. However, the primitive and artless treatment of this difficult subject only contributed to the strengthening of a doctrinaire dogmatism displayed, at times, with religious fervour.

For the past 65 years, Marxist-Leninist philosophy has been developed and applied to the whole range of human thought and experience in the Soviet Union. With the massive impact of this philosophy, its ideas, concepts and terminology found widespread use in the propagandist jargon of the Party bureaucracy, in the educational system, in textbooks, speeches, literature, journals, newspapers, and in the media. In addition, Marxism-Leninism gained almost universal acceptance in the Soviet Union with the claim that it provided the framework towards a scientific world-view based on theories which were scientifically conclusive accord-

[19] For example, A. Chknaverianc, *Kategorii materialisticheskoi dialektiki*, (The categories of dialectical materialism) (Moscow, 1966). This pocket-size booklet (only 50 pages) was published in 200,000 copies.

ing to the laws of nature and history. Even in the absence of disciplined intellectual activity, this claim to scientific validity acquired universal acceptance in Soviet philosophy, manifested in the frequent disregard for scholarly truth. Inevitably, the outcome resulted in the formation of a general conviction that tended to reject the validity of any assertion merely because it contradicted the orthodox and ideological premises of dialectical and historical materialism.

Still, Soviet philosophers maintain that they subscribe to a " consistent commitment in philosophy which calls for a creative approach to theory,"—a commitment supposedly demonstrated in the spirit of the " inalienable Marxist tradition."[20] On the other hand, Soviet philosophers firmly believe that the destiny of mankind lies in the downfall of capitalism, a contingent event at best, with the bourgeoisie forcibly giving up the private ownership of the instruments of production and the positions of command. This argument is reinforced by the automatic conclusion that the functions fulfilled by the bourgeoisie must be taken over by a revolutionary and victorious proletariat.

SOVIET philosophers repeatedly speak of the incessant ideological class struggle, and its end-result, proletarian power. They simply overlook the fact that proletarians in power are no longer proletarians. In reality, once in power, the proletarian as a political man becomes superfluous. Proletarians in power must delegate this power to their self-appointed representative—the Communist Party, which wields autocratic rule through a centrally-controlled political and economic system. The Communist Party is the ruling élite which acts in the name of the whole society, and professes some concern for its general welfare. While this perspective of general welfare is seriously handicapped by a life of constant scarcity, hardship and economic shortcomings, the Party élite has managed to secure considerable privileges in representing the " best " interests of the proletariat. Just like the ordinary proletarians, Soviet philosophers submit without protest to the dictates of the Communist Party, following blindly the indisputable " Party principle " in the belief that the doctrines and concepts of the Communist Party reflect the fundamental interests and outlook of the revolutionary working class. Moreover, the myth of the invincibility of the " Party principle " is carried to an extreme, when Soviet philosophers claim that according to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism " strict objectivity and scientific rigour are combined with partisanship."[21] Apparently, Soviet theoreticians are oblivious of the logical inconsistency in their attempt to reconcile " objectivity," " scientific rigour," and " partisanship."

Even after Stalin's death, in the years of the " thaw," the " Party principle " retained its authoritative influence in Soviet philosophy, not giving rise to dissatisfaction or criticism. On the contrary, after the period

[20] M. Iovchuk, *Philosophical Traditions Today* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973), p. 65.
[21] *The Fundamentals*, p. 660.

of relaxation which lasted into the mid-1960s, the Leninist principle of partisanship in philosophy was praised in the resolutions of Party Congresses, as well as in editorials of the Soviet philosophical journal *Voprosy filosofii*. In a message to the editors of the philosophical journal, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR declared that one of the major tasks in philosophical work is the " intense propagation of Marxist-Leninist theories, and the promotion of achievements in the social sciences in the light of the Leninist tradition."[22]

It is also of particular interest that the Communist Party regularly issues directives reprinted faithfully in the philosophical journal. The Party tells the philosophers to concern themselves with specific problems connected with the concrete tasks of the " construction of communism." Only a close collaboration between the philosophers and the Party will lead to the creation of a genuine, Marxist-Leninist social science.[23] A number of variations on this theme was given prominent display in *Voprosy filosofii* for most of its 1976 editions in the wake of the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

HOWEVER, some recent Western studies of Soviet philosophy regarded the symptoms of tolerance towards divergent opinions in Soviet intellectual circles—especially in the mid-1960s—as evidence of a nascent change in the style of philosophical discourse.

A survey of major publications in contemporary Soviet philosophy will indeed show that, despite most of its rigid and preordained patterns, there are distinctive signs of serious change attributable to the somewhat more tolerant intellectual climate of the late 1950s and the mid-1960s. There is evidence of sharp and searching discussions in the areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of logic, and the history of philosophy. The principles and the laws of the dialectic, the categories of matter, development, motion, essence, form, etc., are subjected to a thorough re-examination. On the whole, however, it is too early to speak of a Soviet philosophy " awakened from dogmatic slumbers."[24] Soviet philosophers, true to the Leninist tradition " uphold the purity and creative development of Marxist theory, organically combine their theoretical work with revolutionary practice, consistently pursue and develop the principles of proletarian internationalism, *implement the principle of commitment to ideology* (my emphasis) and proceed from the philosophical principles of dialectical and historical materialism."[25]

Obviously, in Soviet philosophy, the central ideas of Marxism-Leninism are still being treated as fixed, static principles. It is true that Marxism-Leninism formulated its philosophical components on " the concrete-historical and materialist understanding of the essence of man as the ensemble of the social relations founded on human labour, material

[22] *Voprosy filosofii*, 1969, No. 5, p. 145. Also in 1980, No. 4, p. 14.
[23] Ibid. 1971, No. 4, p. 12.
[24] *Philosophy in the Soviet Union. A survey of the mid-sixties*, compiled and edited by Ervin Laszlo (Sovietica, Praeger, New York, 1967), p. v.
[25] M. Iovchuk, op. cit. p. 143.

production and socio-historical revolutionary practice."[26] But in Soviet philosophy these ideas and principles are handled with a reverent philosophical passivity as absolute universals which " incorporate the ' quintessence ' of our historical epoch," namely—Marxism-Leninism.[27] This attitude of philosophical passivity in Soviet thought is in many respects very much the same as a case of arrested intellectual development, and is richly compensated by a strong ideological posture dedicated to the " irreconcilable struggle between the socialist and bourgeois world outlook."[28] In this struggle in which " pure " philosophy, cleared of its ideological counterweight, is the real loser, a blind commitment to any " ideology constitutes a predicament more treacherous than the susceptibility of man to the vagaries of personal prejudice. If philosophers can admonish each other in matters of personal prejudice—how could they recognize and correct a pervasive bias (in our case Marxist-Leninist ideology) which all Soviet philosophers share and conform to?"[29]

With the mode of Soviet thought totally subordinate to ideology, the Soviet philosopher—his intellectual development guided by ground rules that discourage any deviation from the official political views of the Communist Party—will, in questions of controversy, foreclose the matter with a ready quotation from the Marxist-Leninist classics, in all probability unaware that it is not sound philosophical practice to cite one side without acknowledgment of the other. As a matter of fact, Soviet philosophers proclaim an unquestioning faith in the statements of the " classic " authors of Marxism-Leninism, treating them with the least possible amount of critical interpretation.

Dialectical materialism, with all its ups and downs in the history of Soviet philosophy, provides the only plausible explanation for the revolution and the establishment of the Soviet political system. The dialectic emphasizes the primacy of matter over consciousness, and in the practical realm it furnishes the Soviet philosopher with a kind of narrow concentration for approaching and defining problems. Without the principles of Marxism-Leninism, with its dialectical tightrope acts of self-deception, much of Soviet reality becomes unintelligible. This is why most liberal discussions in Soviet philosophical works will not dare to question the basic ideas and the significance of Marxism-Leninism as an instrument for social and ideological conservation. It is also possible that this is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union has never produced a really outstanding philosopher. Still, judging from its historical development, Marxism-Leninism is flexible in some respects. True, its basic formulations are virtually enshrined and Soviet philosophers never fail to pay homage to Marxist-Leninist ideals, even if they depart widely from the notions under discussion; nevertheless, some elements of the doctrine

[26] Ibid. p. 105.
[27] Ibid. p. 280.
[28] Ibid. p. 294.
[29] Sigmund Krancberg, " The *Science of Logic* in Soviet Philosophy and a Reading in Hegelian Dialectics," in *Studies in Soviet Thought* 22, (1981), p. 93.

seem to be more malleable, and change as the circumstances demand. The change takes place after a long period of careful re-examination, in which Marxist-Leninist theory is forcefully adjusted to new facts and situations. Oddly enough, even the newly-formulated concepts or principles are presented as clear, logical conclusions arrived at on the basis of the Leninist philosophical tradition.[30] On the whole, however, the basic premises and presuppositions of Soviet thought are absolutist and dogmatic (despite its claim that Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with dogmatism),[31] faithfully reflecting the coarse stereotype of official ideological norms. And even if some significant changes have taken place, one should not mistake those changes for symptoms of ideological regression. It is generally recognized that Marxist-Leninist tactics may change, but the ends always remain the same.

SOME philosophical schools prosper, while others are long forgotten or neglected. They all succeed or fail in their attempts to provide an adequate and comprehensive explanation of reality on the basis of human reason and experience. The philosophical school which is capable of independent, clear, constructive thinking, and has the courage to test its own theories by facts and analysis without resorting to authority, has the best chance for long-lasting durability.

A philosophical school like Marxism-Leninism may last for a long time to come, thanks to the powerful support of the Soviet state. Nonetheless, it is this strong support which really harms Soviet philosophy, because it exacts a high ideological price. In the absence of a genuine philosophical scepticism, and disdainful of the autonomy of inquiry, Soviet philosophy rests on a fixed particularism as its point of reference. As a result, Soviet philosophers, with a marked hostility to other ways of thinking, cling to their ideological faith predetermined by Marxist-Leninist principles, without realizing that dogmatism is simply incompatible with reason. Moreover, the more elaborate the ideological framework, the less relevant a philosopher's point of view becomes—indeed, Soviet philosophers, in praise of conformity above honesty, display a remarkable penchant for classifying and generalizing but are much less inclined to analyse critically sensitive political and philosophical issues.[32]

It is true now that the quality and methods of philosophical inquiry in the Soviet Union have lost to a considerable degree the drabness and sterility so markedly prevalent during the Stalinist era. There are, presently, some professional practitioners of philosophy who in the late 1950s and mid-1960s made significant, and sometimes daring, contributions which might be of interest to their Western colleagues.[33] There is

[30] M. Iovchuk, op. cit. pp. 298–99.

[31] *The Fundamentals*, p. 661.

[32] For a good introduction to Soviet philosophy—especially its contemporary practice and future prospects—see Richard T. De George, *Patterns of Soviet Thought* (The University of Michigan Press, 1966).

[33] K. S. Bakradze, *Sistema i metod filosofii Gegelya* (System and method in Hegel's philosophy) (Tbilisi, 1958). This is one of the few Soviet philosophical works which deserves an English translation.

a noticeable shift of interest in the philosophy of science (especially among the younger generation of Soviet philosophers) with a concern for logic and the precision of language in sharp contrast to the speculative metaphysics of Marxism-Leninism. Currently, a small group of philosophers (represented most vocally by G. Batishchev, P. Egides and L. Naumenko), is trying to develop interesting alternatives in re-examining the officially accepted reflection theory of knowledge.[34]

Still, the critical and expositive value of these philosophical works, as well as the levels of academic expertise, are mostly typical of the Soviet experience, in which allegiance to a singular, doctrinaire world outlook considerably narrows the general perspectives of scholarly research and inquiry. As strangers to the habit of truth, Soviet philosophers show a remarkable disregard for observable knowledge and facts when genuine evidence is reduced to irrelevance against universalist ideological claims.

[34] According to the *New York Times*, 22 Oct. 1977, p. A9, P. Egides lost his teaching job and joined the growing ranks of Soviet dissidents.

Psychiatry and the Soviet State

Anthony P. Butcher

THIS article* will first discuss three of the major " pillars " that underscore psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union and will attempt to explain the way in which these " pillars " interact to create a set of political and social conditions that facilitate the continuing process of abuse.

Secondly, by way of presenting a number of brief studies, the article will attempt to illustrate the degree to which psychiatry in the Soviet Union has been subverted to serve the will and intention of the state rather than to serve the psychological needs of the Soviet people.

IN the Soviet Union, as well as in the West, there is both a medical and a social purpose to the treatment of mental illness. The social purpose of the medical sciences in the USSR is outlined by Bukovsky and Gluzman thus:

> If " health " is " desirable behaviour " and " sickness " is " undesirable behaviour," then the social aim of psychiatry is the transformation of undesirable behaviour into desirable.[1]

In the Soviet Union the social aspects of psychiatry have been emphasized by the Party theoreticians. To understand why this is so, and to understand the results of this emphasis, one must confront the pillar of Soviet totalitarianism.

Friedrich and Brzezinski have provided a detailed investigation of the nature of the totalitarian state.[2] They suggest that totalitarianism is a form of political organization as well as a form of outlook and action. It is characterized by a number of qualities, namely: a totalist ideology; a single massed party that is hierarchical, oligarchic and authoritarian in nature; a monopoly of all forms of effective armed combat; a near-complete monopoly of all information and communication outlets; a system of terroristic police control; and finally a centrally-planned economy.

Totalitarianism in general is, in the words of Robert Tucker, " an extremely dynamic phenomenon."[3] For example, Hannah Arendt has suggested that the Stalinist purge (as distinct from other pre-Stalinist Bolshevik purges) sought to maintain a " permanent instability " within Soviet society.[4] This concept of " permanent purge " or " permanent

* I acknowledge the criticisms and help, in preparing this article, of Mr Patrick O'Brien, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Western Australia.

[1] V. Bukovsky and S. Gluzman, " A Manual On Psychiatry For Dissidents," in *Survey* Vol. 21, No. 1/2 Winter–Spring 1975, pp. 180–201, pp. 184–85.

[2] Carl J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship And Autocracy* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.), 1956.

[3] Robert C. Tucker, " The Dictator And Totalitarianism," in *World Politics*, Vol. 17(4), July 1965, p. 561.

[4] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins Of Totalitarianism*, (Allen & Unwin, New York, 1951), p. 376.

revolution " is a constant theme encountered in discussions of totalitarian polities. In the Soviet Union the permanent revolution has been routinized by the 1977 constitution, but beneath the " democratic gloss " the " revolution " still exists.[5]

What is the purpose of this revolution? Field suggests that it seeks to " pulverize all existing social units in order to replace . . . pluralism with a homogenous unanimity patterned on the blueprint of the totalitarian ideology."[6] An essential goal of totalitarianism (and indeed its most obvious characteristic) is the attempt to destroy the individual as an autonomous being and his supercession by the public realm of state authority. The totalitarian state seeks to reduce the separate spheres of an individual's life to one amorphous " whole," to destroy autonomy and individualism, and to replace them with its own purpose and programme. The totalitarian society is, in essence, " a mobilized society, a garrison state in which an attempt is made to husband all social processes behind the regime's objectives, targets and day-to-day decisions."[7]

A second pillar sustaining psychiatric abuse is Soviet Marxism, or Marxism–Leninism as it is more commonly described, and which provides the basis for official Soviet ideology. Although an integral part of totalitarianism itself, Marxism must be considered separately because of its direct link to psychiatry. If totalitarianism is the means by which society is mobilized, Marxism can be seen as the philosophical legitimator of that means. Here, however, Marxism can be considered only as far as its connection to psychiatry is concerned.

There is a dual nature to Marxist ideology which provides the basic dogma of the totalist *milieu*. The ideology is both scientifically correct and morally perfected. It is elevated to the mystical role of a " sacred science," and further,

> This sacredness is evident in the prohibition against the questioning of basic assumptions, and in the reverence which is demanded for the originators of the Word, the present bearers of the Word, and the Word itself.[8]

As the ideology is both scientifically correct and morally perfect, those who do not fully accept the Marxist–Leninist vision of man and society are said to be either unscientific and illogical, or else they are immoral. That is, they are either " mad " or " bad."

The debate over the actual, dynamic function of Soviet official Marxism, as carried out by Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and Amalrik, cannot,

[5] Patrick O'Brien, " Constitutional Totalitarianism," *Survey* Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 1977–78, pp. 70–80.

[6] Mark G. Field, *Soviet Socialized Medicine* (Free Press, New York, 1967), p. 7.

[7] Ibid. p. 10.

[8] Robert J. Lifton, "Thought Reform And The Psychology Of Totalism," in *Dictatorship And Totalitarianism—Selected Readings*, Betty B. Burch (ed.) (Van Norstrand, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965), p. 185.

unfortunately, be discussed here.[9] For whether or not official Marxism has any dynamic function (that is, whether or not the leaders actually believe it) is perhaps not important, for as far as psychiatry is concerned it fulfils two essential purposes. First, it anaesthetizes society against the fear and brutalities generated by the leaders (here it identifies " anti-Soviet agitators " and " propagandists " who, as a result of " mental illness " commit actions which threaten the Soviet people) and secondly, it legitimates the regime which has no other means of legitimation such as free elections or dynastic claim, and therefore approves the regime's right to carry out such obscene practices.

This right was substantiated by M. I. Barsukov, formerly a leading academic who, in 1951, asserted that

> Only the theory of revolutionary Marxism, most developed in the works of Lenin and Stalin, permitted Soviet health protection to solve scientifically the problems of the [health] protection of the broad masses, a protection which is in practice fully realized only in our country, the country of victorious socialism.[10]

Thus, throughout the field of medicine, the Party in general and its leaders in particular—rather than physicians and public health officials—occupied the leading role. Furthermore, even within the highly specialized area of psychotherapy the primacy of Marxist–Leninist ideology can be discovered. In 1966 the Soviet psychotherapist M. S. Lebedinsky wrote that

> The problem of psychotherapeutic theory should be decided in accordance . . . with the ideology of society . . . In the Soviet Union psychotherapy developed and is developing on the basis of Marxist–Leninist philosophy.[11]

Marxist philosophy is essentially materialist and collectivist. It is collectivist in that it stresses not the individual and his concerns, rather, like any totalist ideology, the emphasis is on society, with the whole far outweighing any of its individual constituents. In contrast to Western emphases upon the subjective feelings and intrapsychic events* of the individual, Soviet psychotherapy has been motivated and directed by Marx's view that " The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, it is their social being that determines their consciousness . . ."[12]

On one hand this approach has led to the organization of Soviet health services on a nationwide scale with the plan for Soviet public health

[9] For an outline of this debate, and for Amalrik's view see: Andrei Amalrik, *Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984* (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Revised edition, 1980), pp. 174–87.

[10] Mark G. Field, op. cit. p. 38.

[11] B. M. Segal, " The Theoretical Bases Of Soviet Psychotherapy," in *American Journal of Psychotherapy*, 1975, Vol. 29, pp. 503–523, p. 504.

* Intrapsychic events: events related to the mental life of the individual, including both conscious and unconscious processes, particularly the human faculty for thought, judgment and emotion.

[12] In Robert C. Tucker (ed), *The Marx–Engels Reader* (W. W. Norton, New York, 2nd edition, 1978), p. 4.

being part of the overall state economic plan under the establishment of a single and supreme health authority (the USSR Health Ministry). On the other hand it has caused ideological confusion, for if man is the product of his social and economic environment how can phenomena such as crime and mental illness be explained? Basically, two main explanations can be identified.

First, there is the view that all mental illness has a material base. That is, it has a physical cause. To this end Snezhnevsky writes:

> Any behavioural phenomenon, including psychic, has its material basis . . . any mental disease is basically material, and, as any other disease, is subject to the laws of general pathology.[13]

In this way Snezhnevsky denies the possibility of mental illness arising from an individual's inability to cope with life's stresses such as social isolation, marital problems, dissatisfaction with career opportunities and various other crisis situations.

Secondly, the view necessarily exists that crime itself may be the result of psychiatric illness, since by definition it cannot be attributed to a society " of the highest type." Bukovsky and Gluzman note that

> Professor D. R. Lunts asserts that any illegitimate act, by virtue of its illegitimacy alone, merits psychiatric analysis . . . and [he] substantiates his remarks by claiming that under socialistic conditions there are not social causes for criminal acts. Lunts attributes to capitalism crimes as a phenomenon resulting from social disharmony.[14]

This approach, therefore, substantiates and legitimizes the view that dissenters who commit what the state terms " illegal acts," must be mentally ill, for there is nothing in Soviet social life that would normally facilitate such actions. In other words, the regime is saying, " your disease is dissent."

APART from totalitarianism and Soviet Marxism, another pillar that sustains psychiatric abuse is what may be called psychiatric determinism. There are two aspects of psychiatric determinism that are important. The first is a view of the patient as a defective machine. The nature of the relationship between the state and the individual within a totalitarian polity has been discussed. The implication was that the individual only has worth and value when seen in the context of the grand design, a design proposed and drawn up by the totalitarian party, and inspired by the totalitarian ideology, in this case Marxism. As a result, individual concerns are secondary to group concerns. Moreover, the Soviet state, functioning as a centrally-planned economy within a totalist *milieu*, views society as a vast human resource that must be mobilized to suit the needs of the Party.

Field, in *Soviet Socialized Medicine*, argues precisely from this premise.

[13] A. V. Snezhnevski, " Conceptions of Schizophrenia Within The Last Fifty Years And Today," *International Journal of Psychiatry*. Vol. 2 (1966) pp. 135–37, p. 135.

[14] V. Bukovsky and S. Gluzman, op. cit. p. 185.

He suggests that people in the Soviet Union have become a resource in that without a relatively happy and healthy population, other goals such as industrialization, agricultural development and even militarization, cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the Party to promote the physical and mental health of society. It is physical health that enables people to fulfil social goals, whilst mental health ensures that they accept unequivocally the Party's authority in arriving at these goals.

To achieve its aims, therefore, the regime must concentrate on society as a singular collective entity which is moving towards some form of human perfection defined as " communism," for, as Field suggests,

> The Party does not see its role primarily as one of reflecting the conscious wishes and aspirations of the masses, since the common people often do not know—nor do they have the education, wisdom, or vision to know—what " is good for them." Rather it leads, directs, and guides the masses towards a better future.[15]

The second aspect of psychiatric determinism is what has been alluded to as the perpetuation of psychiatric ideologies.[16] This is where a patient must define himself as ill before he is seen as being on the road to recovery. That is, in order to obtain their freedom the dissidents must first recant their beliefs. In Bukovsky's words:

> First, in order to get out [of a psychiatric hospital] you must admit openly and officially to the doctors that you were sick—" yes, I was ill "; " yes, I didn't know what I was doing when I did it." The second condition is to admit you were wrong, to disavow what you did. I know of several cases of people who refused to say they had done wrong and spent many long years in that hospital.[17]

In March 1971 the Chief Psychiatrist at the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital, Dr L. Zemskov, told dissident Victor Fainberg:

> We'll take away all your writing materials and so forth. We want to give you all the opportunity to be alone with yourself, to do some thinking and come *to the right conclusions. When a person comes to the right conclusions he is no longer a danger to society.*[18] (Emphasis added)

Vladimir Bukovsky and Semyon Gluzman, both former victims of psychiatric abuse (Gluzman was formerly a psychiatrist) have jointly written " A Manual On Psychiatry for Dissidents." In it they describe the

[15] Mark G. Field, op. cit. p. 8.

[16] Irving Goffman, *Asylums*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1961); E. C. Cuff and G. C. F. Payne (eds), *Perspectives In Sociology* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1979), p. 104.

[17] Vladimir Bukovsky, cited in Sidney Bloch & Peter Reddaway, *Russia's Political Hospitals* (Futura Publications, London, 1978), p. 214.

[18] Cited in ibid. p. 215. Fainberg was arested in 1968 for demonstrating in Red Square (Moscow) against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. He was arrested under articles 190–1 " Dissemination Of Fabrications Known to Be False, Which Denigrate The Soviet State And Social System." Interned in Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital until 1973. Transferred to Leningrad Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital No. 5, released after 9 months in November 1973. April–May 1974 interned in Leningrad Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital No. 3 for hunger strike and statement in support of Vladimir Bukovsky. Emigrated June 1974. See Appendix VII in Bloch & Reddaway, op. cit. pp. 441–47.

course of action an individual must take if he is to avoid treatment for being mentally ill. They write:

> However disagreeable it may be, the best motivation you can offer for the actions being imputed to you is: " I wanted to become famous, to be well known; I did not understand the seriousness of the consequences, I did not stand aside and take a look at myself."[19]

However unpleasant this course of action may appear, Bukovsky and Gluzman maintain that only this type of reasoning will make the dissident appear as though he is coming to terms with his illness, and is beginning to see the " error of his ways." However, as Pyotr Grigorenko remarked to a psychiatric commission which, in 1971, asked whether he had changed his convictions: " Convictions are not gloves. One does not change them easily."[20]

THE pillars underlying Soviet psychiatric abuse are not separate and distinct entities. Soviet law, Soviet Marxism and what has been called psychiatric determinism (which is itself a form of medico-determinism) are, in fact, all part of a wider Soviet totalitarianism. The value of examining them each as separate entities is that one then begins to appreciate not only how extensive is the abuse of individual rights in Soviet society, but also (and most importantly) how this abuse is itself ingrained within the very structure of that society. The following brief studies illustrate this point.

First, one can compare Western and Soviet approaches to schizophrenia. The Western position can be expressed as follows:

> The term " schizophrenia " is applied to psychotic reactions which usually begin in adolescence or a little later and in which occur thought disorders and behavioural disturbances [including] a tendency to withdraw from reality and to regress to a deteriorated level of conduct, frequently with hallucinations and delusions.[21]

Although hallucinations (such as " hearing voices ") are common to schizophrenia, disorders of thought content are regarded as central symptoms.[22] Delusions are one facet of thought disorder. Sim and Gordon describe a delusion as a " false, irrational belief which is held with great conviction by the individual [and] cannot be corrected by logic, reason or suggestion."[23] Some examples of delusional thinking include the following: somatic passivity, where " the patient [feels he] is a passive, unwilling recipient of bodily sensations imposed by an external agency "; thought insertion, where the patient believes that foreign thoughts have been placed in his mind by an external source; and thought broadcast, where the patient feels that his thoughts are being transmitted

[19] V. Bukovsky and S. Gluzman, op. cit. p. 193.
[20] Cited in Bloch & Reddaway, op. cit. p. 215.
[21] Myre Sim and E. B. Gordon, *Basic Psychiatry*, (3rd edn, Churchill Livingstone, New York), p. 167.
[22] Gerald C. Davison and John M. Neale, *Abnormal Psychology* (3rd edn, John Wiley, New York, 1982), p. 399.
[23] Myre Sim and E. B. Gordon, op. cit. p. 84.

so that others know them.[24] Although this list is incomplete, it does illustrate the severity of a schizophrenic disorder and the degree of intellectual impairment that occurs. Therefore, when one is discussing dissidents diagnosed as schizophrenic, it should be noted how closely their symptoms mirror the above.

The trend within the West has been toward a more rigid and specific system for diagnosing schizophrenia. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III demonstrates this. Here the symptomology describing schizophrenia is presented in great detail.[25] Further, this approach diagnoses schizophrenia only after the individual has demonstrated continuous symptoms for at least six months. However, whilst Western concepts are being narrowed and refined, Soviet concepts of schizophrenia remain broad, vague and open to manipulation and abuse.

Schizophrenia specifically, like the general concept of " mental illness," has, in the Soviet Union become a flexible and adaptable " label " that is commonly applied to individuals within the dissident movement. Professor Andrei Snezhnevsky, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, has been largely responsible for this. As Amnesty International writes:

> Snezhnevsky's most distinctive contribution to Soviet psychiatry has been his extremely broad definition of schizophrenia, an illness which in his interpretation *need not be accompanied by external symptoms even when it is serious enough to justify forcible hospitalization*.[26] (Emphasis added)

Snezhnevsky posits three forms of schizophrenia. First, there is the " continuous " form. This is characterized by a steady and progressive deterioration without significant remission. Secondly, there is " periodic " schizophrenia. Here there are periodic attacks with intermittent periods of mental health. Thirdly, he identifies " shift-like " schizophrenia which features attacks followed by remission but with each period of remission showing progressive deterioration.[27] It is the " continuous " and " shift-like " forms that are most often applied to dissidents. Reich states that these forms are seen

> as representing a spectrum of clinical states ranging from the very mild to very severe [with] the mildest [being] typified by " symptoms " that merge into normality: social withdrawal, confrontations with parental and other authorities, philosophical concerns and " reformism," which is to say, the wish to change society.[28]

Reich maintains that in the West these " symptoms " would almost never be considered as being schizophrenic by reputable psychiatrists. He

[24] Gerald C. Davison and John M. Neale, op. cit. p. 400.

[25] The Diagnostic And Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 1980.

[26] Amnesty International. *Prisoners Of Conscience in The U.S.S.R.: Their Treatment And Conditions* (2nd edn, Amnesty International, London, 1980), p. 184.

[27] Walter Reich, " Soviet Psychiatry On Trial," in *Commentary*, January 1978, pp. 40–48. This article includes a report on a discussion Reich had with Snezhnevsky at the World Psychiatric Association's Sixth World Congress, Honolulu, August 1977.

[28] Walter Reich, ibid. p. 44.

suggests that " they would be called normal, or neurotic, or if persistent, signs of a character disorder," but rarely would Western psychiatrists declare such individuals as being not responsible.[29]

TWO further characteristics of the Soviet approach to schizophrenia are important in the context of this discussion. First, in Snezhnevsky's opinion the condition is both life-long and irreversible. Therefore, once diagnosed as schizophrenic a dissident is always subject to re-arrest and detention if the authorities decide that his behaviour exhibits a sudden relapse. In this way the regime can efficiently limit the actions of any opposition groups. Secondly, there is the possibility that people suffering from mental illness can appear " seemingly normal." This was outlined by the Presidium of the All-Union Society of Neurologists and Psychiatrists which wrote:

> There is a small number of mental cases whose disease, as a result of mental derangement, paranoia and other psychopathological symptoms, can lead them to anti-social actions . . . such as disturbances of public order, discrimination or slander . . . The seeming normality of such sick persons when they commit socially dangerous actions is used by anti-Soviet propaganda for slanderous contentions that these people are not suffering from a mental disorder.[30]

This criterion of " seeming normality " has been used often in the trials of Soviet dissidents. In 1969 Olga Iofe was arrested on charges of " anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda " (Article 70 of RSFSR Criminal Code) specifically for preparing and circulating leaflets of an " anti-Soviet " content. She was diagnosed as suffering from " creeping schizophrenia," convicted and sent to a special psychiatric hospital where she spent 11 months. Despite the fact that all witnesses testified to her " sound mind and good character " this was deemed irrelevant. In fact it justified the psychiatrist's diagnosis as can be seen from the following court-room exchange:

> *Defence Counsel:* Exactly what physiological tests were carried out to establish that she was suffering from an illness?
>
> *Psychiatrist*: Such physiological tests are carried out on everybody without exception. The absence of symptoms of an illness cannot prove the absence of the illness itself . . . The presence of this form of schizophrenia does not presuppose changes in personality noticeable to others.[31]

The second brief study, which illustrates how deeply ingrained in Soviet society is the denial of individual rights, involves an examination of the actual rights that dissidents have after they are subject to involuntary hospitalization.

[29] Ibid.
[30] Cited in Amnesty International, op. cit. p. 184.
[31] *A Chronicle Of Current Events*, 31 Aug. 1970, issue 15, p. 23.

THERE are two principal methods by which dissidents are forced into becoming mental patients. They are the civil and criminal procedures for involuntary hospitalization.

Civil commitment applies to people who have committed no criminal offence but who, in the opinion of the regime, represent a social danger. The official document describing social danger lists a number of symptoms characteristic of this concept, such as,

> Hypochondriac delirious conditions, which cause the patient's incorrect aggressive behaviour towards certain persons, organizations and institutions.[32]

By way of explanation the document continues,

> The symptoms of illness . . . may be accompanied by outwardly correct behaviour and dissimulation.[33]

Moreover, a person who represents a social danger may be " committed . . . to a psychiatric hospital without his consent or the consent of his relatives, guardians or others."[34] In other words, the regime has established *in law* a means by which it can rid itself of anyone that challenges its authority or the authority of its policies.

This weapon was used by the Soviet state against Zhores Medvedev, who, in 1970, was sent to a regional mental hospital after he had written a critique on the Soviet government's policy of limiting scientific communication with foreign specialists. He was diagnosed as a schizophrenic manifesting a " Paranoid delusion of reforming society." Because of foreign pressure Medvedev spent only 19 days in hospital, but whilst on a visit to Britain in 1973 he was stripped of his citizenship for " actions discrediting the high title of citizen of the USSR " and forbidden to return home.[35]

Patients' rights under this form of confinement are strictly limited. Primarily, there is no judicial review of civil commitment procedures; in fact not only is the individual denied access to a lawyer but more importantly no judicial agency is actually involved with civil commitment. The individual, then, has no opportunity to challenge the decision to incarcerate him, nor can he or his relatives or friends challenge the decision of the examining psychiatric commission which rules on his sanity. The official document simply states that " The hospitalized patient must be examined within 24 hours by a special commission consisting of three psychiatrists . . . [and] closest relatives of the patient are [to be] informed of his hospitalization within 24 hours of the commission's examination of the patient."[36]

[32] " On Emergency Confinement Of Mentally Ill Persons Who Represent A Social Danger." Instruction of the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR 26 Aug. 1971 in Alexander Podrabinek, *Punitive Medicine* (Karoma, Ann Arbor, 1980), pp. 195–97, p. 195.

[33] Ibid. p. 196.

[34] Ibid. p. 195.

[35] Working Group On The Internment of Dissenters In Mental Hospitals, *The Political Abuse Of Psychiatry In The Soviet Union* (The Working Group, London, 1977), p. 4.

[36] " On Emergency Confinement Of Mentally Ill Persons Who Represent A Social Danger " in Alexander Podrabinek, op. cit. p. 197.

Amnesty International, however, maintains that even these limited " rights " are rarely honoured. It claims that often the relatives of the individual are not informed within 24 hours and, furthermore, in some cases the patient does not even undergo a psychiatric examination. Moreover, they state that " often the individuals have been confined after being picked up in the street or at their place of work, without first being examined by a psychiatrist."[37] This occurred in the case of Valerie Novodvorskaya, a linguist working at a Moscow library. In November 1978, soon after she had been involved with the public formation of a free trade union, she was detained. According to Amnesty:

> At 5.45 pm on the day of hospitalization a man came into the room where she was working and asked her to help him take away some books. She took a package of books, went out and did not return. A colleague who was working with her in the same room waited for a long time and then became apprehensive and raised the alarm. After lengthy searching her friends found her in Psychiatric Hospital Number 15.[38]

Two final points should be noted. First, the dissident's family and friends have almost always opposed his forcible hospitalization, usually regarding him as normal. This is contrary to some forms of abuse in the West where relatives may wish to impose upon the state the burden of caring for a " troublesome " family member. Secondly, the Working Group On The Internment of Dissenters In Mental Hospitals is adamant that " In no case has there been evidence of a dissenter having acted violently or even shown a propensity for it."[39] Clearly the social danger lies with the ideas that challenge the authority of the Soviet state and the CPSU's claim to hegemony over all individual concerns.

THE second method of forcible hospitalization is criminal commitment. This applies when the mental health of someone charged with a criminal offence is called into question. In such a case the prosecutor may call for a forensic psychiatric commission to examine the accused to see if he is " accountable," that is sane. If found " not-accountable " the commission submits this finding to the court along with a recommendation for action. Instead of a trial the court then decides whether or not the individual has committed a socially dangerous act, whether the commission's findings should be accepted, and, finally, what measures to apply.

In almost all cases involving dissidents, the commission's findings (usually of non-accountability) are accepted by the court.[40] The court then decides whether to send the individual to an ordinary psychiatric

[37] Amnesty International, *Political Abuse Of Psychiatry In the U.S.S.R.: An Amnesty International Briefing* (Amnesty International, London, March, 1983), p. 4.

[38] Amnesty International, *Prisoners Of Conscience In The U.S.S.R.: Their Treatment And Conditions*, op. cit. p. 179.

[39] Working Group On The Internment Of Dissenters In Mental Hospitals, op. cit. p. 4.

[40] Amnesty International, *Political Abuse Of Psychiatry In The U.S.S.R.: An Amnesty International Briefing*, op. cit. pp. 3–5.

hospital, a special psychiatric hospital, or to commit the accused to the care of a guardian. Despite the fact that, as far as it has been ascertained, dissenters have never displayed violent behaviour, this last option is rarely invoked. Indeed, Amnesty states quite unequivocally that " In no political case known to Amnesty International has a court exercised this option."[41]

The experience of Aleksei Nikitin is typical of people interned under the method of criminal commitment. Nikitin was sacked from his job as a miner and expelled from the Party as a result of his involvement in protests against official corruption at the Don Basin mine in Butovka, where he worked. After being convicted of " slandering the Soviet system " he spent over four years in psychiatric hospitals, having been diagnosed as a psychopath. Following his discharge in February 1977 he visited the Norwegian embassy in Moscow to inquire about immigration. This led to his arrest and reconfinement. In May 1980 (after he was again discharged) Nikitin was examined by Dr Koryagin, a psychiatrist attached to the Moscow Working Commission, an unofficial human rights organization concerned particularly with psychiatric abuse. Koryagin concluded his assessment of Nikitin by saying:

> Nikitin suffers from no psychiatric illness or personality disorder, and there is no evidence that he has had either of these conditions. His admission to special psychiatric hospitals in 1972 and 1977 must be regarded as having been totally unjustified.[42]

Amnesty states that under the process of criminal commitment, " the accused loses virtually all of his or her procedural rights and is left only with the passive right to an honest psychiatric examination and a fair court hearing."[43]

First, the prosecutor is under no obligation to inform the accused that he is to undergo a psychiatric examination " if his mental state makes this impossible."[44] Secondly, the accused has no automatic right to be told the results of this examination, nor any recommendations made by the psychiatrist. Thirdly, according to Article 404 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the USSR the accused may lose the right to be informed of the results of the criminal investigation of his case as well as losing the right to be informed of any new charges brought against him. Article 404 concludes: " If, by virtue of his mental state, the conduct of investigative actions with the participation of the person who has committed the socially dangerous act is possible, the investigator shall draw up a record to this effect."[45]

[41] Ibid. p. 5.

[42] *International Association On The Political Use of Psychiatry*, Information Bulletin, No. 1, May 1981, p. 9.

[43] Amnesty International, *Political Abuse Of Psychiatry In The U.S.S.R.: An Amnesty International Briefing*, op. cit. p. 4.

[44] Harold J. Berman, *Soviet Criminal Law And Procedure. The R.S.F.S.R. Codes* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966), p. 327. This refers to Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

[45] Ibid. pp. 419–20.

Finally, the accused has no automatic right to be present at his trial; Article 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that the accused may " be summoned to the judicial session if the character of his illness does not prevent this."[46] With regard to this, Amnesty states that " In very few cases have prisoners of conscience been permitted to attend the court hearings which ruled on whether or not they were accountable."[47]

THE dynamics of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union have now been discussed. But one vital aspect remains and that is the role of the physician within Soviet society. This factor is important because the physician is the central agency by which the abuse is carried out.

The role of the Soviet defence lawyer has previously been discussed in the literature, where it has been noted that rather than his role being purely client-centred, he is instead virtually an extension of state power particularly when the state's interests are involved. The defence lawyer fulfilled many roles, such as co-worker in the building of communism, an educator of the people (including his client) in a Marxist–Leninist world-outlook, and, finally, a propagandist of communist morality.[48]

As with the defence lawyer, the Soviet physician is inexorably wedded to the totalist state particularly when there is a conflict of interests. This is demonstrated by the Soviet Physician's Oath which reads in part:

> I will, in all my actions, be guided by the principles of communist morality, ever to bear in mind the high calling of the Soviet physician, and of my responsibility to the people and the Soviet state.[49]

The inculcation of communist philosophy begins with the physician's studies which emphasize the centrality of all aspects of Marxist–Leninist thought to the fulfilment of the practice of his profession. Bloch and Reddaway state that the average graduating physician spent some 250 hours devoted to Marxist–Leninist studies, compared with 297 hours for anatomy and 213 hours for surgery. They note that

> According to Dr M. Voikhanskaya, until 1975 a Leningrad psychiatrist . . . 25 percent of the medical curriculum is devoted to political studies [including] . . . dialectical materialism, historical materialism, history of the Communist Party and scientific atheism.[50]

The physician, then, is first and foremost, an agent of the state. His role is to ensure that the smooth functioning of society is not disrupted. Whereas the general practitioner is concerned to maintain a level of physical functioning high enough so that the people can achieve the goals the Party

[46] Ibid. p. 421.

[47] Amnesty International, *Prisoners Of Conscience In The U.S.S.R.: Their Treatment And Conditions*, op. cit. p. 175.

[48] In particular see: F. J. M. Fieldbrugge, " Law And Political Dissent In The Soviet Union," in Donald D. Barry et al. *Contemporary Soviet Law: Essays In Honour Of John J. Hazard* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974), pp. 55–68: Robert Conquest, *Justice And The Legal System In The U.S.S.R.* (Bodley Head, London, 1968).

[49] " The Physician's Oath Of The Soviet Union," quoted in *Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Autumn, 1971, p. 114.

[50] Bloch & Reddaway, op. cit. p. 44.

has set for them, the psychiatric specialist must ensure that the individual is correctly socialized to, and in harmony with, these particular goals. This reinforces the view previously expressed that people in the Soviet Union are seen by the regime primarily as a natural resource. The mental and physical " health " of this resource is essential if the wide-ranging goals the Party has adopted are to succeed.

THE notions that are inherent within various codes of ethics that apply to Western psychiatrists are missing in the Soviet context. The Western ideal stresses, for example, the value and worth of the individual. This can be seen in the Declaration of Hawaii which sets out ethical guidelines for psychiatrists worldwide. The Declaration states " the psychiatrist shall serve the best interests of the patient " and that " every patient must be offered the best therapy available and be treated with the solicitude and respect due to the dignity of all human beings and to their autonomy over their own lives and health."[51]

The Soviet view, however, puts a different emphasis. In the words of Soviet psychotherapist, M. S. Lebedinsky, the Soviet view maintains that

> In his interactions with the patient the doctor should assert an influence which is defined by the medical task, the principles of our medicine, the ideology of our society, its morals and science.[52]

The psychiatrist in the Soviet state has become, therefore, a type of spiritual policeman, and his profession has become " the legal means for [attempts at] controlling personality and for trying to prevent deviance from norms of [political, social and cultural] behaviour prescribed by the authorities."[53]

[51] *Declaration of Hawaii*. Document 940/1/77. Points 1 and 2.
[52] Boris Segal, " The Theoretical Basis Of Soviet Psychotherapy," op. cit. p. 508.
[53] Thomas S. Szasz, *The Myth Of Mental Illness* (Revised edn, Harper and Row, New York, 1974), p. 62.

Totalitarian Strengths and Weaknesses

Robert Wesson

AS the Soviet Union under Konstantin Chernenko grinds through its seventh decade, it is obvious that the revolution has virtually run its course and that in many respects the Soviet state is not very different from its tsarist predecessor, or from what tsarism might have become if it had adapted more gradually to the twentieth century. For on 7 November 1917, the Leninists did not overthrow Russian autocracy, but restored it with new vigour and strength. In the midst of suffering and defeat, the Bolsheviks rebelled against the westernizing Provisional Government and its "bourgeois" values and ideas of constitutional, pluralistic government. They replaced the failed decadent élite with a narrower and more dynamic élite, just as they replaced the hapless tsarist "Little Father" by a new father-ruler, first Lenin, and then Stalin. While using the Western political vocabulary of equality, democracy and rule by the people—or the deserving people—they de-westernized and de-modernized the state, bringing it back under Stalin to something like the despotic tsardom of the sixteenth century.

This renovation and deepening of autocracy, in an age generally tending (as seemed clear in the years before the First World War) towards representative government, was an extraordinary achievement. A small band of revolutionary intellectuals made themselves in effect owners of the country and unlimited masters over its inhabitants, then built a new and powerful state, maintaining the mastery of the wartime revolutionary organization to this day.

The potentialities of the new power structure were unknown until realized in Russia in the 1930s, and they could be realized only by virtue of numerous exceptional circumstances. The ultimate construction of the edifice of Stalinism, the de-westernization of Russia, and the demonstration of how potent the state can be in the hands of an organization strongly dedicated to its own power, were all made possible by a series of extraneous events and conditions.

First among these was the First World War, and the defeats that staggered the economy and destroyed the prestige of the ruling house and privileged classes, eventually caused widespread desperation and made the people responsive to the most extreme demagoguery. The discontent of maltreated minorities in the tsarist empire was also crucial. Latvians, Georgians, especially Jews, and others who were relatively educated but had no stake in society, formed the backbone of Lenin's party.

Another important but neglected circumstance contributing to the formation of the communist state was the interest of the German Reich,

after the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917, in the disruption of the Western-inclined Provisional Government and in the undermining of the Russian army—an interest that it shared with Lenin. The equivalent of several tens of millions of dollars was for the Germans a small price to pay for the sabotaging of the Russian war effort, while for Lenin it was the means not only of supporting a large non-commercial party press but of employing many more professional revolutionaries than he could otherwise have maintained. But Lenin, having accepted money from the enemy, had either to achieve power or be disgraced and probably punished for treason; hence his frantic insistence in the summer of 1917 on an immediate Bolshevik *coup*. Moreover, having gained power, he had to hold it or probably be hanged. This meant a commitment to power unlike that of other parties, not only for ideological reasons (as often stated not only by the Leninists but by their critics), but for criminal reasons (in terms of " bourgeois " codes, not Lenin's morality). No means of repression was morally excluded. Power equalled survival.

The same compulsion applied not only to the top leaders of the Bolshevik Party, but to the rank and file. Although they assuredly believed the passionate declarations of persecuted innocence of their leader, they knew that their Party was accused of acting on behalf of Germany. They had to win the civil war that inevitably followed the take-over not only because of the fierceness of the class struggle, but because their opponents damned them as German agents and would have liked to treat them as such. The merciless civil war thus hardened the new Soviet state. At the same time, the Bolshevik victory, plus disorder and famine, effectively did away with more or less independent urban classes. Of the formerly affluent or educated, there survived some professionals with useful non-political skills, plus bureaucrats who were prepared to work for the new masters as they had for the old.

IT might have been expected that Lenin's Party, having won the civil war, would relax its monopoly and permit a more conventional political order. It did the opposite, stiffening central control, tightening Party discipline, and outlawing the non-Bolshevik socialist organizations that had earned a right to exist by fighting for the revolutionary cause during the civil war. The Leninists proscribed the independent parties previously permitted a somewhat marginal existence, not because the ruling party enjoyed, but because it lacked, support. The people were weary of the hardships and the dictatorship, and the Bolsheviks would certainly have been expelled from power in 1921–22 if popular feeling had had political effect. Peasants and Kronstadt sailors were repressed in the same merciless way as that in which the civil war had been fought. Only by dictatorial means could the Party assure its power.

The climax of the totality of power under Stalin owed something to the fact that he was a non-Russian, an outsider in the basically Russian realm, and at the same time a man of less ideological sophistication than many others in Lenin's entourage, when proficiency in Marxism was still

an important qualification for leadership. He was the only man whom Lenin in his "Testament" specifically asked to be removed from his position. Stalin seems to have felt highly insecure—there is ample testimony to his paranoid tendencies—and in a sense, illegitimate beyond the illegitimacy of the Bolsheviks in general. Consequently he applied within the Party a basic principle of the Party's control over society, raising up those of crude and humble ("proletarian") background, as sanctioned by Marxism. With their help, he displaced and destroyed the more educated Leninists. The terror was propelled not only by Stalin but by thousands of willing subordinates, otherwise insignificant people given power and convinced by Stalin that Party rule, that is, their well-being, was in peril unless they were ruthless in their loyalty.

COUNTLESS dictators and political parties would have been glad, one may feel sure, to follow the example of the Leninists and Stalinists, to crush their opponents and expand the powers of their state to the ultimate. But very few have been able to break the bones of society, so to speak, and to reshape it totally. For example, the Allende forces in Chile in 1970–73 tried to make their regime irreversible (as they put it) by taking over the economy, that is, by placing in charge people owing their positions not to ownership or managerial ability but to political position, whose first priority would be to preserve the socialist order. But the Chilean radicals could not replace the old constitutional system and they could not reduce the armed forces. They were consequently overthrown when economic failure raised tensions and stimulated the opposition.

The Nazi dictatorship was better able to eliminate competition for several reasons: it was less impeded by institutional structures, having been voted full powers by the Reichstag; it entered when the economy was at its worst; and it chalked up national successes that paralysed opposition and enabled Hitler to subjugate the armed forces. Thus the Nazis, following their natural inclinations, continually increased repression in the absence of resistance, and they extended political organization over the economy although they had set out with no programme of socialization.

Latin American dictators getting to the top with the support or acquiescence of strong forces in society, the military above all, have never been able to achieve anything like the totalitarianism of the communist state, although some of them would assuredly like to have done so. Peron of Argentina tried to do the same as the Nazis, whom he admired, by building a mass party, manipulating the trade unions, and attempting to control the economy. But he could never destroy the upper classes, and he was drawn into an unwinnable conflict with the Church and the dominant sector of the armed forces.

Castro was probably no more skilled politically than Peron, but he was in a better position to overcome obstacles to his power. The armed forces of Batista had fallen to pieces, and Castro could count on his personally loyal guerrilla band. Discontent with the old order was deeper in Cuba

than in Argentina, and there were more frictions with the US, whose foreign policy seemed designed to facilitate Castro's slide towards the Soviet orbit. Small-scale hostilities fuelled Castro's synthetic social revolution, and in the patriotic emergency of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro was able to destroy the bases of opposition and declare Cuba socialist. The transformation of Cuba into a totalitarian state, moreover, like other latter-day communisms, owed much to the Soviet example and Soviet power.

IF the communist system is hard to put in place, it is equally hard to remove. Some of the same reasons that make it possible for a band of people of no standing in a traditional society to make themselves masters over all, operate to give them the means and the will to hold tightly on to the levers of power.

Thus, to make the radical shift to a communist system requires a degree of coherence and community of purpose that can be given only by unquestioning adherence to a faith. The radicals, rejectors of authority, are fractious almost by definition; their success demands leadership, organization, and an ideological rationale to make the dissatisfied rebels want to pull together. This requires a joint purpose that can be seen as supremely noble even while it serves the self-interest of those who pursue it. But the conviction of right becomes stronger not only in the struggle for power but, at least initially, in the resolve to keep and enlarge it. On the other hand, it gives the people some reason to accept the claims of the Party, or it at least confuses the opposition. Marxism, or rather Marxism-Leninism, thus lends coherence to the system.

The ideology is froth except in so far as it contributes to power (this is the function of Marxism-Leninism), all the more clearly as enthusiasm for genuine egalitarianism has run out. There is no real alternative to a rationalization for the totalitarian power structure. The Nazi hotch-potch, which amounted mostly to a consecration of collective selfishness, was much less systematic and less effective, and was inherently limited to Germans or Aryans, in contrast to the universality of Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism-Leninism is politically strong because all its operative elements serve the interests of the central power—such as the right of the Party as representative of a " progressive class," the preference for " workers " whose devotion to the Party will be undiluted, the need for socialization of the economy, the priority of heavy (especially the defence) industry, the certitude of political truth found by the Party, the inadmissibility of alien or independent (" bourgeois ") influences, the priority of class (that is, Party) over nation. In 1968 the Soviet Union required of the Czechoslovak Party not that it care better for the workers but that it restore censorship and protect its monopoly. The Soviets give their blessing to Third World dictatorships not on the basis of their social ideals or policies but according to the character of the governing party (and its support for Soviet foreign policy).

Ideology thus remains the verbal aspect of the bond of shared power. If Lenin had taken Marxism literally he would never have attempted a socialist revolution in a backward country—a venture that more consistent Marxists warned could lead only to tyranny. He would have made a real effort to enlist workers not only in the ranks but in the leadership—hardly any of those near Lenin were members of the class the Party was supposed to represent. And a truly Marxist party in power would feel the need to listen to the workers and secure their approval, even if it insisted on its own ultimate power of decision.

THE core of the Leninist doctrine on the other hand is the absolute imperative of Party discipline ("*partiynost'*," or " Party spirit," as the Russians call it), an idealization of collective self-interest. It was a major step in the consolidation of the Soviet system that factionalism was outlawed in 1921. If the prohibition were repealed or even softened, this would represent a major loosening of the system; but of this there is no sign in any ruling Communist Party. The nature of the rulership is all the more omnipotent in the light of the subjects' lack of organization. Moreover, the authorities have a stronger and more direct interest in upholding their positions, that is, in maintaining the power structure, than their opponents have opportunities in overturning it; the ideology both unites the élite and divides the people.

Discipline being so vital, communist parties (in opposition as well as in power) make willingness to identify completely with the Party the supreme virtue. It is difficult to enter, and the militant is wedded to the Party. It is worse, in communist countries, to be an ex-member than never to have joined; freedom of divorce would suggest a conditional commitment where unconditional commitment is of the essence. From almost the start of his career as an agitator, Lenin insisted on a Party of full-time revolutionaries in the Russian conspiratorial tradition to pull the Marxist movement out of the morass of futility into which it seemed to be sinking at around the turn of the century. This theme, which he set forth in *What is to be Done* (1902), was Lenin's great contribution to the making of the communist state. His explanation for why he preferred " fewer but better " members in his Party, that selectivity was necessary to guard against police action, was not convincing, because he knew that the Party was readily infiltrated in any case, and he kept up the same selectivity long after he became the master of police powers. More important was the fact that the full-time revolutionary would accept the ideas and orders of the leadership; to rebel would mean losing a way of life. The leader has the satisfaction, like an army officer, of having a group of unconditional activists behind him, upon whom he can count despite difficulties or changes of policy; the members enjoy the psychological security of a close group with a strongly shared purpose. Welded together, they form an excellent instrument for seizing power in a time of crisis, confusion and division of the other forces.

The absolute necessity of holding on to the state is translated into a

conviction of naturalness and right, a conviction justifying any degree of control and ruthless coercion. From the viewpoint of the individual's material interest, opposition is irrational. The Soviet practice of consigning dissidents to psychiatric wards may seem logical from the rulers' viewpoint.

The communist rulers also usually keep up a more or less chronic state of emergency to make their rule appear more necessary. They particularly maintain a sense of danger from innately hostile foreign powers, partly to fortify their position, partly because of their fear and distrust of whatever they cannot control, partly because of a lingering sense of insecurity and illegitimacy that leads to slightly paranoid attitudes. Marxism furnishes the rationale for antagonism and fear towards the outside (" bourgeois ") world.

MARXISM also provides a solid basis for recruiting from the less privileged strata. This was probably necessary in order to restore and deepen autocratic rule in the face of the general trend towards liberalization in the generations preceding the Russian revolution. Although the Leninist leadership was middle class, the Party drew on those of humble origins, who provided the dedicated and uncritical troops it needed to impose its absolute domination—people promoted to positions of influence (at least in comparison with their previous condition) not because of their general qualifications, but partly because of their lack of " ordinary " qualifications.

The ostensible appeal of the Party lay in its concern for the lower classes; it was much more important, however, that those who, having no independent standing, owed everything to the Party, could be counted on to use their new power ruthlessly and to hold on to it firmly. Urban workers were preferable to peasants, who usually had more solid roots in society. Stalin, unlike Lenin, was a man of no independent standing and no qualifications except for Party work, and he carried proletarianism further by raising those of lower-class origins to strategic positions in the apparatus—a move that the educated, formerly *émigré*, leaders had to accept in accordance with Marxist principles.

The same principle has been followed in communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and in Cuba. The " bourgeois " classes have been mostly barred from politically important positions and their children have been more or less excluded from the higher education that is the gateway to membership of the élite. Especially insecure or illegitimate communist regimes, such as those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or Cuba, have been most systematic in promoting young people of working-class or peasant origin and excluding others, not seeking to win over the fomerly better situated classes, but rather visiting on the children the sins of their fathers.

Those of middle- or upper-class origins are not such reliable servants of the state. They have the habit of independent thinking and are less impressed by political position. For a successful businessman, to hold

political office is no tremendous good fortune and to lose it is no tragedy—if businessmen were really devoted to state power, they would go far towards realizing the Marxist postulate of the domination of market economy countries by capitalists. In a pluralistic society, those who leave office can go into many private activities, just as military rulers can step aside and return comfortably and honourably to the barracks if they tire of managing affairs. In the communist state, those who are disgraced have nowhere to go and can take only what the Party may deign to permit them, as when Malenkov was made the administrator of a power station and Dubcek a forest ranger.

The Leninists, using Marxist ideas, perfected this principle of reliance on people who owe everything to the political authority, but many other political orders have also used it. It is a key factor in strong, ruthless authoritarian rule, as contrasted with moderate or traditional dictatorships, which rely on the support of the upper classes. It is particularly characteristic of contemporary anti-traditional tyrannies commonly called totalitarian, and has been a major factor in their cohesion.

Hitler, for example, followed Lenin in gathering a group of full-time revolutionaries; his intimates and most loyal supporters were nonentities outside their Nazi party roles; they were mostly drifters with no regular occupation. When Hitler was enabled by the depression and by President Hindenburg's folly to grasp power, they were ready to do anything to hold on to it rather than go back to nothing. Hitler pushed out rightist aristocrats who formed the majority in his first cabinet; not one of the top Nazis appeared among the 15,000 names in the pre-Nazi German *Who's Who.*[1]

Despite the weakness of their ideology of racism plus hypernationalism, the Nazis were enabled by their determination, ruthlessness, and unity in the depressed and divided country to eliminate other parties that had a sounder basis in German life than they did. They went on to victories on the world stage, first by threat, then by force of arms, and made their position so monopolistic that they remained almost unchallenged even after it became clear that continuation of the war would only compound the disaster. Although nightly bombings and daily retreats were ample testimony to failure, the Nazis held on because they, like the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1918–20, had no choice. Surrender meant death or imprisonment for Nazi leaders. They excluded alternative leadership so utterly that their domination of the unoccupied part of Germany was total, down to the siege of Berlin and the suicide of the Führer.

STRONG despots regularly surround themselves with persons who owe everything to them. Peter the Great, for example, publicly burned the record books of the aristocracy and raised thousands of commoners,

[1] Juan J. Linz, "Comparative Study of Fascism," in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism, a Reader's Guide*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976), p. 43.

even serfs, to noble status.[2] Ivan the Terrible before him elevated his servants and murdered the boyars of ancient lineage. Turkish sultans pampered their slaves and placed them in the highest positions next to the throne.[3] The favoured slaves, who were not conceivably rivals for the crown, could be decapitated without fuss or returned to ordinary slavery, and therefore had cause to be zealous.

The harshest Latin American dictators, such as Rosas of Argentina and Gomez of Venezuela, relied on crude, ignorant, but wholly devoted bullies to keep polite society in awe of them. More recently, a fundamentally similar policy enabled the Somoza family dictatorship to grip Nicaragua for 44 years. Somoza recruited poor illiterate peasant boys into the National Guard, trained them for soldiery, brutality, and loyalty, isolated them, and gave them power and privileges. Consequently the Guard became a loyal instrument of rule, faithful to its master to the end. Stupid cruelties alienated the bulk of the population, especially in the towns; but the Guard fought bitterly for Somoza and for itself; and the civil war was, unlike the usual Latin American revolution, a bitter, bloody, and prolonged struggle that the Sandinista rebels could hardly have won without foreign support. The Guardsmen did not give up in the usual Latin American manner when they saw the contest going against them, because they had too much to lose and nowhere to go. In defeat they are embittered and unreconciled.

IN ESSENCE, the strength of communism may be summarized as concentration of power in the hands of those primarily dedicated to the system of control and exclusion from influence of those with other values. The durability of communism rests on the ability of those dependent on the system to render and maintain powerless those who might gain by political change.

In a less politically directed society, many persons outside the hierarchical power structure, such as lawyers, businessmen, union leaders, journalists, writers, politicians, and so forth, may feel the need for more or less change and have the means of pressing for it. Historically, modernization has entailed the growth and strengthening of such classes outside the political structure and has raised their importance in the community. Influence, that is, has flowed to sectors concerned with legality, individual and group autonomy, the protection of personal and property rights from the arbitrary power of the state, and the participation of outsiders in the political process. In the settled communist state, on the contrary, channels of information and organization are closed, as far as possible (and very far is possible), to all independent forces. Means of influence are reserved for members of the ruling party, who have an overriding interest in keeping the power structure intact. Not only

[2] B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (Macmillan, New York, 1951), p. 8.
[3] Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford University Press, London, 1950), Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 43.

officials at all levels, but industrial directors, newspaper editors, farm managers, and so forth, hold primarily political positions and enjoy primarily political standing, which would be endangered or lost by political change.

THE communist state thus contradicts general trends of the scientific-industrial revolution towards the diffusion and fluidity of influence in society. It may hence be considered illegitimate in that the monopolistic status of the élite is not justified in generally accepted modern terms, certainly not in the terms that communist governments employ in propaganda. The key fact is that people hold positions of power primarily because of their standing in the power-holding ensemble, only secondarily or marginally because of their non-political ability or their contribution to the satisfaction of social needs. Of course, able scientists and sports champions may well be rewarded, but they are generally kept out of positions of political influence.

The ruling élite hence has an overriding interest in the stability of the ruling order, its order, made by and for itself. This applies most strongly to those who have acted against citizens, for example the political police, who might well face death if their state were to be overthrown. Millions of informers would face reprisals; the KGB probably recruits as widely as it does not merely to gather information but to involve people morally with the uses of power. Countless bureaucrats and controllers would lose their jobs and careers; many would await prosecution for abuses and corruption. Even extensive reforms would be direly threatening to many. Managers in the planned economy oppose changes that would expose them to the chill winds of competition; in a market economy they would be replaced by others with more economic, less political, skills. Without censorship, not only would censors be unemployed; administrators of the arts and literature would cease to be bosses over more talented artists and writers, and many a hack would be unemployed.

POPULARITY is secondary if not irrelevant for the communist state. We may assume that communist rulers wish to be loved; however, they do not have to be popular, and as far as we know they have not been except where communism is fused with nationalism, as in the Soviet Union fighting the Nazi invasion, in Yugoslavia after the split with Stalin, in the struggle of North Vietnam against first French and then American forces, and so on. After the revolutionary phase, communism is based on the separation, not the union, of rulers and ruled, a separation marked by many explicit privileges of the élite without parallel in pluralist societies. Distinguishing privileges are not only of the material kind; censorship, for example, not only suppresses information and ideas but divides the informed from the uninformed and reduces the capacity of the latter to judge the former.

The leaders can hardly know whether they are liked or disliked, as they live secluded lives, no underling is likely to tell them the truth, and there is no uncensored journalism. They see that the people bow; if a few dissidents raise complaints, they are dismissed as eccentrics or foreign hirelings. Probably the rulers are satisfied if people bow deeply enough. It is desirable to keep a gulf between rulers and ruled, so it is necessary only that the latter be obedient, not that they be eager. The ethos of communist rule is not to appeal to people or satisfy their wants but to manage them; the essence is to do away with the need for consent, thus repulsing the challenge of democracy to absolutism. This is best seen from the viewpoint of the élite. If status depends on pandering to the people, they may demand ever more; if the people are to be satisfied, they may become disgruntled and demand change. But if the people can be managed and manipulated, the rulers can feel secure.

It may be that a large majority of Soviet citizens (and presumably those of other communist countries) would like to see political change, in so far as they give thought to the question. In Spain and Portugal, where the grievances of the people were considerably less weighty, nearly everyone seems to have been happy at the departure of the respective dictators. But even an exceptional degree of illegitimacy need not prevent a communist state from governing effectively. In fact, there are advantages if cadres are aware that their status has to be justified by results and their life-style rests on making the system work.[4] Their situation is like that of the Spartans who ruled parasitically over an overwhelming majority of helots. In order to stay on top, the Spartans had to be brave, skilled warriors, united and dedicated to the Spartan ideal. They were, and they remained, masters for three centuries. The rulers of East Germany, who have inherited something of the earlier Prussian tradition, are a tiny, self-chosen minority that has asserted control over the entire state, its resources and people; they also have the burden of acting on behalf of the Russian occupiers, whom the Germans widely view with scorn and regard as a national enemy. To make the state function tolerably, the East German communists have had to administer it well; and, under pressure of necessity, they have managed the economy fairly effectively and have implemented intelligent social policies. It may be inferred that illegitimacy, of which they must be more aware than most communist élites, has made them determined to be more effective communists.

SINCE legitimacy and popularity are secondary or irrelevant, the system is very difficult to shake. Massive economic failure does not convince the cadres that they should surrender their privileges and well-being, nor does it generate an alternative political authority. As long as 5 per cent of the population is strongly dedicated to the status quo and the others are mostly resigned or at least unorganized, the minority is

[4] A. T. Shtromas, "Dissent and Political Change in the Soviet Union," in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (12), Summer/Autumn 1978, pp. 220–21, 274.

in no danger. In some ways, too, the structure is self-restorative. If the regime feels threatened, it is all the more constrained to place in positions of power persons of total loyalty. It can make many small concessions, correcting abuses and satisfying grievances, without giving away any real power. If the state displays a modicum of flexibility and the intelligence to attend to, or to seem to attend to, the most urgent demands while binding its supporters by special status, it appears invulnerable. The economic disaster of collectivization brought no move to oust Stalin, much less the Party: to defuse the violent opposition, it sufficed to allow the peasants to retain garden allotments.

Maoism was an economic failure for 20 years, but the adoration of Mao remained hyperbolic, in fact greatest in the later years of poorer performance. Failure may wed the cadres more firmly to the Party, because it makes it harder for them to look elsewhere for a livelihood, just as corruption makes it more necessary to uphold the system so as to escape retribution. Hence the Party is far more concerned with disloyalty than with the use of power for private benefit.

These priorities greatly help the Party to maintain its precious unity. Infighting there has been in most or all communist systems, inevitably where there is a contest for supremacy; but this has had little effect in softening or weakening the system. An ordinary dictator cannot usually liquidate his allies, landholders, generals, or whatever, because they have a base of their own in society. Stalin, however, or Kim Il-song could annihilate any group he could defeat within the Party because it had no ground outside the Party. Thus the followers of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Trotsky and Bukharin, in the late 1920s, and of Malenkov and Molotov in the 1950s, could be quite destroyed by Stalin or Khrushchev because their only strength lay in the Party. Even the Workers' Opposition in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s could not call on the support of the workers for whom it spoke. In the first place, it was hindered by the fact that the Workers' Oppositionists, like those whom they denounced, owed their position in the trade unions to force and fraud. More importantly, it was out of the question to appeal to genuine workers. For a communist to look for support from the masses or any non-Party source would threaten the basis of the regime. It is even undesirable and dangerous for a communist leader (other than the chief) to enjoy personal popularity.

IN such ways, the communist system parallels conventional military organization; and communist states, especially in their youth, have been distinguished by their military excellence. In the systematic and purposeful use of violence, loyalty and dedication are of supreme importance; and the communists have the military advantage in that cohesion and discipline are postulates of their system. This shows itself most clearly under relatively primitive conditions, where technology, in which the communists are not very strong, is less important than organized personal relations, in which they excel. Thus the communists do best at guerrilla warfare, as in Vietnam, and at underground

resistance, as in occupied Europe during the Second World War, where they came to lead the field nearly everywhere. They have also performed magnificently in regular battles in the Soviet Union, Korea, and Vietnam in particular. They do not fare so well with guerrilla warfare, when the boot is on the other foot (e.g. in Afghanistan).

War, calling upon the strengths of communism, at the same time reinforces them. Thus the civil war tempered the Soviet Party in 1918–20, and civil and anti-Japanese war fortified the Chinese Party over a period of many years. Most striking was the re-invigoration of the Soviet Party by the Second World War. The Stalinist state had become a corrupt despotism as the numbing purges ran out on the eve of the war, and the state showed miserable weakness in the 1939–40 conflict with Finland and the first weeks of the Hitlerian onslaught. But it responded to the invasion and the challenge to do what it was best prepared to do, renewed itself, and went on to perform very well on the battlefield and in the post-war reconstruction. Communist states pay enormous attention to the memory of war not only for morale-building but because those are the glorious times when the system really functioned well.

The communists also have the military advantage in that they can command almost unlimited sacrifices, not only from the cadres but from the civilian population. Indeed, Spartanism, self-denial for everybody in the name of the highest ideal (the preservation of the system), fits the communist system very well. Communism is at its finest struggling under great privations and pressures. If the American government had understood this, it would not have assumed that a sufficient rain of bombs would make the North Vietnamese turn reasonable and sue for peace. The bombing helped the communists.

SINCE the determination of a few to wield power is far more important than the approval of the people, the communist state rests less on legitimacy, or the general acceptance of its rightness and authority, than on illegitimacy, the feeling on the part of those in power that they must use power arbitrarily in order to assure their survival. If the communist state felt itself legitimate, it would be less troubled by a little criticism and would permit people to leave its jurisdiction. (To these and other generalizations, Yugoslavia became an exception because Tito, after the break with Stalin, sought and achieved popular support and legitimization by turning away from standard communist policies.) It would encourage contacts between its citizens and foreigners. The legitimate communist state would let people engage freely in activities that are useful to others, such as cultivating lemons in Georgia and selling them in Moscow or repairing taps for a sum of money. It would not worry about the practice of religion or the formation of clubs. In his memoirs Khrushchev expressed the fear, upon the death of Stalin, that popular feeling might rise like a tide to sweep the Party out of power,[5] a fear that

[5] *Khrushchev Remembers* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), p. 323.

would hardly have occurred to him if he had not felt that the masses hated Party rule or at least had good reason to. He also hoped that Soviet socialism would mature to permit free movement and freedom of expression in the manner of modern states,[6] but he apparently did not understand the Soviet system very well; it was neither as shaky as he feared nor as capable of improvement as he hoped.

THE communist states have not only maintained themselves; they have generally shown great capacity for maintaining order. There have been riots and mass protests in communist countries, but they have been news-worthy partly because of their scarcity. Disorders suppressed by troops in Novocherkassk in 1962 and in Lithuania in 1972 have been the chief blemishes on outward Soviet tranquillity for the past 50 years. Stalin's mad terror was borne with resignation, like the excesses of collectivization. The recession of terror after Stalin was greeted with relief, and a few citizens took advantage of the relaxation to publish independent thoughts in *samizdat* or even unfurl a banner in Red Square for a few seconds before the police could pounce on them. But without fuss or difficulty the authorities have brought back a climate of some fear; and one may feel certain that if executions of dissidents were resumed, few would voice their objections aloud. The Poles, with mostly private farming and a powerful unsubjugated Church, were never fully communized; they have caused their rulers more trouble than the people of any other communist state. They took to the streets in 1956, 1970 and 1976, and in 1980–81 began to dream of freedom; but in 1984 the dream seemed to have been suffocated.

The Chinese masses had ample cause for discontent after the failed Great Leap of 1958–59; but the country was thrown into the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–69, not by popular discontent, but by the anger of the Great Helmsman, Mao, who seemed to be losing control of the government. After the rioting had calmed down, control by the military and the Party was as absolute as before. The Hungarians rose against communist rule in 1956 when it was still relatively new and seemed discredited by de-Stalinization, but Soviet forces taught them a bloody lesson, and they have been quiet ever since. In 1968 the Czechs seemed capable of changing the nature of their regime, but the Soviets cut short the experiment; and the Czechs, like the Hungarians and others, were taught the lesson that communism is distinguished by the capacity to apply force to politics.

THE apparent irreversibility of communist systems is the more remarkable because it goes directly counter to the principal long-term trends inherent in the development of modern civilization since the Renaissance and the scientific-industrial revolution. These include trends towards empirical rationality, free circulation of information, personal

[6] *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1974), p. 84.

autonomy, legality, and representative and responsible government—trends whose importance is attested by the Leninists' claims to fulfil them, to represent the height of reason and science applied to society, to provide the fullest democracy, and to guarantee the fullest freedom. The rise of science and industry required the loosening of mental shackles and political controls to permit inquiry, innovation and initiative. A progressive modern state, as generally understood prior to the advent of communism, presupposed a free flow of information, pluralism, and latitude for enterprise. Yet the communist state frankly rejects " bourgeois objectivity " in favour of politically determined truth, strongly controls and censors communications, is inhospitable to unofficial initiatives of any kind, and manages all aspects of the economy as far as is feasible. It seeks modernization by methods contrary to those that promoted modernization in the past. Communism might even be called the political negation of modernization. This was clearest in the Maoist preference for " Redness " over expertise, not to speak of the de-urbanization of Kampuchea and the destruction of its educated class; but everywhere communism distrusts free intellectual activity while desiring its material fruits.

ALMOST synonymous with the growth of scientific-industrial civilization has been the development of well-defined legal, instead of more arbitrary, traditional or political relations. But the communist order unabashedly, even proudly, places the will of the governing power (theoretically expressive of the workers) over " bourgeois " concepts of law or constitution. The direction of history in the West since the invention of the printing press has been towards the emancipation of the individual from obligatory beliefs (freedom of religion), from foreign domination (the independence of the nation-state and national self-determination) and from economic rigidities (freedom of contract and occupation, security of property). Communist states have gone determinedly in the opposite direction, imposing an obligatory faith, maintaining firm foreign domination in many places (in an era when the old colonial empires have entirely fallen apart), compelling people to work for approved enterprises, sometimes fixing them to the workplace or the land as rigidly as serfs in the Middle Ages. Broadly, the ethos of the modern age is democratic, and egalitarianism is the modern mode. Yet the primary axiom of communism is anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian. It de-modernizes a modern society.[7]

The fixed grip of communist regimes, moreover, seems little affected by massive social and economic change, in defiance of theories that relate political institutions to industrialization, mass communications, literacy, and so forth. This is more apparent in the Soviet Union. Leninism came to a Russia that was overwhelmingly agricultural, 80 per cent rural, and mostly illiterate. The country has been largely industrialized, urbanized,

[7] H. Gordon Skilling, " Development or Retrogression," in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (15), Spring/Summer 1982, pp. 124–30.

and made literate, yet the Party is much more firmly in charge now than it was 60 years ago. Likewise, such formerly rather backward areas as Romania and North Korea have done much the same; but the rule of the Party has evidently only been strengthened thereby.

JUST as the communist establishment maintains itself tenaciously despite changes of conditions, so it prevails over a very wide range of countries of very different backgrounds, from Vietnam to Russia, from East Germany to Cuba. In such diverse states, the systems of control, ideology and management are recognizably similar—as they boast in calling one another " brother socialist " states. It is true that in a number of these diverse states, including the most highly industrialized, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the communist regime was imposed from without and very likely would not be viable without the presence of Soviet armed forces. But the governments of these states, however unpopular or anti-national, have been able to keep order, put on a show of compliance, and even secure (somewhat uneven) economic growth. Under any other system, the proud nations of Eastern Europe, subject to foreign domination and an alien political system, would have seethed against it to a far greater extent.

The communist system is so little influenced by economic factors and has such breadth because its primary component, the concentration of power, is a universal in human society and psychology: despotic courts, from Genghis Khan's to Hitler's, have had a good deal in common. Nonetheless, since the communist system goes counter to basic trends of modernization, it cannot be expected to prosper indefinitely in a modern society. In effect, Marxism-Leninism, like other totalitarian movements, has demonstrated that something approaching slavery is possible and practical in the contemporary world. But the fact that it is shown to be practical in forced labour camps does not imply a genuinely viable state. The structure so well equipped for violence is less well adapted to constructive rule; if it were not, the movement started by Lenin would have long since over-flooded the earth.

The most important shortcoming is the choking of productivity and technological innovation by centralized control. It is evident throughout the communist sphere that economic prosperity, in which borrowing looms very large, has run down, and in some places has become negative. Even if the planning at the top were excellent, the state lacks the ability to manage effectively the range of operations that the communist state is resolved to manage.

Another weakness arises from the very stability of the system. Once post-revolutionary turmoil is past, leaders seem to have title to their posts. Presidents and Prime Ministers have an uncertain hour upon the stage, but General Secretaries usually remain as long as they can breathe. The same applies to some extent to their assistants, because outside the system there is no place for those well-placed in it. The state calcifies as everyone strives to make himself secure. The principle is even extended

to ordinary workers, who are almost immune to dismissal. There is no discipline of flux. This in turn implies susceptibility to the diseases of corruption in many forms, as people feel free to use their positions for profit.

A more strictly political weakness is that the communist state has no regularized bureaucracy or a civil service based on merit. If persons won important positions in accordance with objective criteria and had security of tenure, they would owe their standing not to the Party, but to their own qualities and efforts and would be potentially independent. Presumably their capabilities would continue to be valuable in another political system, and they would have no reason to be horrified of change. Communist states may, of course, promote individuals of high ability; but they are never really trusted in so far as they are merely technocrats, and they are always vulnerable to political disfavour. Since political power is arbitrary, it can hardly be allocated in any regular fashion. For this reason and because of the need for an arbiter able to make decisions in the purely political relations at the highest level, communist systems seem to require a single strong head at the apex, a leader usually exalted as a symbol of the Party.

THE politicized structure also encourages rigidity. After the early days of revolutionary enthusiasm and semi-charismatic leadership have passed, it becomes more and more difficult to carry through any changes seriously threatening to any important group of functionaries. Khrushchev failed; his pragmatic successors have avoided trouble by not trying. Leaders of other communist states have seldom ventured more than modest tinkering with malfunctioning systems, and as years pass they seem ever less inclined to do so. The state rests on the general conviction of its power-holding beneficiaries that it represents the best possible world for them. To injure them brings the *raison d'être* of the system into question, not only for the victims but also for all who have come to count on the rewards of unquestioning loyalty.

It is difficult to liberalize or open up in ways that would better adapt to modern conditions. For example, it would obviously be beneficial for public morale and the legitimacy of Party rule to hold contested elections. Even if all candidates were Party-approved and represented similar philosophies, an open competition of personalities would enliven the now only ceremonial " elections." But in such a contest, winners would owe their places partly to the voters and their own merits, not wholly to the favour of the Party.

It is obvious that consumers would be better served by allowing much small-scale private enterprise, especially in the services; but where some is permitted, it is perpetually harassed. As soon as it prospers, the Party ideologues—who are not philosophers of Marxism-Leninism but watchdogs of Party interests—raise the alarm of creeping capitalism, not because anyone is being exploited but because it suggests possibilities of a good living outside the Party framework, and hence makes loyalty less

essential. A less prosperous but more controlled society is preferable to a more prosperous but less controlled one. Similarly the inefficient collective farms cannot be broken up. It is often said that they are kept for ideological reasons, but a great variety of arrangements could easily be squared with the ideology, such as the small collectives favoured shortly after the revolution or individual cultivation with cooperative ownership of machinery. Soviet peasants have often shown that they can double harvests when less submerged in the collective, but the collective farms are in effect the property of the Party bosses and not to be surrendered. To dissolve them would deprive supervisory functionaries of their function; worse, it might permit people to prosper independently of the Party and so reduce both the Party role and the compulsion to conformity. One may surmise that Castro " socialized " shoeshine boys and street vendors to drive home the totality of rule and to maximize opportunities for Party management. For similar reasons, the communist rulership is relatively unperturbed by gross failures. Whatever the state of the economy, the state fulfils its chief purpose for the élite; reform is correspondingly not essential. Structural rigidities make even technical innovation difficult. The communist states were once catching up with the West in technology; in recent years they have been slipping farther behind.

THE basic weakness of communism as a political system is different, however. Its success requires an ideological vision, accepted by the élite especially but also to some extent by the common folk. Dedication to the faith checks corruption, makes central direction of the economy workable, helps the promotion of talent, and makes some reform possible. By now, the broader idealism of the movement is reduced to make-believe and cant repetition, as states that cannot keep their people in food make an ever less eager pretence of representing the higher social order and the way to Utopian abundance. For the masses, the inspiration of Marxism-Leninism has been buried under the mass of failure, fraud, and cruelties committed in its name. For the children of the élite, it is no longer a magic uplift but a boring status quo. The revolutionary or pseudo-revolutionary doctrine becomes anomalous where change is no longer permissible, and the state and society become conservative. Russians, for example, are overtaken with sentimental fondness for peasant life, and anti-semitism edges out anti-capitalism. Russian readers are uninterested in anything the Party stands for: industry; factory workers; Party affairs, and so on. They love detective stories, science fiction, war stories, and tales of the village and the suffering people.

Power dessicates all faiths, and the Marxist-Leninist faith used as a crutch of the state is even more subject to exhaustion than most, because its materialism lacks emotional depth and its key concept, class struggle, is inappropriate for the settled and increasingly conservative society.

The system tends also to undo itself as the nature of the élite changes. Those tempered by the shared revolution are replaced by careerists

striving to please superiors. Social mobility comes to an end. The new possessors come to feel entitled to their privileges and less gratefully bound to the Party. The new generation consists not of people from nowhere who owe everything to political superiors, but of the offspring of the new class, who feel entitled to everything they get by virtue of family and education. The strength derived from raising people from low to high status is lost. Elitehood becomes hereditary in a new nobility, with the timeless problems of class rule. The incoming generation has a weaker commitment to the system, feels less compelled to justify status by performance, and is freer to demand change, perhaps in the name of the ideals routinely taught. Many, like the offspring of aristocrats elsewhere, reject parental models.

Consequently, the ruling Party gradually loses its capacity to govern in the old, revolutionary way. This has two major consequences. One is that the state becomes less purposeful and effective, while independent forces—the black or grey market economy, ethnic and religious groups, independent writers, and the like, gather importance. Sectors of the élite may become associated with non-political or deviant groups or policies; in the Soviet Union, for example, the Armenian or Tadzhik branches of the Party come to identify more with Armenia or Tadzhikistan. The reward system becomes privatized, and holders of political position seek the satisfaction of private wealth and material independence. The mobilizing regime becomes immobile.

The other result of the debilitation of the Party is less reliance on political means of control—the monopoly of organization and propaganda—and more on the instruments of force, the police and the military. Force is perhaps not used more—Stalin's terror belongs to the past—but it is less rationalized in ideological terms, and the Party looks to the armed forces to do its work of organizing and inspiring the citizens, if not actually running the government. By corollary, the share of the military in the national product grows steadily. The displacement of Party by military authority has gone farthest in Poland, where the Communist Party lost control almost completely in 1980–81 and was compelled to call on General Jaruzelski and the army to save the regime, at the price of replacing many Party bosses with army officers.

The Soviet Union is slowly going in the same direction, although it has not suffered the same breakdown of authority as Poland. Brezhnev, who made himself a marshal, surrounded himself with military men to a much larger degree than Khrushchev. It is appropriate that his successor rose as head of the KGB, a semi-military organization. Under Chernenko the same trends continue. Symbolically, Molotov has been rehabilitated. The military share of the national income increases inexorably.

THE decay of Party rule thus leads not towards liberalization but towards a less thoroughgoing authoritarianism, in which the armed forces play a major, if not yet the leading, role as in the large majority of Third World countries. With the development of vested interests, the

declining communist state may come to a sort of feudalism, which is a system of fixed economic and political relations. The Party will certainly endeavour to remain at the centre of things, but it will probably become more of an administrative apparatus and lose—barring external violence—the ability to move anything. The General Secretary may stand at the top of society and enjoy pre-eminence but not much real sway, like a feudal monarch, with a hollow echo of the power of a Lenin or Stalin to change the structure of the country. The historical sequence may be one " from socialism to feudalism."

The decadence of communism has been rapid by historical standards, doubtless because of the great ability of the system to shield itself from refreshing and renovating influences—indeed, from any external influences. It will probably continue to lose dynamism and vitality, as it has during past decades, presumably to the point where it no longer bears a recognizable resemblance to what Lenin intended. The general political principle, the ruthless and thoroughgoing use of power to keep power in the hands of those whose sole possession it is, is as old as history, and will doubtless continue to be prominent in the political universe in one form or another; but the peculiar Marxist-Leninist embodiment of it, arising from the Russian revolution, will in historical terms probably be brief.

Soviet Joking Matters

Six Leaders in Search of Character

Dora Sturman

THE collection of jokes, six of whose sections form the basis of this article, has been compiled since 1956. However, some earlier jokes are also included in it, which bears witness to their vitality. The owner of the collection, Dr S. A. Tictin, wrote down all the jokes that continued to circulate because they had not lost their relevance.[1]

There is some foundation for suggesting that the older the joke, the more specifically it reflects true historical incidents. Yet, it would appear that today the joke has strayed rather a long way from its original factographical authenticity. If you do find particular historical incidents in a joke (for example Lenin's speech from the armoured car in April 1917, or his participation in the first communist day of free voluntary labour – the *Subbotnik*), they are given such a derisive interpretation that they lose all historical precision:

> " Vladimir Ilyich, let's drink!"
> " No, old man, I don't touch the stuff any more. I remember how once in April '17 I had one too many; they carted me off to the Finland Station and I climbed up on to an armoured car and rattled off such a load of old nonsense that even now I blush to think of it! . . ."

Yet, whatever the current style, the Soviet political joke, and in particular the widespread jokes about the various leaders (i.e. *Vozhd'ya*)—a veritable " Vozhdiada "—without doubt does reflect historical reality. The most contrived subjects and situations are infused with a certain " typical and universal significances."

Born earlier than *samizdat*, the joke antedates the uncensored written stories about Soviet life. Under Stalin you could get 10 years in a labour camp for telling jokes. More recently, the authorities began to put people in prison for it again. Under Andropov, Leningrad-born Irina Tsurkova got three years for telling jokes. But even in the years of the Great Terror they did not manage to suppress their flow and spontaneous circulation – from Party meetings to labour camps. Today, they are rolling like an avalanche.

To give an exhaustive report of the jokes devoted to the six top Kremlin bosses one would have to publish an entire anthology, and this cannot be accomplished within a journal article. Here certain general observations only will be made, with an exposition of the characteristic types of each leader's " joke cycle."

[1] Apart from the jokes in S. A. Tictin's collection, I have used materials from the collections of Y. Telesin (Jerusalem), N. Olin (" Radio Yerevan Speaking ") and some other sources.

STALIN was an ominous and frightening figure who did not exactly conjure up comical associations. But the Soviet political joke has a surprising ability to make fun of the most terrible phenomena of real life. It is not plain laughter, but an inimical smirk that lays bare the very essence of the phenomenon. A gloomy sarcasm adorns practically all the jokes about Stalin. Jokes about Stalin of the 1920s, '30s and '40s, were still doing the rounds, tempered with time, when we began our collection. The genre of tight, satirical miniature transposes badly on to paper and this loss cannot be made up. For example, how can one get across the irony of Jewish intonation in the telegram sent by Trotsky to the Central Committee in response to its demand that he recognize the correctness of Stalin? The telegram reads:

> Stalin is the leader I am not the leader Stalin is right I am wrong I should apologize.

But this is how it should be read:

> " Stalin is the leader—I am *not* the leader?! Stalin is right—I am *wrong*?! I should apologize!!"

That final " I should apologize " denotes: " Not likely!" Just try and convey this idiomatic Odessan sense without the appropriate intonation. How to convey in writing Stalin's immutable Georgian accent, or Lenin's soft burr which are made good use of in the jokes? Or the confused articulation of Khrushchev and Brezhnev?

A feeling of Stalin's sinister essence had been evoked in the people already in the 1920s. In the mid-'20s the following joke was in circulation:

> Stalin is making a speech to the workers: " I am ready to give my blood drop by drop to the cause of the working class."
> An anonymous note from the floor: " Dear Iosif Vissarionovich! Why hold back? Give all of it to us right away!"

In the 1930s:

> Rabinovich goes to the October revolution anniversary parade with a banner: " Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for a happy childhood!"
> A Party organizer runs up to him: " What are you doing, taking the mickey? Look here, you are a very old man indeed: when you were a child, Stalin hadn't even been born yet!"
> " That's why I'm saying ' thank you ' to him!"

In the same series there is the joke about the man who called Stalin—his father, and Soviet Power—his mother. In response to the question: what is your biggest wish?, he replies: " to be a complete and utter orphan." Or there is the one about the devils—who run away from hell the day that Stalin arrives.

The anonymous authors of these jokes did not surrender to the hypnotic influence of the all-pervasive cult of Stalin in these years; as they concocted these and similar biting vignettes, they rehabilitated the nation with their spiteful laughter.

IN the terrible '30s, the name of Stalin was dragged literally into every question, every event, public figure and action. Stalin's approving attitude to this hideous phenomenon did not escape the creators of jokes. They sensed his hidden initiative in the forging of the cult of his own personality. In 1937 the centenary of Pushkin's death was observed throughout the country. At that time the following joke sprang up:

> Various designs for a monument to Pushkin are being presented to Stalin as the supreme judge. The first design shows Pushkin reading Byron:
>
> " This is truly historical, but it is not truly political: where is the universal line of our Party?" asks Stalin in a thick Georgian accent.
>
> The second design is of Pushkin reading Stalin:
>
> " This one is truly political, but it is not truly historical," says Stalin. " There were no books by Comrade Stalin at that time."
>
> The design that turned out to be both truly historical and political was the third one: Stalin reading Pushkin. . .

These same '30s gave rise to jokes about Stalin and the Stalinist tendency to rewrite history (creating an Orwellian situation). Thus the story about Stalin reprimanding Krupskaya for sympathizing with the opposition: he threatens her that he will revise Lenin's biography and will appoint Stasova or Zemlyachka as his widow. . .

The monstrous self-denunciations of the accused in the Stalinist trials, which it would seem hardly contained even a grain of humour, likewise did not avoid being reproduced in jokes.

> Stalin's pipe goes missing. He summons Beria. " Why is it that everything you have gets lost, Lavrenty?" asks Stalin with suspicion. Beria turns pale and two hours later he telephones:
>
> " Forty-seven people have been arrested. The investigation is being conducted by my first deputy." An hour later, Stalin notices that the little brush for cleaning out his pipe has disappeared. . .
>
> At the end of the day, Beria reports: " I have arrested 75 suspects. I am personally carrying out the investigation."
>
> The next morning, the cleaner finds all the things that were lost—they had fallen down behind the sofa. Stalin rings Beria: " No need to look any further, Lavrenty . . . The things have been found."
>
> " Pity, Iosif Vissarionovich," says Beria, aggrieved. " All except one have already confessed . . ."

Long before Stalin's refined individual slyness had been disclosed (if only in his daughter's books), jokes were being made about this particular quality of his. In one of them, Stalin is receiving Pushkin; he hears out his grievances and there and then orders his personal attendant to carry out all the poet's requests immediately. As Pushkin, now a happy man, is on his way out, Stalin lifts the telephone receiver: " Comrade d'Anthès? Comrade Pushkin has just left!" he tells Pushkin's slayer.

In the old jokes about Stalin, there is an inclination, only scarcely hinted at, to blame the security " organs " and not the *Vozhd'* for the mass persecutions. People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov,

complains to Stalin about the hounding of his wife: " Comrade Yezhov must have some material on her," Stalin says to him. " Yezhov has material on you too, Comrade Stalin," replies Litvinov.

But this strain is drowned in the flood of jokes which present Stalin as being the initiator and perpetrator both of the great famine of the early '30s and of the ensuing mass persecutions. Characteristically the jokes do not oppose Stalin to Lenin, and do not present Lenin as a happy beginning.

AFTER the disclosures of 1956, Stalin's name began to figure increasingly often in jokes to do with the actions of his successors. Time and again good use is made of the latters' manipulations of the corpse of Stalin (" Wheresoever the Party orders—there shall I lay "). They deride the blatant unwillingness of the post-Stalin Central Committee to investigate in all seriousness Stalin's criminal deeds: their origins, scope and consequences.

> " Criticism and self-criticism are a great strength in us: we criticized Comrade Stalin at the 20th Party Congress and he reformed. And now, please God, let everyone be as good a Marxist as Stalin." (An anecdotal paraphrase of Khrushchev's well-known formulation.)

The posthumous jokes often stress the continuity between Stalin and his heirs:

> Stalin left three wills in sealed envelopes. On the first was written: "To be opened immediately." It read: " Lay me to rest in the Mausoleum." They laid him there. On the second envelope it said: " To be opened when things get bad." Seeing the ruination of agriculture (1954), they opened the envelope and read: " Put all the blame on me." So, at the 20th Party Congress, they did put all the blame on him. On the third envelope was written: " To be opened when things get very bad." They opened it at the time of the Hungarian uprising (1956) and read: " Do everything as I would do." And, indeed, they did everything as he would have done . . .

Another joke about continuity—this time between Stalin and Brezhnev:

> In 1965 Brezhnev calls up the ghost of Stalin and asks: " Comrade Stalin, what should we do about Sinyavsky?"
> " Which Sinyavsky is this? The radio announcer?"
> " No, Comrade Stalin, it's the writer who . . ."
> " But what do you need two Sinyavskys for?" interrupts Stalin.

Generally speaking, many of the jokes about Stalin are feeble and heavy-handed and not very subtle. It is as though the morbid, crushing figure of Stalin, which could hardly attract anything funny, is reflected in their quality, unless it is a case of Black Humour:

> An old man goes every day to the newspaper stand, looks at the first page of *Pravda*, but never buys the paper. The paper vendor gets impatient and scolds the old man: " What are you doing?" The old man replies: " I am looking for an obituary." " But obituaries are not

on the first page of *Pravda*," exclaims the news vendor. " The one I am looking for will be," says the old man.

In contrast to his predecessor, Khrushchev really had rather a lot in him that was comical, although he also shared responsibility for Stalinist crimes and the creation of Stalin's absolute power. Apparently Khrushchev sincerely believed in the USSR's ability to overtake the West in economic development relatively quickly, to achieve a fantastic abundance, and to build in a couple of decades the technical base for communism. His euphoric optimism and unassailable self-assurance were considerably helped by his ignorance. His reforms did not touch the basic principles of the Soviet system. " Radio Armenia " captured the very essence of this in a laconic exchange:

" How would you describe Khrushchev's reforms?"
" They are like injections of medicine into a wooden leg."

All kinds of jokes poke fun both at Khrushchev's innovations and at his lack of education.

Khrushchev and Bulganin are flying in an aeroplane:
" I am going to throw a hundred-ruble note out of the window," says Bulganin. " Someone will find it and it will make him happy . . ."
"Then I'm going to throw out a whole thousand in ten ruble notes," says Khrushchev. ' I'll make lots of people happy . . ."
" Well, boys, if I throw the pair of you out—it would make the entire nation happy!" says the pilot. (1956)

A drunken war veteran is waving a newspaper in the street and shouting:
" Long live Comrade Khrushchev! Long live Comrade Khrushchev!"
" Look, a cult of personality is starting up again," grumbles a passer-by.
" Long live Comrade Khrushchev on my pension!" concludes the drunk. (1956)

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" Why was Nina Khrushchev sent out from Moscow?"
" Because she was keeping a wild boar in the town centre!" (1957)

An exchange:
" Have you stocked up on soap and washing-powder yet?"
" No, why what's going on?"
" Well, now Khrushchev has begun to reorganize the chemical industry!"

There is a military salute in Tbilisi. One Georgian asks the other:
" What are those shots?"
" Khrushchev has arrived."
" You mean they couldn't get him in one?" (1961)

How times have changed in the span of one five-year plan: in 1952 someone said that Stalin was an idiot and he was shot the very same day; recently someone announced that Khrushchev was an idiot and he got eight years for divulging a state secret! (1957)

Khrushchev is looking at a famous art exhibition at the Manège in Moscow:
" What's that stupid square with the red dots supposed to be?"
" That is a Soviet factory and the workers, Nikita Sergeevich."
" And what's that bit of old canvas smothered in green and yellow meant to be?"
" That is a field of corn . . ."
" And what's that arsehole with ears?"
" That . . . that is a mirror, Nikita Sergeevich!"

A man was arrested for telling jokes and was brought to Khrushchev.
" What furniture! What carpets!" enthused the man.
" Soon everyone in our country will have such things," says Khrushchev.
" It's one or the other," says the man, " either you tell the jokes or I will! . . ." (1959)

There were dozens of such jokes. The ones here are few but typical. They did not cease to be made up even after Khrushchev " dived into the Black Sea a Prime Minister and came out a pensioner " (1964). Here are some of the jokes that emerged after Khrushchev's retirement.

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" Why don't they issue Khrushchev with a pass?"
" Because he took two people into the Mausoleum but only gave back one . . ." (1964)

There are a great number of jokes about Brezhnev and they multiplied right up until his very death; a " Radio Armenia " joke may serve as an epigraph:

" Do we have a personality cult now?"
" We have a cult but no personality." (1971)

Initially, immediately after Khrushchev's retirement, jokes were going around which associated Brezhnev with Stalin:

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" What do Brezhnev's eyebrows represent?"
" Stalin's moustaches on a higher level."

Or:

" I've had my little joke and that's enough now," says Brezhnev glueing his eyebrows back under his nose. (1965)

This identification was the result of the complete halt to any kind of criticism of Stalin with the arrival of the Brezhnev era.

THE ordinariness of Brezhnev is a source of puzzlement: how did this limited and self-adulating " minor politician of the epoch of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn " (*From the Encyclopaedia of the Twenty-First Century*) acquire his enormous power over the country? Brezhnev comes close to Khrushchev in ignorance. After the American landing on

the moon, he orders Soviet cosmonauts to land on the sun in the shortest possible space of time.

" But the temperatures there are so great it isn't even possible to get near it!" complain the scientists.

" Then make the landing at night," orders Ilyich the Second.

Brezhnev's inarticulate way of speaking, the result either of a speech defect or his lack of education, is endlessly made fun of.

A question to " Radio Armenia ":

" Will Brezhnev be given the title of Generalissimo?"

" He will. And what is more if he manages to say the word ' Generalissimo ' he will also be given the title of People's Artist."

According to the jokes, ignorance in the potential Generalissimo goes hand in hand with an impenetrable dimwittedness.

A question to " Radio Armenia ":

" Could Lieutenant Ilyin having made an attempt on Brezhnev at the Kremlin's Borovitsky Gate then hit his chauffeur?"

" Yes, by ricocheting off Brezhnev's forehead."

In the 1970s, supplies of goods to the population grew worse; this gave rise to a flood of jokes about Brezhnev:

Radio Armenia recommends gateau " Brezhnev " to housewives. " Let us have the recipe," the housewives ask. " It's the same as gateau ' Napoleon,' only without the eggs."

The jokes make fun of Brezhnev's sybaritism, of his passion for luxury motor cars, for valuable *objets* and quality items.

A summit meeting is taking place. There is a break for cigarettes. De Gaulle takes out a silver cigarette-case. On it is the inscription: " To General de Gaulle—France, in gratitude."

Johnson gets out a gold cigarette-case. It is engraved: " To Lyndon from your loving wife."

Brezhnev opens a platinum cigarette-case with diamonds scattered all over it. On it is the inscription, practically worn-smooth with age: " To His Imperial Majesty and Sovereign Alexander II from the Russian noblemen."

Or take this story which circulated in Moscow after the kidnapped Czechoslovak leaders were sent home in August 1968. When they were gone, Brezhnev turned to Kosygin: " What a first-class watch Dubcek was wearing!" " Oh, let's see it!" asks Kosygin.

The same point recurs in many other jokes.

Brezhnev's mother comes to Moscow to visit her son. After seeing his suites of rooms filled with expensive things, his servants in attendance, his garages full of luxurious foreign motor cars, she bursts into tears: " Oh, Lyonechka, my son! What will become of us if the Reds come back again?!"

In one of the jokes Brezhnev is getting ready to have an operation to widen his ribcage—there isn't enough room on his uniform for his medals.

The indefatigable " Radio Armenia " wants to know:
" Where was the epicentre of the last earthquake?"
" Beneath the hanger from which Brezhnev's jacket fell."

Tormented with fears, Brezhnev has a dream: " Czechs and Slovaks have gathered in Red Square and have started to eat *matzohs* with chopsticks." Another nightmare: " The Chinese have learnt to fight like Jews, and the Jews—to multiply like the Chinese." (1970)

The barber who is cutting Brezhnev's hair keeps on asking him questions about Poland. In the end, Brezhnev gets annoyed and says:

" Why do you keep asking me all these questions about Poland?"
" It helps me in my work. Any talk about Poland makes your hair stand on end," replies the barber. (1981)

The jokes of the second half of the 1970s and early '80s persistently underline Brezhnev's growing senility and decrepitude:

" I can remember everything that happened without me!" croons Brezhnev as he signs his memoirs *Small Earth*. " Dear Leonid Ilyich speaking!" he answers when the telephone rings. Someone knocks at Brezhnev's door. He rummages for a long time among a pile of papers, finds what he is looking for, goes to the door and reads out: " Who's there?" In 1980 the Olympic Games were held in Moscow. Opening the 1980 Olympiad, Brezhnev announces: " O-O-O-O-O-!" " Leonid Ilyich, that is the Olympic emblem. The text of the welcoming address is lower down!" whispers the master of ceremonies.

Brezhnev meets Margaret Thatcher and reads out from a piece of paper:
" My dear and most respected Mrs Indira Gandhi! . . ."
" Leonid Ilyich, this is Margaret Thatcher," someone informs him.
" My dear and most respected Mrs Indira Gandhi!" he reads out again. Again he is put right.
" I can tell that this is Margaret Thatcher myself, but can't you see what's written down here?" snaps Brezhnev and reads from the piece of paper again:
" My dear and most respected Mrs Indira Gandhi . . ."

Here is one of the last jokes before Brezhnev died—it is Brezhnev's oration at the funeral meeting in memory of Suslov:

" We must award to Comrade Pelshe the highest decoration, for he is the most chivalrous man in the Politburo. When the orchestra struck up at Comrade Suslov's funeral, he was the only one to stand up and ask the widow for a dance." (1982)

Not long before Brezhev's death a joke emerged which foretold his successor. At the Party forum Brezhnev, as always, was making his speech from a piece of paper:

" Today we are seeing off on his final journey a loyal son of our Party (he reads more slowly) General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (still more slowly) Marshal of the Soviet Union,

President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Leonid (pause) Ilyich (pause) Brezhnev! . . ." He looks at the piece of paper tensely, looks down at his clothes: " Sorry, comrades, I have put on Comrade Andropov's jacket again!" (Summer 1982)

Another joke of this period referred to the mechanism of succession. A question to " Radio Armenia ":

" What were Brezhnev's last words?"
" Yuri, don't touch the heart machine." (1982)

The jokes still mocked him after his death:

" Have you heard, Brezhnev has died?"
" What? Personally?"

One cannot help but observe that the jokes devoted to Brezhnev are on insubstantial topics. Most of them have no connection with any kind of historical–political events. The jokes mock the personal characteristics of their disrespected leader, under whose rule for 18 years the country slowly and steadily slipped into neo-Stalinism. And his qualities themselves were a poor education, a primitive self-obsession, petty vainglory . . .

There was a downpour of funny quips and then instantaneous oblivion after this epitaph: " Brezhnev has died. In fact he died a long time ago, only Chernenko never told him . . ." (November 1982)

NO sooner was Brezhnev buried than a torrent of jokes appeared devoted to his sucessor. By contrast with Western Sovietologists who rushed to create the new science of " Andropology," creators of the jokes about Andropov right from the start did not feed on illusions about the new General Secretary's intellectualism and liberalism. An old joke resurfaced, this time directed at Andropov. In this joke, a foreign correspondent wants to know whether the people will follow Andropov.

" If they don't follow me, they'll follow Brezhnev," Andropov replies.

There was just such an exchange between the late Lenin and Stalin, then in power, in an earlier joke.

In the jokes about Andropov, his KGB past was invariably invoked. His rise was perceived as strengthening the security " organs ": " There has been a sexual revolution in the USSR," says the joke. " The ' organs ' have come to power."

At the Central Committee Plenum:
After his unanimous election as General Secretary, Andropov announces: " When you have voted, you may lower your arms and come away from the wall!"

Or the story about the newly-elected General Secretary who comes on the television and radio on 31 December 1982 with the following New

Year address: " Dear Comrades! I wish you a very happy 1937!" (1937 is the symbol of Stalinist persecution in the USSR.)

" Have you heard, Andropov's broken an arm?"
" Whose?" (1983)

A number of transformations were ascribed to the new General Secretary: Tseka (the initials of the Central Committee) of the CPSU into Cheka of the CPSU; Kremlin into Andropol; Moscow into Chekago.

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" Which groups did Soviet society divide into after Andropov came to power?"
" Pithecandropovs, Andropoidovs and Misandropovs."

Two new dances became very popular in Poland and the USSR: the Jaruzelka and the Andropolka. In the Jaruzelka you must keep your hands pinned to your sides; in the Andropolka you must keep your hands behind your back.

From 1983 a new unit of time was introduced in the Soviet Union: one Androp—equivalent to ten years.

" Comrade Andropov, the Polish ambassador to see you."
" Convoy him in."

As Andropov increasingly failed to appear at important public occasions, a number of jokes emerged which speculated on the General Secretary's state of health. A question to " Radio Armenia ":

" Is there an Andropov personality cult?"
"There is a cult, but no Andropov." (Autumn 1983)

" Why is it that Brezhnev travelled abroad, but Andropov doesn't?"
" Brezhnev was supplied from a battery, but Andropov is plugged into the mains." (1983)

" Will Andropov live until 1984?"
" In parts."

As the uncertainty about his health grew, " Radio Armenia " was asked:

" What will happen after Andropov's death?"
" Satan will seek political asylum in Heaven."

When Andropov finally died, " Radio Armenia " was again asked:

" What was positive about Andropov's rule?"
" That it was short-lived."

ANDROPOV'S frailty set the tone for the series of jokes devoted to his successor. These jokes were set in motion immediately after the 69-year-old Andropov died and was replaced by the 72-year-old Chernenko. At the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU two resolutions were passed: 1) To elect Comrade Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich, as General Secretary; 2) to bury him in Red Square. (1984)

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" What did Chernenko inherit from Brezhnev?"
" Senility." (1984)

And another:

" Who is being groomed for the post of General Secretary after Chernenko dies?"
" Tikhonov, Ustinov or Gromyko." (1984)

Finally:

" Why did Chernenko lower his hand twice during the funeral ceremony at Andropov's burial?"
" He was indicating: ' Deeper, deeper!' "

When Chernenko came to power the Kremlin was again renamed: from Andropol to Konstantinopol (1984).

Abramovich was called to the Party office before the Mayday celebrations. " As the oldest member of our work collective we are entrusting to you the task of carrying the portrait of Comrade Chernenko at the parade."
" Don't ask me to do this. I carried Lenin's portrait—Lenin died. I carried Stalin's portraits—he died. I carried Khrushchev's portraits—he was kicked out. I carried Brezhnev's portrait—he died. Even quite recently, I carried Comrade Andropov's portrait—and he also died."
" You have golden hands! That is precisely why you must carry Comrade Chernenko's portrait."
One of the workers: " Let him carry the red flag too—the flag of communism!" (1984)

Several jokes were the result of two funerals in relatively quick succession and the possibility of another one on the horizon. Two Party *apparatchiki* meet at Andropov's funeral:

" How come you're here?"
" I got a ticket at the door. What about you?"
" Oh, I've got a season-ticket now."

Brezhnev found out that Andropov had " caught a cold " and wasn't present on the Mausoleum for the October revolution celebrations. He writes to him from the other world: " I've heard that you are getting ready to come over to us, so don't forget to grab a couple of spoons—one for you and one for me."
Soon afterwards, Andropov arrives in the other world.
" Well, did you bring the spoons? Let's have them!"
" Sorry, I forget . . ."
" Oh well, now you'll also have to eat your broth with a hammer and sickle, like us."
" Lenya, write to Konstantin Ustinovich while there's still time." (1984)

Brezhnev meets Andropov in the other world.
" Well, what do you say, let's drink!"

" No, let's just wait for the third . . ." (1984) (It is a Russian tradition to drink in a threesome.)

STRANGE as this may seem (at first glance), the most wicked of those jokes devoted to Soviet leaders are not about Stalin but about Lenin. The Leninist theme was given new life in the jokes of the late 1950s and reached its apogee in 1970—the year of the Lenin centenary. The major thread of this new cycle of Lenin jokes was to be the aggressive debasing and debunking of the image which was being canonized by an official and still partially popular myth—the image of the ideal revolutionary and the ideal human being.

The earliest jokes, which according to their somewhat aged devotees go back to the beginning of the 1920s, manifest equal animosity for Lenin as they do for Trotsky, and for their deeds (in those years Trotsky enjoyed equal status with Lenin in the jokes devoted to them).

A worker is given a room. Bare walls, except for one which has a nail knocked into it. The only furniture is a portrait of Lenin and one of Trotsky (a gift from the local Party committee).
"I don't know which one to hang and which one to put up on the wall," says the worker. (1921)

The immutable Rabinovich, looking at a placard which says " Lenin died, but his work lives on," sighs:
" It would have been better if you had lived on and your work had died!" (1920s)

In the Lenin Mausoleum a militiaman is saying to the visitors:
" Citizens! Pay your last dues and move along!"
" Do you hear that? After all they've taken away from us, we're still in his debt. How do you like that?" (end of the 1920s)

The total lack of interest in the works of the founding fathers, including Lenin, and the deep indifference to their heritage are cuttingly observed in the jokes of the 1930s.

At the *kolkhoz* ceremonial meeting prizes are being given out for good work:
" For excellent work in the fields, Comrade Ivanova is awarded a sack of grain." (Applause)
" For excellent work on the farm, Comrade Petrova is awarded a sack of potatoes." (Applause)
" For the performance of excellent public services, Comrade Sidorova is awarded the *Collected Works of Lenin!*" (Laughter, applause, exclamation from the hall: " Just the thing for the old whore!) (1930s)

After the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses, the new leadership began an intensive campaign of worship of Lenin to erase from the popular memory the cult of Stalin, to fill the ideological vacuum. The new leadership wanted to demonstrate its continuity not with Stalin, with his " errors " and personal " deficiencies," but with Lenin, whose perfection

was now being ordered to be sung everywhere: from crèches to departments of propaganda and agitation in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

It was convenient to sing the praises of someone long since dead, because there was no possibility that he might compromise himself in some way.

From Khrushchev's time a bond was lastingly forged in Soviet propaganda: Lenin—and whoever was the reigning General Secretary. After each General Secretary's death or retirment, his replacement in the equation by the next successor happens automatically. Brezhnev's name disappeared from the pages of the newspapers the day after the decrees perpetuating his memory were published. At the same time, in the very next editorial of the magazine *National Education*, the name and full title of Andropov were repeated seven times, three of these in direct proximity with the name of Lenin. From the time of Khrushchev's ouster, this operation has engendered in Soviet people a sense of irony and cynical indifference to the reversals of fortune at the heart of the inter-Kremlin leadership struggles. The widespread proliferation of jokes about Lenin is evidence of the fact that a large section of society did not accept the version of Lenin as immortal and ever-beneficent, which was foisted on it by the Kremlin.

THE *Subbotnik*—an exclusively coercive measure (under the guise of being voluntary work), introduced under Lenin—is a source of innumerable jokes. In the 50th anniversary year of Lenin's death a joke then current debunked the legend about " Ilyich carrying the heavy beam on his shoulders " on a *Subbotnik*: the beam turns out to be a rubber inflatable log bequeathed by Lenin to Brezhnev (" the log's the same, but the Ilyich is different ").

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" What different kinds of Easter celebrations are there?"
" There is the Jewish one—Passover—in memory of the Exodus from Egypt; there is the Christian one, in memory of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ; and there is the Soviet one, in memory of how Lenin carried the firewood."

The practice, especially frequent at the end of the 1960s and in the early '70s, of bringing into schools, offices and factory enterprises people who had seen Lenin and who were as though illuminated by the rays of his glory, brought to life a whole row of derisive jokes:

A question to " Radio Armenia ":
" Why has it become fashionable to marry older women?"
" In England because of their social position; in the USA, because of their money; in France, because they are more sexually experienced; in the USSR, because they have seen Lenin."

A Pioneer camp. A participant in the first Leninist *Subbotnik*

begins to reminisce, and he tells about how they were taken from the shop-floor and brought to the *Subbotnik*:

" Then a little chap comes up to me, with a little beard and wearing a cap [Lenin], and he says to me in a soft burr: ' Take a log, Comrade, don't just stand there.' So I sent him on his way. Passing nearby was a tall fellow, thin, wearing an army-coat and also with a little beard. ' Feliks Edmundovich [Dzerzhinsky], take care of him,' says the one with the soft burr, and himself goes off. ' If you don't want to carry logs—then you can chop down the entire forest,' says the thin one. Ten years I spent chopping the forest, languishing in exile, and now look, here I am telling you about the communist *Subbotnik* . . ."

The relentlessness, which forever permeated the tedium of the centenary propaganda, engendered a counter-flow parodying this annoying persistence and unceremoniously debasing Lenin's image.

In the psychiatric hospital the Committee is examining an idiot:

" Your name?"
" Eeee . . ."
" Your surname?"
" Beee . . ."
" Your complaint?"
" Meee . . ."
" And what year is it?"
" Centenary year!!!"

" What is Golda Meir to Lenin—his widow or his sister?"
" Where do you get this one from?"
" Half the day our radio talks about him—half the day about her."

A rabbit runs across the road in front of a bus-load of children. Their mistress asks: " Who is that, children?" The children are silent. " Well, who do we sing so many songs about?" The children (in unison): " It's Grandad Lenin!"

" Radio Armenia " is asked the following question:

" Why were so many factory enterprise managers fired before the Lenin centenary celebrations?"
" Because they went too far. The sculpture factory designed a fountain called ' Lenin's Spurt '; the soap factory issued a soap called ' Round and About in Lenin's Secret Haunts'; the perfume factory put out a scent called ' Lenin's Smell ' and a powder called ' Dust of Lenin '; the children's toy factory made a mausoleum with push-buttons: when you press them Stalin flies out in a little coffin; the watch factory designed a clock fashioned like an armoured car with Lenin as the cuckoo: on the hour Lenin climbs on to the armoured car, rubs his hands together, and says, ' Comrades, the proletarian revolution of which the Bolsheviks dreamed for so long is . . . Cuckoo!'; the bed factory issued a three-person bed called ' Lenin is Always with Us '; the poultry factory gave us ' Lenin's Balls ' (eggs with Lenin's portrait stamped on them); the stationery factory—a fountain-pen called ' Lenin's Style '; and in the park they opened up a rifle range named after Fanny Kaplan [who took a shot at Lenin in 1918]."

THE official myth canonizes the irreproachability of Lenin's life and causes his near-ones and comrades-at-arms, particularly Krupskaya and Dzerzhinsky, to shine in his reflected radiance. The Lenin of the official legend is a puritan and an ascetic. The jokes, however, attribute to Lenin a proclivity for sexual perversions.

" Tell me, Yakov Mikhailovich, is it true that Feliks Edmundovich has been practising the Sin of Onan on the Island?"
" What are you saying, Vladimir Ilyich, he has been studying *Capital* there."
" And that's where he was mistaken, old boy, quite mistaken! It is *the oldest* pastime in the world, I can assure you. And note: it does not detract from the work of the revolution in the slightest. Only for God's sake don't tell Nadezhda Konstantinovna—she is a person with a soul of pure crystal!"

Anything that can bring Lenin down from the heights prescribed by the official propaganda is used as ammunition.

An old Bolshevik is sharing his memories of Lenin: " It was at the 2nd Party Congress. I go to the, pardon me, toilet and our great leader is standing like this modestly to one side, and he is seeing to his little needs. And his eyes looked so kind, so kind! That's how I remember him."

Several of the jokes about Lenin turn to good effect the lack of mercy, little-known among wider audiences, which permeates Lenin's speeches, letters and telegrams of the Soviet era.

" Iosif Vissarionovich, could you for the sake of revolutionary work shoot 10 people?"
" Of course, Vladimir Ilyich!"
" And tell me, old boy, could you shoot 10 thousand, eh?"
" Of course, Vladimir Ilyich!"
" So then, my old friend . . . and if it were necessary for the cause of the revolution to shoot 10 million people? Could you?" At this Lenin screwed up his eyes craftily.
" Of course, Vladimir Ilyich!"
" Oh, no you don't, my good man, at this point we would have taken care of you too!"

Lenin's abstract " class " humanism (which turned into rivers of blood) is reflected in a cynical dialogue in which a thorough knowledge of Lenin's anti-peasant texts can be detected:

A peasant envoy comes to see Lenin:
" Good day, Comrade envoy, sit down! You, of course, are a poor peasant?"
" Well, no, Vladimir Ilyich, not exactly. I have a horse, I do."
" Aha! Then, Comrade, you must be a middle peasant?"
" Yes, Vladimir Ilyich, you could say so as long as I am fed and my children are fed and have shoes to wear, so yes . . . Two horses I've got . . ."
" So, so! Consequently then, Comrade, you must be a *kulak*?"

" Yes, some would say so, Vladimir Ilyich, cabbage soup every day and my children are clothed, so another time the peasant lads will say: ' Yes, Afanasy,' they'll say. ' Yes, you are a *kulak*!'
" Aha! So therefore you are a *kulak*! Hm. Let's see. A *kulak* then! Two horses, yes, shoes for the children, I see. Hm. Feliks Edmundovich [Dzerzhinsky]! Shoot the comrade, please!"
" Vladimir Ilyich, it's already lunch time. Let's shoot him after lunch."
" No, right away. Without fail before lunch. And give his lunch to the starving children!"

Perhaps the cruellest and most spiteful joke in the series about Lenin is the following monologue:

From the memoirs of Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya (for children).
" Dear Children! Lenin's great kindness is known to us all. Now I am going to tell you a story about him. One day, Vladimir Ilyich decided to have a shave, and standing right next to him there was a little boy. Lenin sharpened his razor and glanced at the little boy. Then Lenin shaved, washed out his shaving-brush, and again sharpened his razor, all the time looking at the little boy. Then he wiped the razor and . . . put it back into its case. And just think, he could have slashed the little boy with it!"

We wouldn't be surprised by the joke that " he could have slashed " the little boy's throat with the razor, if we had read carefully Lenin's telegrams about the seizure of *all* grain from those peasants who rose against Bolshevik power, and thus about his sentencing of their children to death by starvation.

OUR excursion into Soviet jokes about Soviet leaders indicates a persistent tendency to debunk the permanent official cult of their personalities. It is not possible to incorporate in full this " Vozhdiada " within the confines of a journal article. It seems that the jokes are not just a safety-valve for impotent malice, unable to influence anything or anyone, but an endeavour which, even at the most terrifying times, does not cease investigating and evaluating what is happening. As such the jokes do not deal only with the past and the present, but they also point to the future.

Sidelights on Soviet Censorship

Vladimir Voinovich

SHORTLY before my departure from Moscow in 1980, a rumour circulated that a just-completed film series based on Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's *Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes* would soon appear on Soviet television. Not long after, though, another rumour circulated that the film had been prohibited and shelved and its producers officially reprimanded for trying to bring what was said to be an " ideologically harmful " work before the general public. This seemed rather strange, because the *Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes* had been published and republished dozens of times in the USSR, and it was hard to imagine just what there might be to find fault with in them now. That quickly became clear, however.

The seditious passage was contained in the very first scene of the first installment in the series, where Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson meet for the first time:

> " How are you?" says Holmes. " You have been in Afghanistan, I perceive." And in response to Watson's astonished query—" How on earth did you know that?"—the world-famous detective explains: " The train of reasoning ran: here is a gentleman of a medical type, but with the air of a military man . . . He has just come from the tropics, for his face is dark, and that is not the natural tint of his skin . . . He has undergone hardship and sickness, as his haggard face shows clearly. His left arm has been injured. He holds it in a stiff and unnatural manner. Where in the tropics could an English army doctor have seen much hardship and got his arm wounded? Clearly in Afghanistan."

Thus a work by the long dead English writer suddenly became controversial and unacceptable from the point of view of the Soviet censors. (By way of making a comparison between two different political systems, it might be pointed out that Conan Doyle's words had to do with the England of his day, and the expansionist war that his country was conducting was spoken about in a forthright manner and not by means of vague allusions. Nevertheless, it did not occur to anyone in England to think of banning the book.) In time, however, the antipathy of the authorities towards the film cooled, and the producers of the series were allowed to change the offending passage in the sound track. And so, instead of mentioning Afghanistan, Sherlock Holmes, in the new version, says: " You have been in a country in the Orient, I perceive." It might be thought that this change, which was based on purely political considerations, would have little or no effect on the artistic quality of the film. But it does! Because, as a literary figure, Sherlock Holmes is remarkable for his ability to pinpoint exactly where someone has been. And when he

is made to say " in a country in the Orient," the approximateness, the impreciseness, of his inference can hardly interest us, for without much effort we could reach the same conclusion ourselves.

IN speaking of Soviet censorship, what is meant first of all is " Glavlit "—the agency responsible for preventing military and state secrets from being made public by the press, radio and television, as well as in literature, films and theatre productions. Glavlit censors have long lists of military units, geographical locations, industrial objects, scientific discoveries and names of persons, references to which are either wholly prohibited in the press or require special permission from Party security organs. These lists become lengthier with each passing year. They include the names of many former Party leaders (from Trotsky to Khrushchev), of numerous writers and dissidents, and of scientists engaged in secret projects. For example, it was forbidden to mention the name of Andrei Sakharov when he was still active in scientific work and was receiving the highest state awards. Later his name was not to be mentioned because of his dissident activities. Today he is mentioned quite often, but only with the approval of the highest Party functionaries, and the references to him are of course derogatory. The list of forbidden names has assumed such catastrophic proportions that the censors sometimes fail to cope with their task. This was demonstrated recently, for example, when the censors allowed the publication of a science-fiction novel by Arthur C. Clarke in which Soviet cosmonauts have the names of Soviet dissidents.

Such errors, allowed to slip into print by Soviet censors or editors and called " lapses " in the editorial lingo, are turning up not for the first, and, it is to be hoped, not for the last time. Some 10 years ago, the mathematician Yuri Gastev published a mischievous book about mathematical logic. In the preface, he expressed gratitude to Doctors Cheyne and Stokes for their assistance in the work on the book. Neither Cheyne nor Stokes had anything to do with mathematics or logic. They were physicians after whom a respiratory phenomenon sometimes occurring at death and known as Cheyne-Stokes respiration is named. This condition preceded Stalin's death, a circumstance that Gastev was hinting at. But he did not stop at that: in the bibliography of his book, he interspersed works by at least a dozen Soviet dissidents, the majority of which also have nothing to do with the subject of his book.

About the same time that Gastev's book was published, the censors at the journal *Avrora* committed a similar blunder. A positive mention of Sakharov crept into one of the articles in the journal, and, as usual in such cases, the chief editor was the one to suffer the consequences most.

IT must be said, however, that Glavlit is only one of the many agencies carrying out censorship—and that only in the final stages before a book, film or play is made available to the public. It is well known that the first censor of a work is its author himself. At the next stage, a work comes into the hands of reviewers, and then it may be passed on to be edited by

various persons (junior editors, editors, senior editors and chief editors). The job of these persons is to do what is necessary to see that the work finally meets certain ideological and artistic requirements, even though the two kinds of requirements are almost without exception mutually contradictory.

The duties of the first person to edit a manuscript which is to be published are roughly as follows:

1. to make the work more or less readable—i.e. if necessary, to improve the plot and the style; correct the language and the grammar (among recognized Soviet writers there is a high percentage of people who are basically illiterate); and, in some cases, even to rewrite the manuscript from beginning to end;
2. to make sure that the manuscript conforms to the basic canons of Socialist Realism, which means that it must have a positive hero, that the (from the communist point of view) good must defeat the (from the communist point of view) evil, and that the general thrust and tone of the work must be optimistic;
3. to eliminate not only any criticism of the Soviet system but even any implication of such criticism, ensuring that Soviet life is consistently portrayed in a rosy light and life in capitalist societies in a gloomy light.

The last requirement is enforced even more strictly than the first. This is why travel articles by persons who have been abroad are, if they fail to give sufficient attention to unemployment, crime, inflation and the like, usually subjected to withering criticism. The editor, furthermore, shares the censor's responsibility for ensuring that no proscribed information—secrets or names or whatever—finds its way into print. Needless to say, if mention of the name of the author himself is on the list of what is prohibited, publication of his work—whatever its merit or importance—will not even be considered.

The editor is the first to be held responsible for any errors that turn up in a publication. In the majority of cases, whenever a book elicits displeasure on the part of the authorities, the author simply comes in for criticism either in the press or at some kind of (usually closed) meeting, but the editor comes in for much more: he may be officially reprimanded, and he may even be fired from his job.

The greatest sin an editor can commit is, of course, what is known as a "political error"—a formulation that can be applied to practically anything: presenting some objectionable (from the Party's standpoint) person or phenomenon in a favourable light; merely alluding to some particular place (Afghanistan) that the authorities are sensitive about; or simply praising or, conversely, insufficiently criticizing a certain trend in art or literature that is not to the liking of the establishment.

Sometimes a simple typographical mistake can become a "political error" and result in dire consequences. During and immediately after the Second World War, orders issued by the Supreme Commander (*Glavnokommanduyushchii*), Stalin, were published in all the newspapers. On

several occasions, it happened that the letter " l " in " *Glavno* " was dropped, leaving the word " *gavno* " (the Russian for " shit "). Under Stalin, such errors were regarded as equivalent to sabotage. I personally know of a case when the managing editor of *Bol'shevik Zaporozh'ya*, a regional newspaper in the Ukraine, committed suicide on discovering that this error had slipped by him. Lidia Korneevna Chukovskaya once told me about a newspaper editor who used to have constant nightmares during the war. He dreamed that in the latest edition of his newspaper the initials of Lenin and Stalin—V. I. and I. V.—had been reversed somehow and that the leaders' names appeared in print as I. V. Lenin and V. I. Stalin.

The fear of mistakes of this kind is so great in the USSR that the editors of large newspapers always assign a special duty officer (he is known as a " fresh mind ") to examine every page of an issue after it has already been checked by the regular editors and proofreaders and before it goes on the news-stands. As mentioned before, punishment for such mistakes was extremely harsh under Stalin, but even today it is quite severe. For example, the hero of my autobiographical story *The Ivankiad*, Sergei Ivanko, was working as a " fresh mind " for the newspaper *Literatura i zhizn'* during the period of Soviet friendship with China but was fired when the paper reported that " the US [instead of the USSR] and Chinese economies have achieved considerable growth."

Naturally, such errors occur most often in newspapers, which are printed under the pressure of daily or almost daily deadlines. As for magazines and books, the editors worry most about the inferences that may possibly be made from a given text—i.e. possible allusions wittingly tucked into the text by the author or possible associations in the text unwittingly overlooked by the author. It is for this reason that even German concentration camps are a subject that is almost always forbidden (only a limited number of books on the subject have been published by special permission), as the descriptions of life there could not but remind the readers of Soviet labour camps. It is for the same reason that Nazism and Fascism fall into the category of almost forbidden themes. In the 1960s, for example, the Party strongly objected to Mikhail Romm's film *Obyknovennyi fashizm* (Ordinary Fascism), for the art of the Third Reich portrayed in the film bore a striking resemblance to Soviet art. Soviet editors and their predicaments deserve to be dealt with in greater detail. Suffice it to say for now that their constant fears and lack of rights force them to look for inferences and veiled allusions even where none exist. One of the charges against film director Andrei Tarkovsky at one time, for example, was that the peasants in his film *Andrei Rublev* were dressed too poorly and reminded one of the Soviet *kolkhozniki*. But how else, it might be asked, should the peasants of fourteenth-century Russia have been dressed?

A rather silly children's film with the title *Vnimanie, cherepakha!* (Watch out, tortoise!) was produced in the USSR in 1968. The central episode in the film was that a tortoise, which was the mascot of pupils at a

Moscow school, escaped and found itself in the middle of a road on which a Soviet tank column happened to be approaching. Noticing the tortoise, the driver of the first tank stopped. The commanding officer (he was somewhere at the rear of the column) called the first tank by radio to ask what the trouble was. The conversation continued for some time, and then the commanding officer nobly ordered that the tanks be driven off the road in order to bypass the tortoise (instead of, say, having one of the tank crew jump out and remove the creature from the road). During the preliminary screening of the film, one of the editors, casting a sly glance at the film director and the script writers, said: " So you have a *cherepakha* (tortoise) in mind? *Che*?" " *Che*?" asked one of the script writers. " Well, the little ' *Che* ' and the big Soviet tank!" In other words, he was implying that what the authors of the film really had in mind was Czechoslovakia (*Chekhoslovakiya*), although the tanks in the film had bypassed the little " *Che*," while in real life, as is known, what happened was somewhat different.

Various instructions—both oral and written—prescribe that editors and censors not only watch out for underlying ideas and implications of an " ordinary " kind but also for those of an " uncontrollable " kind, which is to say whose effect may be unpredictable. Furthermore, they are instructed to struggle against so-called allusions—i.e. against the possibility that the reader will get ideas that are in no way related either to the text or the implications or underlying ideas in it. Asked what " allusions " are, a well-known Soviet film director replied as follows: " Well, for example, you're sitting in a cinema watching some kind of travelogue. You see some, let's say, Caucasian mountains, their peaks covered with snow; you look at the clouds, and at the same time the thought comes to mind: ' But all the same, Brezhnev's a swine.' "

Besides professional censors and editors, censorship is exercised by the most varied organizations, no matter how remote their primary function may be from literature and art. Thus, before publishing a book about geologists (even if it is a work of fiction), the editors send the manuscript to a government geological department; a book about border guards is sent to the KGB, while the Institute of Marxism–Leninism reviews books about revolutionaries. These institutions not only look for factual errors but also make critical remarks (often very crude ones) about the literary merits of the work in question, and the author must accept (or pretend to accept) the criticism.

It goes without saying that censorship is also exercised by the administrative organs of the Writers' Union; by Party organizations (from regional committees to the Central Committee of the CPSU); by city, raion, and oblast cultural departments; by ministries of culture and other organizations on the republican and all-Union levels; and, in certain instances, by such " distinguished personalities " as Heroes of Socialist Labour, cosmonauts, generals (I myself used to be " edited " by representatives of all three categories), etc.

But the principal censor in the Soviet Union—is fear. In undertaking a

new piece of writing, every Soviet writer remembers that the reward for his effort could be emoluments and honours, but maybe also the prohibition of part of what he is going to write or the whole of it or, for that matter, the prohibition of all his works, while he himself may be expelled from the Writers' Union and, in an extreme case, even end up in prison.

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Alfred Zauberman (1903–1984)

A Scholar and a Gentleman

ALFRED Zauberman was born in Lodz in 1903. At the age of 16 he was briefly conscripted to fight for the newly-reborn Poland against Russia. He then passed his student years in Cracow (1920–24, Doctor of Laws-in Economics—1928), in the period when Oskar Lange and Adam Krzyzanowski also distinguished that university. His later passion for Britain always seemed to rest on a solid foundation of love and regret for Cracow. He was heard to say, for instance, that when audiences shrink he will always lecture for two people but not for one, for such was the Cracow rule; and to brush off a student revolutionary with the remark that *his* university was known through Copernicus, and not through the many trivial brawls that have also marked its history.

Alfred demonstrated his linguistic gifts and his basic Polishness while still a second-lieutenant in the army (peacetime exercises on this occasion): a surfeit of alcohol inspired him to lecture in Latin to the peasants of the village where he was stationed. His other foreign languages included Russian, English, French and German; and it is testimony to the solidity of his East European roots that his presumably rusty Russian remained as clear as his much-used English. He had a remarkable tolerance and respect for Russians, and was always willing to see the best in them.

His first career was as a lawyer. He was admitted to the Bar as a barrister in Warsaw, but even at that time he was, along with his compatriot, Stanislaw Swianiewicz, one of the very first Sovietological economists. His first publication was *Russian Currency 1914–24* (Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, 1928). This was followed by *Inheritance*, published by the Bar of Warsaw. For five years he lectured in commercial law to junior members of the Bar. He was legal advisor to leading textile industrial companies. The Nazi invasion left him in Lithuania, from whence he emerged with a Japanese visa. He got to Tokyo on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and spent the remainder of that war, from 1942, in the Polish forces based in Britain; in 1945 he opted to stay. Though always taking up a position at a slight angle to it, he became very British; he was naturalized in 1958.

These adventurous but entirely normal beginnings were followed by a "decline" into stability and distinction. He taught economics in the Polish faculty at Oxford, and then at the Polish University College in London. During this time he was also a graduate student at the LSE, but his obvious devotion to the School began earlier, as its reputation has

always stood extremely high in Eastern Europe. To be a member of the School had in fact been his life-long ambition.

In 1948 he married Evelyn Jones, whose attachment to the School was second only to his. Their London home has been a centre of happiness, civilization and hospitality to many.

IN 1948–49 he broke into the British economic scene with an article on Soviet economic thought in the *Review of Economic Studies*. This subject was at that time *terra incognitissima* to the British native economists. Indeed it was possibly the very first application of specialized Western analysis—as opposed to mere description—in a British journal. By this time he was working on the East European economies for the BBC Overseas Service.

He began lecturing part-time on Soviet economics at the LSE in 1960, and went over to full-time in 1963, becoming Reader in 1967. This was an Indian summer indeed, since precisely now did ordinary verbal analysis begin to seem banal to him, and he learned yet another "foreign" language: matrix algebra. Thus was founded in the School the study of *planometrics*, now accepted as an honourable part of the MSc syllabus. Only Birmingham stands as a rival.

Planometrics is the use of mathematical models and computers by Soviet-type and French planners. It foreshadows the possibility of a detailed but rational control of the whole economy from one centre. The distance between aspiration and reality is still extremely great, and it must be allowed that Alfred's own vision was rather optimistic and foreshortened here. He was in fact *anima naturaliter mathematica*, being noted for this gift in his youth; and no doubt he owed to this capacity his characteristic equanimity towards actual real events, which must have been a necessary quality in so exciting a career as he previously pursued.

Be that as it may, he developed this subject single-handed: syllabus, lectures, and substantial books of his own. How many can claim so great a personal achievement in innovation so shortly before retirement? Regrettably, this event took place in 1970, but he continued to lecture in the School and as a visiting professor abroad, and to attend the seminar on communist economics until the end (17 April 1984).

What Alfred's friends remember most about him is not just his eccentricities, his learning or his wit, but first and foremost his goodness. He did good to other people, and he made one feel a better person. He was a very private man, but deep feelings were finely hinted at in him. At such moments his dignity, considerateness and care for others shone through.

Peter Wiles

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ALEKSA DJILAS was born in Belgrade in 1953. He has an MSc in Politics and Sociology from London University (where he is now preparing a PhD thesis). He writes and lectures on Yugoslav affairs and was guest lecturer at the University of Cologne during 1984. He co-edited *Anthology of Human Rights* and a collection of essays, *Democratic Reforms* (both published in Serbo-Croat).

MILOVAN DJILAS was a member of the Yugoslav Politburo between 1938–54. He was Vice-President of Yugoslavia when he resigned from the Communist Party in 1954. He subsequently spent nine years in prison. He was re-arrested in April 1984 along with 27 other intellectuals at a meeting in Belgrade, but was subsequently released. He is the author of *The New Class*, *Conversations with Stalin*, *Wartime* and other books.

OSKAR GRUENWALD is the Director of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Los Angeles, California. He is the author of *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia* (1983), and co-editor and contributor of *Human Rights in Yugoslavia*, a symposium to be published in 1984. He is the author of many articles and essays which have appeared in journals and books.

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DORA STURMAN was born in 1923 in the USSR. She was imprisoned in 1944 as a result of her university research on the poetry of Pasternak, Mayakovsky and Batritsky. She worked as a school-teacher whilst continuing her illegal research on the Soviet system. In 1977 she emigrated to Israel where she now works as a researcher at the Centre for Soviet and East European Studies of the Jewish University in Jerusalem. She has since published three books and over 80 articles, which have appeared in Russian, Hebrew, English and German.

DESIMIR TOCHITCH is joint editor of *Review*, published by the Study Centre for Yugoslav Affairs in London, and the Editor of *Nasa rec* (Our Word), a monthly magazine which publishes work by Yugoslav dissidents. After the war he was engaged in research work in Paris in *Le Centre International des Syndicalistes Exiles* and in *La Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.* He has written on human rights, self-management, collectivization and national problems in Yugoslavia. His books include *Totalitarisme et Droits de l'Homme*, Paris, 1948.

VLADIMIR VOINOVICH came into literary prominence with the publication of a comic novel about Soviet life during the Second World War, *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin* (1970). In 1975 he wrote an open letter to Yuri Andropov (then head of the KGB) in which he complained that KGB agents had tried to poison him. Subsequently he published abroad *The Ivankiad*, a book which tells the story of his struggle with Soviet bureaucracy to protect his flat in the Moscow writer's cooperative from annexation by KGB officials who wanted the extra space. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1982 and now lives in Germany.

ROBERT WESSON is a Senior Research Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Senior Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara. He received his PhD in Soviet Studies from Columbia University. He has written or edited 24 books, including *Lenin's Legacy*, *The Ageing of Communism*, *Why Marxism?*, *Communism and the Communist Systems* and *The Russian Dilemma*.

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

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